CHAPTER VII

PERSONALITIES OF THE MEXICAN PROBLEM

Page's remarks about the "trouble in Mexico City" and the "remaining

task" refer, of course, to Sir Lionel Carden. "As I make Carden out," he

wrote about this time, "he's a slow-minded, unimaginative, commercial

Briton, with as much nimbleness as an elephant. British commerce is his

deity, British advantage his duty and mission; and he goes about his

work with blunt dullness and ineptitude. That's his mental calibre as I

read him--a dull, commercial man."

Although Sir Lionel Carden had been compelled to harmonize himself with

the American policy, Page regarded his continued presence in Mexico City

as a standing menace to British-American relations. He therefore set

himself to accomplish the minister's removal. The failure of President

Taft's attempt to obtain Carden's transfer from Havana, in 1912, showed

that Page's new enterprise was a delicate and difficult one; yet he did

not hesitate.

The part that the wives of diplomats and statesmen play in international

relations is one that few Americans understand. Yet in London, the

Ambassador's wife is almost as important a person as the Ambassador

himself. An event which now took place in the American Embassy

emphasized this point. A certain lady, well known in London, called upon

Mrs. Page and gave her a message on Mexican affairs for the Ambassador's

benefit. The purport was that the activities of certain British

commercial interests in Mexico, if not checked, would produce a serious

situation between Great Britain and the United States. The lady in

question was herself a sincere worker for Anglo-American amity, and this

was the motive that led her to take an unusual step.

"It's all being done for the benefit of one man," she said.

The facts were presented in the form of a memorandum, which Mrs. Page

copied and gave the Ambassador. This, in turn, Page sent to President

Wilson.

_To Edward M. House_

London, November 26, 1913.

DEAR HOUSE:

Won't you read the enclosed and get it to the President? It is

somewhat extra-official but it is very confidential, and I have a

special reason for wishing it to go through your hands. Perhaps it

will interest you.

The lady that wrote it is one of the very best-informed women I

know, one of those active and most influential women in the high

political society of this Kingdom, at whose table statesmen and

diplomats meet and important things come to pass. . . .

I am sure she has no motive but the avowed one. She has taken a

liking to Mrs. Page and this is merely a friendly and patriotic

act.

I had heard most of the things before as gossip--never before as

here put together by a responsible hand.

Mrs. Page went to see her and, as evidence of our appreciation and

safety, gave the original back to her. We have kept no copy, and I

wish this burned, if you please. It would raise a riot here, if any

breath of it were to get out, that would put bedlam to shame.

Lord Cowdray has been to see me for four successive days. I have a

suspicion (though I don't know) that, instead of his running the

Government, the Government has now turned the tables and is running

him. His government contract is becoming a bad thing to sleep with.

He told me this morning that he (through Lord Murray) had withdrawn

the request for any concession in Colombia[38]. I congratulated

him. "That, Lord Cowdray, will save you as well as some other

people I know a good deal of possible trouble." I have explained to

him the whole New Principle _in extenso_, "so that you may see

clearly where the line of danger runs." Lord! how he's changed!

Several weeks ago when I ran across him accidentally he was

humorous, almost cynical. Now he's very serious. I explained to him

that the only thing that had kept South America from being

parcelled out as Africa has been is the Monroe Doctrine and the

United States behind it. He granted that.

"In Monroe's time," said I, "the only way to take a part of South

America was to take land. Now finance has new ways of its own!"

"Perhaps," said he.

"Right there," I answered, "where you put your 'perhaps,' I put a

danger signal. That, I assure you, you will read about in the

histories as 'The Wilson Doctrine'!"

You don't know how easy it all is with our friend and leader in

command. I've almost grown bold. You feel steady ground beneath

you. They are taking to their tents.

"What's going to happen in Mexico City?"

"A peaceful tragedy, followed by emancipation."

"And the great industries of Mexico?"

"They will not have to depend on adventurers' favours!"

"But in the meantime, what?"

"Patience, looking towards justice!"

Yours heartily and in health (you bet!)

W.H.P.

_From Edward M. House_

145 East 35th Street,

New York City.

December 12, 1913.

DEAR PAGE:

Your budget under dates, November 15th, 23rd, and 26th came to me

last week, just after the President had been here. I saved the

letters until I went to Washington, from which place I have just

returned.

The President has been in bed for nearly a week and Doctor Grayson

permitted no one to see him but me. Yesterday before I left he was

feeling so well that I asked him if he did not want to feel better

and then I read him your letters. Mrs. Wilson was present.

I cannot tell you how pleased he was. He laughed repeatedly at the

different comments you made and he was delighted with what you had

to say concerning Lord Cowdray. We do not love him for we think

that between Cowdray and Carden a large part of our troubles in

Mexico has been made. Your description of his attitude at the

beginning and his present one pleased us much.

After I had read the confidential letter the President said "now

let me see if I have the facts." He then recited them in

consecutive order just as the English lady had written them, almost

using the same phrases, showing the well-trained mind that he has.

I then dropped the letter in the grate.

He enjoyed heartily the expression "Washington is a deep hole of

silence towards ambassadors," and again "The volume of silence that

I get is oppressive," and of course the story apropos of this last

remark.

I was with him for more than an hour and he was distinctly better

when I left. I hated to look at him in bed for I could not help

realizing what his life means to the Democratic Party, to the

Nation and almost to the world.

Of course you know that I only read your letters to him. Mr. Bryan

was my guest on Wednesday and I returned to Washington with him but

I made no mention of our correspondence and I never have. The

President seems to like our way of doing things and further than

that I do not care.

Upon my soul I do not believe the President could be better pleased

than he is with the work you are doing.

Faithfully yours,

E.M. HOUSE.

From now on the Ambassador exerted a round-about pressure--the method of

"gradual approach" already referred to--upon the Foreign Office for

Carden's removal. An extract from a letter to the President gives a hint

concerning this method:

* * * * *

I have already worked upon Sir Edward's mind about his Minister to

Mexico as far as I could. Now that the other matter is settled and while

Carden is behaving, I go at it. Two years ago Mr. Knox made a bad

blunder in protesting against Carden's "anti-Americanism" in Cuba. Mr.

Knox sent Mr. Reid no definite facts nor even accusations to base a

protest on. The result was a failure--a bad failure. I have again asked

Mr. Bryan for all the definite reports he has heard about Carden. That

man, in my judgment, has caused nine tenths of the trouble here.

* * * * *

Naturally Page did not ask the Minister's removal directly--that would

have been an unpardonable blunder. His meetings during this period with

Sir Edward were taking place almost every day, and Carden, in one way or

another, kept coming to the front in their conversation. Sir Edward,

like Page, would sacrifice much in the cause of Anglo-American

relations; Page would occasionally express his regret that the British

Minister to Mexico was not a man who shared their enthusiasm on this

subject; in numerous other ways the impression was conveyed that the two

countries could solve the Mexican entanglement much better if a more

congenial person represented British interests in the Southern Republic.

This reasoning evidently produced the desired results. In early January,

1914, a hint was unofficially conveyed to the American Ambassador that

Carden was to be summoned to London for a "conversation" with Sir Edward

Grey, and that his return to Mexico would depend upon the outcome of

that interview. There was a likelihood that, in future, Sir Lionel

Carden would represent the British Empire in Brazil.

This news, sent in discreet cipher to Washington, delighted the

Administration. "It is fine about Carden," wrote Colonel House on

January 10th. "I knew you had done it when I saw it in the papers, but I

did not know just how. You could not have brought it about in a more

diplomatic and effectual way."

And the following came from the President:

From President Wilson

Pass Christian,

January 6, 1914.

MY DEAR PAGE:

I have your letter of December twenty-first, which I have greatly

enjoyed.

Almost at the very time I was reading it, the report came through

the Associated Press from London that Carden was to be transferred

immediately to Brazil. If this is true, it is indeed a most

fortunate thing and I feel sure it is to be ascribed to your

tactful and yet very plain representations to Sir Edward Grey. I do

not think you realize how hard we worked to get from either Lind or

O'Shaughnessy[39] definite items of speech or conduct which we

could furnish you as material for what you had to say to the

Ministers about Carden. It simply was not obtainable. Everything

that we got was at second or third hand. That he was working

against us was too plain for denial, and yet he seems to have done

it in a very astute way which nobody could take direct hold of. I

congratulate you with all my heart on his transference.

I long, as you do, for an opportunity to do constructive work all

along the line in our foreign relations, particularly with Great

Britain and the Latin-American states, but surely, my dear fellow,

you are deceiving yourself in supposing that constructive work is

not now actually going on, and going on at your hands quite as much

as at ours. The change of attitude and the growing ability to

understand what we are thinking about and purposing on the part of

the official circle in London is directly attributable to what you

have been doing, and I feel more and more grateful every day that

you are our spokesman and interpreter there. This is the only

possible constructive work in foreign affairs, aside from definite

acts of policy. So far as the policy is concerned, you may be sure

I will strive to the utmost to obtain both a repeal of the

discrimination in the matter of tolls and a renewal of the

arbitration treaties, and I am not without hope that I can

accomplish both at this session. Indeed this is the session in

which these things must be done if they are to be done at all.

Back of the smile which came to my face when you spoke of the

impenetrable silence of the State Department toward its foreign

representatives lay thoughts of very serious concern. We must

certainly manage to keep our foreign representatives properly

informed. The real trouble is to conduct genuinely confidential

correspondence except through private letters, but surely the thing

can be changed and it will be if I can manage it.

We are deeply indebted to you for your kindness and generous

hospitality to our young folks[40] and we have learned with delight

through your letters and theirs of their happy days in England.

With deep regard and appreciation,

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

HON. WALTER H. PAGE,

American Embassy,

London, England.

Yet for the American Ambassador the experience was not one of unmixed

satisfaction. These letters have contained references to the demoralized

condition of the State Department under Mr. Bryan and the succeeding

ones will contain more; the Carden episode portrayed the stupidity and

ignorance of that Department at their worst. By commanding Carden to

cease his anti-American tactics and to support the American policy the

Foreign Office had performed an act of the utmost courtesy and

consideration to this country. By quietly "promoting" the same minister

to another sphere, several thousand miles away from Mexico and

Washington, it was now preparing to eliminate all possible causes of

friction between the two countries. The British, that is, had met the

wishes of the United States in the two great matters that were then

making serious trouble--Huerta and Carden. Yet no government, Great

Britain least of all, wishes to be placed in the position of moving its

diplomats about at the request of another Power. The whole deplorable

story appears in the following letter.

_To Edward M. House_

January 8th, 1914.

MY DEAR HOUSE:

Two days ago I sent a telegram to the Department saying that I had

information from a private, _unofficial_ source that the report

that Carden would be transferred was true, and from another source

that Marling would succeed him. The Government here has given out

nothing. I know nothing from official sources. Of course the only

decent thing to do at Washington was to sit still till this

Government should see fit to make an announcement. But what do they

do? Give my telegram to the press! It appears here almost verbatim

in this morning's _Mail_.--I have to make an humiliating

explanation to the Foreign Office. This is the third time I've had

to make such an humiliating explanation to Sir Edward. It's getting

a little monotonous. He's getting tired, and so am I. They now deny

at the Foreign Office that anything has been decided about Carden,

and this meddling by us (as they look at it) will surely cause a

delay and may even cause a change of purpose.

That's the practical result of their leaking at Washington. On a

previous occasion they leaked the same way. When I telegraphed a

remonstrance, they telegraphed back to me that the leak had been

_here_! That was the end of it--except that I had to explain to Sir

Edward the best I could. And about a lesser matter, I did the same

thing a third time, in a conversation. Three times this sort of

thing has happened.--On the other hand, the King's Master of

Ceremonies called on me on the President's Birthday and requested

for His Majesty that I send His Majesty's congratulations. Just ten

days passed before a telegraphic answer came! The very hour it

came, I was myself making up an answer for the President that I was

going to send, to save our face.

Now, I'm trying with all my might to do this job. I spend all my

time, all my ingenuity, all my money at it. I have organized my

staff as a sort of Cabinet. We meet every day. We go over

everything conceivable that we may do or try to do. We do good team

work. I am not sure but I doubt whether these secretaries have

before been taken into just such a relation to their chief. They

are enthusiastic and ambitious and industrious and--_safe_. There's

no possibility of any leak. We arrange our dinners with reference

to the possibility of getting information and of carrying points.

Mrs. Page gives and accepts invitations with the same end in view.

We're on the job to the very limit of our abilities.

And I've got the Foreign Office in such a relation that they are

frank and friendly. (I can't keep 'em so, if this sort of thing

goes on.)

Now the State Department seems (as it touches us) to be utterly

chaotic--silent when it ought to respond, loquacious when it ought

to be silent. There are questions that I have put to it at this

Government's request to which I can get no answer.

It's hard to keep my staff enthusiastic under these conditions.

When I reached the Chancery this morning, they were in my room,

with all the morning papers marked, on the table, eagerly

discussing what we ought to do about this publication of my

dispatch. The enthusiasm and buoyancy were all gone out of them. By

their looks they said, "Oh! what's the use of our bestirring

ourselves to send news to Washington when they use it to embarrass

us?"--While we are thus at work, the only two communications from

the Department to-day are two letters from two of the Secretaries

about--presenting "Democratic" ladies from Texas and Oklahoma at

court! And Bryan is now lecturing in Kansas.

Since I began to write this letter, Lord Cowdray came here to the

house and stayed two and a half hours, talking about possible joint

intervention in Mexico. Possibly he came from the Foreign Office. I

don't know whether to dare send a despatch to the State Department,

telling what he told me, for fear they'd leak. And to leak

this--Good Lord! Two of the Secretaries were here to dinner, and I

asked them if I should send such a despatch. They both answered

instantly: "No, sir, don't dare: _write_ it to the President." I

said: "No, I have no right to bother the President with regular

business nor with frequent letters." To that they agreed; but the

interesting and somewhat appalling thing is, they're actually

afraid to have a confidential despatch go to the State Department.

I see nothing to do but to suggest to the President to put

somebody in the Department who will stay there and give intelligent

attention to the diplomatic telegrams and letters--some

conscientious assistant or clerk. For I hear mutterings, somewhat

like these mutterings of mine, from some of the continental

embassies.--The whole thing is disorganizing and demoralizing

beyond description.

All these and more are _my_ troubles. I'll take care of them. But

remember what I am going to write on the next sheet. For here may

come a trouble for _you:_

Mrs. Page has learned something more about Secretary Bryan's

proposed visit here in the spring. He's coming to talk his peace

plan which, you know, is a sort of grape-juice arbitration--a

distinct step backward from a real arbitration treaty. Well, if he

comes with _that_, when you come to talk about reducing armaments,

you'll wish you'd never been born. Get your ingenuity together,

then, and prevent that visit[41].

Not the least funny thing in the world is--Senator X turned up

to-day. As he danced around the room begging everybody's pardon

(nobody knew what for) he complimented everybody in sight,

explained the forged letter, dilated on state politics, set the

Irish question on the right end, cleared Bacon[42] of all hostility

to me, declined tea because he had insomnia and explained just how

it works to keep you awake, danced more and declared himself happy

and bowed himself out--well pleased. He's as funny a cuss as I've

seen in many a day. Lord Cowdray, who was telling Mexican woes to

Katharine in the corner, looked up and asked, "Who's the little

dancing gentleman?" Suppose X had known he was dancing for--Lord

Cowdray's amusement, what do y' suppose he'd've thought? There are

some strange combinations in our house on Mrs. Page's days at home.

Cowdray has, I am sure, lost (that is, failed to make) a hundred

million dollars that he had within easy reach by this Wilson

Doctrine, but he's game. He doesn't lie awake. He's a dead-game

sport, and he knows he's knocked out in that quarter and he doesn't

squeal. His experiences will serve us many a good turn in the

future--as a warning. I rather like him. He eats out of my hand in

the afternoon and has one of his papers jump on me in the morning.

Some time in the twenty-four hours, he must attain about the normal

temperature--say about noon. He admires the President

greatly--sincerely. Force meets force, you see. With the President

behind me I could really enjoy Cowdray centuries after X had danced

himself into oblivion.

By the way, Cowdray said to me to-day: "Whatever the United States

and Great Britain agree on the world must do." He's right. (1) The

President must come here, perhaps in his second term; (2) these two

Governments must enter a compact for peace and for gradual

disarmament. Then we can go about our business for (say) a hundred

years.

Heartily,

W.H.P.

In spite of the continued pressure of the United States and the passive

support of its anti-Huerta policy by Great Britain, the Mexican usurper

refused to resign. President Wilson now began to espouse the interests

of Villa and Carranza. His letters to Page indicate that he took these

men at their own valuation, believed that they were sincere patriots

working for the cause of "democracy" and "constitutionalism" and that

their triumph would usher in a day of enlightenment and progress for

Mexico. It was the opinion of the Foreign Office that Villa and Carranza

were worse men than Huerta and that any recognition of their

revolutionary activities would represent no moral gain.

_From President Wilson_

The White House, Washington,

May 18, 1914.

MY DEAR PAGE:

. . . As to the attitude of mind on that side of the water toward the

Constitutionalists, it is based upon prejudices which cannot be

sustained by the facts. I am enclosing a copy of an interview by a

Mr. Reid[43] which appeared in one of the afternoon papers recently

and which sums up as well as they could be summed up my own

conclusions with regard to the issues and the personnel of the

pending contest in Mexico. I can verify it from a hundred different

sources, most of them sources not in the least touched by

predilections for such men as our friends in London have supposed

Carranza and Villa to be.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

HON. WALTER H. PAGE,

U.S. Embassy,

London, England.

The White House, Washington,

June 1, 1914.

MY DEAR PAGE:

. . . The fundamental thing is that they (British critics of Villa)

are all radically mistaken. There has been less disorder and less

danger to life where the Constitutionalists have gained control

than there has been where Huerta is in control. I should think that

if they are getting correct advices from Tampico, people in England

would be very much enlightened by what has happened there. Before

the Constitutionalists took the place there was constant danger to

the oil properties and to foreign residents. Now there is no danger

and the men who felt obliged to leave the oil wells to their

Mexican employees are returning, to find, by the way, that their

Mexican employees guarded them most faithfully without wages, and

in some instances almost without food. I am told that the

Constitutionalists cheered the American flag when they entered

Tampico.

I believe that Mexico City will be much quieter and a much safer

place to live in after the Constitutionalists get there than it is

now. The men who are approaching and are sure to reach it are much

less savage and much more capable of government than Huerta.

These, I need not tell you, are not fancies of mine but conclusions

I have drawn from facts which are at last becoming very plain and

palpable, at least to us on this side of the water. If they are not

becoming plain in Great Britain, it is because their papers are not

serving them with the truth. Our own papers were prejudiced enough

in all conscience against Villa and Carranza and everything that

was happening in the north of Mexico, but at last the light is

dawning on them in spite of themselves and they are beginning to

see things as they really are. I would be as nervous and impatient

as your friends in London are if I feared the same things that they

fear, but I do not. I am convinced that even Zapata would restrain

his followers and leave, at any rate, all foreigners and all

foreign property untouched if he were the first to enter Mexico

City.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

HON. WALTER H. PAGE,

American Embassy,

London, England.

On this issue, however, the President and his Ambassador to Great

Britain permanently disagreed. The events which took place in April,

1914--the insult to the American flag at Tampico, the bombardment and

capture of Vera Cruz by American forces--made stronger Page's

conviction, already set forth in this correspondence, that there was

only one solution of the Mexican problem.

_To Edward M. House_

April 27, 1914.

DEAR HOUSE:

. . . And, as for war with Mexico--I confess I've had a continually

growing fear of it for six months. I've no confidence in the

Mexican leaders--none of 'em. We shall have to Cuba-ize the

country, which means thrashing 'em first--I fear, I fear, I fear;

and I feel sorry for us all, the President in particular. It's

inexpressibly hard fortune for him. I can't tell you with what

eager fear we look for despatches every day and twice a day hurry

to get the newspapers. All England believes we've got to fight it

out.

Well, the English are with us, you see. Admiral Cradock, I

understand, does not approve our policy, but he stands firmly with

us whatever we do. The word to stand firmly with us has, I am very

sure, been passed along the whole line--naval, newspaper,

financial, diplomatic. Carden won't give us any more trouble

during the rest of his stay in Mexico. The yellow press's abuse of

the President and me has actually helped us here.

Heartily yours,

W.H.P.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 38: This was another manifestation of British friendliness.

When the American excitement was most acute, it became known that

British capitalists had secured oil concessions in Colombia. At the

demand of the British Government they gave them up.]

[Footnote 39: Mr. Nelson O'Shaughnessy, Chargé d'Affaires in Mexico.]

[Footnote 40: Mr. and Mrs. Francis B. Sayre.]

[Footnote 41: Colonel House succeeded in preventing it.]

[Footnote 42: Senator Augustus O. Bacon, of Georgia who was reported to

nourish ill-feeling toward Page for his authorship of "The Southerner."]

[Footnote 43: Probably an error for John Reed, at that time a newspaper

correspondent in Mexico--afterward well known as a champion of the

Bolshevist régime in Russia.]

The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, Volume I · 第 7 / 13 章