pertractata a D. Joanne in libro coram Patribus lecto, statuere
articulum fidei circa corporeitatem Angelorum, perspicuum est:
unde ad tollendam contradictionem hujus, cum allata definitione
Concilii Lateranensis, multum desudant Theologi. Unus enim, Suarez,
=de Angelis=, ait, quod Patres non contradixerunt tali asserto de
corporeitate Angelorum, quia non de illa re agebatur. Alius, Bann.,
in p. p. q. 10, ait, quod Synodus adprobavit conclusionem, nempe
Angelos pingi posse, non tamen adprobavit rationem, =quia corporei
sunt=. Alius, Molin., in p. p., q. 50. a. 1, ait, quod definitiones
Conciliares in illa Synodo factæ sunt solum =actione septima=, proinde
ea quæ habentur in actionibus præcedentibus non esse definitiones de
fide. Alii, Joverc. et Mirand., =Sum. Conc.=, scribunt nec Nicænum,
nec Lateranense Concilium intendisse definere de fide quæstionem; et
Nicænum quidem locutum fuisse juxta opinionem Platonicorum, quæ ponit
Angelos corporeos, et tunc prævalebat; Lateranense autem locutum esse
juxta mentem Aristotelis, qui, l. 12. =Metaphys.=, tex. 49, ponit
intelligentias incorporeas, quæ sententia contra Platonicos apud
plerosque Doctores invaluit expost.
38. That this approbation by a Council of the doctrine set forth at
length in the book of John establishes an article of belief with
regard to the corporeity of Angels, there is not a shadow of doubt: so
Theologians toil and moil in order to remove the contradiction apparent
between that decision and the definition, above quoted, by the Council
of Lateran. One of them, Suarez, says that if the Fathers did not
disprove such an assertion of the corporeity of Angels, it is because
that was not the question. Another contends that the Synod did approve
the conclusion, namely that Angels might be pictured, but not the
motive given, _their corporeity_. A third, Molina, observes that the
definitions issued in Council by the Synod were thus issued only at the
_seventh sitting_, whence he argues that those of the previous sittings
are not definitions of belief. Others, lastly, write that neither the
Council of Nicea nor that of Lateran intended defining a question of
belief, the Council of Nicea having spoken according to the opinion of
the Platonists, which describes Angels as corporeal beings and was then
prevailing, whilst that of Lateran went with Aristoteles, who, in his
12th. book of _Metaphysics_, lays down the existence of incorporeal
intelligences, a doctrine which has since carried the day with most
Doctors over the Platonists.
39. Sed quam frigidæ sint istæ responsiones nemo non videt, ac eas
minime satisfacere oppositioni palmariter demonstrat Bonaventura Baro,
=Scot. Defens.=, tom. 9, apolog. 2, actio 1, § 2 per totum.
Proinde ad tollendam contradictionem Conciliorum dicendum est, Nicænum
locutum esse de una, Lateranense autem de alia specie Angelorum,
et illam quidem corpoream, hanc vero penitus incorpoream; et sic
conciliantur aliter irreconciliabilia Concilia.
39. But any one can discern the invalidity of those answers, and
Bonaventure Baro (_Scot. Defens._, tome 9) proves to evidence that
they do not bear. In consequence, in order to agree the two Councils,
we must say that the Council of Nicea meant one species of Angels,
and that of Lateran another: the former, corporeal, the latter on the
contrary absolutely incorporeal; and thus are reconciled two otherwise
irreconcilable Councils.
40. Præmittendum 2º, nomen Angeli esse nomen officii, non naturæ, ut
concorditer scribunt S. S. Patres: Ambros. in c. 1 =epist. ad Hebr.=,
Hilaris, l. 5 de Trin., Augustinus, lib. 15 =de Civit. Dei= c. 23,
Gregorius, =Hom. 34 in Evang.=, Isidorus, l. =de Sum. Bonit.=, c. 12;
unde præclare ait D. Ambrosius: Angelus non ex eo quod est spiritus, ex
eo quod agit, Angelus, quia =Angelus= Græce, Latine =Nuntius= dicitur;
sequitur igitur ex hoc, quod illi, qui ad aliquod ministerium a Deo
mittuntur, sive spiritus sint, sive homines, Angeli vocari possunt;
et de facto ita vocantur in Scripturis Sacris: nam de Sacerdotibus,
Concionatoribus ac Doctoribus, qui tanquam Nuntii Dei explicant
hominibus divinam voluntatem, dicitur, =Malach.= c. 2. v. 7: =Labia
Sacerdotis custodient scientiam, et legem requirent ex ore ejus, quia
Angelus Domini exercituum est=. D. Joannes Baptista ab eodem Propheta,
c. 3 v. 1, vocatur Angelus, dum ait: =Ecce ego mitto Angelum meum, et
præparabit viam ante faciem meam=. Et hanc prophetiam esse ad litteram
de S. Joanne Baptista testatur Christus Dominus in =Evangelio Matthæi=,
11, v. 10. Immo et ipse Deus, quia fuit missus a Patre in mundum ad
evangelizandum legem gratiæ, vocatur Angelus. Ita in prophetia Isaiæ,
c. 9 v. 6, juxta versionem Septuaginta: =Vocabitur nomen ejus magni
consilii Angelus=, et clarius in Malachiæ c. 3 v. 1: =Veniet ad templum
sanctum suum Dominator quem vos quæritis, et Angelus testamenti quem
vos vultis=. Quæ prophetia ad litteram est de Christo Domino. Sequitur
igitur nullum absurdum sequi ex hoc, quod dicimus Angelos quosdam
esse corporeos, nam et homines, qui corpore constant, Angeli vocabulo
efferuntur.
40. Secondly, I premise that the word Angel applies, not indeed to
the kind, but to the office: the Holy Fathers are agreed thereupon
(St. Ambrose, on the _Epistle to the Hebrews_; St. Austin, _City of
God_; St. Gregory, _Homily 34 on Scripture_; St. Isidorus, _Supreme
Goodness_). An Angel, very truly says St. Ambrose, is thus styled,
not because he is a spirit, but on account of his office; Ἁγγελος in
Greek, _Nuntius_ in Latin, that is to say _Messenger_; it follows that
whoever is entrusted by God with a mission, be he spirit or man, may be
called an Angel, and is thus called in the Holy Scriptures, where the
following words are applied to Priests, Preachers and Doctors, who, as
Messengers of God, explain to men the divine will (Malachi, chapt. 2,
v. 7). “_The priest’s lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek
the law at his mouth, for he is the Angel of the Lord of Hosts._” The
same prophet, chapt. 3, v. 1, bestows the name of Angel on St. John
the Baptist, when saying: “_Behold, I will send my Angel and he shall
prepare the way before me._” That this prophecy literally applies to
St. John the Baptist is testified by our Lord Jesus-Christ, in the
Gospel, according to St. Matthew, chapt. 11, v. 10. Still more: God
himself is called an Angel, because he has been sent by His Father to
herald the law of mercy. To witness, the prophecy of Isaiah, chapt.
9, v. 6, according to Septuagint: “_He shall be called an Angel of
Wonderful Counsel._” And more plainly still in Malachi, chapt. 3, v.
1; “_The Lord whom ye seek shall suddenly come to his temple, even the
Angel of the covenant whom ye delight in_”, a prophecy which literally
applies to our Lord Jesus-Christ. There is consequently nothing absurd
in the contention that some Angels are corporeal, since men, who
assuredly have a body, are called Angels.
41. Præmittendum 3º, nondum rerum naturalium, quæ sunt in mundo, satis
perspectam esse existentiam, aut naturam, ut proinde aliquid negandum
sit ex eo, quod de illo nunquam alias dictum, aut scriptum fuerit.
Patet enim tractu temporis detectas esse novas terras, quas Antiqui
nostri ignorarunt, novaque animalia, herbas, plantas, fructus, semina
nunquam alias visa; et si pervia esset Terra Australis incognita,
cujus indagatio, et lustratio a multis hucusque incassum tentata est,
adhuc nova nobis alia panderentur. Patet adhuc, quod per inventionem
microscopii, et alias machinas, et organa Philosophiæ experimentalis
modernæ, sicut etiam per exactiorem indaginem Anatomistarum, multarum
rerum naturalium existentiam, vires, naturamque tum innotuisse, tum
dietim innotescere, quæ præcedentes Philosophi ignorarunt, ut patet
in auro fulminante, phosphoro, et centum aliis chymicis experimentis,
circulatione sanguinis, venis lacteis, vasis lymphaticis, et aliis
hujusmodi quæ nuper Anatomistæ adinvenerunt. Proinde ineptum erit
aliquod exsibillare ex hoc quod de eo nullus Antiquorum scripserit,
attento maxime Logicorum axiomate, quod locus ab auctoritate negativa
non tenet.
41. Thirdly, I premise that neither the existence nor the nature of
the natural things in this world has been sufficiently investigated to
allow of denying a fact, merely because it has never been previously
spoken of or written about. In the course of time have not new lands
been discovered which the Ancients knew not of? New animals, herbs,
plants, fruits and seeds, never seen elsewhere? And if that mysterious
Austral land came at last to be explored, as has been to this day
vainly tried by so many travellers, what unforeseen disclosures would
be the result! Through the invention of the microscope and other
instruments used by modern experimental Philosophy, combined with the
more exact methods of investigation of Anatomists, have there not been,
and are there not, every day, brought to light the existence, qualities
and characteristics of a number of natural things unknown to ancient
Philosophers, such as fulminating gold, phosphorus, and a hundred other
chemical compounds, the circulation of the blood, the lacteal vessels,
the lymph-ducts and other recent anatomical discoveries? To deride a
doctrine because it does not happen to be mentioned in any ancient
author would therefore be absurd, especially bearing in mind this axiom
of Logic: _locus ab auctoritate negativa non tenet_.
42. Præmittendum 4º, quod in Sacra Scriptura, et Ecclesiasticis
traditionibus non traditur nisi id, quod ad animæ salutem necessarium
est, quoad credendum, sperandum et amandum; unde inferre non licet
ex eo, quod nec ex Scriptura, nec ex traditione aliquod habetur,
proinde negandum sit, quod illud tale existat: aut nos quidem Fides
docet, Deum per Verbum suum omnia creasse visibilia, et invisibilia;
pariterque ex Jesu Christi Domini nostri meritis tum gratiam, tum
gloriam omni, et cuivis rationali creaturæ conferri. Num autem alius
Mundus a nostro, quem incolimus, sit, et in eo alii homines non ab
Adam prognati, sed alio modo a Deo creati existant (sicut ponunt illi
qui lunarem globum habitatum opinantur); pariterque num in hoc Mundo,
quem incolimus, aliæ existant creaturæ rationales ultra homines, et
Spiritus Angelicos, quæ regulariter hominibus sint invisibiles, et
per accidens, et earum executiva potentia fiant visibiles: hoc nullo
modo spectat ad fidem, et hoc scire, aut ignorare non est ad salutem
hominis necessarium, sicut nec scire rerum omnium physicarum numerum
aut naturam.
42. Fourthly, I premise that Holy Scripture and ecclesiastical
tradition do not teach us any thing beyond what is requisite for the
salvation of the soul, namely Faith, Hope and Charity. Consequently,
from a thing not being stated either by Scripture or tradition it must
not be inferred that that thing is not in existence. For instance,
Faith teaches us that God, by His Word, made things visible, and
invisible, and also that, through the merits of our Lord Jesus-Christ,
grace and glory are conferred on every rational creature. Now, that
there be another World than the one we live in, and that it be peopled
by men not born of Adam but made by God, in some other way, as is
implied by those who believe the lunar globe to be inhabited; or
further, that in the very World we dwell in, there be other rational
creatures besides man and the Angelic Spirits, creatures generally
invisible to us and whose being is disclosed but accidentally, through
the instrumentality of their own power; all that has nothing to do with
Faith, and the knowledge or ignorance thereof is no more necessary to
the salvation of man than knowing the number or nature of all physical
things.
43. Præmittendum 5º, nullam inveniri repugnantiam, nec in Philosophia,
nec in Theologia; quod dari possint creaturæ rationales constantes
spiritu et corpore, aliæ ab homine, quia si esset repugnantia, hoc
esset vel ex parte Dei (et hoc non quia ipse omnipotens est), vel
ex parte rei creabilis; et neque hoc, quia sicut creatura mere
spiritualis, ut Angeli, creata est, et mere materialis, ut Mundus, et
partim spiritualis, partim corporea, corporeitate terrestri, et crassa,
ut homo, ita creabilis est creatura constans spiritu rationali, et
corporeitate minus crassa, sed subtiliore, quam sit homo. Et profecto
post Resurrectionem anima Beatorum erit unita corpori glorioso dote
subtilitatis donato: ut proinde concludi posset, potuisse Deum creare
creaturam rationalem corpoream, cui naturaliter indita sit corporis
subtilitas, sicut per gratiam corpori glorioso confertur.
43. Fifthly, I premise that neither Philosophy nor Theology is
repugnant to the possible existence of rational creatures having spirit
and body and distinct from man. Such repugnance could be supported only
on God, and that is inadmissible, since he is all-mighty, or on the
thing to be made, and that likewise cannot be supported; for, as there
are purely spiritual creatures, such as Angels, or merely material,
such as the World, or lastly semi-spiritual and semi-corporeal, of an
earthly and gross corporeity, such as man, so there may well be in
existence a creature endowed with a rational spirit and a corporeity
less gross, more subtile than man’s. No doubt, moreover, but that after
Resurrection, the souls of the blessed will be united with a glorious
and subtile body; from which may be inferred that God may well have
made a rational and corporeal creature whose body naturally enjoys the
subtilty which will be conferred by the grace on the glorious body.
44. Astruitur autem magis talium creaturarum possibilitas ex solutione
argumentorum, quæ contra positam conclusionem fieri possunt, pariterque
ex responsione ad interrogationes, quæ possunt circa eam formari.
44. But, the possible existence of such creatures will be still better
set forth by solving the arguments which can be adduced against our
conclusion, and replying to the questions it may raise.
45. Prima interrogatio est, an tales creaturæ dicendæ essent animalia
rationalia? Quod si sic, quomodo different ab homine, cum quo communem
haberent definitionem?
45. First question: should such creatures be styled rational animals?
And if so, in what do they differ from man, with whom they would have
that definition in common?
46. Respondeo quod essent animalia rationalia sensibus et organis
corporis prædita, sicut homo: differrent autem ab homine non solum
ratione corporis tenuioris, sed etiam materiæ. Homo siquidem ex
crassiore elementorum omnium parte, puta ex luto, nempe aqua et terra
crassa formatus est, ut constat ex Scriptura, =Gen.= 2. v. 7.; ista
vero formata essent ex subtiliore parte omnium, aut unius, seu alterius
elementorum; ut proinde alia essent terrea, alia aquea, alia aerea,
et alia ignea; et ut eorum definitio cum hominis definitione non
conveniret, addendum esset definitioni hominis crassa materialitas sui
corporis, per quam a dictis animalibus differret.
46. I reply: Yes, they would be rational animals, provided with senses
and organs even as man; they would, however, differ from man not only
in the more subtile nature, but also in the matter of their body. In
fact, as is shown by Scripture, man has been made from the grossest
of all elements, namely clay, a gross mixture of water and earth:
but those creatures would be made from the most subtile part of all
elements, or of one or other of them; thus, some would proceed from
earth, others from water, or air, or fire; and, in order that they
should not be defined in the same terms as man, to the definition of
the latter should be added the mention of the gross materiality of his
body, wherein he would differ from said animals.
47. Secunda interrogatio est, quandonam hujus modi animalia fuissent
condita, et num cum brutis producta a terra, aut ab aqua, ut
quadrupedia, et aves respective; an vero a Domino Deo formata, ut fuit
homo?
47. Second question: At what period would those animals have been
originated, and wherefrom? From earth, like the beasts, or from water,
like quadrupeds, birds, etc.? Or, on the contrary, would they have been
made, like man, by our Lord God?
48. Respondeo quod de fide est, quod posito, quod existant de
facto, creata sint a principio Mundi: sic enim definitur a Concilio
Lateranensi (Firm. de sum. Trinit. et fide cathol.); nempe quod
Deus sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utramque de
nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem. Sub illa etenim
Creaturarum generalitate etiam illa animalia essent comprehensa. Quo
vero ad eorum formationem, decuisse ipsorum corpus a Deo ministerio
Angelorum formatum fuisse, sicut a Deo formatum legimus corpus hominis,
quia ipsi copulandus erat spiritus immortalis, quandoquidem spiritus
incorporeus et proinde nobilissimus corpori pariter originaliter
nobiliori cæteris brutis jungendus erat.
48. I reply: It is an article of belief, expressly laid down by the
Council of Lateran, that whatever is in fact and at present, was
made in the origin of the world. By His all-mighty virtue, God, from
the beginning of time, raised together from nothing both orders of
creatures, spiritual and corporeal. Now, those animals also would be
included in the generality of creatures. As to their formation, it
might be said that God Himself, through the medium of Angels, made
their body as he did man’s, to which an immortal spirit was to be
united. That body being of a nobler nature than that of other animals,
it was meet that it should be united to an incorporeal and highly noble
spirit.
49. Tertia interrogatio, an talia animalia habuissent originem ab uno
solo, velut omnes homines ab Adam, an vero plura simul formata essent
sicut fuit de cæteris animantibus a terra et aqua productis, in quibus
fuerunt mares et fœminæ quæ speciem per generationem conservant? Et
si hoc oporteret inter talia animalia esse distinctionem sexus; ipsa
nasci, et interire; passionibus sensus affici, nutriri, crescere; et
tunc quo alimento vescerentur, esset quærendum; præterea an vitam
socialem ducerent, ut homines; qua politica regerentur; num urbes ad
habitandum struxissent; num artes, studia, possessiones, et bella
inter ea essent, sicut est in hominibus.
49. Third question: Would those animals descend from one individual, as
all men descend from Adam, or, on the contrary, would many have been
made at the same time, as was the case for the other living things
issued from earth and water, wherein were males and females for the
preservation of the kind by generation? Would there be amongst them
a distinction between the sexes? Would they be subject to birth and
death, to senses, passions, want of food, power of growth? If so, what
their nutrition? Would they lead a social life, as men do? By what
laws ruled? Would they build up cities for their dwellings, cultivate
the arts and sciences, hold property, and wage war between themselves,
as men are wont to?
50. Respondeo: potuit esse quod omnia ab uno, velut homines ab Adam,
sint progenita; potuit pariter esse, quod ex iis multi mares, et plures
fœminæ fuissent formatæ, a quibus per generationem eorum species essent
propagatæ. Ultro admitteremus talia animalia oriri et mori; mares
alios, alias fœminas inter ea esse; passionibus, sensibus agitari velut
homines; nutriri et crescere secundum molem sui corporis; cibum autem
ipsorum non crassum qualem requirit crassities corporis humani, sed
substantiam tenuem et vaporosam emanantem per effluvia spirituosa a
rebus physicis pollentibus corpusculis maxime volatilibus, ut nidor
carnium maxime assatarum, vapor vini, fructuum, florum, aromatum, a
quibus copiosa hujusmodi effluvia usque ad totalem partium subtiliorum
ac volatilium evaporationem scaturiunt. Talia autem animalia civilem
vitam ducere posse, et inter ea distinctos esse gradus dominantium
ac servientium pro conditione naturæ ipsorum, artesque, scientias,
ministeria, exercitia, loca, mansiones, ac alia necessaria ad eorum
conservationem, nullam penitus importat repugnantiam.
50. I reply: It may be that all descend from one individual, as men
descend from Adam; it may be also that a number of males and females
were made initially, who preserved their kind by generation. We will
further admit that they are born and die; that they are divided into
males and females, and are moved by senses and passions, as men are;
that they feed and grow according to the size of their body; their
food, however, instead of being gross like that required by the human
body, must be delicate and vapoury, emanating through spirituous
effluvia from whatever in the physical world abounds with highly
volatile corpuscles, such as the flavour of meats, especially of
roasts, the fume of wine, the fragrancy of fruit, flowers, aromatics,
which evolve an abundance of those effluvia until all their subtile
and volatile parts have completely evaporated. To their being able to
lead a social life, with distinctions of rank and precedence; to their
cultivating the arts and sciences, exercising functions, maintaining
armies, building up cities, doing in short whatever is requisite for
their preservation, I have in the main no objection.
51. Quarta interrogatio est, qualis esset eorum corporis figuratio,
an humanam, an aliam formam, et qualem haberent, et an partes
corporis ipsorum haberent ordinem essentialem inter se, ut corpora
cæterorum animalium, an vero accidentalem tantum, ut corpora fluidarum
substantiarum, ut olei, aquæ, nubis, fumi, etc.; et num substantiæ
suarum partium organicarum diversimode constarent, ut organa hominum,
in quibus sunt aliæ partes crassissimæ, ut ossa, aliæ minus crassæ, ut
cartilagines, aliæ tenues, ut membranæ.
51. Fourth question: What would their figure be, human or otherwise?
Would the ordering of the divers parts of their body be essential, as
with other animals, or merely accidental, as with fluid substances,
such as oil, water, clouds, smoke, etc.? Would those organic parts
consist of various substances, as is the case with the organs of the
human body, wherein are to be found very gross parts, such as the
bones, others less gross, such as the cartilages, and others slender,
such as the membranes?
52. Respondeo, quod quantum ad figuram corpoream nihil certi
affirmare debemus, aut possumus, cum talis figura non sit exacte
nobis sensibilis, nec quoad visum, nec quoad tactum, præ sui corporis
tenuitate, ac perspicacitate; qualis proinde vere sit, noverent ipsi,
aliique, qui substantias immateriales intuitive cognoscere possunt.
Quoad congruentiam et probabilitatem dico, illa referre speciem
corporis humani, cum aliquo distinctivo a corpore humano, nisi forte
ad hoc sufficiat sua ipsorum tenuitas. Ducor, quia corpus humanum
plasmatum a Deo perfectissimum est, inter animalia quæque, et cum
cætera bruta in terram sint prona, eo quia anima eorum mortalis est,
Deus, ut ait poeta Ovid., =Metamorphos.=:
=Os homini sublime dedit, cœlumque tueri
Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus=;