DEFEAT OF NEJUMI AT TOSKI, AND OF OSMAN DIGNA AT TOKAR.
The Khalifa's intentions regarding Egypt--Wad en Nejumi despatched
north--Various operations on the Egyptian frontier--Battle of
Toski--Defeat and death of Nejumi--Subsequent events in
Dongola--Osman Digna's operations against Sawakin--Is defeated at
Tokar--Emin Pasha and events in Equatoria--Recent events in Uganda
and Unyoro.
Having briefly considered the Khalifa's operations within the Sudan, let
us now turn and follow his movements and intentions regarding Egypt.
Ever since the annihilation of Hicks Pasha's expedition the conquest of
Egypt had been the dream of the Mahdi's life. Those of his followers who
had seen Egypt described it in the most glowing terms to the Sudanese,
whose cupidity was fully aroused. The immense wealth in Cairo, the
lovely women in the harems, had excited their most ardent desires.
The Mahdi himself had decided on the Khedive's palace of Abdin as his
place of residence, whence it was his intention to proceed to Syria, and
after conquering it, to advance on Mecca. He had prophesied that the
conquest of Egypt should be carried out by Khalifa Sherif's flag, and he
himself had done all in his power to incite the Egyptians to revolt. He
wrote numbers of letters to the leading sheikhs and principal people in
Cairo, and had he not died, there is no doubt his influence would have
permeated, in no small degree, into Egypt. Several people in Egypt
believed in him as the true Mahdi, and besides, he was now the ruler of
hundreds of thousands of people. With his death belief in Mahdiism began
to decline. His successor, it is true, was a man of boundless energy,
and had just as ambitious ideas as his predecessor in regard to the
conquest of Egypt, but circumstances had entirely altered.
[Illustration: AN ARAB SHEIKH OF UPPER EGYPT.]
The Mahdi's death and the Khalifa's accession had caused Mahdiism to
break up into two distinct parties, viz. the Baggara Arabs, who called
themselves the Arabs of the Sudan, and the "Aulad Belad," or country
people, such as the Danagla, Barabra, Jaalin, and other tribes on the
White Nile. This division in Mahdieh considerably weakened it. Wad En
Nejumi and his emirs belonged to the section opposed to the Khalifa, and
who would like to have freed themselves from his control; in consequence
Abdullah always arranged that a Baggara emir should be attached to
Nejumi, to keep him informed of all the latter's doings.
The Mahdi had laid down the plan for invading Egypt, which should be by
combined movements from Dongola towards Halfa, and from Abu Hamed
towards Korosko; and accordingly, when the English evacuated Dongola in
June 1885, Mohammed el Kheir, the conqueror of Berber, together with
Abdel Majid, at once took possession of the province, and the first
action which took place between these latter and the British and
Egyptian troops occurred in December the same year at Giniss. El Kheir
was defeated, and fixed his advanced camp at Kerma.
The fall of Sennar enabled the Khalifa to send forward more troops for
his operations against Egypt, and the Mahdi's prophecy that the conquest
of Egypt was to be carried out by Sherif's flag, entirely fell in with
his own arrangements, for he entrusted the command of the advanced force
to Wad En Nejumi, who belonged to Sherif's raya (flag), and thus
succeeded in keeping this powerful emir, whom he regarded with great
fear and jealousy, as far away from him as possible.[K]
Nejumi set out from Omdurman in November 1885, and marching along the
river bank to Berber, robbed and pillaged as if he were advancing
through an enemy's country. He seized the goods of merchants at Berber,
giving them receipts signed to the effect that they should receive
payment when he had taken Assuan. He captured two Egyptian spies, one of
whom he decapitated, and the other had his hand and foot cut off. During
his stay at Berber he robbed and pillaged in all directions, and used to
boast of his approaching conquest of Egypt. He stopped all trade with
the north, and drove on the entire population towards Dongola.
It was not, however, until the end of November 1886, that he reached
Dongola, and there he began to organize his fighting force, which was
continually increased by reinforcements sent from Omdurman.
Early in 1887 four messengers were despatched with letters to Her
Majesty the Queen of England, His Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, and His
Highness the Khedive. These envoys were permitted to come to Cairo, and
to personally deliver their letters; but when they were opened, perused,
and found only to contain a summons from the Khalifa to adopt Mahdiism,
and submit to him, or the recipients would suffer the same fate as
Gordon and Hicks, the messengers were at once sent back without any
reply being given to them, and this was considered by Abdullah to be the
greatest insult that could have been offered to him.
The Dervish advanced-guards continued to creep on towards the Egyptian
Frontier, whilst Hassan Khalifa, the nephew of the former Mudir of
Berber, occupied the desert wells, and made several incursions on the
river to the north and south of Korosko. Mounted on dromedaries, these
bold raiders made sudden descents on defenceless villages, carried off
quantities of booty, and then disappeared into the desert.
At this time the Egyptians had retired to Wadi Halfa, and the Dervishes
had occupied Sarras, a little to the south, from whence they constantly
harassed the Egyptian outposts. A variety of circumstances, however,
occurred to prevent Khalifa Abdullah from carrying out his projects
against Egypt. The revolt in Darfur, the Abyssinian war, internal
dissensions, all contributed to impede the despatch of troops north.
Besides, the Dervish garrison in Dongola had already done much to
destroy the well-being and prosperity of the province; they plundered
the inhabitants, who, in their turn, became averse to the Dervish
occupation; continued warfare had produced a famine; numbers died of
small-pox.
Bahr el Karrar in 1888 occupied the wells of Haimar and Ongat, and from
here was able to annoy the inhabitants on the Nile between Assuan and
Korosko. He raided the village of Kalabsheh, some fifty miles south of
Assuan, killed the Egyptian police guards, and carried off their officer
a captive to Omdurman. All this time there was a great deal of talk in
the capital about the conquest of Egypt, but we never received any very
decisive news. The captured officer was paraded through the streets in
triumph, and was then brought before the Khalifa, who received him
kindly, and questioned him very fully about Egypt; but he quite
understood what sort of replies to make to the Khalifa's questions, and
only told him what he knew would please; so he was well treated, set at
liberty, and now lives in Omdurman.
From time to time the Khalifa despatched reinforcements to Dongola which
never returned, and this was the reason of the main road leading north
out of Omdurman being called "Darb Esh Shuhada" ("The Martyrs' Road ").
The Egyptian Government had now confined itself to the defence of its
own frontiers. In June 1888, Bishir Bey, a subsidized Government sheikh,
turned Bahr Karrar out of Haimar; but on the other hand, the Sarras
Dervishes made a sudden descent on the Dabarosa bazaar, killed a number
of merchants, and escaped before the troops from Haifa could intercept
them. Meanwhile, there was not much harmony between the big emirs.
Nejumi and his followers were jealous of the masterful Baggaras, and it
was only with the greatest reluctance that they brought themselves to
show any respect to the Emir Mussaid of the Baggara Habbanieh, who had
been sent to Dongola by the Khalifa to watch and report on Nejumi's
doings.
The Baggaras hated Nejumi to such an extent that one of their number
attempted to poison him; but he recovered after a long illness, though
he never entirely got the poison out of his system. It is said that his
eyesight was always bad afterwards. This constant bickering between the
Baggara and Nejumi crippled his energy. Formerly he had been greatly
feared by them, but now his own people were annoyed that he showed so
much deference to the Khalifa and his emirs. As for the Khalifa, he was
thoroughly exasperated by Nejumi's indolence, and summoned him to
Omdurman.
During his absence from the province, a deserter from the Egyptian side
led the Dervishes into the fort at Khor Musa, within five miles of
Halfa, where they killed some of the garrison, but were unable to take
the whole fort. Colonel Wodehouse having been informed of their attack,
at once sent out help, and the Dervishes were surprised and annihilated.
[Illustration: BISHIR BEY, SHEIKH OF THE ABABDEH ARABS.]
Towards the end of 1888 Nejumi was in Dongola again. The Khalifa had
threatened to throw him into chains unless he showed more energy in his
operations against Egypt. He had already exhibited his displeasure by
imprisoning Sheikh Idris and Makin Wad en Nur, who had shown a
reluctance to go forward, for they had made up their minds that a
successful attack on Egypt was an impossibility. They could not even
capture Wadi Halfa. The desert roads were next to impassable owing to
want of water, whilst the river was in the hands of the enemy, who had
numbers of steamers, and could prevent any Dervish advance by water. All
these difficulties were quite apparent to Nejumi and his emirs; but so
self-confident was the Khalifa, that he could not believe there was any
great difficulty in conquering Egypt; added to this, several sheikhs of
Upper Egypt had assured him that when the Dervishes advanced they would
be joined by the entire population.
Thus the Khalifa insisted, and Nejumi could not do otherwise than obey.
He had already transferred to Dongola the entire Batahin tribe, which
had showed a mutinous spirit, and early in 1889 he sent a further
detachment, consisting of thirty flags, composed for the most part of
Gehena Arabs, who are not warlike, and were most averse to fighting in
the Dervish cause. Thus, like lambs to the slaughter, were these
unwilling tribes driven forward to battle.
When the revolt in Darfur had been suppressed, and Abyssinia had been
humbled, the Khalifa turned his attention more earnestly than ever to
the invasion of Egypt. He despatched Yunis ed Dekeim to Dongola, and on
his arrival, Nejumi was to begin his advance north.
Nejumi was now nominated Commander-in-chief, and being one of the
Mahdi's most determined and fanatical emirs, he had given him the title
of "Emir el Umara" ("The Emir of emirs"). He had under his command
several brave emirs, such as Abdel Halim, Makin en Nur, Wad Gubara,
Sheikh Idris, Osman Azrak, and several others. But the fighting
conditions of these Dervishes had considerably changed during the last
few years. The Ansar no longer fought for Mahdieh. All those promises
of joys in paradise were no longer believed in, for by dying the Mahdi
had proved himself to be false, and so were all his prophecies. They did
not fight to obtain booty, for long experience had shown them that the
booty was exclusively appropriated by the Khalifa and his emirs. It was
now fear of the Khalifa's anger which drove them to fight, and numbers
of them deserted when a favourable opportunity occurred for them to do
so.
Not only were all these feelings at work in Nejumi's force, but also the
conditions of the country in which he was operating were very different
from those in which he had won all his early victories. Then he knew
every path, almost every tree. It was his own country; the inhabitants
were of his own race; volunteers flocked to his standards. He always
largely exceeded his enemies in point of numbers; but now it was all
entirely different. He knew nothing of the country through which he had
to march; enormous difficulties blocked his every movement. Even had the
population of Upper Egypt been desirous of joining him, they were much
too carefully looked after by the troops and the Government to be able
to do so. An enormous desert separated him from the position he desired
to reach, and the result was that his force--just as Hicks's force had
done--suffered greatly from want of water. As usual he was accompanied
by numbers of women and children, and sometimes even five dollars would
not purchase a drink of water.
Abdullah showed his mistrust of the men by permitting their wives and
families to accompany them, for he thought that they could not well run
away, leaving their wives and children behind, and therefore they would
have to fight; but this great crowd of women and children hampered
Nejumi's movements enormously, and still further increased the want
which already prevailed in the Dervish camp. When in Dongola, the
Gehenas were suffering so terribly from famine that they stole the
Dervishes' sheepskins, on which they prayed, and ate them.
It was madness to attempt to invade Egypt with such a force as Nejumi
then had, made up of almost every tribe and nationality, all huddled
together, and yet absolutely wanting in cohesion. Then the enemy which
they were going to fight was of an entirely different stamp to the one
they had overcome in the Sudan. The Egyptian was not the same as in the
old days. The army was now composed of well-trained battalions under
English officers; and it is not out of place here to remark that the
occupation of Egypt by England was a heavy blow to the Khalifa and his
followers. Often have I heard him say, "If the English would only
evacuate Egypt, I should very soon take possession of it."
Thus did Nejumi set out from Dongola with his force. At Sarras a parade
was held, and some 14,000 souls counted; but of these nearly half were
women and children. His intention was to avoid Halfa, and march direct
on Bimban, as the inhabitants of that place had promised to join him;
but in the village of Argin, he was attacked and defeated by Colonel
Wodehouse. Here Nejumi lost about 1,000 men, amongst whom were several
emirs, including Sheikh Idris and Abdel Kader Guru, besides many more
wounded. On account of this victory, Wodehouse Pasha was known in the
Sudan as "the vanquisher of Wad Nejumi."
But, in spite of his defeat, Nejumi still continued his advance,
although the only food he had for his force was camels' and donkeys'
meat, and his troops were more dead than alive. He was obliged to make
his cavalry into a rear-guard to prevent desertion, but still large
numbers succeeded in joining the Egyptian troops.
The Sirdar, General Grenfell Pasha, wrote a letter to Nejumi, in which
he showed him that he understood the wretched state his troops had come
to, and urging him not to expose uselessly the lives of so many of his
people; but take the wise course and surrender. Nejumi, however, boldly
replied that if Grenfell Pasha would adopt Mahdiism he would guarantee
him happiness and contentment, otherwise he would sweep him and his
troops off the face of the earth.
Only one of the two messengers who had been sent with General Grenfell's
letter returned with this reply; the other--an Arab named Abdel
Hadi--was sent on to Omdurman bearing the General's letter to the
Khalifa, who was also informed by Nejumi, that Abdel Hadi had originally
been on the Dervish side at Abu Hamed, but had deserted over to the
"Turks."[L] On his arrival, Abdullah questioned him closely regarding
the latest news of Nejumi and the condition of the opposing armies.
Abdel Hadi replied that the "Turks" were very strong, and that it was
probable that Nejumi would be defeated. For this saying, he was thrown
into prison for months, and would have starved to death had not Neufeld,
who was with him in prison, given him some help; he was eventually
released through the intermediary of Hajji Saad, and permitted to return
to Abu Hamed, whence he escaped back to Egypt.
Meanwhile Nejumi still continued his advance; he could not and would not
submit. On the one hand he was of far too proud a nature to submit to
the hated Egyptian troops; and on the other, his fear of the Khalifa
added to his natural obstinacy. At Toski his advance was arrested by
General Grenfell at the head of the Egyptian troops, and he had no other
course open but to fight. He was utterly defeated, himself and most of
his emirs killed, whilst a mass of men, women and children fell into the
hands of the Egyptian force.
This battle took place on the 3rd of August, 1889; by it the
annihilation of Hicks Pasha's expedition was avenged, and the project of
invading Egypt, which had been maturing for the last three years,
entirely collapsed. The news of this defeat caused great commotion in
Omdurman; it was at first rumoured that every one had been killed; and
the Khalifa was in despair. He hated the Europeans and Egyptians, and
though we, in our hearts, were rejoiced at the news, we suffered no
small anxiety as well, for we thought it quite possible that the Khalifa
would appease his wrath to some extent by venting his annoyance on us.
It was, indeed, a most crushing blow for him and his followers.
[Illustration: WAD EN NEJUMI.
_From a photograph of a drawing made by an Egyptian officer of the great
Emir, as he lay dead on the field of Toski._]
The Emirs Hassan en Nejumi--a relative of Wad Nejumi--and Siwar ed
Dahab, who had escaped from the massacre, returned with all speed to
Dongola, and thence to Omdurman. They reported that it was madness of
Nejumi to have attempted what he did; that all his emirs were opposed to
it, and that they had told Nejumi that they were sure, if the Khalifa
were fully informed of all the circumstances, he would never have
permitted him to advance. As it was, famine, want of water, and the
unseasonable time of the year, ought to have been sufficient reasons for
postponing the expedition; but Nejumi turned a deaf ear to all their
protests, he feared the Khalifa; his plundering and cruelties cried to
heaven for vengeance, and the instruments of that vengeance appeared in
the persons of General Grenfell and Colonel Wodehouse.
Saleh Bey, the son of Hussein Pasha Khalifa, and a subsidized sheikh of
the Egyptian Government, drove his nephew out of Murat, advanced almost
to Abu Hamed, and we fondly hoped that the Government would at least
advance to Dongola, which is the key of the Sudan; but we were again
doomed to disappointment.
And now Mahdiism was far too exhausted to make any further attempts on
Egypt. The province of Dongola had been utterly ruined, and Yunis's
ill-treatment of the inhabitants was beyond description. Complaints of
his evil deeds eventually reached the Khalifa's ears, and fearing that
the inhabitants might be induced to join the "Turks," he relieved Yunis
of his appointment, and replaced him by Zogal, who, in spite of his
former fall from power, was known to be a just man, and the Khalifa
trusted to him to restore the confidence of the people. Yet the Khalifa
did not entirely trust Zogal, and still left Mussaid to watch him, he
also sent another Baggara called Arabi with three hundred troops to
observe his doings.
Dongola now became a hotbed of spying and cross-spying. Matters became
so serious that it seemed a fight between the rival parties was
imminent, and every post brought letters from either section, accusing
the other of malpractices. The Khalifa therefore summoned these two
emirs--Mussaid and Arabi--to Dongola, and on their arrival they reported
that it was Zogal's intention to deliver up the province to the Egyptian
Government. Thereupon the Khalifa recalled Zogal, and replaced him by
Yunis.
Zogal, on his arrival in Omdurman, was well received, and did not
hesitate to refute the misstatements of the emirs; but he was not
believed, and was thrown into chains, where he remains to this day.
Zogal's only fault is, that he is a Dongolawi, and a relative of the
Mahdi, whilst his opponents are all Baggaras, who are the governing
party, and therefore he is not likely to receive any pity from them.
Besides Wad en Nejumi and Abu Anga, there yet remained one of the
greatest of the Mahdi's old emirs. I mean Osman Digna, to whom I
referred in the early pages of this work. He had been sent to the
Eastern Sudan after the fall of El Obeid, and in July 1883, had taken up
a position near Sawakin. The Mahdi had given him proclamations to
distribute to all the tribes in the neighbourhood of Kassala and
Sawakin, ordering them to rise against the Government. The summons was
obeyed, and by the end of 1883 Osman Digna was in possession of all the
principal posts in the vicinity. The most important work which Osman
Digna performed for the Mahdi was cutting the communication between
Sawakin and Berber, and thus blocking the shortest and best road into
the Sudan. Fully alive to the importance of this route, the Government
made repeated attempts to re-open it, but Osman, with his dauntless
Hadendoas, caused every effort to fail.
On the 3rd of February, General Baker Pasha made a vain attempt, but was
cut to pieces at El Teb, losing over two thousand men and all his arms
and ammunition. After Baker's defeat, the English made another effort,
and after General Graham had defeated Osman Digna at both Teb and Tamai,
the proposal was made to open the road to Berber, and thus relieve
Gordon, then besieged in Khartum; but it was thought impossible to fight
Osman Digna's hordes, and to overcome the difficulties of the desert, so
the idea was abandoned.
For seven long years Osman Digna continued alternately to harass and
besiege Sawakin; but gradually numbers of the local Arabs--notably the
Amarar--fell away from his cause, and intertribal conflicts ensued.
When almost quite deserted, Osman Digna came to Omdurman. In January
1887, he returned _viâ_ Gedaref and Kassala, where he collected some
four thousand men, eventually occupied Handub, and again besieged
Sawakin. He also defeated the Amarar, and killed over seven hundred of
them.
Kitchener Pasha, the Governor-General of the Red Sea Littoral, was
severely wounded during his attack on Handub; in March of the same year
Abu Girgeh arrived with a force from Kassala, and thus Osman became
almost as powerful as ever. He continued to harass Sawakin, and to
devastate the neighbouring country. It was useless for him to attempt to
take the town, he therefore received the Khalifa's orders to establish
himself at Tokar in January 1889, and at the same time he was permitted
to open commercial relations with Sawakin. A small post was established
at Handub, and Dervish merchants were actually permitted to enter the
town and purchase goods.
These commercial relations existed for about two years between Sawakin
and the Dervishes, and, as a famine prevailed at Tokar, the enemy drew
most of their supplies through the port of Trinkitat. Suddenly news
reached Omdurman to the effect that the gates of Sawakin had been
closed, and all traffic stopped between Tokar and Handub. In consequence
the famine increased, and merchants arriving in Omdurman said that no
doubt it was the intention of the Government to attack Osman Digna very
soon.
The wealthiest of these merchants was a certain Omar Kisha, who had
smuggled quantities of lead and powder through Sawakin. The news they
brought was soon confirmed, and in February 1891, Handub was occupied.
In March a message was received from Zogal, in Dongola, to the effect
that a salute had been fired at Halfa to announce the occupation of
Tokar by the Government, and the complete defeat of Osman Digna. This
news created almost a panic in Omdurman, and what made it worse was the
uncertainty, for no news had been received either through Berber or
Kassala. It was not until eight days later that a Shukrieh Arab arrived
from Kassala, and said that he had heard much talk about the defeat at
Tokar, but the fate of Osman Digna was uncertain, some said that he had
been killed, others, seriously wounded. A month afterwards letters
arrived from Osman himself confirming the news of the defeat. This
caused great consternation, and the Khalifa at once assembled a council.
It was said that an Egyptian expedition had already reached Berber, and
every day it was thought news would arrive of the capture of Dongola. It
was decided to make a camp at Metemmeh. The whole of Omdurman was
secretly rejoicing at the approaching downfall of the Khalifa, but again
we were all doomed to the most bitter disappointment. News came from
Berber that the "Turks" had no intention of advancing further, and were
content to have occupied Tokar, where they had built a fort and securely
established themselves. But, though thus temporarily relieved, the loss
of Tokar was a very severe blow to the Khalifa, as the Government was
now in immediate contact with the tribes on the Sawakin-Berber road, and
the way was clear.
On the last Muled (the anniversary of the Prophet's birth) Osman Digna
arrived at Omdurman, accompanied by a few followers. During his flight
from Tokar towards Kassala his followers had nothing to eat but wild
figs, and many had starved. The Khalifa received Osman very coldly, and
reproached him for his defeat; he afterwards sent him to cultivate on
the Atbara, where he now lives at a place called Adaramab.
Of all the opponents to Government, Osman Digna was perhaps the most
bitter; he had done great things at Sawakin, Kassala, and on the
Abyssinian frontier, but by his ruthless cruelty he had alienated the
Arabs from his cause. In his present seclusion he has, probably,
occasion to think of all his evil and bloodthirsty deeds, which have
ended in the ruin of his country and the death of his followers. Almost
all the Arabs who espoused his cause with so much zeal are now dead,
and his present humiliation is a fitting reward for his blind adherence
to a false and ruthless tyrant.
Scarcity of money in the beit et mal at Omdurman was the main reason for
the despatch of an expedition up the White Nile. Since 1885 Emin had not
been disturbed by the Dervishes, and Karamallah had long since retired
to Bahr el Ghazal, from whence no news had been received of him for
years.
There was no Dervish post south of Fashoda, which was the market to
which the blacks brought their cattle for sale. The negro tribes all
along the White Nile had been left quite undisturbed by the Dervishes,
but now it occurred to the Khalifa to send an expedition to collect
ivory and slaves and to subdue Emin Pasha. Omar Saleh was appointed to
command, and was given three steamers and a number of sailing vessels;
he was also the bearer of a letter to Emin informing him of the various
events which had occurred in the Sudan, and calling on him to surrender
to Omar. To add weight to his letter, he also ordered the Syrian
Stambuli to write in a similar sense; also some of the Copts in Omdurman
were ordered to write to the Copts who were known to be in Emin's
service.
Omar Saleh left Omdurman in July 1888, and a whole year passed without
any information of his movements reaching Omdurman; it was thought that
Emin must have annihilated the expedition and captured the steamers. The
Khalifa became restless, but at length one of the steamers returned,
laden with ivory and slaves.
We were all naturally most anxious to hear about Emin, and the men who
brought the despatches informed us that they had arrived at Regaf in
October; this place they took by storm, and had sent down to Omdurman
one of the clerks they had taken prisoner there. As to Emin, they stated
that he and an Englishman (we thought this Englishman must be the
intrepid Stanley) had been put in chains by the mutinous soldiers,
because the Englishman wanted to bring Emin to Egypt, as the Khedive had
sent him there for that purpose. Omar Saleh had seized this opportunity
to take possession of the province, but he had been driven back by the
mutineers; this last news was not told the Khalifa, but we heard it in
confidence. Omar had begged the Khalifa to send back the steamer without
delay, and in consequence it went south again a few days afterwards.
[Illustration: A NATIVE WOMAN OF MAKARAKA, THE WIFE OF ONE OF EMIN
PASHA'S OFFICERS, WHO REACHED EGYPT FROM UGANDA IN JUNE 1892.]
A long time after this another steamer arrived from Equatoria, but it
brought no important information. It seemed that Emin had left the
provinces, that on his departure the country had fallen into a state of
anarchy, and that the blacks had massacred all the Arabs. The Khalifa
despatched two emirs, Hasib and Elias Wad Kanuna, to Regaf in the
steamer; and as it was reported that the Dervishes there suffered a
great deal from the climate, he decided to make it a place of exile, and
afterwards sent only bad characters there.
In 1891 the Emir Hasib arrived in Omdurman; he came as a fugitive, and
reported that he was with two of the steamers which had been sent to a
place two days' journey from Regaf to collect ivory; they made a zariba,
and one steamer was already loaded up when they were suddenly attacked
by the blacks, who killed everyone in the zariba, and he had retreated
with the remaining empty steamer, but the other had fallen into the
enemy's hands.
Some of the blacks who came to Omdurman with Hasib said that they had
heard Emin had returned to the province and had stirred up the blacks to
revolt against the Dervishes; but Hasib was of a different opinion, and
believed the attack to have been purely a local affair.[M]
Khalifa Abdullah now felt some alarm for the safety of his posts at
Lado and Regaf, more particularly as he was now at war with the
Shilluks, and his post at Fashoda was hemmed in by this warlike tribe;
he therefore despatched another steamer south to obtain more
information, but the Dervishes he wished to send refused to go, and had
to be dragged on board in chains.
In my opinion the Khalifa will have some difficulty in retaining his
posts on the White Nile. When I left Omdurman, the head of the Shilluk
King was hanging on the gallows, and his brave people revolted against
this act of treachery which had deprived them of their chief. The revolt
had assumed large proportions, and the Emir Zeki had been despatched to
Fashoda from Galabat, and had been heavily pressed by the infuriated
blacks.
FOOTNOTES:
[K] It was the knowledge of this fact that caused General Sir
F. Grenfell, in his letter written to Nejumi, calling on him to
surrender just prior to the action of Toski, to say, "I know that you
personally have been the victim of a base jealousy imposed upon you by
the false Khalifa."--_Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan_, p. 418.
[L] It must be remembered that with the Arabs of the Sudan the
term "Turk" is a synonym for the hated oppressor of whatever
nationality. The British troops, even, were confounded under the same
appellation.
[M] The arrival of a portion of the old Equatoria garrison in
Cairo in June 1892, who had travelled under the ægis of the Imperial
British East Africa Company through Uganda to Mombasa, throws further
light on the present situation in Equatoria. They state that after
Stanley's departure from Kavalli's, Selim Bey (Emin's old commandant),
who had been despatched north to collect the garrison, finding that
Stanley had gone, settled down with a small number of men in his old
camp at Kavalli's, while the rebel officer, Fadl Maula Bey, with the
bulk of the garrison, remained in the neighbourhood of Wadelai. This
place was eventually attacked by the Dervishes, who were driven off, but
most of the garrison, feeling that they could not trust Fadl Maula, who
was known to have been in communication with the Dervishes, deserted to
Selim Bey. Emin had come to Kavalli's in April 1891, but on stating that
he was in German employ had been joined by only a few of his old
garrison, and had not attempted to re-enter his old province. Shortly
after Emin's departure, Captain Lugard had arrived, and had taken the
entire force into Uganda and Unyoro, where he had established some
military posts.--F. R. W.