German trench. But subsequently the progress was no longer uniform.
While certain units continued their forward movement with extreme
rapidity, others came up against machine guns still in action and either
stopped or advanced only with difficulty. Some centres of the German
resistance maintained their position for several hours and even for
several days.
[Sidenote: Outline of advance in Champagne.]
[Sidenote: The battle a series of assaults.]
A line showing the different stages of our advance in Champagne would
assume a curiously winding outline, and would reveal on the one hand the
defensive power of an adversary resolved to stick to the ground at all
costs and on the other the victorious continuity of the efforts of our
troops in this hand-to-hand struggle. The battle of Champagne must be
considered in the light of a series of assaults, executed at the same
moment, in parallel or convergent directions and having for their object
either the capture or the hemming in of the first German position, the
units being instructed to reform in a continuous line before the second
position.
[Sidenote: Unity of the action.]
In order to understand the development, the terrain must be divided into
several sectors, in each of which the operations, although closely
co-ordinated, assumed, as a consequence either of the nature of the
ground or of the peculiarities of the enemy defences, a different
character. The unity of the action was nevertheless ensured by the
simultaneity of the rush, which carried all the troops beyond the first
position, past the batteries, to the defences established by the enemy
on the heights to the south of Py.
[Sidenote: At extremities offensive does not progress.]
At the two extremities of our attacking front, subjected to converging
fires and to counter-attacks on the flanks, our offensive made no
progress. The fighting which took place in Auberive and round about
Servon were distinguished by more than one trait of heroism, but they
were destined to have no other result than that of containing the forces
of the enemy and of immobilising him at the wings while the attack was
progressing in the centre.
[Sidenote: Position from Auberive to Souain a triangle.]
[Sidenote: Wire checks the attackers.]
[Sidenote: Gains maintained.]
(1) _Sector of l'Epine de Vedegrange._ The first German line was
established at the base of a wide glacis covered with clumps of trees,
and formed a series of salients running into each other. At certain
points it ran along the edge of the woods where the supplementary
defences were completed by abattis. The position as a whole between
Auberive and Souain described a vast triangle. To the west of the road,
from Saint-Hilaire to Saint-Souplet, the troops traversed the first
enemy line and rushed forward for a distance of about a kilometre as far
as a supporting trench, in front of which they were stopped by the
wirework. A counterattack debouching from the west and supported by the
artillery of Moronvillers caused a slight retirement of our left. The
troops of the right, on the contrary, maintained their gains and
succeeded on the following days in enlarging and extending them,
remaining in touch with the units which were attacking on the east of
the road. The latter had succeeded in a particularly brilliant manner
in overcoming the difficulties with which they were confronted.
[Sidenote: Nature of the position captured.]
[Sidenote: Prisoners and guns seized.]
The German position which they captured, with its triple and quadruple
lines of trenches, its small forts armed with machine guns, its woods
adapted for the purpose in view, constituted one of the most complete
schemes of defence on the Champagne front and afforded cover to a
numerous artillery concealed in the woods of the glacis. On this front,
which was about three and a half kilometres wide, the attack on
September 25, 1915 achieved a varying success. The troops on the left,
after having penetrated into the first trench, had their progress
arrested by machine guns. On the right, however, in spite of the
obstacle presented by four successive trenches, each of which was
covered by a network of wire entanglements and was concealed in the
woods, where our artillery had difficulty in reaching them, the
attacking troops gained nearly two kilometres, capturing seven hundred
prisoners, of whom seventeen were officers, and seizing two guns of 77
and five guns of 105.
The advance recommenced on September 27, 1915. The left took possession
of the woods lining the road from Saint-Hilaire to Saint-Souplet as far
as the Epine de Vedegrange. Along the whole extent of the wooded heights
as far as the western side of the hollow at Souain the success was
identical. Notwithstanding the losses they sustained, notwithstanding
the fatigue involved in the incessant fighting, the troops pushed
forward, leaving behind them only a sufficient force to clear the woods
of isolated groups of the enemy who still remained there. Between 4 and
6 p.m. we arrived immediately in front of the second German position.
[Sidenote: Second German position penetrated.]
[Sidenote: Results of attack in this sector.]
On the 27th we penetrated into this position at two points. We took
possession of a trench about a kilometre wide, called the "parallel of
the Epine de Vedegrange," which is duplicated almost throughout by
another trench (the parallel of the wood of Chevron), and the wirework
entanglements of which were intact, and precluded an assault. Further
east our soldiers also continued, thanks to the conformation of the
terrain, to penetrate into the enemy trench to a depth of about four
hundred metres. But it was impossible to take advantage of this breach
owing to a concentration of the German heavy artillery, a rapidly
continued defence of the surrounding woods, and the fire of machine guns
which it was not possible to capture and which were directed from the
trenches on the right and left of the entry and exit to the breach. The
results attained in this attacking sector alone may be stated thus:
fifteen square miles of territory organized for defence throughout
nearly the whole of its extent; on September 28, forty-four cannon,
seven of 105 and six of 150, and more than three thousand prisoners.
(2) _Sector of Souain._ The enemy lines round about Souain described a
wide curve. In the immediate vicinity of our trenches, to the west at
the Mill and to the east of the wood of Sabot, they swerved to the
extent of over a kilometre to the north of the village and of the source
of the Ain.
[Sidenote: Sapping operations.]
[Sidenote: Assault made in three directions.]
When the offensive was decided upon it was necessary, in order to extend
our lines forward to striking distance, to undertake sapping operations
in parallel lines, and at times to make dashes by night over the
intervening ground. The men working underground got into communication
with the trenches by digging alleys of communication. This difficult
undertaking was effected with very slight losses, under the eyes and
under the fire of the enemy. Our parallel lines approached to within a
distance of two hundred metres of the German trenches. The assault was
made in three different directions: on the west in the direction of
Hills 167 and 174; in the centre along a line running parallel with the
road from Souain to Pomme-Py, in the direction of the farm of Navarin;
on the east in the direction of the woods intersected by the road from
Souain to Tahure, and in the direction of the Butte de Souain.
[Sidenote: Machine gun positions surrounded.]
The advance was extremely rapid--on the left two kilometres in less than
one hour, in the centre three kilometres in forty-five minutes. At 10
a.m. we had reached the farm of Navarin. Towards the east the forward
march was more difficult. Some German machine guns stood their ground in
the wood of Sabot and contributed to the resistance of the enemy. This
defence was destined to be overcome by surrounding them. Arriving at the
wooded region in that part where it is intersected by the road from
Souain to Tahure, the assailants joined up on September 27, 1915 with
those of our troops who were attacking to the north of Perthes. They
left behind them only what was barely necessary in the way of troops to
clear the woods of stragglers.
[Sidenote: The French take guns and supplies.]
Parlementaires were sent to the Germans, who received them with a volley
of rifle shots and endeavored to escape during the night. The majority
were killed and the survivors surrendered. Several batteries and a large
quantity of _materiel_ (supplies of shells and provisions, grenades,
telephones, wire, light railways) remained in our hands. On the 28th,
along the entire length of the sector, we were immediately in front of
the second German position. The troops had shown an unparalleled ardour
and energy. They had been trained by officers whose courage and spirit
of self-sacrifice are indicated by this casualty list; a general of
division and four colonels wounded; two colonels killed.
[Sidenote: Wooded region between Souain and Perthes.]
[Sidenote: Region broken up by mines and trenches.]
(3) _Sector of Perthes._ Between Souain and Perthes stretches a wooded
region in which already, in February and March, heavy fighting had taken
place. At that period we had contrived to take possession on the eastern
extremity of this region of the German defences of the wood of Sabot. We
had also made progress to the north-west of Perthes, on the summit of
Hill 200. But between these two positions the Germans had retained a
strong system of trenches forming a salient almost triangular in shape,
to which we gave the name of the Pocket (_la Poche_). During the whole
year a war of mining had been going on, and the region, which was broken
up by concave constructions and intersected in all directions by
trenches and alleys of communication, constituted an attacking ground
all the more difficult because to the north of la Poche the somewhat
thickly wooded Trou Bricot, the edges of which were in a state of
defence, obstructed a rapid advance. This wooded region extends over a
width of a kilometre and a half and a depth of four kilometres. The
arrangements made for the attack contemplated, after the capture of la
Poche, the surrounding of the wood of the Trou Bricot. The junction was
to be made at the road from Souain to Tahure, with the troops assigned
for the attack on the eastern border of the hollow at Souain.
[Sidenote: The York trench.]
The ground to the east of the Trou Bricot was less difficult. Open and
comparatively flat, it was defended on the north of Perthes by a triple
line of trenches distant 100 metres from each other. At a distance of
1000 metres to 1200 metres a supporting trench, called the "York
trench," was almost unique in its entire construction. The open country
beyond stretched for a distance of three kilometres up to the second
German position (Hill 195, Butte de Tahure). The principal effort was
directed against this passage, the left flank of the attack being
secured by a subsidiary action confined to the capture of la Poche.
[Sidenote: Attack preceded by artillery fire.]
At 9 a.m. our artillery directed its fire successively against the
first-line trenches and the supporting trenches. The attack took place
in the most perfect order. The assailants were already swarming in the
German lines when the enemy artillery opened its defensive fire. Our
counter-batteries hampered the German pieces and our reserves in the
rear suffered little from their fire.
[Sidenote: La Poche position surrendered.]
[Sidenote: The York trench occupied.]
At 9.45 a.m. the two columns which were attacking the extremities of the
salient of la Poche joined hands. The position was surrounded. These
Germans who remained alive inside it surrendered. At the same time a
battalion was setting foot in the defences of the southern edges of the
wood of Trou Bricot. The battalions that followed, marching to the
outside of the eastern edges, executed with perfect regularity a "left
turn" and came and formed up alongside the alleys of communication as
far as the supporting trench. At the same moment, in the open country to
the north of Perthes, the troops surmounted the three first-line
trenches and, preceded by our artillery, made a quick march towards the
York trench and occupied it almost without striking a blow.
[Sidenote: Cleaning up the sector.]
Further to the East, along the road from Perthes to Tahure, their
advance encountered greater difficulties. Some centres of the German
resistance could not be overcome. A sheltered machine gun continued its
fire. An infantry officer, with a quartermaster of artillery, succeeded
in getting into action a gun at a distance of three hundred metres from
the machine gun and in firing at it at close quarters. Of the troops
which were advancing to the north of Perthes, some made for the eastern
border of the wood of Bricot, where they penetrated into the camps,
ousting the defenders and surprising several officers in bed. Late in
the afternoon one of our regiments had reached the road from Souain to
Tahure. Other units were marching straight towards the north, clearing
out the little woods on the way. They there captured batteries of which
the artillerymen were riveted to their guns by means of bayonets
(notably ten pieces of 105 and five of 150).
[Sidenote: Progress hindered by weather.]
The same work was being performed in the woods extending east of the
road from Perthes to Souain and Tahure, where batteries were charged and
captured while in action. At this spot a regiment covered four
kilometres in two hours and captured ten guns, three of 105 and seven of
77. But, from twelve o'clock midday onwards the rate of progress
decreased, the bad weather making it impossible for our artillery to see
what was going on, and rendering the joining up of the different corps
extremely difficult. From the Buttes de Souain and Tahure the enemy
directed converging fires on our men, who were advancing along very open
ground. Nevertheless they continued their advance as far as the slopes
of Hill 193 and the Butte de Tahure, and there dug themselves in.
[Sidenote: Contact with second German position.]
The night passed without any counter-attack by the enemy. Our artillery,
including several field batteries, which had arrived immediately after
the attack beyond the York trench, also brought forward its heavy
pieces. At dawn the reconstituted regiments made another forward rush
which enabled them to establish themselves in immediate contact with the
second German position from the Butte de Souain to the Butte de Tahure,
and even to seize several advanced posts in that neighbourhood.
But on the lower slopes some of the wire entanglements remained intact;
a successful assault on them would have been possible only after a fresh
preparation. Up to October 6, 1915, the troops remained where they were,
digging trenches and organizing a defensive system which had to be
constructed all over again on ground devastated by the enemy fire.
[Sidenote: Ravin des Cuisines.]
(4) _Sector of Le Mesnil._ It was to the north of Le Mesnil that we
encountered the greatest resistance on the part of the adversary. In the
course of the engagements of the preceding winter we had succeeded in
securing a foothold on top of the hill numbered 196. The Germans
remained a little to the east, in a ravine which we continued to call by
its designation of the "Ravine of the Kitchens" (Ravin des Cuisines).
Our assault rendered us masters of it, but we could make no further
progress.
[Sidenote: Fighting on the Butte du Mesnil.]
The German trenches are constructed on the northern slopes of Hill 196,
and are concealed from field observation so that it is difficult for the
artillery to play upon them. Moreover, they are flanked on one side by
the twin heights of the Mamelles, on the other by the Butte du Mesnil.
To the eastward some of our units contrived on September 25, 1915, to
penetrate into the trenches of the _butte_ (knoll), but failed to
maintain their ground, in consequence of a counter-attack supported by
flank fires. Westward, it was not until the night of the 1st to the 2nd
of October, 1915, that we captured the northern Mamelle, thus
surrounding the works of the Trapeze which surmount the southern
Mamelle.
[Sidenote: Rapid and brilliant advance.]
(5) _Sector of Beausejour._ The attacks launched north of Beausejour met
with a more rapid and more brilliant success. The swarm of invaders
throwing themselves on the first German lines captured one after the
other the enemy works in the very sparsely timbered woods called the Fer
de Lance wood and the Demi-Lune wood, and afterwards all the works known
as the Bastion. In one rush certain units gained the top of Maisons de
Champagne, past several batteries, killing the artillerymen as they
served their pieces. The same movement took the assailants across the
intricate region of the mine "funnels" of Beausejour up to the extended
wood intersected by the road to Maisons de Champagne. Our soldiers then
came across German artillerymen engaged in unlimbering their guns. They
killed the drivers and horses; the survivors surrendered.
[Sidenote: Cavalry supports the infantry.]
[Sidenote: Enemy counter-attacks.]
Further westward the left wing of the attacking troops advanced with
greater difficulty, being hampered by small forts and covered works with
which the trenches were everywhere protected. It was at this moment that
the cavalry came unexpectedly to the support of the infantry. Two
squadrons of hussars having crossed our old trenches in face of a heavy
defensive artillery fire prepared to gallop against the German batteries
north of Maisons de Champagne, when they reached that part of the lines
where the Germans still maintained their position. The latter
immediately directed the fire of their machine guns against the
cavalrymen, several of whose horses were hit. The hussars dismounted
and, with drawn sabres, made for the trenches, while favoured by this
diversion, the infantrymen resumed their forward movement. The
resistance of the enemy broke down; more than six hundred Germans were
captured in this way. In the course of the afternoon and during the day
of September 25, 1915, some enemy counter-attacks were made from the
direction of Ripont, but were unsuccessful in ousting us from the summit
of Maisons de Champagne.
On the following days a fierce struggle took place north of the summit
in the region of a defensive work known as the "Ouvrage de la Defaite,"
which was captured by us, lost, then recaptured, and finally evacuated
in consequence of an extremely violent bombardment.
[Sidenote: Heights of Massiges.]
(6) _Sector of Massiges._ The safety of our troops which had advanced as
far as the extended wood and Maisons de Champagne was assured by the
capture of the summits of the heights of Massiges. This sharply
undulating upland, numbered 199 on the north and 191 on the south,
constituted in the hands of the Germans a fortress which they believed
to be impregnable and from the top of which they commanded our positions
in several directions. At 9.15 a.m. the two first attacking parties
marched out in columns. The men went forth gaily and deliberately,
preceded by the firing of the field artillery. By 9.30 a.m. our
infantry, before the enemy had had time to recover themselves, had
reached the summit.
[Sidenote: Enemy machine gun fire.]
[Sidenote: Lines of grenadiers.]
From this moment, subject to machine gun and musketry fire, the men
could only proceed slowly along the summits by the alleys of
communication, with hand grenades, supported by the artillery, with whom
they remained in constant touch by flag-signalling. As the advance of
our grenadiers continued, the Germans surrendered in large numbers. An
uninterrupted chain of grenade-bearers, like the chains of
bucket-holders at a fire in former times, was established in the alleys
of communication from Massiges forward, and each fresh arrival of
grenades was accompanied by a fresh advance.
[Sidenote: Value of possessing the heights.]
From September 25 to October 3, 1915, the fight continued in this way
and was carried on by our soldiers with fierce persistency. The Germans
hurled upon the spot constant reinforcements and offered an obstinate
resistance that has rarely been equalled. They stood up to be shot
down--the machine-gun men at their guns, the grenadiers on their grenade
chests. All attempts at a counter-attack remained equally unproductive.
The possession of the heights of Massiges enabled us to extend our gains
towards Ville-sur-Tourbe, while taking in flank the trenches which we
had failed to secure by a frontal attack.
The loss of the heights of Massiges appears to have particularly upset
the German General Staff, which, after having denied the fact,
represented that the ground which it had lost as a consequence of
grenade fighting had been abandoned owing to artillery fire.
[Sidenote: Attitude of the enemy.]
The attitude of the enemy was characterized by: (1) Surprise; (2)
disorganization; (3) a sudden and almost disorderly engagement of the
reserves; (4) the exhaustion and demoralization of the soldiers.
[Sidenote: Reasons for surprise.]
(1) It is beyond doubt that the Germans were surprised by the extent and
violence of our attacks. They were expecting a French offensive. The
orders of the day of Generals von Fleck and Von Ditfurth prove this.
("The possibility of a great French offensive must be considered": Von
Ditfurth, August 15. "The French Higher Command appears to be disposed
to make another desperate effort": Von Fleck, September 26.) But the
Germans foresaw neither the strength nor the success of the effort.
During our artillery preparation twenty-nine battalions only were
brought back to Champagne (the 183rd Brigade, the 5th Division of the
3rd Corps, and one-half of the 43rd Division of Reserve). In thus
limiting before the attack the reinforcements of its effectives the
German General Staff showed that they did not suspect the vigour of the
blow that was about to be delivered.
The same thing happened with regard to the subordinate forces. Inside
the shelters in the second line officers were captured while lying down;
they had an unwarranted confidence in the strength of their first line,
and the interruption of telephone communications had prevented their
being informed of the rapid progress of our offensive.
[Sidenote: Rapidity of French attack.]
(2) This rapidity of our attack explains the disorganization of the
adversary on the morning of September 25. At some points certain
officers and non-commissioned officers were able to continue the
resistance until the investment, followed by capitulation. But elsewhere
there were prompt surrenders. Men were also seen flying before our
attacking troops and being killed while making for their second
position.
[Sidenote: How the German reserves were utilized.]
(3) In order to make up for the insufficiency of the local reserves the
German military authorities had to put in line not only the important
units which they held at their disposal behind the front (10th Corps
brought back from Russia), but the local reserves from other sectors
(Soissonnais, Argonne, Woevre, Alsace), which were despatched to
Champagne one battalion after another, and even in groups of double
companies.
Nothing better indicates the disorganization of the German command and
the significance of the check suffered than the conditions under which
these reserves were engaged.