"POLICY" AND "PRINCIPLE" IN MEXICO
I
The last days of February, 1913, witnessed one of those sanguinary
scenes in Mexico which for generations had accompanied changes in the
government of that distracted country. A group of revolutionists
assailed the feeble power of Francisco Madero and virtually imprisoned
that executive and his forces in the Presidential Palace. The Mexican
army, whose most influential officers were General Blanquet and General
Victoriano Huerta, was hastily summoned to the rescue of the Government;
instead of relieving the besieged officials, however, these generals
turned their guns upon them, and so assured the success of the uprising.
The speedy outcome of these transactions was the assassination of
President Madero and the seizure of the Presidency by General Huerta.
Another outcome was the presentation to Page of one of the most delicate
problems in the history of Anglo-American relations.
At almost any other time this change in the Mexican succession would
have caused only a momentary disturbance. There was nothing new in the
violent overthrow of government in Latin-America; in Mexico itself no
president had ever risen to power except by revolution. The career of
Porfirio Diaz, who had maintained his authority for a third of a
century, had somewhat obscured this fundamental fact in Mexican
politics, but Diaz had dominated Mexico for seven presidential terms,
not because his methods differed from the accepted methods of his
country, but because he was himself an executive of great force and a
statesman of genius, and could successfully hold his own against any
aspiring antagonist. The civilized world, including the United States,
had long since become reconciled to this situation as almost a normal
one. In recognizing momentarily successful adventurers, Great Britain
and the United States had never considered such details as justice or
constitutionalism: the legality of the presidential title had never been
the point at issue; the only question involved was whether the
successful aspirant actually controlled the country, whether he had
established a state of affairs that approximately represented order, and
whether he could be depended upon to protect life and property. During
the long dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz, however, certain events had
taken place which had awakened the minds of Americans to the possibility
of a new international relationship with all backward peoples. The
consequences of the Spanish War had profoundly impressed Page. This
conflict had left the United States a new problem in Cuba and the
Philippines. Under the principles that for generations had governed the
Old World there would have been no particular difficulty in meeting this
problem. The United States would have candidly annexed the islands, and
exploited their resources and their peoples; we should have concerned
ourselves little about any duties that might be owed to the several
millions of human beings who inhabited them. Indeed, what other
alternatives were there?
One was to hand the possessions back to Spain, who in a four hundred
years' experiment had demonstrated her unfitness to govern them; another
was to give the islands their independence, which would have meant
merely an indefinite continuance of anarchy. It is one of the greatest
triumphs of American statesmanship that it discovered a more
satisfactory solution. Essentially, the new plan was to establish in
these undeveloped and politically undisciplined regions the fundamental
conditions that may make possible the ultimate creation of democratic,
self-governing states. It was recognized that constitutions and election
ballots in themselves did not necessarily imply a democratic order.
Before these there must come other things that were far more important,
such as popular education, scientific agriculture, sanitation, public
highways, railroads, and the development of the resources of nature. If
the backward peoples of the world could be schooled in such a
preliminary apprenticeship, the time might come when the intelligence
and the conscience of the masses would be so enlightened that they could
be trusted with independence. The labour of Leonard Wood in Cuba, and of
other Americans in the Philippines, had apparently pointed the way to
the only treatment of such peoples that was just to them and safe for
mankind.
With the experience of Cuba and the Philippines as a guide, it is not
surprising that the situation in Mexico appealed to many Americans as
opening a similar opportunity to the United States. The two facts that
outstood all others were that Mexico, in her existing condition of
popular ignorance, could not govern herself, and that the twentieth
century could not accept indefinitely a condition of disorder and
bloodshed that had apparently satisfied the nineteenth. The basic
difficulty in this American republic was one of race and of national
character. The fact that was constantly overlooked was that Mexico was
not a Caucasian country: it was a great shambling Indian Republic. Of
its 15,000,000 people less than 3,000,000 were of unmixed white blood,
about 35 per cent. were pure Indian, and the rest represented varying
mixtures of white and aboriginal stock. The masses had advanced little
in civilization since the days of Cortez. Eighty per cent. were
illiterate; their lives for the most part were a dull and squalid
routine; protection against disease was unknown; the agricultural
methods were most primitive; the larger number still spoke the native
dialects which had been used in the days of Montezuma; and over good
stretches of the country the old tribal régime still represented the
only form of political organization. The one encouraging feature was
that these Mexican Indians, backward as they might be, were far superior
to the other native tribes of the North American Continent; in ancient
times, they had developed a state of society far superior to that of the
traditional Redskin. Nevertheless, it was true that the progress of
Mexico in the preceding fifty years had been due almost entirely to
foreign enterprise. By 1913, about 75,000 Americans were living in
Mexico as miners, engineers, merchants, and agriculturists; American
investments amounted to about $1,200,000,000--a larger sum than that of
all the other foreigners combined. Though the work of European
countries, particularly Great Britain, was important, yet Mexico was
practically an economic colony of the United States. Most observers
agree that these foreign activities had not only profited the
foreigners, but that they had greatly benefited the Mexicans themselves.
The enterprise of Americans had disclosed enormous riches, had given
hundreds of thousands employment at very high wages, had built up new
Mexican towns on modern American lines, had extended the American
railway system over a large part of the land, and had developed street
railways, electric lighting, and other modern necessities in all
sections of the Republic. The opening up of Mexican oil resources was
perhaps the most typical of these achievements, as it was certainly the
most adventurous. Americans had created this, perhaps the greatest of
Mexican industries, and in 1913, these Americans owned nearly 80 per
cent. of Mexican oil. Their success had persuaded several Englishmen,
the best known of whom was Lord Cowdray, to enter this same field. The
activities of the Americans and the British in oil had an historic
significance which was not foreseen in 1913, but which assumed the
greatest importance in the World War; for the oil drawn from these
Mexican fields largely supplied the Allied fleets and thus became an
important element in the defeat of the Central Powers. In 1913, however,
American and British oil operators were objects of general suspicion in
both continents. They were accused of participating too actively in
Mexican politics and there were those who even held them responsible for
the revolutionary condition of the country. One picturesque legend
insisted that the American oil interests looked with jealous hostility
upon the great favours shown by the Diaz Administration to Lord
Cowdray's company, and that they had instigated the Madero revolution in
order to put in power politicians who would be more friendly to
themselves. The inevitable complement to this interpretation of events
was a prevailing suspicion that the Cowdray interests had promoted the
Huerta revolt in order to turn the tables on "Standard Oil," to make
safe the "concessions" already obtained from Diaz and to obtain still
more from the new Mexican dictator.
To determine the truth in all these allegations, which were freely
printed in the American press of the time, would demand more facts than
are at present available; yet it is clear that these oil and other
"concessions" presented the perpetual Mexican problem in a new and
difficult light. The Wilson Administration came into power a few days
after Huerta had seized the Mexican Government. The first difficulty
presented to the State Department was to determine its attitude toward
this usurper.
A few days after President Wilson's inauguration Mr. Irwin Laughlin,
then Chargé d'Affaires in London--this was several weeks before Page's
arrival--was instructed to ask the British Foreign Office what its
attitude would be in regard to the recognition of President Huerta. Mr.
Laughlin informed the Foreign Office that he was not instructed that the
United States had decided on any policy, but that he felt sure it would
be to the advantage of both countries to follow the same line. The query
was not an informal one; it was made in definite obedience to
instructions and was intended to elicit a formal commitment. The
unequivocal answer that Mr. Laughlin received was that the British
Government would not recognize Huerta, either formally or tacitly.
Mr. Laughlin sent his message immediately to Washington, where it
apparently made a favourable impression. The Administration then let it
be known that the United States would not recognize the new Mexican
régime. Whether Mr. Wilson would at this time have taken such a
position, irrespective of the British attitude, is not known, but at
this stage of the proceedings Great Britain and the United States were
standing side by side.
About three weeks afterward Mr. Laughlin heard that the British Foreign
Office was about to recognize Huerta. Naturally the report astonished
him; he at once called again on the Foreign Office, taking with him the
despatch that he had recently sent to Washington. Why had the British
Government recognized Huerta when it had given definite assurances to
Washington that it had no intention of doing so? The outcome of the
affair was that Sir Cecil Spring Rice, British Ambassador in Washington,
was instructed to inform the State Department that Great Britain had
changed its mind. France, Germany, Spain, and most other governments
followed the British example in recognizing the new President of Mexico.
It is thus apparent that the initial mistake in the Huerta affair was
made by Great Britain. Its action produced the most unpleasant
impression upon the new Administration. Mr. Wilson, Mr. Bryan, and their
associates in the cabinet easily found an explanation that was
satisfactory to themselves and to the political enthusiasms upon which
they had come into power. They believed that the sudden change in the
British attitude was the result of pressure from British commercial
interests which hoped to profit from the Huerta influence. Lord Cowdray
was a rich and powerful Liberal; he had great concessions in Mexico
which had been obtained from President Diaz; it was known that Huerta
aimed to make his dictatorship a continuation of that of Diaz, to rule
Mexico as Diaz had ruled it, that is, by force, and to extend a
welcoming hand to foreign capitalists. An important consideration was
that the British Navy had a contract with the Cowdray Company for oil,
which was rapidly becoming indispensable as a fuel for warships, and
this fact necessarily made the British Government almost a champion of
the Cowdray interests. It was not necessary to believe all the rumours
that were then afloat in the American press to conclude that a Huerta
administration would be far more acceptable to the Cowdray Company than
any headed by one of the military chieftains who were then disputing the
control of Mexico. Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bryan believed that these events
proved that certain "interests," similar to the "interests" which, in
their view, had exercised so baleful an influence on American politics,
were also active in Great Britain. The Wilson election in 1912 had been
a protest against the dominance of "Wall Street" in American politics;
Mr. Bryan's political stock-in-trade for a generation had consisted of
little except a campaign against these forces; naturally, therefore, the
suspicion that Great Britain was giving way to a British "Standard Oil"
was enough to arm these statesmen against the Huerta policy, and to
intensify that profound dislike of Huerta himself that was soon to
become almost an obsession.
With this as a starting point President Wilson presently formulated an
entirely new principle for dealing with Latin-American republics. There
could be no permanent order in these turbulent countries and nothing
approaching a democratic system until the habit of revolution should he
checked. One of the greatest encouragements to revolution, said the
President, was the willingness of foreign governments to recognize any
politician who succeeded in seizing the executive power. He therefore
believed that a refusal to recognize any government "founded upon
violence" would exercise a wholesome influence in checking this national
habit; if Great Britain and the United States and the other powers would
set the example by refusing to have any diplomatic dealings with General
Huerta, such an unfriendly attitude would discourage other forceful
intriguers from attempting to repeat his experiment. The result would be
that the decent elements in Mexico and other Latin-American countries
would at last assert themselves, establish a constitutional system, and
select their governments by constitutional means. At the bottom of the
whole business were, in the President's and Mr. Bryan's opinion, the
"concession" seekers, the "exploiters," who were constantly obtaining
advantages at the hands of these corrupt governments and constantly
stirring up revolutions for their financial profit. The time had now
come to end the whole miserable business. "We are closing one chapter in
the history of the world," said Mr. Wilson, "and opening another of
unimaginable significance. . . . It is a very perilous thing to determine
the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material interests. . . . We
have seen such material interests threaten constitutional freedom in the
United States. Therefore we will now know how to sympathize with those
in the rest of America who have to contend with such powers, not only
within their borders, but from outside their borders."
In this way General Huerta, who, in his own eyes, was merely another in
the long succession of Mexican revolutionary chieftains, was translated
into an epochal figure in the history of American foreign policy; he
became a symbol in Mr. Wilson's new scheme of things--the representative
of the order which was to come to an end, the man who, all unwittingly,
was to point the new way not only in Mexico, but in all Latin-American
countries. The first diplomatic task imposed upon Page therefore was one
that would have dismayed a more experienced ambassador. This was to
persuade Great Britain to retrace its steps, to withdraw its recognition
of Huerta, and to join hands with the United States in bringing about
his downfall. The new ambassador sympathized with Mr. Wilson's ideas to
a certain extent; the point at which he parted company with the
President's Mexican policy will appear in due course. He therefore began
zealously to preach the new Latin-American doctrine to the British
Foreign Office, with results that appear in his letters of this period.
_To the President_
6 Grosvenor Square, London,
Friday night, October 24, 1913.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
In this wretched Mexican business, about which I have read columns
and columns and columns of comment these two days and turned every
conceivable proposition back and forth in my mind--in this whole
wretched waste of comment, I have not seen even an allusion to any
moral principle involved nor a word of concern about the Mexican
people. It is all about who is the stronger, Huerta or some other
bandit, and about the necessity of order for the sake of financial
interests. Nobody recalls our action in giving Cuba to the Cubans
or our pledge to the people of the Philippine Islands. But there is
reference to the influence of Standard Oil in the American policy.
This illustrates the complete divorce of European politics from
fundamental morals, and it shocks even a man who before knew of
this divorce.
In my last talk with Sir Edward Grey I drove this home by
emphasizing strongly the impossibility of your playing primary heed
to any American business interest in Mexico--even the immorality of
your doing so; there are many things that come before business and
there are some things that come before order. I used American
business interests because I couldn't speak openly of British
business interests and his Government. I am sure he saw the obvious
inference. But not even from him came a word about the moral
foundation of government or about the welfare of the Mexican
people. These are not in the European governing vocabulary.
I have been trying to find a way to help this Government to wake up
to the effect of its pro-Huerta position and to give them a chance
to refrain from repeating that mistake--and to save their faces;
and I have telegraphed one plan to Mr. Bryan to-day. I think they
ought now to be forced to show their hand without the possibility
of evasion. They will not risk losing our good-will--if it seem
wise to you to put them to a square test.
It's a wretched business, and the sordid level of European
statecraft is sad.
I ran across the Prime Minister at the royal wedding reception[34]
the other day.
"What do you infer from the latest news from Mexico?" he asked.
"Several things."
"Tell me the most important inference you draw."
"Well, the danger of prematurely making up one's mind about a
Mexican adventurer."
"Ah!" and he moved on.
Very heartily yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
_To the President_
London, Sunday, Nov. 16, 1913.
. . . About the obligations and inferences of democracy, they are
dense. They don't really believe in it; and they are slow to see
what good will come of ousting Huerta unless we know beforehand who
will succeed him. Sir Edward Grey is not dense, but in this matter
even he is slow fully to understand. The Lord knows I've told him
plainly over and over again and, I fear, even preached to him. At
first he couldn't see the practical nature of so "idealistic" a
programme. I explained to him how the immemorial "policy" that we
all followed of recognizing momentarily successful adventurers in
Latin-America had put a premium on revolution; that you had found
something better than a policy, namely, a principle; that policies
change, but principles do not; that he need not he greatly
concerned about the successor to Huerta; that this is primarily and
ultimately an American problem; that Great Britain's interest being
only commercial is far less than the interest of the United States,
which is commercial and also ethical; and so on and so on. His
sympathies and his friendliness are all right. But Egypt and India
were in his mind. He confessed to me that he was much
impressed--"if you can carry it through." Many men are seeing the
new idea (I wonder if you are conscious how new it is and how
incredible to the Old World mind?) and they express the greatest
and sincerest admiration for "your brave new President"; and a wave
of friendliness to the United States swept over the Kingdom when
the Government took its open stand. At the annual dinner of the
oldest and richest of the merchants' guilds at which they invited
me to respond to a toast the other night they proposed your health
most heartily and, when I arose, they cheered longer and louder
than I had before heard men cheer in this kingdom. There is, I am
sure, more enthusiasm for the United States here, by far, than for
England in the United States. They are simply dense about any sort
of government but their own--particularly dense about the
application of democracy to "dependencies" and inferior peoples. I
have a neighbour who spent many years as an administrator in India.
He has talked me deaf about the inevitable failure of this
"idealistic" Mexican programme. He is wholly friendly, and wholly
incredulous. And for old-time Toryism gone to seed commend me to
the _Spectator_. Not a glimmering of the idea has entered
Strachey's head. The _Times_, however, now sees it pretty clearly.
I spent Sunday a few weeks ago with two of its editors in the
country, and they have come to see me several times since and
written fairly good "leaders" out of my conversation with them. So
much for this head. For the moment at least that is satisfactory.
You must not forget that they can't all at once take it in, for
they do not really know what democracy is or whither it leads and
at bottom they do not really believe in it as a scheme of
government--not even this Liberal Cabinet.
The British concern for commercial interests, which never sleeps,
will, I fear, come up continuously. But we shall simply do justice
and stand firm, when this phase of the subject comes forward.
It's amusing, when you forget its sadness, that their first impulse
is to regard an unselfish international act as what Cecil Rhodes
called the English "unctuous rectitude." But this experience that
we are having with them will be worth much in future dealings. They
already feel very clearly that a different hand has the helm in
Washington; and we can drive them hard, if need be, for they will
not forfeit our friendship.
It is worth something to discover that Downing Street makes many
mistakes. Infallibility dwells a long way from them. In this matter
they have made two terrible blunders--the recognition of Huerta
(they know that now) and the sending of Carden (they may already
suspect that: they'll know it presently).
Yours always faithfully,
WALTER H. PAGE.
P.S. By Jove, I didn't know that I'd ever have to put the British
Government through an elementary course in Democracy!
To the President.
Occasionally Page discussed with Sir Edward Grey an alternative
American policy which was in the minds of most people at that time:
_To the President_
. . . The foregoing I wrote before this Mexican business took its
present place. I can't get away from the feeling that the English
simply do not and will not believe in any unselfish public
action--further than the keeping of order. They have a mania for
order, sheer order, order for the sake of order. They can't see how
anything can come in any one's thought before order or how anything
need come afterward. Even Sir Edward Grey jocularly ran me across
our history with questions like this:
"Suppose you have to intervene, what then?"
"Make 'em vote and live by their decisions."
"But suppose they will not so live?"
"We'll go in again and make 'em vote again."
"And keep this up 200 years?" asked he.
"Yes," said I. "The United States will he here two hundred years
and it can continue to shoot men for that little space till they
learn to vote and to rule themselves."
I have never seen him laugh so heartily. Shooting men into
self-government! Shooting them into orderliness--he comprehends
that; and that's all right. But that's as far as his habit of mind
goes. At Sheffield last night, when I had to make a speech, I
explained "idealism" (they always quote it) in Government. They
listened attentively and even eagerly. Then they came up and asked
if I really meant that Government should concern itself with
idealistic things--beyond keeping order. Ought they to do so in
India?--I assure you they don't think beyond order. A nigger
lynched in Mississippi offends them more than a tyrant in Mexico.
_To Edward M. House_
London, November 2, 1913.
DEAR HOUSE:
I've been writing to the President that the Englishman has a mania
for order, order for order's sake, and for--trade. He has reduced a
large part of the world to order. He is the best policeman in
creation; and--he has the policeman's ethics! Talk to him about
character as a basis of government or about a moral basis of
government in any outlying country, he'll think you daft. Bah! what
matter who governs or how he governs or where he got his authority
or how, so long as he keeps order. He won't see anything else. The
lesson of our dealing with Cuba is lost on him. He doesn't believe
_that_. We may bring this Government in line with us on Mexico. But
in this case and in general, the moral uplift of government must be
forced by us--I mean government in outlying countries.
Mexico is only part of Central America, and the only way we can
ever forge a Central and South American policy that will endure is
_this_ way, precisely, by saying that your momentarily successful
adventurer can't count on us anywhere; the man that rules must
govern for the governed. Then we have a policy; and nobody else has
that policy. This Mexican business is worth worlds to us--to
establish this.
We may have a diplomatic fight here; and I'm ready! Very ready on
this, for its own sake and for reasons that follow, to wit:
Extraordinary and sincere and profound as is the respect of the
English for the American people, they hold the American Government
in contempt. It shifts and doesn't keep its treaty, etc.,
etc.--They are right, too. But they need to feel the hand that now
has the helm.
But one or two things have first to be got out of the way. That
Panama tolls is the worst. We are dead wrong in that, as we are
dead right on the Mexican matter. If it were possible (I don't know
that it is) for the President to say (quietly, not openly) that he
agrees with us--if he do--then the field would be open for a fight
on Mexico; and the reënforcement of our position would he
incalculable.
Then we need in Washington some sort of Bureau or Master of
Courtesies for the Government, to do and to permit us to do those
little courtesies that the English spend half their time in
doing--this in the course of our everyday life and intercourse. For
example: When I was instructed to inform this Government that our
fleet would go to the Mediterranean, I was instructed also to say
that they mustn't trouble to welcome us--don't pay no 'tention to
us! Well, that's what they live for in times of peace--ceremonies.
We come along and say, "We're comin' but, hell! don't kick up no
fuss over us, we're from Missouri, we are!" And the Briton shrugs
his shoulders and says, "Boor!" These things are happening all the
time. Of course no one nor a dozen nor a hundred count; but
generations of 'em have counted badly. A Government without
manners.
If I could outdo these folk at their game of courtesy, and could
keep our treaty faith with 'em, then I could lick 'em into the next
century on the moral aspects of the Mexican Government, and make
'em look up and salute every time the American Government is
mentioned. See?--Is there any hope?--Such is the job exactly. And
you know what it would lead to--even in our lifetime--_to the
leadership of the world_: and we should presently be considering
how we may best use the British fleet, the British Empire, and the
English race for the betterment of mankind.
Yours eagerly,
W.H.P.
A word of caution is necessary to understand Page's references to the
British democracy. That the parliamentary system is democratic in the
sense that it is responsive to public opinion he would have been the
first to admit. That Great Britain is a democracy in the sense that the
suffrage is general is also apparent. But, in these reflections on the
British commonwealth, the Ambassador was thinking of his old familiar
figure, the "Forgotten Man"--the neglected man, woman, and child of the
masses. In an address delivered, in June, 1914, before the Royal
Institution of Great Britain, Page gave what he regarded as the
definition of the American ideal. "The fundamental article in the creed
of the American democracy--you may call it the fundamental dogma if you
like--is the unchanging and unchangeable resolve that every human being
shall have his opportunity for his utmost development--his chance to
become and to do the best that he can." Democracy is not only a system
of government--"it is a scheme of society." Every citizen must have not
only the suffrage, he must likewise enjoy the same advantages as his
neighbour for education, for social opportunity, for good health, for
success in agriculture, manufacture, finance, and business and
professional life. The country that most successfully opened all these
avenues to every boy or girl, exclusively on individual merit, was in
Page's view the most democratic. He believed that the United States did
this more completely than Great Britain or any other country; and
therefore he believed that we were far more democratic. He had not found
in other countries the splendid phenomenon presented by America's great
agricultural region. "The most striking single fact about the United
States is, I think, this spectacle, which, so far as I know, is new in
the world: On that great agricultural area are about seven million farms
of an average size of about 140 acres, most of which are tilled by the
owners themselves, a population that varies greatly, of course, in its
thrift and efficiency, but most of which is well housed, in houses they
themselves own, well clad, well fed, and a population that trains
practically all its children in schools maintained by public taxation."
It was some such vision as this that Page hoped to see realized
ultimately in Mexico. And some such development as this would make
Mexico a democracy. It was his difficulty in making the British see the
Mexican problem in this light that persuaded him that, in this
comprehensive meaning of the word, the democratic ideal had made an
inappreciable progress in Europe--and even in Great Britain itself.
II
These letters are printed somewhat out of their chronological order
because they picture definitely the two opposing viewpoints of Great
Britain and the United States on Mexico and Latin-America generally.
Here, then, was the sharp issue drawn between the Old World and the
New--on one side the dreary conception of outlying countries as fields
to be exploited for the benefit of "investors," successful
revolutionists to be recognized in so far as they promoted such ends,
and no consideration to be shown to the victims of their rapacity; and
the new American idea, the idea which had been made reality in Cuba and
the Philippines, that the enlightened and successful nations stood
something in the position of trustees to such unfortunate lands and that
it was their duty to lead them along the slow pathway of progress and
democracy. So far the Wilsonian principle could be joyfully supported by
the Ambassador. Page disagreed with the President, however, in that he
accepted the logical consequences of this programme. His formula of
"shooting people into self-government," which had so entertained the
British Foreign Secretary, was a characteristically breezy description
of the alternative that Page, in the last resort, was ready to adopt,
but which President Wilson and Secretary Bryan persistently refused to
consider. Page was just as insistent as the Washington Administration
that Huerta should resign and that Great Britain should assist the
United States in accomplishing his dethronement, and that the Mexican
people should have a real opportunity of setting up for themselves. He
was not enough of an "idealist," however, to believe that the Mexicans,
without the assistance of their powerful neighbours, could succeed in
establishing a constitutional government. In early August, 1913,
President Wilson sent Mr. John Lind, ex-Governor of Minnesota, to Mexico
as his personal representative. His mission was to invite Huerta to
remove himself from Mexican politics, and to permit the Mexican people
to hold a presidential election at which Huerta would himself agree not
to be a candidate. Mr. Lind presented these proposals on August 15th,
and President Huerta rejected every one of them with a somewhat
disconcerting promptitude.
That Page was prepared to accept the consequences of this failure
appears in the following letter. The lack of confidence which it
discloses in Secretary Bryan was a feeling that became stronger as the
Mexican drama unfolded.
_To Edward M. House_
London, August 25, 1913.
MY DEAR HOUSE:
. . . If you find a chance, get the substance of this memorandum into
the hands of two men: the President and the Secretary of
Agriculture. Get 'em in Houston's at once--into the President's
whenever the time is ripe. I send the substance to Washington and I
send many other such things. But I never feel sure that they reach
the President. The most confidential letter I have written was lost
in Washington, and there is pretty good testimony that it reached
the Secretary's desk. He does not acknowledge the important things,
but writes me confidentially to inquire if the office of the man
who attends to the mail pouches (the diplomatic and naval
despatches in London[35]) is not an office into which he might put
a Democrat.--But I keep at it. It would he a pleasure to know that
the President knows what I am trying to do. . . .
Yours heartily,
WALTER H. PAGE.
Following is the memorandum:
In October the provisional recognition of Huerta by England will
end. Then this Government will be free. Then is the time for the
United States to propose to England joint intervention merely to
reduce this turbulent scandal of a country to order--on an
agreement, of course, to preserve the territorial integrity of
Mexico. It's a mere police duty that all great nations have to
do--as they did in the case of the Boxer riots in China. Of course
Germany and France, etc., ought to be invited--on the same pledge:
the preservation of territorial integrity. If Germany should come
in, she will thereby practically acknowledge the Monroe Doctrine,
as England has already done. If Germany stay out, then she can't
complain. England and the United States would have only to announce
their intention: there'd be no need to fire a gun. Besides settling
the Mexican trouble, we'd gain much--having had England by our side
in a praise-worthy enterprise. That, and the President's visit[36]
would give the world notice to whom it belongs, and cause it to be
quiet and to go about its proper business of peaceful industry.
Moreover, it would show all the Central and South American States
that we don't want any of their territory, that we will not let
anybody else have any, but that they, too, must keep orderly
government or the great Nations of the earth, will, at our bidding,
forcibly demand quiet in their borders. I believe a new era of
security would come in all Spanish America. Investments would be
safer, governments more careful and orderly. And--we would not have
made any entangling alliance with anybody. All this would prevent
perhaps dozens of little wars. It's merely using the English fleet
and ours to make the world understand that the time has come for
orderliness and peace and for the honest development of backward,
turbulent lands and peoples.
If you don't put this through, tell me what's the matter with it.
I've sent it to Washington after talking and being talked to for a
month and after the hardest kind of thinking. Isn't this
constructive? Isn't it using the great power lying idle about the
world, to do the thing that most needs to be done?
Colonel House presented this memorandum to the President, but events
sufficiently disclosed that it had no influence upon his Mexican policy.
Two days after it was written Mr. Wilson went before Congress, announced
that the Lind Mission had failed, and that conditions in Mexico had
grown worse. He advised all Americans to leave the country, and declared
that he would lay an embargo on the shipment of munitions--an embargo
that would affect both the Huerta forces and the revolutionary groups
that were fighting them.
Meanwhile Great Britain had taken another step that made as unpleasant
an impression on Washington as had the recognition of Huerta. Sir Lionel
Edward Gresley Carden had for several years been occupying British
diplomatic posts in Central America, in all of which he had had
disagreeable social and diplomatic relations with Americans. Sir Lionel
had always shown great zeal in promoting British commercial interests,
and, justly or unjustly, had acquired the fame of being intensely
anti-American. From 1911 to 1913 Carden had served as British Minister
to Cuba; here his anti-Americanism had shown itself in such obnoxious
ways that Mr. Knox, Secretary of State under President Taft, had
instructed Ambassador Reid to bring his behaviour to the attention of
the British Foreign Office. These representations took practically the
form of requesting Carden's removal from Cuba. Perhaps the unusual
relations that the United States bore toward Cuba warranted Mr. Knox in
making such an approach; yet the British refused to see the matter in
that light; not only did they fail to displace Carden, but they knighted
him--the traditional British way of defending a faithful public servant
who has been attacked. Sir Lionel Carden refused to mend his ways; he
continued to indulge in what Washington regarded as anti-American
propaganda; and a second time Secretary Knox intimated that his removal
would he acceptable to this country, and a second time this request was
refused. With this preliminary history of Carden as a background, and
with the British-American misunderstanding over Huerta at its most
serious stage, the emotions of Washington may well be imagined when the
news came, in July, 1913, that this same gentleman had been appointed
British Minister to Mexico. If the British Government had ransacked its
diplomatic force to find the one man who would have been most
objectionable to the United States, it could have made no better
selection. The President and Mr. Bryan were pretty well persuaded that
the "oil concessionaires" were dictating British-Mexican policy, and
this appointment translated their suspicion into a conviction. Carden
had seen much service in Mexico; he had been on the friendliest terms
with Diaz; and the newspapers openly charged that the British oil
capitalists had dictated his selection. All these assertions Carden and
the oil interests denied; yet Carden's behaviour from the day of his
appointment showed great hostility to the United States. A few days
after he had reached New York, on his way to his new post, the New York
_World_ published an interview with Carden in which he was reported as
declaring that President Wilson knew nothing about the Mexican situation
and in which he took the stand that Huerta was the man to handle Mexico
at this crisis. His appearance in the Mexican capital was accompanied by
other highly undiplomatic publications. In late October President Huerta
arrested all his enemies in the Mexican Congress, threw them into jail,
and proclaimed himself dictator. Washington was much displeased that Sir
Lionel Carden should have selected the day of these high-handed
proceedings to present to Huerta his credentials as minister; in its
sensitive condition, the State Department interpreted this act as a
reaffirmation of that recognition that had already caused so much
confusion in Mexican affairs.
Carden made things worse by giving out more newspaper interviews, a
tendency that had apparently grown into a habit. "I do not believe that
the United States recognizes the seriousness of the situation here. . . . I
see no reason why Huerta should be displaced by another man whose
abilities are yet to be tried. . . . Safety in Mexico can be secured only
by punitive and remedial methods, and a strong man;"--such were a few of
the reflections that the reporters attributed to this astonishing
diplomat. Meanwhile, the newspapers were filled with reports that the
British Minister was daily consorting with Huerta, that he was
constantly strengthening that chieftain's backbone in opposition to the
United States and that he was obtaining concessions in return for this
support. To what extent these press accounts rested on fact cannot be
ascertained definitely at this time; yet it is a truth that Carden's
general behaviour gave great encouragement to Huerta and that it had the
deplorable effect of placing Great Britain and the United States in
opposition. The interpretation of the casual reader was that Great
Britain was determined to seat Huerta in the Presidency against the
determination of the United States to keep him out. The attitude of the
Washington cabinet was almost bitter at this time against the British
Government. "There is a feeling here," wrote Secretary Lane to Page,
"that England is playing a game unworthy of her."
The British Government promptly denied the authenticity of the Carden
interview, but that helped matters little, for the American public
insisted on regarding such denials as purely diplomatic. Something of a
storm against Carden arose in England itself, where it was believed that
his conception of his duties was estranging two friendly countries.
Probably the chief difficulty was that the British Foreign Office could
see no logical sequence in the Washington policy. Put Huerta out--yes,
by all means: but what then? Page's notes of his visit to Sir Edward
Grey a few days after the latest Carden interview confirm this:
* * * * *
I have just come from an hour's talk with Grey about Mexico. He showed
me his telegram to Carden, asking about Carden's reported interview
criticizing the United States, and Carden's flat denial. He showed me
another telegram to Carden about Huerta's reported boast that he would
have the backing of London, Paris, and Berlin against the United States,
in which Grey advised Carden that British policy should be to keep aloof
from Huerta's boasts and plans. Carden denied that Huerta made such a
boast in his statement to the Diplomatic Corps. Grey wishes the
President to know of these telegrams.
Talk then became personal and informal. I went over the whole subject
again, telling how the Press and people of the United States were
becoming critical of the British Government; that they regarded the
problem as wholly American; that they resented aid to Huerta, whom they
regarded as a mere tyrant; that they suspected British interests of
giving financial help to Huerta; that many newspapers and persons
refused to believe Carden's denial; that the President's policy was not
academic but was the only policy that would square with American ideals
and that it was unchangeable. I cited our treatment of Cuba. I explained
again that I was talking unofficially and giving him only my own
interpretation of the people's mood. He asked, if the British Government
should withdraw the recognition of Huerta, what would happen.
"In my opinion," I replied, "he would collapse."
"What would happen then--worse chaos?"
"That is impossible," I said. "There is no worse chaos than deputies in
jail, the dictatorial doubling of the tariff, the suppression of
opinion, and the practical banishment of independent men. If Huerta
should fall, there is hope that suppressed men and opinion will set up a
successful government."
"Suppose that fail," he asked--"what then?"
I replied that, in case of continued and utter failure, the United
States might feel obliged to repeat its dealings with Cuba and that the
continued excitement of opinion in the United States might precipitate
this.
Grey protested that he knew nothing of what British interests had done
or were doing, that he wished time to think the matter out and that he
was glad to await the President's communication. He thanked me cordially
for my frank statements and declared that he understood perfectly their
personal nature. I impressed him with the seriousness of American public
opinion.
* * * * *
The last thing that the British Government desired at this time was a
serious misunderstanding with the United States, on Mexico or any other
matter. Yet the Mexican situation, in early November, 1913, clearly
demanded a complete cleaning up. The occasion soon presented itself. Sir
William Tyrrell, the private secretary of Sir Edward Grey sailed, in
late October, for the United States. The purpose of his visit was not
diplomatic, but Page evidently believed that his presence in the United
States offered too good an opportunity to be lost.
To Edward M. House
Newton Hall, Newton, Cambridge.
Sunday, October 26, 1913.
DEAR HOUSE:
Sir William Tyrrell, the secretary of Sir Edward Grey--himself, I
think, an M.P.--has gone to the United States to visit his friend,
Sir Cecil Spring Rice. He sailed yesterday, going first to Dublin,
N.H., thence with the Ambassador to Washington. He has never before
been to the United States, and he went off in high glee, alone, to
see it. He's a good fellow, a thoroughly good fellow, and he's an
important man. He of course has Sir Edward's complete confidence,
but he's also a man on his own account. I have come to reckon it
worth while to get ideas that I want driven home into his head.
It's a good head and a good place to put good ideas.
The Lord knows you have far too much to do; but in this juncture I
should count it worth your while to pay him some attention. I want
him to get the President's ideas about Mexico, good and firm and
hard. They are so far from altruistic in their politics here that
it would be a good piece of work to get our ideas and aims into
this man's head. His going gives you and the President and
everybody a capital chance to help me keep our good
American-English understanding.
Whatever happen in Mexico, I'm afraid there will be a disturbance
of the very friendly feeling between the American people and the
English. I am delivering a series of well-thought-out discourses to
Sir Edward--with what effect, I don't know. If the American press
could be held in a little, that would be as good as it is
impossible.
I'm now giving the Foreign Office the chance to refrain from more
premature recognizing.
Very hastily yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
Sir William Tyrrell, to whom Page refers so pleasantly, was one of the
most engaging men personally in the British Foreign Office, as well as
one of the most influential. Though he came to America on no official
mission to our Government, he was exceptionally qualified to discuss
Mexico and other pending questions with the Washington Administration.
He had an excellent background, and a keen insight into the human
aspects of all problems, but perhaps his most impressive physical trait
was a twinkling eye, as his most conspicuous mental quality was
certainly a sense of humour. Constant association with Sir Edward Grey
had given his mind a cast not dissimilar to that of his chief--a belief
in ordinary decency in international relations, an enthusiasm for the
better ordering of the world, a sincere admiration for the United States
and a desire to maintain British-American friendship. In his first
encounter with official Washington Sir William needed all that sense of
the ludicrous with which he is abundantly endowed. This took the form of
a long interview with Secretary Bryan on the foreign policy of Great
Britain. The Secretary harangued Sir William on the wickedness of the
British Empire, particularly in Egypt and India and in Mexico. The
British oil men, Mr. Bryan declared, was nothing but the "paymasters" of
the British Cabinet.
"You are wrong," replied the Englishman, who saw that the only thing to
do on an occasion of this kind was to refuse to take the Secretary
seriously. "Lord Cowdray hasn't money enough. Through a long experience
with corruption the Cabinet has grown so greedy that Cowdray hasn't the
money necessary to reach their price."
"Ah," said Mr. Bryan, triumphantly, accepting Sir William's bantering
answer as made in all seriousness. "Then you admit the charge."
From this he proceeded to denounce Great Britain in still more
unmeasured terms. The British, he declared, had only one interest in
Mexico, and that was oil. The Foreign Office had simply handed its
Mexican policy over to the "oil barons" for predatory purposes.
"That's just what the Standard Oil people told me in New York," the
British diplomat replied. "Mr. Secretary, you are talking just like a
Standard Oil man. The ideas that you hold are the ones which the
Standard Oil is disseminating. You are pursuing the policy which they
have decided on. Without knowing it you are promoting the interest of
Standard Oil."
Sir William saw that it was useless to discuss Mexico with Mr.
Bryan--that the Secretary was not a thinker but an emotionalist.
However, despite their differences, the two men liked each other and had
a good time. As Sir William was leaving, he bowed deferentially to the
Secretary of State and said:
"You have stripped me naked, Mr. Secretary, but I am unashamed."
With President Wilson, however, the Englishman had a more satisfactory
experience. He was delighted by the President's courtesy, charm,
intelligence, and conversational powers. The impression which Sir
William obtained of the American President on this occasion remained
with him for several years and was itself an important element in
British-American relations after the outbreak of the World War. And the
visit was a profitable one for Mr. Wilson, since he obtained a clear
understanding of the British policy toward Mexico. Sir William succeeded
in persuading the President that the so-called oil interests were not
dictating the policy of Sir Edward Grey. That British oil men were
active in Mexico was apparent; but they were not using a statesman of so
high a character as Sir Edward Grey for their purposes and would not be
able to do so. The British Government entertained no ambitions in Mexico
that meant unfriendliness to the United States. In no way was the policy
of Great Britain hostile to our own. In fact, the British recognized the
predominant character of the American interest in Mexico and were
willing to accept any policy in which Washington would take the lead.
All it asked was that British property and British lives be protected;
once these were safeguarded Great Britain was ready to stand aside and
let the United States deal with Mexico in its own way.
The one disappointment of this visit was that Sir William Tyrrell was
unable to obtain from President Wilson any satisfactory statement of his
Mexican policy.
"When I go back to England," said the Englishman, as the interview was
approaching an end, "I shall be asked to explain your Mexican policy.
Can you tell me what it is?"
President Wilson looked at him earnestly and said, in his most decisive
manner:
"I am going to teach the South American Republics to elect good men!"
This was excellent as a purpose, but it could hardly be regarded as a
programme.
"Yes," replied Sir William, "but, Mr. President, I shall have to explain
this to Englishmen, who, as you know, lack imagination. They cannot see
what is the difference between Huerta, Carranza, and Villa."
The only answer he could obtain was that Carranza was the best of the
three and that Villa was not so bad as he had been painted. But the
phrase that remained with the British diplomat was that one so
characteristically Wilsonian: "I propose to teach the South American
Republics to elect good men." In its attitude, its phrasing, it held the
key to much Wilson history.
Additional details of this historic interview are given in Colonel
House's letters:
From Edward M. House
145 East 35th Street,
New York City.
November 4, 1913.
DEAR PAGE:
Your cablegram, telling me of the arrival of Sir William Tyrrell on
the _Imperator_, was handed me on my way to the train as I left for
Washington.
The President talked with me about the Mexican situation and it
looks as if something positive will be done in a few days unless
Huerta abdicates.
It is to be the policy of this Administration henceforth not to
recognize any Central American government that is not formed along
constitutional lines. Anything else would be a makeshift policy. As
you know, revolutions and assassinations in order to obtain control
of governments are instituted almost wholly for the purpose of loot
and when it is found that these methods will not bring the desired
results, they will cease.
The President also feels strongly in regard to foreign financial
interests seeking to control those unstable governments through
concessions and otherwise. This, too, he is determined to
discourage as far as it is possible to do so.
This was a great opportunity for England and America to get
together. You know how strongly we both feel upon this subject and
I do not believe that the President differed greatly from us, but
the recent actions of the British Government have produced a
decided irritation, which to say the least is unfortunate.
Faithfully yours,
E.M. HOUSE.
145 East 35th Street,
New York City.
November 14, 1913.
DEAR PAGE:
Things have happened quickly since I last wrote to you. I went to
Washington Monday night as the guest of the Bryans. They have been
wanting me to come to them and I thought this a good opportunity.
I talked the Mexican situation out thoroughly with him and one of
your dispatches came while I was there. I found that he was
becoming prejudiced against the British Government, believing that
their Mexican policy was based purely upon commercialism, that they
were backing Huerta quietly at the instance of Lord Cowdray, and
that Cowdray had not only already obtained concessions from the
Huerta Government, but expected to obtain others. Sir Lionel Carden
was also all to the bad.
I saw the President and his views were not very different from
those of Mr. Bryan. I asked the President to permit me to see Sir
William Tyrrell and talk to him frankly and to attempt to
straighten the tangle out. He gave me a free hand.
I lunched with Sir William at the British Embassy although Sir
Cecil Spring Rice was not well enough to be present. I had a long
talk with Sir William after lunch and found that our suspicions
were unwarranted and that we could get together without any
difficulty whatever.
I told him very frankly what our purpose was in Mexico and that we
were determined to carry it through if it was within our power to
do so. That being so I suggested that he get his government to
coöperate cordially with ours rather than to accept our policy
reluctantly.
I told him that you and I had dreamed of a sympathetic alliance
between the two countries and that it seemed to me that this dream
might come true very quickly because of the President and Sir
Edward Grey. He expressed a willingness to coöperate freely and I
told him I would arrange an early meeting with the President. I
thought it better to bring the President into the game rather than
Mr. Bryan. I told him of the President's attitude upon the Panama
toll question but I touched upon that lightly and in confidence,
preferring for the President himself to make his own statement.
I left the Bryans in the morning of the luncheon with Sir William,
intending to take an afternoon train for New York, but the
President wanted me to stay with him at the White House over night
and meet Sir William with him at half past nine the following
morning. He was so tired that I did not have the heart to urge a
meeting that night.
From half past nine until half past ten the President and Sir
William repeated to each other what they had said separately to me,
and which I had given to each, and then the President elaborated
upon the toll question much to the satisfaction of Sir William.
He explained the matter in detail and assured him of his entire
sympathy and purpose to carry out our treaty obligations, both in
the letter and the spirit.
Sir William was very happy after the interview and when the
President left us he remained to talk to me and to express his
gratification. He cleared up in the President's mind all suspicion,
I think, in regard to concessions and as to the intentions and
purposes of the British Government. He assured the President that
his government would work cordially with ours and that they would
do all that they could to bring about joint pressure through
Germany and France for the elimination of Huerta.
We are going to give them a chance to see what they can do with
Huerta before moving any further. Sir William thinks that if we are
willing to let Huerta save his face he can be got out without force
of arms.
Sir William said that if foreign diplomats could have heard our
conversation they would have fallen in a faint; it was so frankly
indiscreet and undiplomatic. I did not tell him so, but I had it in
the back of my mind that where people wanted to do right and had
the power to carry out their intentions there was no need to cloak
their thoughts in diplomatic language.
All this makes me very happy for it looks as if we are in sight of
the promised land.
I am pleased to tell you of the compliments that have been thrown
at you by the President, Mr. Bryan, and Sir William. They were all
enthusiastic over your work in London and expressed the keenest
appreciation of the way in which you have handled matters. Sir
William told me that he did not remember an American Ambassador
that was your equal.
Faithfully yours,
E.M. HOUSE.
So far as a meeting between a British diplomat and the President of the
United States could solve the Mexican problem, that problem was
apparently solved. The dearest wish of Mr. Wilson, the elimination of
Huerta, seemed to be approaching realization, now that he had persuaded
Great Britain to support him in this enterprise. Whether Sir William
Tyrrell, or Sir Edward Grey, had really become converted to the
President's "idealistic" plans for Mexico is an entirely different
question. At this time there was another matter in which Great Britain's
interest was even greater than in Mexico. These letters have already
contained reference to tolls on the Panama Canal. Colonel House's letter
shows that the President discussed this topic with Sir William Tyrrell
and gave him assurances that this would be settled on terms satisfactory
to Great Britain. It cannot be maintained that that assurance was really
the consideration which paved the way to an understanding on Huerta. The
conversation was entirely informal; indeed, it could not be otherwise,
for Sir William Tyrrell brought no credentials; there could be no
definite bargain or agreement, but there is little question that Mr.
Wilson's friendly disposition toward British shipping through the Panama
Canal made it easy for Great Britain to give him a free hand in Mexico.
A few days after this White House interview Sir Lionel Carden performed
what must have been for him an uncongenial duty. This loquacious
minister led a procession of European diplomats to General Huerta,
formally advised that warrior to yield to the American demands and
withdraw from the Presidency of Mexico. The delegation informed the grim
dictator that their governments were supporting the American policy and
Sir Lionel brought him the unwelcome news that he could not depend upon
British support. About the same time Premier Asquith made conciliatory
remarks on Mexico at the Guildhall banquet. He denied that the British
Government had undertaken any policy "deliberately opposed to that of
the United States. There is no vestige of foundation for such a rumour."
These events changed the atmosphere at Washington, which now became
almost as cordial to Great Britain as it had for several months been
suspicious.
_To Edward M. House_
London, November 15, 1913.
DEAR HOUSE:
All's well here. The whole trouble was caused not here but in
Mexico City; and that is to be remedied yet. And it will be! For
the moment it is nullified. But you need give yourself no concern
about the English Government or people, in the long run. It is
taking them some time to see the vast difference between acting by
a principle and acting by what they call a "policy." They and we
ourselves too have from immemorial time been recognizing successful
adventurers, and they didn't instantly understand this new
"idealistic" move; they didn't know the man at the helm! I preached
many sermons to our friend, I explained the difference to many
private groups, I made after-dinner speeches leading right up to
the point--as far as I dared, I inspired many newspaper articles;
and they see it now and have said it and have made it public; and
the British people are enthusiastic as far as they understand it.
And anybody concerned here understands the language that the
President speaks now. You mustn't forget that in all previous
experiences in Latin America we ourselves have been as much to
blame as anybody else. Now we have a clear road to travel, a policy
based on character to follow forever--a new era. Our dealing with
Cuba was a new chapter in the history of the world. Our dealing
with Mexico is Chapter II of the same Revelation. Tell 'em this in
Washington.
The remaining task will be done too and I think pretty soon. For
that I need well-loaded shells. I'll supply the gunpowder.
And don't you concern yourself about the English. They're all
right--a little slow, but all right.
Heartily yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
_To Edward M. House_
Newtimber Place, Hassocks, Sussex,
Sunday, November 23, 1913.
DEAR HOUSE:
Your letter telling me about Tyrrell and the President brought me
great joy. Tyrrell is in every way a square fellow, much like his
Chief; and, you may depend on it, they are playing fair--in their
slow way. They always think of India and of Egypt--never of Cuba.
Lord! Lord! the fun I've had, the holy joy I am having (I never
expected to have such exalted and invigorating felicity) in
delivering elementary courses of instruction in democracy to the
British Government. Deep down at the bottom, they don't know what
Democracy means. Their Empire is in the way. Their centuries of
land-stealing are in the way. Their unsleeping watchfulness of
British commerce is in the way. "You say you'll shoot men into
self-government," said Sir Edward. "Doesn't that strike you as
comical?" And I answered, "It is comical only to the Briton and to
others who have associated shooting with subjugation. We associate
shooting with freedom." Half this blessed Sunday at this country
house I have been ramming the idea down the throat of the Lord
Chancellor[37]. _He_ sees it, too, being a Scotchman. I take the
members of the Government, as I get the chance or can make it, and
go over with them the A B C of the President's principle: no
territorial annexation; no trafficking with tyrants; no stealing of
American governments by concession or financial thimble-rigging.
They'll not recognize another Huerta--they're sick of that. And
they'll not endanger our friendship. They didn't see the idea in
the beginning. Of course the real trouble has been in Mexico
City--Carden. They don't know yet just what he did. But they will,
if _I_ can find out. I haven't yet been able to make them tell me
at Washington. Washington is a deep hole of silence toward
ambassadors. By gradual approaches, I'm going to prove that Carden
can do--and in a degree has already done--as much harm as Bryce did
good--and all about a paltry few hundreds of million dollars' worth
of oil. What the devil does the oil or the commerce of Mexico or
the investments there amount to in comparison with the close
friendship of the two nations? Carden can't be good long: he'll
break out again presently. He has no political imagination. That's
a rather common disease here, too. Few men have. It's good fun. I'm
inviting the Central and South American Ministers to lunch with me,
one by one, and I'm incidentally loading them up. I have all the
boys in the Embassy full of zeal and they are tackling the
Secretaries of the Central and South American legations. We've got
a _principle_ now to deal by with them. They'll see after a while.
English people are all right, too--except the Doctrinaires. They
write much rank ignorance. But the learned men learn things last of
all.
I thank you heartily for your good news about Tyrrell, about the
President (but I'm sorry he's tired: make him quit eating meat and
play golf); about the Panama tolls; about the Currency Bill (my
love to McAdoo); about my own little affairs.--We are looking with
the very greatest pleasure to the coming of the young White House
couple. I've got two big dinners for them--Sir Edward, the Lord
Chancellor, a duchess or two, some good folk, Ruth Bryan, a couple
of ambassadors, etc., etc., etc. Then we'll take 'em to a literary
speaking-feast or two, have 'em invited to a few great houses; then
we'll give 'em another dinner, and then we'll get a guide for them
to see all the reforming institutions in London, to their hearts'
content--lots of fun.
Lots of fun: I got the American Society for its Thanksgiving dinner
to invite the Lord Chancellor to respond to a toast to the
President. He's been to the United States lately and he is greatly
pleased. So far, so good. Then I came down here--where he, too, is
staying. After five or six hours' talk about everything else he
said, "By the way, your countrymen have invited me," etc., etc.
"Now what would be appropriate to talk about?" Then I poured him
full of the New Principle as regards Central and South America;
for, if he will talk on that, what he says will be reported and
read on both continents. He's a foxy Scot, and he didn't say he
would, but he said that he'd consider it. "Consider it" means that
he will confer with Sir Edward. I'm beginning to learn their
vocabulary. Anyhow the Lord Chancellor is in line.
It's good news you send always. Keep it up--keep it up. The volume
of silence that I get is oppressive. You remember the old nigger
that wished to pick a quarrel with another old nigger? Nigger No. 1
swore and stormed at nigger No. 2, and kept on swearing and
storming, hoping to provoke him. Nigger No. 2 said not a word, but
kept at his work. Nigger No. 1 swore and stormed more. Nigger No. 2
said not a word. Nigger No. 1 frothed still more. Nigger No. 2,
still silent. Nigger No. 1 got desperate and said: "Look here, you
kinky-headed, flat-nosed, slab-footed nigger, I warns you 'fore
God, don't you keep givin' me none o' your damned silence!" I wish
you'd tell all my friends that story.
Always heartily yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 34: Prince Arthur of Connaught and the Duchess of Fife were
married in the Chapel Royal, October 16, 1913.]
[Footnote 35: See the Appendix (at end of Vol. II) for this episode in
detail.]
[Footnote 36: There was a suggestion, which the Ambassador endorsed,
that President Wilson should visit England to accept, in the name of the
United States, Sulgrave Manor, the ancestral hone, of the Washingtons.
See Chapter IX, page 274.]
[Footnote 37: Viscount Haldane, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain
since 1912.]