These two lovely cities of Italia Irrendenta are respectively the keys
to the right and left flank of the Austrian frontier. Trent guards the
valley of the Adige, one of the few natural highways from Italy into
Austrian territory. Bourcet himself, in 1735, designed the defense of
this pathway at Rivoli, just inside the Italian boundary, where he laid
out what were considered impregnable positions. To the north; where
Trent lies, the country becomes more and more difficult for an invader,
and up to this time the Italians have not been able to come within
striking distance of the great Austrian fortress, though they hold
Rovereto, and have cut the direct line of communication between Trent
and Toblach.
[Sidenote: Italian game on the Gorizia front.]
On the Gorizia front they have made what in this war may be considered
as important gains. Gorizia stands watch over the valley of the Isonzo
and Austria's Adriatic littoral. Besides occupying Grado and Monfalcone
in the coastlands, General Cadorna's forces have crossed the Isonzo at
several points, have smashed through to the north, and now threaten to
envelop Gorizia. Indeed, many observers believe that Cadorna could at
any time take the place by a grand assault if he were willing to pay the
cost in blood.
Despite the very unfavorable character of the country, the Italians have
gained more ground here in the same period than either the Germans or
the Anglo-French forces in the flat or rolling plains of Flanders and
northern France. But the outflanking tactics of Bourcet, with feints and
swift maneuvering, have had little to do with it. The assailants have
had to fight their way step by step.
The Austrians had prepared all sorts of disagreeable surprises. They had
hewn gun-positions out of solid cliffs, skilfully placed so as to cover
the routes of approach, and had cemented up the embrasures. It was
merely necessary to knock the cement out and pour shells upon the
advancing Italians at a range of several miles. The batteries were
inaccessible to storming parties, and the Italians had to drag up guns
of equal caliber to put them out of business.
[Sidenote: Ancient methods employed.]
In some places rocks and masses of ice were rolled down the slopes, as
in the brave old days of the Helvetians; and in this line the Austrians
introduced an innovation. When the Italians began driving their trenches
up the steep slopes of Podgora--the Gibraltar of Gorizia--the defenders
rolled down barrels of kerosene and set them alight with artillery fire.
This enterprise throve joyously until the Italian gunners got the range
of the launching-point and succeeded in exploding a few barrels among
the Austrians themselves.
[Sidenote: Austria had possession of the heights.]
The writer does not mean to give the impression that Italy's job in the
Alps is all but finished. A glance at the map of the frontier will cure
any one of such a notion. The Italians were forced to start this
campaign under every strategic disadvantage. By the frontier delimited
in 1866, they were left without natural defenses on the north and east.
All along the Austrian boundary the heights remained in the hands of the
Hapsburgs as natural menaces to Venetia and Lombardy. Italy received the
plains, but Austria held the mountain fastnesses that hung above them.
This is so much the case that when Italy declared war, the Austrian
general orders reminded the troops that they were in the position of men
on the top floor of a six-story house, defending it from attackers who
must mount from the street under a plunging fire.
[Sidenote: Chasseurs Alpins in the Vosges.]
But in one way or another the Italians have been doggedly fighting their
way up the walls of the house. For one thing, their Alpini have brought
to great perfection the use of skis in military operations on the
snow-clad slopes. This is the first war in which skis have really come
to the front. In France, too, the Chasseurs Alpins have been able to
show the Germans some astonishing things with their long wooden
snow-shoes in the winter fighting among the crests of the Vosges.
A typical instance of this is the story of the capture of a German post
on the Alsatian frontier in the winter of 1914-15. The Germans, holding
the railroad from Ste. Marie to Ste. Croix, were expecting an attack
from the French position at St. Die. This impression was deliberately
strengthened by a heavy artillery fire from St. Die, while a
considerable detachment of the Chasseurs Alpins led a body of infantry
along a winding mountain road to the village of Bonhomme. There they
posted themselves just out of sight of the German lines, while the
_chasseurs_ scaled the snow-covered heights and crept along the flank
of the German position.
When they had reached the desired position, the infantry charged along
the road and the Chasseurs Alpins simultaneously whizzed down the slope
on their skis. The swift flank attack did the business, and the Germans
were driven for some miles down the valley of the Weiss toward Colmar.
[Sidenote: Austrians capture of Mt. Loevchen.]
One of the greatest single mountain successes of the war was the
Austrian capture of Mount Loevchen, the huge black mass of rock, nearly
six thousand feet high, which dominates the Austrian port of Cattaro and
sentinels the little kingdom of Montenegro on the west.
Ever since the war began the Austrians have from time to time made
attempts to reach the summit of this mighty rock. It is only a matter of
an hour or two by winding road in peace times, but the Austrians were
something like eighteen months on the job; and in all this time it is
doubtful if the defenders ever numbered much more than five thousand. It
was not captured until the Montenegrins had practically run out of
ammunition and of reasons for holding the position. The rest of their
kingdom was overrun, and they were to all intents and purposes out of
the war.
[Sidenote: Russians in the Carpathians.]
The Russian campaign in the Carpathians, before the great German drive
of a year ago pushed the Czar's armies back into their own country, also
illustrates how the mountain warfare of to-day grew by natural
tendencies from the tactics of Bourcet into the trench warfare of
northern France.
In the first weeks of the war, when the great offensive movement of the
Austrian army toward Lublin was crushed by the Grand Duke Nicholas, and
the broken hosts of the Dual Monarchy were sent flying through Galicia
and the Carpathians, a cloud of Cossack cavalry followed them and
penetrated into the plains of Hungary. This last operation was merely a
raid, however, and the Cossacks were soon galloping back through the
mountain passes.
Then the Russians laid siege to Przemysl, and occupied the whole of
Galicia up to the line of the San. Later they pushed on westward to the
Dunajec, threatening Cracow. This was their high tide. On their left
flank was the mass of the Carpathians, pierced by a number of passes.
The more important of these, from west to east, are the Tarnow, Dukla,
Lupkow, and Uzsok.
[Sidenote: The Carpathian passes.]
The Austrians were rallied after some weeks, and put up something of a
fight for these "contracted places." The Russians, following the
precepts of Bourcet, threatened the passage which seemed most desirable,
because of the railroad facilities, and delivered a heavy blow at the
Dukla Pass, the least important of the four. Here they pushed through to
Bartfeld, on the Hungarian plain. Then, however, Mackensen's fearful
blow smashed the Russian line on the Dunajec and poured the German
legions across Galicia in the rear of the Carpathian armies, forcing the
Muscovites to abandon the passes and scurry home.
[Sidenote: Plains more often battlegrounds.]
Mountain warfare has always had a certain romantic glamour, and it has
filled many pages in the literature of fighting. As a matter of
historical fact, however, it has played a comparatively small part in
the world's annals. Almost all the great campaigns have been fought out
in the lowlands. It is Belgium, for instance, and not Switzerland, that
has been proverbially the battle-ground of Europe. Napoleon and Suwaroff
marched armies through the Alps, but only as a means of striking
unexpectedly at the enemy who occupied the plains beyond.
Up to the time of the present war, mountain campaigns have usually been
no more than picturesque foot-notes to history, illuminated by the valor
of raiding clansmen like Roderick Dhu of the Scottish Highlands, or
guerrilla chiefs like Andreas Hofer, the Tyrolese patriot. Hofer's
struggle against Napoleon was indeed a gallant and notable one, but it
scarcely entered into the main current of history.
[Sidenote: Garibaldi's mountain campaigns.]
If, however, we include Garibaldi among the mountain fighters--and such
was the characteristic bent of his remarkable military genius--we must
accord him a place among the molders of modern Europe, for without his
flashing sword Italy could not have been liberated and united. His two
Alpine campaigns against the Austrians were successful and effective,
but his most brilliant powers were shown in his memorable invasion of
Sicily in 1860. Chased ashore at Marsala by the Neapolitan war-ships,
and narrowly escaping capture, he led his followers--one thousand
red-shirted volunteers armed with obsolete muskets--into the Sicilian
mountains, where he played such a game that within two months he
compelled the surrender of a well-equipped army of nearly thirty
thousand regulars. The history of warfare can show but few exploits so
daring and so dramatic.
* * * * *
The most important military movement on the western front in the early
autumn of 1915 was the great French offensive in Champagne. During the
preceding months of the spring and summer, there had been hard fighting
all along the 400-mile line from the North Sea to Switzerland. The
military results had been small on either side and now the French
resolved on a mighty offensive which should be decisive in its
accomplishments. What these results actually were is told in the
following narrative.
THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE OF 1915
OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE FRENCH HEADQUARTERS STAFF
Copyright, National Review, January, 1916.
[Sidenote: Menace of the French in Alsace.]
After the battles of May and June, 1915, in Artois, activity on the
Western front became concentrated in the Vosges, where, by a series of
successful engagements, we managed to secure possession of more
favorable positions and to retain them in spite of incessant
counter-attacks. The superiority established over the adversary, the
wearing down of the latter through vain and costly counter-offensives,
which absorbed in that sector his local resources; the state of
uncertainty in which the Germans found themselves in view of the menace
of a French division in Alsace--such were the immediate results of these
engagements. From the number of the effectives engaged, and the limited
front along which the attacks took place, those attacks nevertheless
were no more than local.
[Sidenote: Preparing for a great offensive.]
While those operations were developing, the higher command was carefully
preparing for a great offensive. The situation of the Russian armies
imposed on us, as their Allies, obligations the accomplishment of which
had been made possible by the results of a long course of preparation no
less than by the aid of circumstances.
[Sidenote: Improved defensive organizations.]
The inaction of the adversary, engaged on the Eastern front in a series
of operations of which he had not foreseen the difficulties, and thus
reduced to the defensive on our front, left the initiative of the
operations in our hands. The landing in France of fresh British troops
enabled Marshal French to take upon himself the defence of a portion of
the lines hitherto held by French troops. The improvement of our
defensive organizations, which made possible certain economies in the
effectives, the regrouping of units and the creation of new units, also
had the effect of placing a larger number of men at the disposal of the
Generalissimo. The increased output of war _materiel_ ensured him the
necessary means for a complete artillery preparation.
[Sidenote: Joffre's appeal to the troops.]
Among all the elements of success which were thus united at the end of
the summer of 1915, not the least was the incomparable individual worth
of the French soldier. It was to the traditional warlike qualities of
the race that the Generalissimo appealed when, on September 23, 1915, he
addressed to the troops the following general order, which was read to
the regiments by their officers:
"SOLDIERS OF THE REPUBLIC
"After months of waiting, which have enabled us
to increase our forces and our resources, while
the adversary has been using up his own, the
hour has come to attack and conquer and to add
fresh glorious pages to those of the Marne and
Flanders, the Vosges and Arras.
"Behind the whirlwind of iron and fire let
loose, thanks to the factories of France, where
your brothers have, night and day, worked for
us, you will proceed to the attack, all
together, on the whole front, in close union
with the armies of our Allies.
[Sidenote: The spirit of the soldier.]
"Your _elan_ will be irresistible. It will
carry you at a bound up to the batteries of the
adversary, beyond the fortified lines which he
has placed before you.
"You will give him neither pause nor rest until
victory has been achieved.
"Set to with all your might for the deliverance
of the soil of la Patrie, for the triumph of
justice and liberty.
"J. JOFFRE."
The description of the operations in Champagne will show under what
conditions our troops acquitted themselves of the task assigned to them,
and also the value and significance of this success, without precedent
in the war of positions in which we are at present engaged.
[Sidenote: The German line that was broken.]
The German line that was broken in Champagne is the same that was
fortified by our adversaries after the victory of the Marne. It rests on
the western side on the Massif de Moronvillers; to the east it stretches
as far as the Argonne. It was intended to cover the railway line from
Challerange to Bazancourt, a line indispensable for the concentration
movements of the German troops. The offensive front, which extended from
Auberive to the east of Ville-sur-Tourbe, presents a varied aspect. From
east to west may be seen:
[Sidenote: A wooded glacis.]
(1) A glacis about eight kilometres in width, the gentle slopes of which
are covered by numerous little woods. The road from Saint-Hilaire to
Saint-Souplet, with the Baraque de l'Epine de Vedegrange, marks
approximately its axis.
[Sidenote: Valley of Souain.]
(2) The hollow, at the bottom of which is the village of Souain and of
which the first German line followed the further edge. The road from
Souain to Pomme-Py describes the radius of this semi-circle. The farm of
Navarin, at a distance of three and a half kilometres to the north of
Souain, stands on the top of the hills.
[Sidenote: Second German line.]
(3) To the north of Perthes a comparatively tranquil region of uniform
aspect, forming between the wooded hills of the Trou Bricot and those of
the Butte du Mesnil a passage three kilometres wide, barred by several
lines of trenches and ending at a series of heights, the Butte de
Souain, Hills 195 and 201, and the Butte de Tahure, surmounted by the
second German line.
[Sidenote: A strong German position.]
(4) To the north of Le Mesnil, a very strong position, bastioned on the
west by two twin heights (Mamelle Nord and Trapeze), on the east by the
Butte du Mesnil. The German trenches formed between these two bastions a
powerful curtain, behind which extended as far as Tahure a thickly
wooded, undulating region.
(5) To the north of Beausejour a bare terrain easily practicable, with a
gentle rise in the direction of Ripon as far as the farm of Maisons de
Champagne.
[Sidenote: Eastern flank of the German line.]
(6) To the north of Massiges, Hills numbered 191 and 199, describing on
the map the figure of a hand, very strongly constructed and constituting
the eastern flank of the whole German line. This tableland slopes down
gently in the direction of Ville-sur-Tourbe.
[Sidenote: German system of trench defenses.]
The achievements of our troops from September 25 to October 3, 1915, in
this region may be thus summarised: They scaled the whole of the glacis
of l'Epine de Vedegrange; they occupied the ridge of the hollow at
Souain; debouched in the opening to the north of Perthes to the slopes
of Hill 195 and as far as the Butte de Tahure; carried the western
bastions of the curtain of le Mesnil; advanced as far as Maisons de
Champagne and took by assault the "hand" of Massiges. That is to say
that they captured an area about forty square kilometres in extent. The
importance of that figure is shown when one examines on the map
accompanying this report the position of the German trenches, with a
view to understanding the system of defence adopted by our adversaries.
Two positions, distant from three to four kilometres from each other,
stand out clearly. The first is the more dense; the trenches with their
alleys of communication present at certain points the appearance of a
wirework chessboard. Everywhere, to a depth of from 300 to 400 metres
there are at least three parallel lines, sometimes five. The trenches
are separated from each other as a rule by wire entanglements varying in
width from 15 to 60 metres.
[Sidenote: The second position.]
[Sidenote: Alleys of communication.]
The second position comprises only one trench, reinforced at certain
points by a supporting trench. It is everywhere constructed, as is the
wire network in front of it, in the form of a slope. On top there are
merely observation stations with machine-gun shelters connected with the
trench by an alley of communication. Between the two positions the
terrain was also specially prepared, being cut up by transverse or
diagonal trenches. The alleys of communication constructed to facilitate
the firing, which were in many cases protected by wirework, make
possible, according to the German method, a splitting up of the terrain
by lateral fire and the maintenance, even after the tide of the
assailants had flooded the trenches, of centres of resistance, veritable
strongholds that could only be reduced after a siege. The positions of
the artillery were established, as were also the camps and provision
depots, behind the first position, the principal line of defence.
[Sidenote: German organization known.]
The whole German organization was known to us. It was shown on our maps,
and every defensive work, trench, alley of communication, and clump of
trees was given a special name or a number preceded by a certain letter,
according to the sector of attack wherein it was situated. This minute
precision in the details of the preparation is worthy of being pointed
out; it constitutes one of the peculiarities of the present war, a
veritable siege war, in which the objective has to be realised
beforehand and clearly determined, every piece of ground having to be
captured by heavy fighting, as was formerly every redan and every
curtain.
The bombardment of the German positions began on September 22, 1915 and
was pursued night and day according to a time scheme and a division of
labour previously determined upon. The results expected were:
[Sidenote: Results of bombardment.]
(1) The destruction of the wire entanglements.
(2) The burial of the defenders in their dug-out.
(3) The razing of the trenches and the demolition of the embrasures.
(4) The stopping-up of the alleys of communication.
[Sidenote: Work of the long-range guns.]
The gun-fire covered not only the first trench but also the supporting
trench and even the second position, although the distance at which the
last was situated and the outline of its wire entanglements made it
difficult to make field observations in that direction. At the same time
the heavy long-range guns bombarded the headquarters, the cantonments
and the railway stations; they cut the railway lines, causing a
suspension of the work of revictualling. The best witnesses to the
effectiveness of our bombardment are to be found in unfinished letters
found upon prisoners.
[Sidenote: Letters found on prisoners.]
"SEPTEMBER 23.
"The French artillery fired without
intermission from the morning of the 21st to
the evening of the 23rd, and we all took refuge
in our dug-outs. On the evening of the 22nd we
were to have gone to get some food, and the
French continued to fire on our trenches. In
the evening we had heavy losses, and we had
nothing to eat."
"SEPTEMBER 25.
"I have received no news, and probably I shall
not receive any for some days. The whole postal
service has been stopped; all places have been
bombarded to such an extent that no human being
could stand against it.
"The railway line is so seriously damaged that
the train service for some time has been
completely stopped.
"We have been for three days in the first line;
during those three days the French have fired
so heavily that our trenches are no longer
visible."
[Sidenote: Number of wounded.]
"SEPTEMBER 24.
"For the last two days the French have been
firing like mad. To-day, for instance, a
dug-out has been destroyed. There were sixteen
men in it. Not one of them managed to save his
skin. They are all dead. Besides that, a number
of individual men have been killed and there
are a great mass of wounded.
"The artillery fires almost as rapidly as the
infantry. A mist of smoke hangs over the whole
battle-front, so that it is impossible to see
anything. Men are dropping like flies.
"The trenches are no longer anything but a
mound of ruins."
[Sidenote: Sufferings of the soldiers.]
"SEPTEMBER 24.
"A rain of shells is pouring down upon us. The
kitchen and everything that is sent to us is
bombarded at night. The field-kitchens no
longer come to us. Oh, if only the end were
near! That is the cry every one is repeating.
Peace! Peace!"
Extract from the notebook of a man of the 103rd Regiment:
"From the trench nothing much can now be seen;
it will soon be on a level with the ground."
Letter of an artilleryman of the 100th Regiment of Field Artillery:
"SEPTEMBER 25.
"We have passed through some terrible hours. It
was as though the whole world was in a state of
collapse. We have had heavy losses. One company
of two hundred and fifty men had sixty killed
last night. A neighboring battery had sixteen
killed yesterday.
[Sidenote: Destructiveness of the French shells.]
"The following instance will show you the
frightful destructiveness of the French shells.
A dug-out five metres deep, surmounted by 2
metres 50 centimetres of earth and two
thicknesses of heavy timber, was broken like a
match."
Report made on September 24 in the morning, by the captain commanding
the 3rd company of the 135th Regiment of Reserve:
"The French are firing on us with great bombs
and machine-guns. We must have reinforcements
at once. Many men are no longer fit for
anything. It is not that they are wounded, but
they are Landsturmers. Moreover the wastage is
greater than the losses announced.
"Send rations immediately; no food has reached
us to-day. Urgently want illuminating
cartridges and hand grenades. Is the hospital
corps never coming to fetch the wounded?"
[Sidenote: German troops exhausted.]
"SEPTEMBER 25, 11.45.
"I urgently beg for reinforcements; the men are
dying from fatigue and want of sleep. I have no
news of the battalion."
The time fixed for all the attacks on the Champagne front was a
quarter-past nine in the morning. There was no hesitation. At the time
mentioned the troops came out of the trenches with the aid of steps or
scaling ladders and drew up in line before making a rush at the German
trenches.
The operation was rapidly effected. The objective was at an average
distance of two hundred metres; this was covered without serious losses.
The Germans were nearly everywhere surprised, and their defensive fire
was not opened until after the invading tide of the attackers had passed
by.
[Sidenote: First German trench penetrated.]