CHAPTER I

A BEGINNER’S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

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Illustration: IMMANUEL KANT

(The Puttrich’sche Portrait of Kant was printed in the

_Kant-Studien_ in 1906 and is said by Professor Vaihinger to

be one of the best likenesses of the Königsberg philosopher.

The name of the artist was Puttrich, and the original painting

goes back before 1798. It is interesting to note that this

portrait of Kant was used by the sculptor, Rauch, as his model

for the statue of Kant upon the memorial monument of Frederick

the Great.)

A BEGINNER’S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

HERBERT ERNEST CUSHMAN, LL.D., PH.D.

_Sometime Professor of Philosophy in Tufts College

Lecturer of Philosophy in Harvard College

Lecturer of Philosophy in Dartmouth College_

VOL. II

MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Illustration: (‡ Colophon)

BOSTON NEW YORK CHICAGO

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY

The Riverside Press Cambridge

COPYRIGHT, 1911, BY HERBERT ERNEST CUSHMAN

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

PREFACE

The pedagogical purpose of this history of philosophy is stated in

the Preface to the first volume. It may be desirable in this place to

restate what that purpose is.

This book is intended as a text-book for sketch-courses in the history

of philosophy. It is written for the student rather than for the

teacher. It is a history of philosophy upon the background of geography

and of literary and political history. Since the book is intended for

the student, it makes the teacher all the more necessary; for it puts

into the hands of the student an outline of the history of philosophy

and into the hands of the teacher the class-room time for inspiring

the student with his own interpretations. In making use of geographical

maps, contemporary literature, and political history, this book is

merely employing for pedagogical reasons the stock of information

with which the student is furnished, when he begins the history of

philosophy. The summaries, tables, and other generalizations are

employed, as in text-books in other subjects, as helps to the memory.

Therefore the book has the single purpose of arranging and organizing

the material of the history of philosophy for the beginner.

The student will be impressed with the short time-length of the modern

period compared with the tremendously long stretches of the periods

of antiquity. The modern period is only four hundred and fifty years

in length, if we take the date 1453 as its beginning. Compared to the

twenty-two hundred years of ancient and mediæval life, the period of

modern life seems very short. Furthermore the student who has followed

the philosophy of antiquity must have observed how often philosophy

arose out of ethnic situations in which whole civilizations were

involved. He will find that modern philosophy in this respect stands in

contrast with the philosophy of ancient times. With the decentralizing

of modern Europe, philosophy has also become decentralized. This

does not mean that philosophical movements have included fewer people

in their sweep, but that the movements have had shorter life, the

transitions have been quicker, and the epochs have been briefer.

Modern civilization is subjective; and its philosophy is thereby more

technical, and more difficult to understand and to interpret than the

philosophy of antiquity.

There are many helpful books in English on the history of modern

philosophy, and the student should have them at hand. I call attention

especially to Rand, _Modern Classical Philosophers_, for its judicious

selection from the original sources; to Royce, _Spirit of Modern

Philosophy_, chapters iii to x; to Eucken, _The Problem of Human

Life_, pp. 303 to 518; and to the Summaries in Windelband, _History

of Philosophy_, Parts IV to VII. Besides these there are valuable

histories of modern philosophy by Falckenberg, Höffding (2 vols.),

Weber, Ueberweg (vol. ii), Calkins, Dewing, and Rogers.

To friends who have read parts of the manuscript, I desire to

acknowledge my indebtedness for many wise criticisms and suggestions;

especially to Professor W. A. Neilson, Professor R. B. Perry, Dr. B.

A. G. Fuller, and Dr. J. H. Woods of Harvard University; to Professor

Mary W. Calkins of Wellesley College; to Professor W. P. Montague of

Columbia University; and to Professor S. P. Capen of Clark College.

TUFTS COLLEGE, December, 1910.

CONTENTS

VOLUME II. MODERN PHILOSOPHY

(1453 TO THE PRESENT TIME)

CHAPTER I. THE CHARACTERISTICS AND DIVISIONS OF THE MODERN

PERIOD 1

THE DIFFICULTY IN THE STUDY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY 1

THE PERIODS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY 2

THE CAUSES OF THE DECAY OF THE CIVILIZATION OF THE MIDDLE

AGES 4

(a) _The Internal Causes_ 4

(1) The Intellectual Methods were Self-Destructive 4

(2) The Standard of Truth became a Double Standard 5

(3) The Development of Mysticism 5

(4) The Doctrine of Nominalism 5

(b) _The External Causes_ 6

CHAPTER II. THE RENAISSANCE (1453–1690) 8

THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE RENAISSANCE 8

(a) _The New Man of the Renaissance_ 8

(b) _The New Universe of the Renaissance_ 9

(1) The Transformation of the Physical Universe 9

(2) The Restoration of the World of Antiquity 10

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RENAISSANCE IN HISTORY 11

MAP SHOWING THE DECENTRALIZATION OF EUROPE 13

THE TWO PERIODS OF THE RENAISSANCE: THE HUMANISTIC

(1453–1600); THE NATURAL SCIENCE (1600–1690) 15

(a) _The Similarities of the Two Periods_ 16

(b) _The Differences of the Two Periods_ 16

(1) The Countries which participate in the

Renaissance differ in the Two Periods 16

(2) The Intellectual Standards differ in the Two

Periods 17

(3) The Scientific Methods in the Two Periods were

Different 18

(4) The Attitude of the Church toward Science differs

in the Two Periods 19

A BRIEF CONTRAST OF THE TWO PERIODS――A SUMMARY OF THE

DISCUSSION ABOVE 21

CHAPTER III. THE HUMANISTIC PERIOD OF THE RENAISSANCE

(1453–1600) 22

THE LONG LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HUMANISTIC PERIOD 22

NICOLAS OF CUSA (1401–1464) 24

PARACELSUS (1493–1541) 25

GIORDANO BRUNO (1548–1600) 27

MAP SHOWING THE BIRTHPLACES OF THE CHIEF PHILOSOPHERS OF

THE RENAISSANCE 30

CHAPTER IV. THE NATURAL SCIENCE PERIOD OF THE RENAISSANCE

(1600–1690) 31

THE PHILOSOPHERS OF THE NATURAL SCIENCE PERIOD 31

THE MATHEMATICAL ASTRONOMERS 32

GALILEO GALILEI (1564–1641) 36

THE LIFE OF FRANCIS BACON, BARON VERULAM (1561–1626) 39

THE POSITION OF BACON IN PHILOSOPHY 39

THE AIM OF BACON 42

THE METHOD OF BACON 43

(a) _Bacon’s Criticism of the Past_ 44

(b) _Bacon’s Positive Construction_ 45

THE ENGLISH NATURAL SCIENCE MOVEMENT 46

THOMAS HOBBES AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES 47

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF HOBBES (1588–1679) 49

1. As a Classical Scholar (1588–1628) 49

2. As Mathematician (1628–1638) 49

3. As Philosopher (1638–1651) 50

4. As Controversialist (1651–1668) 50

5. As Classical Scholar (1668–1679) 50

THE INFLUENCES UPON THE THOUGHT OF HOBBES 50

1. His Premature Birth 50

2. His Father 51

3. The New Mathematical Science 52

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IN THE TEACHING OF HOBBES 52

THE METHOD OF HOBBES 54

THE KINDS OF BODIES 55

HOBBES’S APPLICATION OF THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY TO

PSYCHOLOGY 56

HOBBES’S APPLICATION OF THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY TO

POLITICS 58

THE RENAISSANCE IN ENGLAND AFTER HOBBES 61

CHAPTER V. THE RATIONALISM OF THE NATURAL SCIENCE PERIOD

OF THE RENAISSANCE 62

THE NATURE OF RATIONALISM 62

THE MENTAL CONFLICT IN DESCARTES 65

THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES

(1596–1650) 66

1. As Child and Student (1596–1613) 66

2. As Traveler (1613–1628) 66

3. As Writer (1629–1650) 67

4. In Stockholm (1649–1650) 67

THE TWO CONFLICTING INFLUENCES UPON THE THOUGHT OF

DESCARTES 67

THE METHOD OF DESCARTES 69

INDUCTION――PROVISIONAL DOUBT――THE ULTIMATE CERTAINTY OF

CONSCIOUSNESS 70

DEDUCTION――THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 72

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 73

THE REALITY OF MATTER 75

GOD AND THE WORLD 77

THE RELATION OF GOD TO MATTER 77

THE RELATION OF GOD TO MINDS 78

THE RELATION OF MIND AND BODY 78

THE INFLUENCE OF DESCARTES 80

THE RELATION OF THE OCCASIONALISTS AND SPINOZA TO

DESCARTES 81

PORTRAIT OF SPINOZA 84

THE HISTORICAL PLACE OF SPINOZA 84

THE INFLUENCES UPON SPINOZA 86

1. His Jewish Training 86

2. His Impulse from the New Science――Descartes’

Influence 86

3. His Acquaintance with the Collegiants 87

THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF SPINOZA

(1632–1677) 88

1. In Israel (1632–1656) 89

2. In Retirement (1656–1663) 89

3. In the Public Eye (1663–1677) 90

THE METHOD OF SPINOZA 90

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF SPINOZA’S PHILOSOPHY 91

THREE CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SPINOZA’S TEACHING 93

THE PANTHEISM OF SPINOZA――THE ALL-INCLUSIVENESS OF GOD 94

THE MYSTICISM OF SPINOZA 98

SPINOZA’S DOCTRINE OF SALVATION 102

SUMMARY OF SPINOZA’S TEACHING 106

LEIBNITZ AS THE FINISHER OF THE RENAISSANCE AND THE

FORERUNNER OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 107

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF LEIBNITZ (1646–1716) 108

1. Leipsic and University Life (1646–1666) 111

2. Mainz and Diplomacy (1666–1672) 111

3. Paris and Science (1672–1676) 111

4. Hanover and Philosophy (1676–1716) 112

THE THREE INFLUENCES UPON THE THOUGHT OF LEIBNITZ 112

(1) His Early Classical Studies 112

(2) The New Science and his own Discoveries 113

(3) Political Pressure for Religious Reconciliation 114

THE METHOD OF LEIBNITZ 115

THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM FOR LEIBNITZ 118

THE RESULT OF LEIBNITZ’S EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLES

OF SCIENCE――A PLURALITY OF METAPHYSICAL SUBSTANCES 119

1. Leibnitz first scrutinized the Scientific

Conception of Motion 119

2. Leibnitz next examined the Scientific Conception of

the Atom 120

3. Leibnitz then identified Force with the Metaphysical

Atom 121

THE DOUBLE NATURE OF THE MONADS 122

THE TWO FORMS OF LEIBNITZ’S CONCEPTION OF THE UNITY OF

SUBSTANCES 125

THE INTRINSIC UNITY OF THE MONADS――THE PHILOSOPHICAL

UNITY 125

THE SUPERIMPOSED UNITY OF THE MONADS――THE THEOLOGICAL

UNITY 129

CHAPTER VI. THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1690–1781) 132

THE EMERGENCE OF THE “NEW MAN”――INDIVIDUALISM 132

THE PRACTICAL PRESUPPOSITION OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT――THE

INDEPENDENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 134

THE METAPHYSICAL PRESUPPOSITION OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 135

THE PROBLEMS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 135

(a) _Utilitarian Problems_ 136

(b) _Questions of Criticism_ 138

A COMPARISON OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN ENGLAND, FRANCE,

AND GERMANY 140

THE MANY GROUPS OF PHILOSOPHERS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 140

MAP SHOWING THE BIRTHPLACES OF SOME OF THE INFLUENTIAL

THINKERS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 144

CHAPTER VII. JOHN LOCKE 145

THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN 145

JOHN LOCKE, LIFE AND WRITINGS (1632–1704) 147

1. Student Life (1632–1666) 147

2. As Politician (1666–1683) 148

3. As Philosophical Author (1683–1691) 149

4. As Controversialist (1691–1704) 149

THE SOURCES OF LOCKE’S THOUGHT 150

1. His Puritan Ancestry 150

2. His Training in Tolerance 150

3. The Scientific Influence 151

4. The Political Influence 152

SUMMARY 153

THE PURPOSE OF LOCKE 153

TWO SIDES OF LOCKE’S PHILOSOPHY 155

(a) _The Negative Side――Locke and Scholasticism_ 156

(b) _The Positive Side――The New Psychology and

Epistemology_ 157

LOCKE’S PSYCHOLOGY 158

LOCKE’S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 160

LOCKE’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 162

THE INFLUENCE OF LOCKE 163

THE ENGLISH DEISTS 164

THE ENGLISH MORALISTS 166

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF THE ENGLISH MORALISTS 168

CHAPTER VIII. BERKELEY AND HUME 169

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF GEORGE BERKELEY (1685–1753) 169

1. His Early Training (1685–1707) 169

2. As Author (1707–1721) 170

3. As Priest and Missionary (1721–1753) 171

THE INFLUENCES UPON THE THOUGHT OF BERKELEY 172

THE PURPOSE OF BERKELEY 173

BERKELEY’S GENERAL RELATION TO LOCKE AND HUME 174

BERKELEY’S POINTS OF AGREEMENT WITH LOCKE 175

THE NEGATIVE SIDE OF BERKELEY’S PHILOSOPHY 176

1. As shown in General in his Analysis of Abstract

Ideas 177

2. As shown in Particular in his Analysis of Matter 177

THE POSITIVE SIDE OF BERKELEY’S PHILOSOPHY 179

1. Esse est Percipi 179

2. The Existence of Mind is assumed by Berkeley 180

3. Spiritual Substances are Sufficient to explain all

Ideas 181

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF DAVID HUME (1711–1776) 183

1. Period of Training (1711–1734) 184

2. Period of Philosopher (1734–1752) 185

3. Period of Politician (1752–1776) 185

INFLUENCES UPON THE THOUGHT OF HUME 186

DOGMATISM, PHENOMENALISM, AND SKEPTICISM 187

THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS 189

THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS 191

THE ASSOCIATION OF CONTIGUITY 193

THE ASSOCIATION OF RESEMBLANCE 194

1. Mathematics 194

2. The Conception of Substance: Hume’s Attack on

Theology 195

THE ASSOCIATION OF CAUSATION: HUME’S ATTACK ON SCIENCE 196

THE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 199

HUME’S THEORY OF RELIGION AND ETHICS 200

THE SCOTTISH SCHOOL 201

CHAPTER IX. THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 203

THE SITUATION IN FRANCE IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT 203

THE ENGLISH INFLUENCE IN FRANCE 206

THE TWO PERIODS OF THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT 207

THE INTELLECTUAL ENLIGHTENMENT (1729–1762)――VOLTAIRE,

MONTESQUIEU, AND THE ENCYCLOPÆDISTS 208

VOLTAIRE (1694–1778) 209

THE ENCYCLOPÆDISTS 211

THE SOCIAL ENLIGHTENMENT (1762–1789) 213

ROUSSEAU (1712–1778) 213

THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT (1740–1781) 216

THE INTRODUCTORY PERIOD (1648–1740). ABSOLUTISM 217

1. The Rise of Prussia 218

2. The Early German Literature 219

3. The Pietistic Movement 219

4. The Transformation of Leibnitz’s Rationalism 220

SUMMARY OF THE LITERARY ENLIGHTENMENT OF GERMANY

(1740–1781) 223

THE POLITICAL ENLIGHTENMENT OF GERMANY――FREDERICK THE

GREAT 224

THE COURSE OF THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT 226

LESSING 228

CHAPTER X. KANT 230

THE CONVERGENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES IN GERMANY 230

THE THREE CHARACTERISTICS OF GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 231

THE TWO PERIODS OF GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 232

THE INFLUENCES UPON KANT 233

1. Pietism 233

2. The Leibnitz-Wolffian Philosophy 233

3. The Physics of Newton 234

4. The Humanitarianism of Rousseau 234

5. The Skepticism of Hume 235

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF KANT (1724–1804) 235

THE PROBLEM OF KANT 238

THE METHOD OF KANT 239

THE THREEFOLD WORLD OF KANT――SUBJECTIVE STATES,

THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES, AND PHENOMENA 240

THE WORLD OF KNOWLEDGE 243

THE PLACE OF SYNTHESIS IN KNOWLEDGE 245

THE JUDGMENTS INDISPENSABLE TO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 248

THE PROOF OF THE VALIDITY OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 252

1. In what does the Validity of Sense-♦Perception

consist? 253

2. In what does the Validity of the Understanding

consist? 255

HAS THE REASON BY ITSELF ANY VALIDITY? 260

THE IDEA OF THE SOUL 262

THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSE 264

THE IDEA OF GOD 265

CONCLUSION 268

THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON: THE

ETHICS OF KANT 269

THE MORAL LAW AND THE TWO QUESTIONS CONCERNING IT 271

1. The First Question concerning the Moral Law 272

2. The Second Question concerning the Moral Law 273

THE MORAL POSTULATES 275

1. The Postulate of Freedom 276

2. The Postulate of the Immortality of the Soul 276

3. The Postulate of the Existence of God 276

CHAPTER XI. THE GERMAN IDEALISTS 278

IDEALISM AFTER KANT 278

FICHTE, SCHELLING, AND HEGEL 279

MAP SHOWING THE UNIVERSITY TOWNS AND OTHER IMPORTANT

PLACES CONNECTED WITH THE GERMAN IDEALISTS 280

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FICHTE (1762–1814) 282

1. His Education (1762–1790) 283

2. Discipleship of Kant (1790–1794) 283

3. His Life at Jena (1794–1799) 284

4. His Life at Berlin (1799–1814) 284

THE INFLUENCES UPON FICHTE’S TEACHING 285

WHY WE PHILOSOPHIZE 286

THE MORAL AWAKENING 287

THE CENTRAL PRINCIPLE IN FICHTE’S PHILOSOPHY 288

THE MORAL WORLD 290

GOD AND MAN 292

WHAT A MORAL REALITY INVOLVES 293

1. It involves the Consciousness of Something Else 293

2. It involves a Contradiction 294

ROMANTICISM 295

GOETHE AS A ROMANTICIST 297

ROMANTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY 299

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF SCHELLING (1775–1854) 300

1. Earlier Period (1775–1797) 302

2. The Philosophy of Nature (1797–1800) 302

3. The Transcendental Philosophy (1800–1801) 302

4. The Philosophy of Identity (1801–1804) 303

5. The Philosophy of Freedom and God (1804–1809) 303

6. The Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation

(1809–1854) 303

A BRIEF COMPARISON OF FICHTE AND SCHELLING AS

PHILOSOPHERS 303

SCHELLING’S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE 305

SCHELLING’S TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY 307

THE SYSTEM OF IDENTITY 310

SCHELLING’S RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY 311

HEGEL AND THE CULMINATION OF IDEALISM 312

WHY HEGEL REMAINS TO-DAY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF KANT 314

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF HEGEL (1770–1831) 315

1. Formative Period (1770–1796) 317

2. Formulation of his Philosophy (1796–1806) 317

3. Development of his Philosophy (1806–1831) 317

REALISM, MYSTICISM, AND IDEALISM 318

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF HEGEL’S IDEALISM 321

THE COSMIC UNITY 322

THE COSMIC LAW 326

HEGEL’S APPLICATION OF HIS THEORY 328

CHAPTER XII. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE THING-IN-ITSELF 330

HERBART AND SCHOPENHAUER 330

JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART 332

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF HERBART (1776–1841) 333

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF EXPERIENCE 334

THE ARGUMENT FOR REALISM 334

THE MANY REALS AND NATURE PHENOMENA 337

THE SOUL AND MENTAL PHENOMENA 338

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER AND HIS PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS 340

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF SCHOPENHAUER (1788–1860) 342

1. Period of Education (1788–1813) 343

2. Period of Literary Production (1813–1831) 343

3. Period of Retirement (1831–1860) 343

THE INFLUENCES UPON SCHOPENHAUER’S THOUGHT 343

THE WORLD AS WILL AND THE WORLD AS IDEA 345

THE WILL AS IRRATIONAL REALITY 347

THE MISERY OF THE WORLD AS IDEA――PESSIMISM 348

THE WAY OF DELIVERANCE 349

CHAPTER XIII. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 352

THE RETURN TO REALISM 352

THE CHARACTER OF THE REALISM OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 353

MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND GERMAN IDEALISM 355

THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 356

1. The Problem of the Functioning of the Soul 357

2. The Problem of the Conception of History 360

INDEX 365

ILLUSTRATIONS

IMMANUEL KANT _Frontispiece_

MAP SHOWING THE DECENTRALIZATION OF EUROPE 13

MAP SHOWING THE BIRTHPLACES OF THE CHIEF PHILOSOPHERS OF

THE RENAISSANCE 30

BARUCH DE SPINOZA 84

MAP SHOWING THE BIRTHPLACES OF SOME OF THE INFLUENTIAL

THINKERS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 144

MAP SHOWING THE UNIVERSITY TOWNS AND OTHER IMPORTANT

PLACES CONNECTED WITH THE GERMAN IDEALISTS 280

A BEGINNER’S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME II

MODERN PHILOSOPHY (1453 TO THE PRESENT TIME)

CHAPTER I

THE CHARACTERISTICS AND DIVISIONS OF THE MODERN PERIOD

=The Difficulty in the Study of Modern Philosophy.= Beside the great

spans of ancient and mediæval civilizations, the 450 years of the

modern period seem brief. The road is indeed relatively short from

mediæval times to the century in which we live, and yet it proves

difficult to the student who travels it for the first time. Even for

the modern mind the study of modern philosophy is inherently more

difficult than that of the ancient and mediæval. The preceding periods

present new points of view, but these, once attained, lead along

comparatively easy ways. The chief difficulty of the preceding periods

is overcome when their peculiar view of things is gained; but the

student of modern philosophy is confronted with difficulties all along

the way. In the first place, modern philosophy is very complex because

it is a conflict of various aspirations. It has neither the objectivity

of ancient thought nor the logical consistency of mediæval thought.

It arises from subjective motives, whose shadings are difficult to

trace. The task is rendered harder by the fact that intimations of the

problems in the history of modern philosophy are on the whole present

in the beginner’s mind; and yet at the same time his mind possesses,

besides these, many mediæval notions as well. For the student to pass

successfully through the entire length of modern thought from Cusanus

to Spencer means, therefore, two things for him: (1) he must gain an

insight into the depth and significance of his own half-formed ideas;

(2) he must transcend or give up entirely his mediæval notions. If

therefore philosophy represents the epoch that produces it,――either as

the central principle or as the marginal and ulterior development of

that epoch,――the modern can come to an understanding of the history of

modern philosophy only by coming to an understanding of himself and his

own inner reflections.

This will explain why the short period of modern thought is

traditionally divided into comparatively many periods. These

subordinate periods ring out the changes through which the modern man

feels that he himself has blindly passed in his inner life. Modern

philosophy is no more local and temporary than the ancient; it is no

less a part of a social movement; but the modern man is more alive to

the differentiations of modern thought than he is to those of antiquity.

=The Periods of Modern Philosophy.= The divisions of the history of

modern philosophy are as follows:――

1. The Renaissance (1453–1690)――from the end of the Middle

Ages to the publication of Locke’s _Essay on the Human

Understanding_.

2. The Enlightenment (1690–1781)――to the publication of Kant’s

_Critique of Pure Reason_.

3. German Philosophy (1781–1831)――to the death of Hegel.

4. The Nineteenth Century Philosophy (1820–the present time).

The Renaissance, the first period, covers more than half of the length

of modern times. It is sometimes called the springtime of modern

history, although it is longer than all the other seasons together.

It is to be noted that two epoch-making books form the dividing lines

between the first three periods. The transition from the Renaissance

to the Enlightenment is signalized by Locke’s great _Essay on the Human

Understanding_, which expressed for one hundred years the political

and philosophical opinions of western Europe. The transition from the

Enlightenment to German Philosophy was in its turn signalized by the

appearance of Kant’s _Critique of Pure Reason_, and this book may be

said to have been fundamental to human thinking ever since. There is

one point further to be noticed in these divisions, and that is the

overlapping of the last two periods. German philosophy ends practically

with the death of Hegel in 1831, and the modern Evolution movement

began at least ten years before, about 1820. No great philosophical

treatise marks the division here, for the Evolution movement had its

beginnings in German philosophy and in the discoveries and practical

inventions of natural science. Evolution, however, became a reaction

upon the last phases of German philosophy, and then formed a distinct

movement. The book that formulated the Evolution movement most fully

appeared several years after the theory was under way. This was

Darwin’s _Origin of Species_, published in 1859. Locke’s _Essay_ and

Kant’s _Critique_ are therefore the most influential philosophical

interpretations of the history of modern times since its early

beginnings in the Renaissance.

=The Causes of the Decay of the Civilization of the Middle Ages.= The

social structure of the mediæval time weakened and broke apart, in the

first place because of certain inherent defects in its organism; in

the second place because of some remarkable discoveries, inventions,

and historical changes. We may call these (1) _the internal causes_ and

(2) _the external causes_ of the fall of the civilization of the Middle

Ages.

(a) _The Internal Causes_ were inherent weaknesses in mediæval

intellectual life, and alone would have been sufficient to bring

mediæval society to an end.

(1) _The intellectual methods_ of the Middle Ages were self-destructive

methods. We may take scholasticism as the best expression of the

intellectual life of the Middle Ages, and scholasticism even in its

ripest period used the _method of deductive logic_. Scholasticism did

not employ induction from observation and experiment, but proceeded on

the principle that the more universal logically a conception is, the

more real it is. (See vol. i, p. 355.) On this principle scholasticism

set as its only task to penetrate and clarify dogma. Its theism was

a _logical_ theism. Even Thomas Aquinas, the great classic schoolman,

used formal logic (dialectics) as the method of obtaining the truth.

After him in the latter part of the Middle Ages, logic instead of being

a method became an end. It was studied for its own sake. This naturally

degenerated into word-splitting and quibbling, into the commenting

upon the texts of this master and that, into arid verbal discussions.

The religious orders frittered away their time on verbal questions of

trifling importance. The lifetime of such intellectual employment is

always a limited one.

(2) _The standard of the truth_ of things in the Middle Ages became

a double standard, and was therefore self-destructive. Ostensibly

there was only one standard,――infallible dogma. Really there were two

standards,――reason and dogma. The employment of logical methods implied

the human reason as a valid standard. Logic is the method of human

reasoning. To use logic to clarify dogma, to employ the philosophy

of Aristotle to supplement the Bible, to defend faith by argument,

amounted in effect to supporting revelation by reason. It was the same

as defending the infallible and revealed by the fallible and secular.

It was the erecting of a double standard. It called the infallible into

question. It was the offering of excuses for what is supposedly beyond

suspicion. The scholastic made faith the object of thought, and thereby

encouraged the spirit of free inquiry.

(3) _The development of Mysticism_ in the Middle Ages was a powerful

factor that led to its dissolution. There is, of course, an element

of mysticism in the doctrine of the church from St. Augustine

onwards, and in the Early Period of the Middle Ages mysticism had

no independence. But mysticism is essentially the direct communion

with God on the part of the individual. The intermediary offices of

the church are contradictory to the spirit of mysticism. It is not

surprising, therefore, to find in the last period of scholasticism

numerous independent mystics as representatives of the tendency of

individualistic religion, which was to result in the Protestantism of

the Renaissance.

(4) _The doctrine of Nominalism_ was the fourth important element to be

mentioned that led to the dissolution of the civilization of the Middle

Ages. This was easily suppressed by the church authorities in the early

mediæval centuries, when it was a purely logical doctrine and had no

empirical scientific basis. In the later years, however, nominalism

gained great strength with the acquisition of knowledge of the nature

world. Nominalism turned man’s attention away from the affairs of

the spirit. It incited him to modify the realism of dogma. It pointed

out the importance of practical experience. It emphasized individual

opinion, neglected tradition, and placed its hope in the possibilities

of science rather than in the spiritual actualities of religion.

(b) _The External Causes_ consisted of certain important events that

brought the Middle Ages to a close and introduced the Renaissance.

These events caused great social changes by demolishing the

geographical and astronomical conceptions of mediæval time which had

become a part of church tradition.

First to be mentioned are the inventions which belong to the Middle

Ages, but which came into common use not before the beginning of the

Renaissance. These played an important part in the total change of

the society which followed. They were the magnetic needle, gunpowder,

which was influential in destroying the feudal system, and printing,

which would have failed in its effect had not at the same time

the manufacture of paper been improved. Moreover at the end of the

fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century occurred the

following events:――

1453. Constantinople fell and its Greek scholars migrated to Italy.

1492. Columbus discovered America, an achievement which was made

possible by the use of the magnetic needle.

1498. Vasco da Gama discovered the all-sea route to India and thereby

changed the course of the world’s commerce.

1518. The Protestant Reformation was begun by Luther.

1530. Copernicus wrote his _De revolutionibus orbium_, in which he

maintained that the earth moved around the sun.

A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Modern Philosophy · 第 1 / 13 章