about 300 men; we numbered fifty, with twenty-nine guns. In the night,
Lieutenant Schmidt died. We had to dig his grave with our hands and with
our bayonets, and to eliminate every trace above it, in order to protect
the body. Rademacher had been buried immediately after the skirmish,
both of them silently, with all honors.
[Sidenote: The men suffer from thirst.]
"The wounded had a hard time of it. We had lost our medicine chest in
the wreck; we had only little packages of bandages for skirmishes; but
no probing instrument, no scissors were at hand. On the next day our men
came up with thick tongues, feverish, and crying 'Water! water!' But
each one received only a little cupful three times a day. If our water
supply was exhausted, we would have to sally from our camp and fight our
way through. Then we should have gone to pot under superior numbers. The
Arab gendarmes simply cut the throats of those camels that had been
wounded by shots, and then drank the yellow water that was contained in
the stomachs. Those fellows can stand anything. At night we always
dragged out the dead camels that had served as cover, and had been
shot. The hyenas came, hunting for dead camels. I shot one of these,
taking it for an enemy in the darkness.
"That continued about three days. On the third day there were new
negotiations. Now the Bedouins demanded arms no longer, but only money.
This time the negotiations took place across the camp wall. When I
declined, the Bedouin said: 'Beaucoup de combat,' (lots of fight.) I
replied:
"'Please go to it!'
[Sidenote: Troops of the Emir of Mecca.]
"We had only a little ammunition left, and very little water. Now it
really looked as if we would soon be dispatched. The mood of the men was
pretty dismal. Suddenly, at about 10 o'clock in the morning, there
bobbed up in the north two riders on camels, waving white cloths. Soon
afterward there appeared, coming from the same direction, far back, a
long row of camel troops, about a hundred; they draw rapidly near by,
ride singing toward us, in a picturesque train. They were the messengers
and troops of the Emir of Mecca.
"Sami Bey's wife, it developed, had, in the course of the first
negotiations, dispatched an Arab boy to Jeddah. From that place the
Governor had telegraphed to the Emir. The latter at once sent camel
troops, with his two sons and his personal surgeon; the elder, Abdullah,
conducted the negotiations; the surgeon acted as interpreter, in French.
Now things proceeded in one-two-three order, and the whole Bedouin band
speedily disappeared. From what I learned later, I know definitely that
they had been corrupted with bribes by the English. They knew when and
where we would pass and they had made all preparations. Now our first
act was a rush for water; then we cleared up our camp, but had to
harness our camels ourselves, for the camel drivers had fled at the
very beginning of the skirmish. More than thirty camels were dead. The
saddles did not fit, and my men know how to rig up schooners, but not
camels. Much baggage remained lying in the sand for lack of pack
animals.
[Sidenote: The party reaches Mecca.]
"Then, under the safe protection of Turkish troops, we got to Jeddah.
There the authorities and the populace received us very well. From there
we proceeded in nineteen days, without mischance, by sailing boat to
Elwesh, and under abundant guard with Suleiman Pasha in a five-day
caravan journey toward this place, to El Ula, and now we are seated at
last in the train and are riding toward Germany--into the war at last!"
"Was not the war you had enough?" I asked.
"Not a bit of it," replied the youngest Lieutenant; "the _Emden_ simply
captured ships each time; only a single time, at Penang, was it engaged
in battle, and I wasn't present on that occasion. War? No, that is just
to begin for us now."
[Sidenote: Muecke's great task.]
"My task since November," said Muecke, "has been to bring my men as
quickly as possible to Germany against the enemy. Now, at last, I can do
so."
"And what do you desire for yourself?" I asked.
"For myself," he laughed, and the blue eyes sparkled, "a command in the
North Sea."
* * * * *
Japan was bound by alliance with Great Britain to join with her to
attack any aggressor, and to carry out her pledges she, at the outbreak
of the war, prepared to capture the German stronghold Tsing-tao, the
capital of the concession of Kiao-chau, which Germany had obtained from
China, and had converted into a German possession.
CAPTURE OF TSING-TAO
A. N. HILDITCH
Battle Sketches by A. N. Hilditch, Oxford University Press.
[Sidenote: Qualities of the Japanese.]
[Sidenote: Count Okuma Prime Minister.]
[Sidenote: Japanese ultimatum.]
Tokyo, capital of Japan, lies at the head of Tokyo Bay, in the
south-east of Nippon. Its two million inhabitants are distributed among
houses and streets which present curious intermixtures of Japanese and
European architecture, customs, or science. The jinrikisha notably has
been displaced largely by tramcars which, carrying all passengers at a
uniform rate of four sen, make it possible to travel ten miles for a
penny. It is an industrial city, but on account of occasional
earthquakes no very large buildings line the thoroughfares. The
traveller can here observe to advantage the strange characteristics of
the most stoical race upon earth, or can contrast, if he will, the
courteous, imperturbably serene disposition of the most martial nation
of the East with the present disposition of the most rabidly bellicose
nation of the West. When Japanese and German, indeed, met in conflict
before Tsing-tao in the autumn of 1914, there was seen, in the Japanese
soldier, during a campaign of peculiar hardship and difficulty, a
revival of the qualities of the old Samurai, with his quiet courage, his
burning patriotism, his patience, his habitual suppression of emotional
display singularly distinct from those of the modern Goth. Nor was the
statesmanship which brought about that conflict less admirable. Japan's
alliance with Great Britain was at once a solemn pledge and the guiding
principle of her foreign policy. August 1914 found British interests
and the vast trade that centred at Hong-kong in danger: German armed
vessels prowled the seas, and the German naval base of Tsing-tao was
busy with warlike preparations. Great Britain appealed to Japan to free
their joint commerce from the menace. The Japanese Prime Minister, Count
Okuma, might well hesitate, however, before recommending intervention.
Was he the right minister to direct a war? He was nearer eighty than
seventy years old, and recently had been for seven years in retirement:
his Government had a minority in the Diet, and to the Genro his name was
anathema: he claimed the allegiance of no party, and the powerful
military and naval clans, Choshiu and Satsuma, were openly hostile. He
had been raised to power a few months before by public demand for
progressive government. There were considerations other than domestic or
personal, indeed, which might have tempted some statesmen to hold their
hands. To temporize while events revealed themselves in Europe would be
safer than immediate action; while to remain neutral might lead to the
transference to the Japanese of much trade with China now in British
hands, inevitably hampered by the menace of German commerce-destroyers.
Nevertheless, Count Okuma's Cabinet came to a bold and loyal decision.
Baron Kato, the Foreign Minister, reassured Great Britain of active
Japanese aid, and on August 15 sent an ultimatum to Germany. The latter
was requested to withdraw at once all German armed vessels from Eastern
waters, and to deliver to Japan before September 15 the entire leased
territory of Kiao-chau, with a view to its eventual restoration to
China. The ultimatum was timed to expire at noon on August 23. That day
arrived without satisfaction having been given to Japan. Within a few
hours the 2nd Japanese squadron steamed off towards Tsing-tao.
[Sidenote: German Pacific squadron sails.]
[Sidenote: Tsing-tao's importance.]
[Sidenote: Germans prepare defense.]
[Sidenote: Japanese warships approach.]
Before the outbreak of hostilities with Great Britain, Vice-Admiral the
Graf von Spee, who commanded the German Pacific squadron, had steamed
away from Tsing-tao with most of his ships. To use Tsing-tao as a naval
base while engaging in commerce-raiding seemed a sound and a practicable
plan, since the British and Australian naval forces, though superior,
were hardly strong enough simultaneously to blockade the harbour and to
search the seas. The plan was, however, rendered impossible by the
Japanese ultimatum, and the Admiral, after having lingered for some
weeks in the Western Pacific, departed for other seas and other
adventures. Such was the result of Japan's action, and thus dangerous
were the tactics that Japan's action had frustrated. For Tsing-tao,
situated upon one of the two peninsulas, divided by two miles of
waterway, enclosing the bay of Kiao-chau, with its safe and spacious
anchorage for vessels of any size, constituted one of the most important
naval bases on the Chinese coast. It had, indeed, been described as the
key to Northern China. Dominating the eastern coast of the Shantung
peninsula, the port formed the centre of the semicircular area known as
Kiao-chau, extending on a radius of 32 miles around the shores of the
bay, with a population of 60,000. This area was, under the Chinese
German agreement as to Tsing-tao, influenced and controlled by Germany,
though not strictly subject to her, and regarded as neutral territory.
Its surface was mainly mountainous and bare, though the lowlands were
well cultivated, but in parts it was rich in mineral wealth, large but
undeveloped supplies of coal being present. In winter the port,
connected to the junction of Tsi-nan by a German-built railway, was the
natural outlet for the trade of Northern China. The heights which
surrounded the bay offered admirable sites for fortification, while the
land-approaches to Tsing-tao were guarded by formidable defences
stretched across its peninsula. In many quarters the stronghold was
regarded as a second Port Arthur. The Germans had paid particular
attention to defence, so much so, indeed, that over five-sixths of the
white inhabitants were engaged in military occupations. Five thousand
German marines constituted the normal garrison, though the outbreak of
war in August called about a thousand more men--volunteers, reservists,
and sailors--to the colours. The complement of the _Kaiserin Elizabeth_,
an Austrian cruiser sheltering in the harbour, left for Tientsin, having
received orders to disarm their ship, but returned in time to join the
defenders. The garrison was amply provisioned for five or six months,
and well provided with weapons, stores, and munitions. Most of the
German ships off the Chinese coast at the outbreak of war, indeed, had
made immediately for Tsing-tao, and discharged upon its wharves many
thousand tons of cargo. When war with Japan became inevitable,
therefore, the defenders could anticipate a successful resistance,
provided the expected instantaneous victories in Europe materialized.
Elaborate preparations were made for the defence. The harbour mouth was
blocked by three sunken vessels, enabling only small craft to enter.
Chinese villages within the leased territory, and the bridge where the
railway crossed the boundary, were destroyed, partial compensation being
paid to the inhabitants. Native labourers were engaged to throw up
earthworks to strengthen the town fortifications. Many foreigners,
women, children, and non-combatants, meanwhile, had left the town. On
Friday evening, August 21, at roll-call, the Governor, Captain
Meyer-Waldeck, read out a message from the German Emperor exhorting the
garrison to defend the town to their utmost, and to do their 'duty to
the last'. It was listened to stoically. The following day a diversion
occurred which opened hostilities propitiously for the Germans. The
British destroyer _Kennet_, encountering the German destroyer _S. 90_
off the coast, gave chase. The _S. 90_ immediately made for port, and
the _Kennet_, in the ardour of pursuit, closed in unawares within range
of the German land batteries. The latter opened fire, and before she
could draw off the _Kennet_ sustained ten casualties, though little
material damage. Next day the term of the Japanese ultimatum expired. It
was doubtful at what point the Japanese would begin operations, or what
tactics they would adopt. The fear was prevalent among Germans that the
enemy would enter Chinese territory to reach the town from the land:
newspapers under German influence, indeed, circulating in Chinese coast
towns, started a press campaign with the object of stirring the Chinese
Government to oppose by force any Japanese landing in her territory.
Outposts were placed by the Germans along the shores of the neutral zone
to watch for developments: they descried, on August 24, the approach of
Japanese warships.
Vice-Admiral Sadakichi Kato, who commanded the approaching squadron,
immediately upon arrival took measures to protect himself against danger
from mines. Seven islets clustering round the mouth of Kiao-chau Bay
were occupied, to form a convenient local naval base, while
mine-sweepers swept the surrounding seas. No less than a thousand mines
were taken from the water. A blockade of the whole Kiao-chau coast was
declared, as commencing from 9 a.m., August 27, and war vessels
patrolled the shores, some seventy miles long. Action soon began, and
continued during ensuing days, with shells that at intervals screamed
towards the town. The position was, however, reconnoitred carefully.
Japanese airmen went up frequently to scan the fortifications and to
drop bombs. All protruding structures, spires and factory-chimneys, had
been levelled to the ground by the Germans so as to afford no mark for
fire. Bombs were dropped on the railway station and on one of the
numerous barrack buildings. The operations continued spasmodically into
September, while Kato was awaiting the approach by land of a
co-operating army, which had now disembarked on the northern coast of
the Shantung peninsula, about 150 miles due north of Tsing-tao.
[Sidenote: Landing effected.]
[Sidenote: Floods hinder advance.]
The landing was effected on September 2, without hindrance or opposition
on the part of the Chinese. The Government, following the precedent of
the Russo-Japanese War, immediately published a declaration refusing to
hold itself responsible for the obligations of strict neutrality in
areas that formed, within Lung-kow, Lai-chau, and the neighbourhood of
Kiao-chau Bay, passage-ways essential to the belligerent troops. It was,
of course, incumbent upon the Powers involved to respect Chinese
property and administrative rights. Japan, therefore, was permitted to
make use of the main roads to transport an army to the rear of
Tsing-tao. The forces landed composed a division numbering 23,000, and
commanded by Lieutenant-General Mitsuomi Kamio. An advance-guard was
sent forward without delay, but soon found its way rendered impassable
by torrential floods which at this time swept down upon and devastated
the province of Shantung, bridges, roads, and even villages being
submerged and destroyed, with great loss of life, largely owing to
Chinese official incompetence. The Japanese, after covering 20
kilometres in two days, reached a stream so swollen that crossing was
impossible. The artillery had to return to Lung-kow. German diplomacy,
meanwhile, exasperated at its inability to prevent a Japanese landing,
had not been inactive.
[Sidenote: Chinese neutrality.]
[Sidenote: Rivalry of British and Japanese.]
[Sidenote: Japanese advance.]
The German and Austrian ministers at Peking, on hearing of the Japanese
landing, protested strongly. China, it was claimed, ought to have
forestalled and resisted the landing, but instead had deliberately
extended the war-zone in order to facilitate Japanese movements. She
would be held responsible for any injury to the German cause or
property. To this China replied that, if it was incumbent upon her to
prevent by force Japan operating in her territory, it was equally her
duty to prevent by force Germany fortifying and defending Tsing-tao.
China had endeavoured, indeed, but unsuccessfully, to preclude
belligerent operations in her territory: only after the Japanese
landing, when she was powerless to do otherwise, had she extended the
zone of war. As to the responsibility, she reiterated her previous
declaration. The baffled Germans fell back on threats: the right was
reserved to visit upon China dire consequences for her alleged breach of
neutrality. The incident, thrown into striking contrast with Germany's
offer to Belgium, marked the unscrupulousness of German diplomacy, but
stirred also many doubts among the foreign communities in China, in
which the British, allied as they were to the Japanese, formed a
predominating element. An anomaly of the situation was that British
local interests had long conflicted with Japanese national interests.
Japan's activities had, at every stage of her recent history, reduced
British opportunities. Japanese trader competed with British trader for
the markets of China, and Japan's share of the annual trade expansion
was increasing, that of Great Britain decreasing. High tariffs and
preferential rates had closed Corea and Manchuria to British enterprise.
It is easy to estimate in what commercial jealousy and rivalry such
circumstances had resulted. While the expediency of the British-Japanese
alliance was fully recognized, and its consequences admitted to be the
freedom of the China seas from menace of commerce-destroyers,
nevertheless the fact remained that the hostilities against Tsing-tao
would constitute a fresh impulse to Japanese expansion. The operations
in Shantung were watched with critical eyes by many British in the
foreign settlements of China. The floods had, meanwhile, subsided
considerably, and on September 12 Japanese cavalry reached Tsimo, ten
miles outside the Kiao-chau zone. No trace of the enemy north of the
Pai-sha River had been seen, beyond a German aeroplane that occasionally
passed overhead on reconnoitring flights. On the following day a number
of sharp skirmishes with outposts occurred, and one Japanese patrol
found its way to the small town of Kiao-chau, situated at the head of
the bay, some 22 miles from Tsing-tao itself. The brushes with the
Germans became of daily occurrence, and in one of them a high official
of the German Legation at Peking, who had volunteered for service, was
killed. On September 17 the Japanese attacked Wang-ko-huang, 13 miles
from Tsimo, the enemy being in a fortified position and provided with
machine-guns. At sunset, however, they abandoned the village and
withdrew under cover of darkness, leaving behind quantities of equipment
and supplies. A little later a development came about that brought the
dissatisfaction of British traders to a head. About September 18, after
hostile patrols had been driven away from the shore by the fire of
destroyers, Japanese artillery and troops were landed at Laoshan Bay,
north of Tsing-tao, just within the leased territory. Why was it
necessary that troops should have been landed on the northern shore of
the peninsula of Shantung, 150 miles from their objective, when guns
could be disembarked with perfect safety on the eastern shore, not 40
miles from the objective, and within the German zone?
[Sidenote: A British force co-operates.]
The British were not as critical of Japan's strategy as they were
suspicious of her policy. Dark suggestions got afoot that she had
ulterior designs upon the whole Chinese province of Shantung. Such views
could not but have reached the ears of the British authorities at
Wei-hei-wei and elsewhere, nor could they have been deaf to previous
murmurs. Diplomatic circles, however, could extend little sympathy to
the critics. Nevertheless, it was undeniable that the latter were
aggrieved, and that their attitude might produce unfortunate effects. If
Great Britain herself took some share in the Tsing-tao operations,
greater sympathy with their purpose might be induced, and a better state
of feeling in the Orient between the two peoples might possibly result.
It must have been some aim such as this that prompted the dispatch of a
British force to the Tsing-tao area to co-operate with General Kamio, a
step which the earlier symptoms of the British discontent cannot but
have influenced. On September 19, however, 1,000 of the 2nd South Wales
Borderers, a force so small as to be nominal, under Brigadier-General
Barnardiston, left Tientsin and proceeded to Wei-hei-wei. Transport
mules having here been taken on board, the expedition on September 22
coasted down the eastern shore of Shantung, and next day landed at
Laoshan Bay. A month later, as will be seen, they were joined by 500 of
the 36th Sikhs.
[Sidenote: Faint opposition.]
[Sidenote: Artillery battle.]