Every book about the fighting scholar, every moderately competent

article about him must invite new immigrants into Borrow's kingdom.

But Mr. Shorter is not an introductory critic, not one who by his own

skill and charm summons strangers to make the acquaintance of a great

man. He is an inept critic who thrives by attaching his name to great

reputations. Fancy a man of any trifling literary experience, with the

least enthusiasm for literature, writing about style in a style like

this: "Borrow, in common with many other great English authors whose

work will live, was not uniformly a good stylist. He has many

lamentable fallings away from the ideals of the stylist. But he will,

by virtue of a wonderful individuality, outlive many a good stylist."

It is a sin so to "style" in a chapter about Edward FitzGerald, who at

the sound of such sentences would have clapped his hands to his ears.

Borrow describes himself in that pugnacious defence of Lavengro which

forms the appendix to "The Romany Rye." "Though he may become

religious, it is hardly to be expected that he will become a very

precise and straitlaced person; it is probable that he will retain,

with his scholarship, something of his gypsyism, his predilection for

the hammer and tongs, and perhaps some inclination to put on certain

gloves, not white kid, with any friend who may be inclined for a

little old English diversion, and a readiness to take a glass of ale,

with plenty of malt in it, and as little hop as may well be--ale at

least two years old--with the aforesaid friend--when the diversion is

over."

Is not that an irresistible man? Shouldn't you think that there would

have been among his contemporaries two or three hundred thousand good

sports, rooters, heelers, literary and non-literary bookmakers who

would bet on him and back him in any enterprise in which his

adventurous spirit elected to engage? Yet it was not so. He enjoyed

only a short period of popularity after the publication of "The Bible

in Spain." When he died at a ripe old age in 1881, he was not well

known. During his life the only highly distinguished man of letters

who knew and appreciated him was FitzGerald, the exquisite poet and

critic--FitzGerald, whose literary habits were as distant as possible

from Borrow's, whose fine-edged rapier seems utterly alien to Borrow's

short arm jab or his overhand wallop. FitzGerald had a curious

accuracy in spotting what was worth while in his time and in dodging

certain celebrated things that other people thought worth while, and

there is nothing inconsistent in his knowing that Borrow wrote good

English. But looking over Borrow's shoulder at his contemporaries, and

remembering Borrow's ungainly verses, one is amused to find that the

only real literary man facing one with a wink in his eye is

FitzGerald. The others have their backs turned.

Consider also Borrow's posthumous fame. His first biographer is Dr.

Knapp, an American professor of philology. And the modern critics who

praise him are not open-air men, but bookish, library men, whose names

do not suggest the robustly adventurous, Lionel Johnson, Mr.

Watts-Dunton, Mr. Birrell, Mr. Seccombe.

Most literary critics praise him in terms laudatory enough to atone

for the sins of their professional predecessors, whom Borrow held up

to "show the creatures wriggling, blood and foam streaming from their

broken jaws." His four important books are published in Everyman's

Library; Mr. Birrell says that "we are all Borrovians now"; within

twenty years have appeared three biographical studies, besides Mr.

Shorter's. Yet Dr. Knapp's fundamental biography which was published

in 1898 is out of print; that mysterious and reprehensible entity

known as the public has not demanded a new edition. It is all

consistent with the Borrovian inconsistency. Borrow was proud of being

a gentleman and a scholar, and he was both in all true senses of the

words; but he hated gentility and wrote a hammer-and-tongs chapter

against the genteel; no revolutionist despising the "bourgeois" ever

punched their smug faces with such violent verbal fisticuffs.

He boasts of his fondness for gypsies and prize-fighters and quite

simply asks, "If he had not associated with prize-fighters, how could

he have used his fists?" However, he is an aristocrat and has no

sympathy with radical weavers. Despite his hatred of cant, some

sentences in "The Bible in Spain" have a missionary twang. He drifts

naturally away from the Church of England, yet when he attacks other

ecclesiastical institutions he holds up the Church of England as the

exemplar of religious truth. He scorns all deviation from fact, yet

his biographers have not wholly succeeded in separating what he did

from what he invented.

He was undoubtedly a polyglot, he made metrical translations from

thirty languages, wrote a version of the Gospel of St. Luke in Spanish

Gypsy (the first book ever attempted in any Gypsy dialect), supervised

the printing of the Bible in Manchu-Tartar, made translations from the

English into Manchu-Tartar, Russian and Turkish in good style, as any

of us who has read them can testify. In the person of Lavengro he lost

the stalwart Isopel Berners because he insisted on giving her lessons

in Armenian! For all that, he made mistakes and so gave the scholars

evidence that he was no scholar. He was not. He had an instinct for

language, especially for that language which he knew, as we know it,

probably better than he knew Manchu-Tartar. In his English narratives

we can follow him and praise him or censure him without violating the

severe rule which he laid down: "Critics, when they review books,

ought to have a competent knowledge of the subjects which those books

discuss."

The four books of Borrow which belong to English literature are "The

Bible in Spain," "Lavengro," "The Romany Rye" and "Wild Wales." "The

Bible in Spain" is one of those books that grow out of circumstances;

it was to a large extent thought out and phrased on the scene, amid

the adventures which it narrates; later it was cast into book form. It

grew out of experience, but an artist shaped its growth. Borrow was

sent by the Bible Society to distribute Spanish versions of the Bible.

He encountered the opposition of allied church and government, was

arrested, put in prison for three weeks, and liberated through the

influence of British officials.

It is not, however, the Bible or his mission that stimulates Borrow's

imagination. Cities and people, meetings on the road, scraps of talk,

sometimes rather long conversations, monologues by Borrow, the

mischances, dangers and excitements of a country at once wild and

anciently civilized, Borrow's opinions about languages, characters,

landscapes and anything else under the Spanish skies--such is the

substance of the book; and the substance is transmitted through a

style that gives little heed to elegance, that walks along like a

healthy man on a tramp. The most eccentric of men, full of strange

languages and odd ideas, Borrow writes English as naturally as he

drinks English ale. There is not a touch of eloquence, not a great

phrase; his descriptions are rather literal records of what was in

front of him and how he liked it than "word-paintings." The dominant

writers of his time were super-eloquent. Borrow does not speak their

language. Perhaps that is why he did not rival them in popular favor,

and also why he seems to us so refreshingly downright.

Borrow, like his master Defoe, has the art of setting all things forth

as if they were matters of fact. Even when his characters talk of

unusual matters, nay, especially when they harangue and gossip about

queer things, their conversation sounds like a transcription from life

and not like invention.

"Lavengro" and its sequel, "The Romany Rye," are properly classified

in Everyman's Library under fiction, and "The Bible in Spain" is

classified as "Travel and Topography." In what proportion

autobiography and fiction are admixed is a question which does not

effect the merits of the books. They all follow about the same method,

and so, too, does "Wild Wales." The episodes are inconsequential, and

the looseness of organization not only permits Borrow unlimited

latitude of subject, but strengthens the Defoe-like illusion of truth;

he never loses the tone of the veracious chronicler who puts things

down in the order of nature and not according to the design of art.

Between adventures and more or less pertinently to them, Borrow

becomes itinerant schoolmaster and gives us instruction in language,

philology, comparative literature, ethics and religion. He is not a

pedant, but a humanist: "It has been said, I believe, that the more

languages a man speaks, the more a man he is; which is very true,

provided he acquires languages as a medium for becoming acquainted

with the thoughts and feelings of the various sections into which the

human race is divided; but in that case he should rather be termed a

philosopher than a philologist."

Borrow need not be read continuously; if he enters upon a discourse

that promises not to interest you, you can turn the pages rapidly

until the eye strikes something more attractive. In his wide variety

is something for everybody. The conversations with the old apple woman

who had read the story of "Blessed Mary Flanders"; the chapters on

pugilism; the talks with tinkers and publicans; the old man who knew

Chinese but could not tell time by the clock; the outrageous attack

upon Walter Scott; the theological arguments with the man in

black--these are some of the choice fragments of what Borrow was

pleased to call a "dream." The general atmosphere is less that of

dreamland than of the broad highway in full sunlight. Since Borrow

died the cult of the open air has increased, and to that as much as to

anything is due the revival of interest in him. He is a great person,

a colossal egotist who in his journeyings takes up the whole road. It

is healthy for a man to be an egotist--especially if he is a colossal

one.

SHELLEY

In his "Defence of Poetry" Shelley says that the imagination is the

moral instrument. To be greatly good a man must imagine intensely and

comprehensively. Poetry serves morality not by what it explicitly

teaches, but by its power to awaken and enlarge the mind, to render it

"the receptacle of a thousand unapprehended combinations of thought."

Since poetry strengthens the imagination, which is the organ of the

moral nature of man, "a poet would do ill to embody his own

conceptions of right and wrong, which are usually those of his time

and place, in his poetical creations which participate in neither." A

remarkable book could be made of the best things said in prose by

English poets about poetry. Perhaps one book would not hold so much. A

narrower yet great and imaginative book could be made of what Shelley

said about poetry and what English poets have said about him. Such a

book would explain and exhibit the theory of poetry and the art of

criticism. The very good edition of Shelley in the Regent Library,

(edited by Roger Ingpen) contains some brief "Testimonia" which invite

one to the essays from which they are taken, by Browning, Swinburne,

Francis Thompson.

It is significant that Mr. Ingpen has not quoted from Arnold. If it is

the function of poetry to expand the imagination and make the mind

aware of a thousand unapprehended combinations of thought, how did it

happen that Arnold, a genuine poet, missed Shelley utterly? Arnold was

not satisfied with his essay and intended to return to the subject.

That he could do a better thing is proved by his essay on Keats,

which, after he has done with his droning, schoolmasterly defence of

Keats's morals, is eloquent, serene and restrainedly emotional.

Shelley phrased many of the revolutionary ideas that were current in

his time. Arnold's timid school-bred culture was impervious to any

sort of revolutionary idea. Shelley's ideas did not impress him; he

thought Shelley a wonderful singer, but a singer without a solid body

of thought. Now, Shelley was the most full-minded poet of his time. He

knew more about what ought to be done with the world than any of his

contemporaries. That he failed to free Ireland and that the French

revolution was a disaster are a reflection on other people's

intelligence, not on his. It is not at all derogatory to a man's ideas

that for centuries and centuries after him the world fails to come up

to his teachings. If an angel is ineffectual that is not the angel's

fault. Indeed a too readily effectual angel would be rather a

journalist than a seer.

That the bulk of mankind is ages behind the best of its poets and

seers might possibly be explained by the fact that the bulk of mankind

simply has not met their thoughts. But how shall one explain the fact

that artistic children of culture, who have had opportunity to read,

who respond to the beauty of seers and poets, remain at the tail of

the intellectual procession, are not abreast of long dead poets like

Shelley, and let the leaders of their own day sweep past them

unapprehended, unguessed? The thing that makes one impatient of the

privilege of culture is that many of those who have enjoyed it do not

lead; they drag mankind back. In "Winds of Doctrine," by Mr. George

Santayana, the mind of the present age is likened to "a philosopher at

sea who, to make himself useful, should blow into the sail." When you

make a generality about the mind of today, you are perfectly safe, for

nobody can dispute you. Nobody knows what the mind of today is doing.

It is doing so many things that no one of us can keep track of it. But

when a man writes himself down in a book, you can tell what his mind

is doing--in that book. I should liken Mr. Santayana to a philosopher

who, really wanting to sail, had forgot to cast off and was still

lashed to the dock with a spanking wind blowing out to sea.

It is no wonder that Whitman, revolutionary in substance and form,

perplexes the genteel and the cloistered. But it is a wonder that

Shelley, whose form is classic and whom a century has transformed from

demon to angel, does not reach them. A striking example of critical

and philosophic blindness is Mr. Santayana's essay on Shelley. Mr.

Santayana is a poet, and in this essay he says beautiful poetic

things. He is not stupid as Arnold was, for once in his life. But he

misses Shelley. He understands what Shelley was related to before

Shelley, for example, Plato, but he does not know the relation of

Shelley to his time or to the world since Shelley. What Mr. Santayana

says is lucid in phrase but quite hopelessly confused in thought. He

says that Shelley was "a finished child of nature, not a joint

product, like most of us, of nature, history and society." That is not

true of Shelley or any other human being in recorded history. It is

worse biography than Dowden's, and it seems that so old a critic as

Taine might have saved a man from writing such nonsense in the year

1912. Mr. Santayana says that "Shelley was not left standing aghast,

like a Philistine, before the destruction of the traditional order."

That is naive. Of course Shelley was not left standing aghast; he was

trying his best to destroy the traditional order; he was butting his

beautiful head against it. He did not budge the traditional order. One

reason is that most people have impoverished imaginations, that the

world can't do what Tolstoy thought would save it, stop and think for

five minutes. Another little reason is that there are too many

conservatives like Mr. Santayana teaching the young men of the world.

Yet Mr. Santayana says that Shelley was "unteachable"!

Shelley believed that a man would do ill to embody his own conceptions

of right and wrong in his poetry. Yet every man, poet or not, who

writes at all and is not a hypocrite, embodies his conceptions of

right and wrong in all his utterances. Shelley was intensely personal

in his poetry. His sky-larking, star-sweeping way of expressing

himself takes us out of range of his individual opinions. He spoke

heart-near things in splendid distances and tried to pull the far

skies down into sodden British hearts. The revolt, the defeated revolt

of his own times, near to him as the news of the daily papers, he

allegorized as the rebellion of a mythological Islam, and he flung the

stars reeling through Spenserian stanzas. No essayist has risen fully

to Shelley's poetic stature and comprehended him except another great

poet, Francis Thompson. Speaking his own convictions, as every man,

poet, critic, or even an academic voice of reason must and should

speak his convictions, Thompson begins his essay by pleading for a

reunion between his church and the art of poetry. So much of his essay

seems to me interesting but not closely relevant to Shelley. After

this introduction Thompson soars into the greatest essay that has ever

been written on an English poet by an English poet.

Most poets, with their wonderful ears, of course write good prose.

Francis Thompson has a fine essay on the prose of poets. Even

Browning, who wrote little prose except the extraordinary

parenthetical letters, was so clarified by Shelley that in his essay

he discovered a fairly fluent and readable style.

Shelley is primarily neither philosopher nor revolutionist, but lyric

poet. Yet to treat him only as a lyric poet is to forget his great

drama, "The Cenci," which can hold up its head undiminished beside the

Elizabethans. That idiotic British officialdom does not, or did not at

last accounts, allow its performance on the regular stage, is perhaps

only one more proof of how little impression Shelley's austere

anarchism made on practical British morality. "The Cenci" is austere;

for Shelley, it is athletically economical. The last speech of

Beatrice is an unexcelled emotional climax. Yet even in this play we

find that "intensely personal" note of Shelley; it speaks all his

heart against all injustice. The play learned many lessons from the

Elizabethans. It is not far wrong to call these lines Shakespearean:

My wife and children sleep;

They are now living in unmeaning dreams;

But I must wake, still doubting if that deed

Be just which was most necessary. O,

Thou replenished lamp! whose narrow fire

Is shaken by the wind and on whose edge

Devouring darkness hovers!

H. G. WELLS AND UTOPIA

Utopias fall into two classes, the local and the chronological. That

is, some are removed from present fact by geographical transition to a

country apart from us in space, a magic island, a realm undiscovered

until the romancer found it and assumed it to be extant in the

romancer's year of grace; others are sundered from present fact by

being thrown forward into the future or backward into a time that

precedes recorded history. The desirable land within the limits of

present time and the known surficial limits of the globe is obviously

not convincing. One fears that it may be rediscovered and invaded by

an imperial fleet or an inquisitive scientific expedition. Crusoe's

island is no longer remote. The geographers have plotted the planet

and have snared every conceivable no-man's-land in the meshes of

realistic lines of latitude and longitude.

The ideal civilization which plays ducks and drakes, not with space,

but with time, is safer. Nothing can dislodge it or disprove it or in

any wise proceed against it--except by force of superior imagination.

For nobody knows what may happen in the future. That is why all the

theological heavens are sublimely ramparted against attack.

Bellamy placed his ideal civilization within the impregnable security

of a time as yet unborn. His conception was original and in its way

was more realistic than the timeless abstraction of Plato and More,

and the Nowhere from which Morris sent news. The fundamental scheme of

portraying a future upon this earth was so fascinating that Bellamy's

book enjoyed a success out of all proportion to its literary skill or

its sociological insight. He had a first-rate plan, but with what

unfanciful and rigidly precise lines he filled it in! His style is

stiff and his future is ossified.

Mr. H. G. Wells took the idea of describing an imagined tomorrow and

made of it a stimulating romance. In saying that he took the idea one

does not mean to imply that he borrowed the scheme of "Looking

Backward" or of any other book. The notion of criticizing today from

the height of a postulated tomorrow was probably born and raised

before Bellamy. My bibliography is imperfect, but I seem to remember

that an Assyrian conceived the notion and inscribed his reflections on

a ton of brick. The important thing is the kind of future a man

imagines and the way he gets there and the justice of his backlook on

the world as it is. Wells's "The World Set Free" is the most

vision-expanding book of its kind--if there be a kind--that I have

ever quarrelled with and been delighted by. It justifies the last word

of its title. It does not cramp the growth of the race between a set

of rules. It spreads the lines of development out at a generously wide

angle. It bids humanity spring from what it is. It makes no

desperately impossible demands upon our common nature. Indeed, with a

cunning hidden plea, not evident at first glance, Mr. Wells draws the

world council, which gathered together the shattered nations and gave

them the first good government they had ever known, as a collection of

ordinary men, with only one or two inspiring geniuses. The idea--a

very important idea--is that any of us duffers could do it if we had

to, and if we were only jolted out of a few little private interests

and superstitions.

The value of a Utopia is not so much the description of a desirable

and convincingly attainable state as in the reflex description of an

undesirable state--the state in which we live. To show how the "new

civilization" was unhampered by political intrigue and financial

considerations is to show how obstructive is the present system of

politics and ownership. "Man the warrior, man the lawyer, and all the

bickering aspects of life, pass into obscurity; the grave dreamers,

man the curious learner and man the creative artist, come forward to

replace these barbaric aspects of existence by a less ignoble

adventure." In "those" times, that is the present seen from the year

2000, many of the homes were entirely "horrible, uniform, square,

squat, ugly, hideously proportioned, uncomfortable, dingy, and in some

respects quite filthy; only people in complete despair of anything

better could have lived in them." In "our" time, that is about 2000,

the last stupid capitalist who wanted millions for an invention he had

stolen was laughed out of court. People do not struggle to get,

because they do not run the risk of starvation and wage slavery; they

produce as artists, because man likes to do things with his head and

his hands. In our times we understand that Bismarck, to take a salient

example, was not an admirable man but a gross person, and that the age

that produced him, made him a ruler, and paid him respect, was a dull,

stupefied, vicious age. The time when people were taking pills for all

kinds of ailments, were being killed by the slow process of the slum

or the swift process of the ill-managed railroads, is past the

imagination of "our" time to conceive.

From such a past the world is set free. The people of that past day

might have set themselves free, but they were too stupid; the workmen

were debased, timid and without imagination, the capitalists had to be

intent on property and dividends lest they fall to the unpropertied

condition of workmen; lawyers, clergymen, popular novelists like Mr.

Wells, editors, journalists, and other professional parasites did not

dare utter even such vision as they had, or did it for money under

convenient restrictions. It was an unthinkably rotten period in the

history of the world. Only a few kickers knew how rotten it was, or

had courage to express their sense of the prevalent putrescence.

The Critical Game · 第 10 / 13 段