From the 30th, Russia and Germany--as an inevitable sequel to the

conversations of the 29th--went forward actively with their military

preparations. What was the exact nature of these preludes to the German

mobilization? It was impossible to gain any precise notion at Berlin.

The capital was rife with various rumors that augured ill for the

future. We heard tell of regiments moving from the northern provinces

towards the Rhine. We learnt that reservists had been instructed to keep

themselves in readiness for marching orders. At the same time, postal

communication with Belgium and France had been cut off. At the

Wilhelmstrasse, the position was described to me as follows: "Austria

will reply to Russia's partial mobilization with a general mobilization

of her army. It is to be feared that Russia will then mobilize her

entire forces, which will compel Germany to do the same." As it turned

out, a general mobilization was indeed proclaimed in Austria on the

night of the 30th.

Nevertheless, the peace _pourparlers_ went on between Vienna and St.

Petersburg on the 30th and 31st, although on the latter date Russia, as

Berlin expected, in answer both to the Austrian and the German

preparations, had mobilized her entire forces. Even on the 31st these

discussions seemed to have some chance of attaining their object.

Austria was now more accurately gauging the peril into which her own

blind self-confidence and the counsels of her ally were leading her, and

was pausing on the brink of the abyss. The Vienna Cabinet even consented

to talk over the gist of its Note to Serbia, and M. Sazonoff at once

sent an encouraging reply.

It was desirable, he stated, that representatives of all the Great

Powers should confer in London under the direction of the British

Government.

Was a faint glimmer of peace, after all, dawning above the horizon?

Would an understanding be reached, at the eleventh hour, among the only

States really concerned with the Serbian question? We had reckoned

without our host. The German Emperor willed otherwise. Suddenly, at the

instance of the General Staff, and after a meeting of the Federal

Council, as prescribed by the constitution, he issued the decree of

_Kriegsgefahrzustand_ (Imminence-of-War). This is the first phase of a

general mobilization--a sort of martial law, substituting the military

for the civil authorities as regards the public services (means of

communication, post, telegraphs, and telephones).

This momentous decision was revealed to us on the 31st by a special

edition of the _Berliner Lokalanzeiger_, distributed at every street

corner. The announcement ran as follows:

RUSSIA WANTS WAR!

"From official sources we have just received

(at 2 P.M.) the following report, pregnant with

consequences:

"'The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg sends

us word to-day that a general mobilization of

the Russian Army and Navy had previously been

ordered. That is why His Majesty the Emperor

William has decreed an Imminence-of-War. His

Majesty will take up his residence in Berlin

to-day.'

"Imminence-of-War is the immediate prelude to a

general mobilization, in answer to the menace

that already hangs over Germany to-day, owing

to the step taken by the Tsar."

[Sidenote: The Kaiser's ultimatum to Russia.]

As a drowning man catches at a straw, those who in Berlin saw

themselves, with horror, faced by an impending catastrophe, clutched at

a final hope. The German general mobilization had not yet been ordered.

Who knew whether, at the last moment, some happy inspiration from the

British Cabinet, that most stalwart champion of peace, might cause the

weapons to drop from the hands that were about to wield them? Once more,

however, the Emperor, by his swift moves, shattered this fond illusion.

On the 31st, at seven o'clock in the evening, he dispatched to the

Russian Government a summons to demobilize both on its Austrian and on

its German frontiers. An interval of twelve hours was given for a reply.

It was obvious that Russia, who had refused two days before to cease

from her military preparations, would not accept the German ultimatum,

worded as it was in so dictatorial a form and rendered still more

insulting by the briefness of the interval granted. As, however, no

answer had come from St. Petersburg by the afternoon of August 1st,

Herren von Jagow and Zimmermann (so the latter informed me) rushed to

the Chancellor and the Emperor, in order to request that the decree for

a general mobilization might at least be held over until the following

day. They supported their plea by urging that the telegraphic

communication with St. Petersburg had presumably been cut, and that this

would explain the silence of the Tsar. Perhaps they still hoped against

hope for a conciliatory proposal from Russia. This was the last flicker

of their dying pacifism, or the last awakening of their conscience.

Their efforts could make no headway against the stubborn opposition of

the War Minister and the army chiefs, who represented to the Emperor the

dangers of a twenty-four hours' delay.

[Sidenote: Germany mobilizes.]

The order for a mobilization of the army and navy was signed at five

o'clock in the afternoon and was at once given out to the public by a

special edition of the _Lokalanzeiger_. The mobilization was to begin on

August 2nd. On the 1st, at ten minutes past seven in the evening,

Germany's declaration of war was forwarded to Russia.

[Sidenote: Pretexts given in Germany.]

[Sidenote: Heroism of France.]

As all the world knows, the Berlin Cabinet had to resort to wild

pretexts, such as the committing of acts of hostility (so the military

authorities alleged) by French aviators on Imperial soil, in order to

find motives, two days later, for its declaration of war on France.

Although Germany tried to lay the blame for the catastrophe at Russia's

door, it was in reality her western neighbour that she wished to attack

and annihilate first. On this point there can be no possible doubt

to-day. "Poor France!" said the Berlin newspapers, with feigned

compassion. They acknowledged that the conduct of the French Government

throughout the crisis had been irreproachable, and that it had worked

without respite for the maintenance of peace. While her leaders

fulfilled this noble duty to mankind, France was offering the world an

impressive sight--the sight of a nation looking calmly and without fear

at a growing peril that she had done nothing to conjure up, and,

regarding her word as her bond, determined in cold blood to follow the

destiny of her ally on the field of battle. At the same time she offered

to Germany, who had foolishly counted on her being torn by internal

troubles and political feuds, the vision of her children closely linked

together in an unconquerable resolve--the resolve to beat back an

iniquitous assault upon their country. Nor was this the only surprise

that she held in store. With the stone wall of her resistance, she was

soon to change the whole character of the struggle, and to wreck the

calculations of German strategy.

No one had laboured with more energy and skill to quench the flames lit

by Austria and her ally than the representative of the Republic at

Berlin.

"Don't you think M. Cambon's attitude has been admirable?" remarked the

British Ambassador to me, in the train that was whirling us far away

from the German capital on August 6th. "Throughout these terrible days

nothing has been able to affect his coolness, his presence of mind, and

his insight." I cannot express my own admiration better than by

repeating this verdict of so capable a diplomat as Sir Edward Goschen,

who himself took a most active part in the vain attempt of the Triple

Entente to save Europe from calamity.

VIII

[Sidenote: Berlin enthusiastic.]

The Berlin population had followed the various phases of the crisis with

tremendous interest, but with no outward show of patriotic fervour.

Those fine summer days passed as tranquilly as usual. Only in the

evenings did some hundreds of youths march along the highways of the

central districts, soberly singing national anthems, and dispersing

after a few cries of "Hoch!" outside the Austro-Hungarian and Italian

Embassies and the Chancellor's mansion.

On August 2nd I watched the animation of the Sunday crowd that thronged

the broad avenue of the Kurfuerstendamm. It read attentively the special

editions of the newspapers, and then each went off to enjoy his or her

favourite pastime--games of tennis for the young men and maidens, long

bouts of drinking in the beer-gardens, for the more sedate citizens with

their families. When the Imperial motor-car flashed like a streak of

lightning down Unter den Linden, it was hailed with loud, but by no

means frantic, cheers. It needed the outcries of the Press against

Russia as the instigator of the war, the misleading speeches of the

Emperor and the Chancellor, and the wily publications of the Government,

to kindle a patriotism rather slow to take fire. Towards the close of my

stay, feeling displayed itself chiefly by jeers at the unfortunate

Russians who were returning post-haste to their native country, and

blackguardly behaviour towards the staff of the Tsar's Ambassador as he

was leaving Berlin.

[Sidenote: German people deluded.]

That the mass of the German people, unaware of Russia's peaceful

intentions, should have been easily deluded, is no matter for

astonishment. The upper classes, however, those of more enlightened

intellect, cannot have been duped by the official falsehoods. They knew

as well as we do that it was greatly to the advantage of the Tsar's

Government not to provoke a conflict. In fact, this question is hardly

worth discussing. Once more we must repeat that, in the plans of William

II and his generals, the Serbian affair was a snare spread for the

Northern Empire before the growth of its military power should have made

it an invincible foe.

[Sidenote: Uncertainty regarding Britain.]

[Sidenote: England's attitude.]

There is no gainsaying that uncertainty as to Britain's intervention was

one of the factors that encouraged Germany. We often asked ourselves

anxiously at Berlin whether Germany's hand would not have been stayed

altogether if the British Government had formally declared that it would

not hold aloof from the war. We even hoped, for a brief moment, that Sir

Edward Grey would destroy the illusions on which the German people loved

to batten. The British Foreign Secretary did indeed observe to Prince

Lichnowsky on July 29th that the Austro-Serbian issue might become so

great as to involve all European interests, and that he did not wish the

Ambassador to be misled by the friendly tone of their conversations into

thinking that Britain would stand aside. If at the beginning she had

openly taken her stand by the side of her Allies, she might, to be sure,

have checked the fatal march of events. This, at any rate, is the most

widespread view, for a maritime war certainly did not enter into the

calculations of the Emperor and Admiral von Tirpitz, while it was the

nightmare of the German commercial world. In my opinion, however, an

outspoken threat from England on the 29th, a sudden roar of the British

lion, would not have made William II draw back. The memory of Agadir

still rankled in the proud Germanic soul. The Emperor would have risked

losing all prestige in the eyes of a certain element among his subjects

if at the bidding of the Anglo-Saxon he had refused to go further, and

had thus played into the hands of those who charged him with conducting

a policy of mere bluff and intimidation. "Germany barks but does not

bite" was a current saying abroad, and this naturally tended to

exasperate her. An ominous warning from the lips of Sir Edward Grey

would only have served to precipitate the onslaught of the Kaiser's

armies, in order that the intervention of the British fleet might have

no influence on the result of the campaign, the rapid and decisive

campaign planned at Berlin.

[Sidenote: British opinion.]

We know, moreover, from the telegrams and speeches of the British

Foreign Minister, how carefully he had to reckon with public feeling

among his countrymen in general and among the majority in Parliament. A

war in the Balkans did not concern the British nation, and the strife

between Teuton and Slav left it cold. It did not begin to be properly

roused until it grasped the reality of the danger to France's very

existence, and it did not respond warmly to the eloquent appeals of Mr.

Asquith and Sir Edward Grey until the day when it knew that the Germans

were at the gates of Liege, where they threatened both Paris and

Antwerp--Antwerp, "that pistol pointed at the heart of England."

* * * * *

With the failure of diplomatic efforts to prevent war as a result of the

deliberate intention of Germany to bring about the conflict, the great

German war machine was put in motion. It was anticipated by the General

Staff that the passage across Belgium would be effected without

difficulty and with the acquiescence of King and people.

How wrong was this judgment is one of the curious facts of history. The

Germans discovered this error when their armies presented themselves

before the strong fortress of Liege, the first fortified place in their

path. Its capture was necessary for the successful passage of the German

troops.

[Sidenote: Importance of the delay.]

It was captured, but at a cost in time and in their arrangement of plans

which were a great element in the great thrust--back at the Marne.

THE DEFENCE OF LIEGE

CHARLES BRONNE

English Review, April, 1915.

[Sidenote: Germany invades Belgium.]

On Sunday, August 2nd, while the news was going round that a train had

entered Luxembourg with German forces, the German Minister at Brussels

delivered an ultimatum to Belgium demanding the free passage through our

territory of the German armies. The following day, Monday, the Belgian

Government replied that the nation was determined to defend its

neutrality. The same night the German advanced posts entered our

territory. Tuesday morning they were before Vise, at Warsage, at

Dolhain, and at Stavelot. The bridges of Vise and Argenteau and the

tunnels of Troisponts and Nas-Proue were blown up.

[Sidenote: Atrocities begin.]

From this day the atrocities committed by the pioneers of German

"Kultur" began at Vise with fire and the massacre of inhabitants. On

Thursday, they were to continue at Warsage and Berneau. On Wednesday,

August 5th, the investment of Liege began, the bombardment being

specially directed to the north-west sector which comprises the forts of

Evegnee, Barchon, and Fleron. In the afternoon the attack extended as

far as the fort of Chaudfontaine. The region attacked by the foe was

thus that between the Meuse and the Vesdre, the beautiful country of

Herve, where cornfields are followed by vineyards, where meadowland

encroaches on the sides of narrow but picturesque valleys, where small

but thick woods conceal the number of the assailants. It was found

necessary to destroy some prosperous little farms, several country

houses, and pretty villas. This was but a prelude to the devastation

brought by the soldiers of the Kaiser.

The enemy was in force. Later it was known that around Liege were the

10th Prussian Army Corps from Aix-la-Chapelle on the way to Vise, the

7th Corps, which had passed through the Herve country, the 8th, which

had entered through Stavelot, and also a brigade of the 11th Corps,

making up a total of about 130,000 men.

[Sidenote: Forts of Liege.]

To resist these forces, General Leman had forts more than twenty-four

years old and 30,000 men: the 3rd division of the army increased by the

15th mixed brigade, _i.e._, the 9th, 11th, 12th, and 14th of the line, a

part of the 2nd Lancers, a battalion of the 1st Carabineers, and the

Divisional Artillery.

* * * * *

Thursday, August 6th, was rich in moving incidents.

While the enemy were in force before Barchon, in a night attack, an

attempt was made on General Leman. The story has been variously told.

Here is the true version.

[Sidenote: German spies.]

The enemy's spies, so numerous in Liege, had been able to give the most

exact information regarding the installation of the General Staff in the

Rue Sainte Foy. They were quite aware that for a week the defender of

Liege had only been taking two or three hours' rest in his office, so as

to be more easily in telephonic communication with the forts and

garrison. These offices in the Rue Sainte Foy were very badly situated,

at the extreme end of the northern quarter, and were defended only by a

few gendarmes. General Leman had been warned, however, and the King

himself had at last persuaded him to take some precautions against a

possible attempt. He had finally given way to this advice, and a

rudimentary structure, but a sure one, fitted with electric light and

telephone, was being set up under the railway tunnel near the Palais

station.

This was, then, the last night the General would pass at Rue Sainte Foy.

[Sidenote: General Leman in danger.]

Towards half-past four in the morning a body of a hundred men descended

from the heights of Tawes. Whence did they come? How had they been able

to penetrate into the town? Some have said that they dressed in Liege

itself. In reality, they represented themselves to the advanced posts of

the fort of Pontisse as being Englishmen come to the aid of Liege, and

asked to be conducted to the General Staff. They were soldiers of a

Hanoverian regiment, and bore upon their sleeves a blue band with the

word "Gibraltar." This contributed in no small degree to cause them to

be taken for British sharpshooters. They were preceded by a spy who had

put on the Belgian uniform of the 11th of the line and who seemed to

know the town very well. At Thier-a-Liege, they stopped a moment to

drink at a wine-shop and then went on. They were more than a hundred in

number and were preceded by two officers. A detachment of Garde Civique,

posted at the gas factory of the Rue des Bayards, did not consider it

their duty to interfere. A few individuals accompanied the troop, crying

"Vive les Anglais." A few passers-by, better-aware of the situation,

protested. The troop continued its imperturbable march. The officers

smiled. Thus they arrived at Rue Sainte Foy where, as we have said, the

offices of the General Staff of General Leman were installed.

A German officer asked of the sentinel on the door an interview with

General Leman. The officers of the latter, who now appeared, understood

the ruse at once, and drew their revolvers. Shots were exchanged. One of

the officers, Major Charles Marchand, a non-commissioned officer of

gendarmes, and several gendarmes were killed. The Germans attempted to

enter the offices, of which the door had been closed. They fired through

the windows, and even attempted to attack the house by scaling the

neighbouring walls. General Leman, who was working, ran out on hearing

the first shots. He was unarmed. He demanded a revolver. Captain Lebbe,

his aide-de-camp, refused to allow him to expose himself uselessly, and

begged him to keep himself for the defence of Liege. He even used some

violence to his chief, and pushed him towards the low door which

separated the house from the courtyard of a neighbouring cannon foundry.

With the help of another officer, the captain placed his General in

safety. While this was happening, the alarm had been given, and the

Germans, seeing that their attempt to possess themselves of the person

of General Leman had failed, retired. The guard, which comprised some

fifty men, fired repeatedly on the retreating party. Some fifty Germans,

including a standard-bearer and a drummer, were killed. Others were made

prisoners.

[Sidenote: General Leman in Fort Loncin.]

The General retired to the citadel of Sainte Walburge, and later to the

fort of Loncin. From there he followed the efforts of the enemy

attacking anew the north-east and south-east sectors. The environs of

Fort Boncelles are as difficult to defend as those of the

Barchon-Evegnee-Fleron front. There is first the discovered part which

surrounds what remains of the unfortunate village of Boncelles, which

the Belgians themselves were forced to destroy to free their field of

fire, but for the rest, there are only woods, that of Plainevaux, which

reaches to the Ourthe, Neuville, and Vecquee woods, that of Begnac,

which continues Saint Lambert wood as far as Trooz and the Meuse.

[Sidenote: Belgian troops fight heroically.]

Every place here swarmed with Germans, 40,000 at least, an army corps

which had spent a day and a night in fortifying themselves, and had been

able to direct their artillery towards Plainevaux, to the north of

Neuville, and upon the heights of Ramet. Thirty thousand men at least

would have been needed to defend this gap and less than 15,000 were

available. A similar attack was delivered at the same time between the

Meuse and the Vesdre. On both sides miracles of heroism were performed,

but the enemy poured on irresistibly. They were able to pass, on the one

side, Val Saint Lambert, on the other, between Barchon and the Meuse,

between Evegnee and Fleron. Fighting took place well into the night, the

enemy being repulsed at Boncelles twice. The following morning I saw

pieces of German corpses. The Belgian artillery had made a real carnage,

and no smaller number of victims fell in the bayonet charges. The 9th

and the Carabineers, who had fought the day before at Barchon, were

present here.

[Sidenote: Retreat ordered.]

In the other sector, the soldiers of the 12th of the line particularly

behaved like heroes. The battle began towards two o'clock in the morning

at Retinne where, after prodigies of valour and a great slaughter of the

enemy, the Belgian troops were forced to retire. The struggle continued

at Saine and at Queue du Bois. Here Lieutenant F. Bronne and forty of

his men fell while covering the retreat. In spite of such devotion and

of a bravery that will not be denied, the enemy passed through. Why?

Some troops surrendered with their officers, who were afterwards set

free upon parole at Liege. But this was only a very small exception, and

it was under the pressure of an enemy four times as numerous that the

3rd division succumbed after three days of repeated fighting, during

which the soldiers were compelled to make forced marches from one

sector to another, and stop the rest of the time in the trenches

fighting. The enemy's losses were 5,000 killed and 30,000 wounded.

General Leman considered that he had obtained from his troops the

maximum effort of which they were capable and ordered a retreat. It was

executed in good order, and the enemy had suffered so severely that they

did not dream of pursuit. They contented themselves with pushing forward

as far as the plateau of Saint-Tilman (close to Boncelles) and that of

Robermont (behind Fleron) some cannons of 15, which had bombarded the

town the first time on Thursday, August 6th, at four o'clock in the

morning. No German troops, except some 200 men who entered as prisoners,

penetrated into the town on this day.

Although this retreat left behind a few men with several guns, it may be

said to have been effected in good order. I was able to see that for

myself in passing through with the troops, from the fifth limit of the

Saint Trond route, near Fort Loncin, up to the centre of the town. The

auto in which I was seated was able to pass easily.

[Sidenote: Refugees.]

The terrified population from Bressoux began to arrive. There were

people half-dressed, but who carried some object which to them seemed

the most precious, sometimes a simple portrait of a loved one. Others

drove cattle before them. The men carried children, while women followed

painfully loaded with household goods. Mixed up with them were the Garde

Civique. It had just been assembled and informed that it was disbanded,

and a certain number of them had told the inhabitants that the Prussians

were coming, and that there was nothing better to do than for everyone

to bolt himself in. The cannon had thundered all night. The citizens of

Liege had found in their letter-boxes a warning from the burgomaster

concerning the behaviour of the inhabitants in case of the town being

occupied by the enemy. This urgent notice, distributed the night before

between 9 and 11 p.m., foreshadowed an imminent occupation. The hasty

flight of the people of Bressoux stopped when they had crossed the

Meuse; but as the bombardment recommenced towards noon, fright again

seized on the population. The bombardment lasted till two. Some thirty

shells fell on different parts of the town.

[Sidenote: Bridge of Arches destroyed.]

World's War Events, Vol. I · 第 2 / 28 段