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[Illustration: THE CATHEDRAL OF NOTRE DAME AT RHEIMS]
WORLD'S WAR EVENTS
RECORDED BY STATESMEN . COMMANDERS
HISTORIANS AND BY MEN WHO FOUGHT OR SAW
THE GREAT CAMPAIGNS
COMPILED AND EDITED BY
FRANCIS J. REYNOLDS
FORMER REFERENCE LIBRARIAN . LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
AND
ALLEN L. CHURCHILL
ASSOCIATE EDITOR "THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR"
ASSOCIATE EDITOR "THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA"
VOLUME I
[Illustration]
P. F. COLLIER & SON COMPANY
NEW YORK
Copyright 1919
BY P. F. COLLIER & SON COMPANY
WORLD'S WAR EVENTS
VOLUME I
BEGINNING WITH THE CAUSES OF THE WAR
AND THE INVASION OF BELGIUM IN
1914 AND CARRYING THE HISTORY
OF THE WAR TO
THE CLOSE OF
1915
CONTENTS
ARTICLE PAGE
I. WHAT CAUSED THE WAR 7
_Baron Beyens_
II. THE DEFENSE OF LIEGE 41
_Charles Bronne_
III. THE GREAT RETREAT 62
_Sir John French_
IV. THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 73
_Sir John French_
V. HOW THE FRENCH FOUGHT 83
_French Official Account_
VI. THE RACE FOR THE CHANNEL 96
_French Official Account_
VII. THE LAST DITCH IN BELGIUM 108
_Arno Dosch_
VIII. WHY TURKEY ENTERED THE WAR 125
_Roland G. Usher_
IX. THE FALKLAND SEA FIGHT 142
_A. N. Hilditch_
X. CRUISE OF THE EMDEN 176
_Captain Muecke_
XI. CAPTURE OF TSING-TAO 198
_A. N. Hilditch_
XII. GALLIPOLI 221
_A. John Gallishaw_
XIII. GAS: SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES 240
_Colonel E. D. Swinton_
XIV. THE CANADIANS AT YPRES 248
_By the Canadian Record Officer_
XV. SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA 277
_Judicial Decision by Judge J. M. Mayer_
XVI. MOUNTAIN WARFARE 313
_Howard C. Felton_
XVII. THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE OF 1915 322
_Official Account of the French Headquarters Staff_
XVIII. THE TRAGEDY OF EDITH CAVELL 348
_Brand Whitlock_
XIX. GALLIPOLI ABANDONED 366
_General Sir Charles C. Monro_
XX. THE DEATH-SHIP IN THE SKY 375
_Perriton Maxwell_
WHAT CAUSED THE WAR
BARON BEYENS
The National Review, June, 1916.
I
[Sidenote: Political designs of Francis Ferdinand.]
The Archduke Francis Ferdinand will go down to posterity without having
yielded up his secret. Great political designs have been ascribed to
him, mainly on the strength of his friendship with William II. What do
we really know about him? He was strong-willed and obstinate, very
Clerical, very Austrian, disliking the Hungarians to such an extent that
he kept their statesmen at arm's-length, and having no love for Italy.
He has been credited with sympathies towards the Slav elements of the
Empire; it has been asserted that he dreamt of setting up, in place of
the dual monarchy, a "triune State," in which the third factor would
have been made up for the most part of Slav provinces carved out of the
Kingdom of St. Stephen. Immediately after he had been murdered, the
_Vossische Zeitung_ refuted this theory with arguments which seemed to
me thoroughly sound.
The Archduke, said the Berlin newspaper, was too keen-witted not to see
that he would thus be creating two rivals for Austria instead of one,
and that the Serb populations would come within the orbit of Belgrade
rather than of Vienna. Serbia would become the Piedmont of the Balkans;
she would draw to herself the Slavs of the Danube valley by a process of
crystallization similar to that which brought about Italian unity.
[Sidenote: Army and Navy reorganized.]
From year to year the Archduke had acquired more and more weight in the
governance of the Empire, in proportion as his uncle's will grew weaker
beneath the burden of advancing age. Thus he had succeeded in his
efforts to provide Austria-Hungary with a new navy, the counterpart, on
a more modest scale, of the German fleet, and to reorganize the
effective army, here again taking Germany for his model. Among certain
cliques, he was accused of not keeping enough in the background, of
showing little tact or consideration in the manner of thrusting aside
the phantom Emperor, who was gently gliding into the winter of the years
at Schoenbrunn amid the veneration of his subjects of every race.
Another charge was that he appointed too many of his creatures to
important civil and military posts.
[Sidenote: Antagonism of Russia and Austria.]
We may well believe that this prince, observing the gradual decay of the
monarchy, tried to restore its vigour, and that his first thought was to
hold with a firm grasp, even before assuming the Imperial crown, the
cluster of nationalities, mutually hostile and always discontented, that
go to make up the Dual Empire. So far as foreign relations are
concerned, we may assume that he was bent on winning her a place in the
first rank of Powers; that he wished, above all, to see her predominant
all along the Danube and in the Balkans; that he even aimed at giving
her the road to Salonika and the Levant, though it were at the price of
a collision with Russia. This antagonism between the two neighbour
Empires must have often been among the topics of his conversations with
William II.
The Archduke needed military glory, prestige won on the battle-field, in
order to seat his consort firmly on the throne and make his children
heirs to the Caesars. He had been suspected, both in Austria and abroad,
of not wishing to observe the family compact which he had signed at the
time of his marriage with Countess Sophie Chotek. It was thought that he
perhaps reserved the right to declare it null and void, in view of the
constraint that had been put upon him. The successive honours that had
drawn the Duchess of Hohenberg from the obscurity in which the
morganatic wife of a German prince is usually wrapped, and had brought
her near to the steps of the throne, showed clearly that her rise would
not stop half-way.
[Sidenote: Domestic life of the Archduke.]
The Archduke, like William II himself, was reputed to be an exemplary
father and husband. He was one of those princes who adore their own
children, but, under the spur of political ambition, are very prone to
send the children of others to the shambles. A fine theme for Socialist
and Republican preachers to enlarge upon!
I often met the heir to the Imperial crown, especially at Vienna in
1910, where I had the honour of accompanying my Sovereign, and two years
later at Munich, the Prince Regent's funeral.
On each occasion this Hapsburg, with his heavy features, his scowling
expression, and his rather corpulent figure (quite different from the
slim build characteristic of his line), struck me as a singular type.
His face was certainly not sympathetic, nor was his manner engaging. The
Duchess of Hohenberg, whom, after having known her as a little girl when
her father was Austrian Minister at Brussels, I found gracefully doing
the honours in the Belvedere Palace, had retained in her high station
the genial simplicity of the Chotek family. This probably did not
prevent her from cherishing the loftiest ambitions for herself, and
above all for her eldest son, and from coveting the glory of the double
crown.
II
[Sidenote: Assassination of Francis Ferdinand.]
The news that an assassin's hand had struck down the Archduke and his
wife, inseparable even in death, burst upon Berlin on the afternoon of
Sunday, June 28, like an unexpected thunderclap in the midst of a calm
summer's day. I went over at once to the Austro-Hungarian Embassy, in
order to express all the horror that I felt at this savage drama. Count
Szoegyen, the senior member of the diplomatic corps, was on the eve of
resigning the post that he had held for twenty years, honoured by all
his colleagues. It was whispered that his removal had been asked for by
the Archduke, who was anxious to introduce young blood into the
diplomatic service. I found the Ambassador quite overcome by the
terrible news. He seemed stricken with grief at the thought of his aged
Sovereign, who had already lost so many of his nearest and dearest, and
of the Dual Empire, robbed of its most skillful pilot, and with no one
to steer it now but an octogenarian leaning on a youth of twenty-six. M.
Cambon had come to the Embassy at the same time, and we left together
discussing the results, still impossible to foresee clearly, that this
fatality might have for European affairs.
[Sidenote: Serajevo tragedy a menace.]
From the very next day the tone of the Berlin Press, in commenting on
the Serajevo tragedy, was full of menace. It expected the Vienna Cabinet
to send to Belgrade an immediate request for satisfaction, if Serbian
subjects, as it was believed, were among those who had devised and
carried out the plot. But how far would this satisfaction go, and in
what form would it be demanded? There was the rub. The report, issued by
the semi-official _Lokalanzeiger_, of a pressure exerted by the
Austro-Hungarian Minister, with a view to making the Serbian Government
institute proceedings against the anarchist societies of which the
Archduke and his wife had been the victims, surprised no one, but was
not confirmed. On the other hand, a softer breeze soon blew from Vienna
and Budapest, and under its influence the excitement of the Berlin
newspapers suddenly abated. An order seemed to have been issued: the
rage and fluster of the public were to be allowed to cool down. The
Austro-Hungarian Government, so we were informed by the news agencies,
were quietly taking steps to prosecute the murderers. Count Berchtold,
in speaking to the diplomatic corps at Vienna, and Count Tisza, in
addressing Parliament at Budapest, used reassuring language, which
raised hopes of a peaceful solution.
[Sidenote: Opinion is moderate in Berlin.]
The Wilhelmstrasse also expressed itself in very measured terms on the
guarantees that would be demanded from Serbia. Herr Zimmermann, without
knowing (so he said to me) what decision had been arrived at in Vienna,
thought that no action would be taken in Belgrade until the
Austro-Hungarian Government had collected the proofs of the complicity
of Serbian subjects or societies in the planning of the Serajevo crime.
He had made a similar statement to the Russian Ambassador, who had
hastened to impart to him his fears for the peace of Europe, in the
event of any attempt to coerce Serbia into proceeding against the secret
societies, if they were accused of intrigues against the Austrian
Government in Bosnia and Croatia. Herr Zimmermann declared to M.
Sverbeeff that, in his opinion, no better advice could be given to the
Serbian Government than this: that it should put a stop to the nefarious
work of these societies and punish the accomplices of the Archduke's
assassins. The moderation of this remark fairly reflected the general
state of public opinion in Berlin.
[Sidenote: Kaiser William's opinion.]
But what of the Emperor, the Archduke's personal friend? Would not his
grief and anger find voice in ringing tones? All eyes were turned
towards Kiel, where the fatal news reached William II while he was
taking part in a yacht race on board his own clipper. He turned pale,
and was heard to murmur: "So my work of the past twenty-five years will
have to be started all over again!" Enigmatic words which may be
interpreted in various ways! To the British Ambassador, who was also at
Kiel, with the British squadron returning from the Baltic, he unburdened
himself in more explicit fashion: "Es ist ein Verbrechen gegen das
Deutschtum" ("It is a crime against Germanity"). By this he probably
meant that Germany, feeling her own interests assailed by the Serajevo
crime, would make common cause with Austria to exact a full retribution.
With more self-control than usual, however, he abstained from all
further public utterances on the subject.
It had been announced that he would go to Vienna to attend the
Archduke's funeral. What were the motives that prevented him from
offering to the dead man this last token of a friendship which, at first
merely political, had become genuine and even tender, with a touch of
patronage characteristic of the Emperor?
[Sidenote: William II not at the funeral.]
He excused himself on the ground of some slight ailment. The truth is,
no doubt, that he was disgusted with the wretched stickling for
etiquette shown by the Grand Chamberlain of the Viennese Court, the
Prince di Montenuovo, who refused to celebrate with fitting splendour
the obsequies of the late heir apparent and his morganatic wife. Under
these circumstances, Vienna could have no desire either for the presence
of William II or for his criticisms.
[Sidenote: The Kaiser goes to Norway.]
At the beginning of July, the Emperor left for his accustomed cruise
along the Norwegian coast, and in Berlin we breathed more freely. If he
could withdraw so easily from the centre of things, it was a sign that
the storm-clouds that had nearly burst over Serbia were also passing off
from the Danube valley. Such, I fancy, was the view taken by the British
Government, for its Ambassador, who was already away on leave, was not
sent back to Berlin. Other diplomats, among them the Russian Ambassador,
took their annual holiday as usual. But the Emperor, in the remote
fiords of Norway, was all the time posted up in the secret designs of
the Vienna Cabinet. The approaching ultimatum to Serbia was telegraphed
to him direct by his Ambassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirsky, a very
active worker, who strenuously advocated a policy of hostility towards
Russia, and from the first moment had wanted war.
[Sidenote: The Kaiser decides.]
We may assume that the Emperor, if his mind was not already made up at
Kiel, came to a decision during his Norwegian cruise. His departure for
the north had been merely a snare, a device for throwing Europe and the
Triple Entente off the scent, and for lulling them into a false
security. While the world imagined that he was merely seeking to soothe
his nerves and recruit his strength with the salt sea breezes, he was
biding his time for a dramatic reappearance on the stage of events,
allowing the introductory scenes to be played in his absence.
III
During the first half of July, my colleagues and I at Berlin did not
live in a fool's paradise. As the deceptive calm caused by Vienna's
silence was prolonged, a latent, ill-defined uneasiness took hold of us
more and more. Yet we were far from anticipating that in the space of a
few days we should be driven into the midst of a diplomatic maelstrom,
in which, after a week of intense anguish, we should look on, mute and
helpless, at the shipwreck of European peace and of all our hopes.
[Sidenote: Austria's ultimatum to Serbia.]
The ultimatum, sent in the form of a Note by Baron von Giesl to the
Serbian Cabinet on July 23, was not disclosed by the Berlin newspapers
until the following day, in their morning editions. This bolt from the
blue proved more alarming than anything we had dared to imagine. The
shock was so unexpected that certain journals, losing their composure,
seemed to regard the Vienna Cabinet's arraignment as having overshot the
mark. "Austria-Hungary," said the _Vossische Zeitung_, "will have to
justify the grave charges that she makes against the Serbian Government
and people by publishing the results of the preliminary investigations
at Serajevo."
[Sidenote: Russia would defend Serbia.]
My own conviction, shared by several of my colleagues, was that the
Austrian and Hungarian statesmen could not have brought themselves to
risk such a blow at the Balkan kingdom, without having consulted their
colleagues at Berlin and ascertained that the Emperor William would
sanction the step. His horror of regicides and his keen sense of
dynastic brotherhood might explain why he left his ally a free hand, in
spite of the danger of provoking a European conflict. That danger was
only too real. Not for one moment did I suppose that Russia would prove
so careless of Serbia's fate as to put up with this daring assault on
the latter's sovereignty and independence; that the St. Petersburg
Cabinet would renounce the principle of "The Balkans for the Balkan
nations," proclaimed to the Duma two months before by M. Sazonoff, in
short, that the Russian people would disown the ancient ties of blood
that united it with the Slav communities of the Balkan peninsula.
The pessimistic feeling of the diplomatic corps was increased on the
following day, the 25th, by the language addressed to it at the
Wilhelmstrasse. Herren von Jagow and Zimmermann said that they had not
known beforehand the contents of the Austrian Note. This was a mere
quibble: they had not known its actual wording, I grant, but they had
certainly been apprised of its tenor. They hastened to add, by the way,
that the Imperial Government approved of its ally's conduct, and did not
consider the tone of its communication unduly harsh. The Berlin Press,
still with the exception of the Socialist organs, had recovered from its
astonishment of the day before; it joined in the chorus of the Vienna
and Budapest newspapers, from which it gave extracts, and faced the
prospect of a war with perfect calm, while expressing the hope that it
would remain localized.
[Sidenote: No signs of peaceful settlement.]
In comparison with the attitude of the German Government and Press, the
signs pointing to a peaceful settlement seemed faint indeed. They all
came from outside Germany, from the impressions recorded in foreign
telegrams. Public opinion in Europe could not grasp the need for such
hectoring methods of obtaining satisfaction, when there was no case for
refusing discussion on the normal diplomatic lines. It seemed impossible
that Count Berchtold should ignore the general movement of reproof which
appeared spontaneously everywhere but in Berlin against his ultimatum. A
moderate claim would have seemed just; but Serbia could not be asked to
accept a demand for so heavy an atonement, couched in a form of such
unexampled brutality.
[Sidenote: Key to the situation in Berlin.]
The more I reflected on the ghastly situation created by the collusion
of German and Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, the more certain did I feel
that the key to that situation (as M. Sazonoff said later) lay in
Berlin, and that there was no need to look further for the solution of
the problem. If, however, the choice between peace and war was left to
the discretion of the Emperor William, whose influence over his ally in
Vienna had always overruled that of others, then, considering what I
knew as to His Majesty's personal inclinations and the plans of the
General Staff, the upshot of it all was no longer in doubt, and no hope
of a peaceful arrangement could any longer be entertained. I
communicated this dismal forecast to the French Ambassador, whom I went
to see on the evening of the 25th. Like myself, M. Cambon laboured under
no illusions. That very night I wrote to my Government, in order to
acquaint it with my fears and urge it to be on its guard. This report,
dated the 26th, I entrusted, as a measure of precaution, to one of my
secretaries, who at once left for Brussels. Early next morning, my
dispatch was in the hands of the Belgian Foreign Minister.
[Sidenote: War aimed at Russia and France.]
The ultimatum to Serbia [it ran] is a blow contrived by Vienna and
Berlin, or rather, contrived here and carried out at Vienna. Requital
for the assassination of the Austrian heir apparent and the Pan-Serb
propaganda serves as a stalking-horse. The real aim, apart from the
crushing of Serbia and the stifling of Jugo-Slav aspirations, is to deal
a deadly thrust at Russia and France, with the hope that England will
stand aside from the struggle. In order to vindicate this theory, I beg
to remind you of the view prevailing in the German General Staff,
namely, that a war with France and Russia is unavoidable and close at
hand--a view which the Emperor has been induced to share. This war,
eagerly desired by the military and Pan-German party, might be
undertaken to-day under conditions extremely favourable for Germany,
conditions that are not likely to arise again for some time to come.
After a summary of the situation and of the problems that it raised, my
report concluded as follows:
We, too, have to ask ourselves these harassing
questions, and keep ourselves ready for the
worst; for the European conflict that has
always been talked about, with the hope that it
would never break out, is to-day becoming a
grim reality.
[Sidenote: Dangers for Belgium.]
The worst contingencies that occurred to me, as
a Belgian, were the violation of a part of our
territory and the duty that might fall upon our
soldiers of barring the way to the
belligerents. In view of the vast area over
which a war between France and Germany would be
fought, dared we hope that Belgium would be
safe from any attack by the German army, from
any attempt to use her strategic routes for
offensive purposes? I could not bring myself to
believe that she would be so fortunate. But
between such tentatives and a thoroughgoing
invasion of my country, plotted a long time in
advance and carried out before the real
operations of the war had begun, there was a
wide gulf, a gulf that I never thought the
Imperial Government capable of leaping over
with a light heart, because of the European
complications which so reckless a disdain for
treaties would not fail to involve.
IV
Until the end of the crisis, the idea of a preventive war continually
recurred to my mind. Other heads of legations, however, while sharing
my anxieties on this point, did not agree with me as to the
premeditation of which I accused the Emperor and the military chiefs. I
was not content with putting my questions to the French Ambassador,
whose unerring judgment always carried great weight with me. I also
visited his Italian colleague, an astute diplomat, thoroughly versed in
German statecraft. He had always put me in mind of those dexterous
agents employed by the sixteenth-century Italian republics.
[Sidenote: Signor Bollati's views.]
[Sidenote: Germany and Austria confident.]
According to Signor Bollati, the German Government, agreeing in
principle with the Vienna Cabinet as to the necessity for chastising
Serbia, had not known beforehand the terms of the Austrian Note, the
violence of which was unprecedented in the language of Chancelleries.
Vienna, as well as Berlin, was convinced that Russia, in spite of the
official assurances that had recently passed between the Tsar and M.
Poincare regarding the complete readiness of the French and Russian
armies, was not in a position to enter on a European war, and that she
would not dare to embark upon so hazardous an adventure. Internal
troubles, revolutionary intrigues, incomplete armaments, inadequate
means of communication--all these reasons would compel the Russian
Government to be an impotent spectator of Serbia's undoing. The same
confidence reigned in the German and Austrian capitals as regards, not
the French army, but the spirit prevailing among Government circles in
Paris.
At present [added the Ambassador] feeling runs so high in Vienna that
all calm reflection goes by the board. Moreover, in seeking to
annihilate Serbia's military power, the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet is
pursuing a policy of personal revenge. It cannot realize the mistakes
that it made during the Balkan War, or remain satisfied with the
partial successes then gained with our aid--successes that, whatever
judgment may be passed upon them, were certainly diplomatic victories.
All that Count Berchtold sees to-day is Serbia's insolence and the
criticism he has had to endure even in Austria. By this bold stroke,
very unexpected from a man of his stamp, he hopes to turn the criticism
into applause.
The Ambassador held that Berlin had false ideas as to the course that
the Tsar's Government would adopt. The latter would find itself forced
into drawing the sword, in order to maintain its prestige in the Slav
world. Its inaction, in face of Austria's entry into the field, would be
equivalent to suicide. Signor Bollati also gave me to understand that a
widespread conflict would not be popular in Italy. The Italian people
had no concern with the overthrow of the Russian power, which was
Austria's enemy; it wished to devote all its attention to other
problems, more absorbing from its own point of view.
[Sidenote: Vienna welcomes war on Serbia.]
The blindness of the Austrian Cabinet with regard to Russian
intervention has been proved by the correspondence, since published, of
the French and British representatives at Vienna. The Viennese populace
was beside itself with joy at the announcement of an expedition against
Serbia, which, it felt sure, would be a mere military parade. Not for a
single night were Count Berchtold's slumbers disturbed by the vision of
the Russian peril. He is, indeed, at all times a buoyant soul, who can
happily mingle the distractions of a life of pleasure with the heavy
responsibilities of power. His unvarying confidence was shared by the
German Ambassador, his most trusted mentor. We can hardly suppose that
the Austrian Minister shut his eyes altogether to the possibility of a
struggle with the Slav world. Having Germany as his partner, however,
he determined, with the self-possession of a fearless gambler, to
proceed with the game.
At Berlin, the theory that Russia was incapable of facing a conflict
reigned supreme, not only in the official world and in society, but
among all the manufacturers who made a specialty of war material.
[Sidenote: Berlin believes Russia weak.]
Herr Krupp von Bohlen, who was more entitled to give an opinion than any
other of this class, declared on July 28 that the Russian artillery was
neither efficient nor complete, while that of the German army had never
before been so superior to all its rivals. It would be madness on
Russia's part, he inferred, to take the field against Germany under
these conditions.
V
The foreign diplomatic corps was kept in more or less profound ignorance
as to the _pourparlers_ carried on since the 24th by the Imperial
Foreign Office with the Triple Entente Cabinets. Nevertheless, to the
diplomats who were continually going over to the Wilhelmstrasse for
news, the crisis was set forth in a light very favourable to Austria and
Germany, in order to influence the views of the Governments which they
represented. Herr von Stumm, the departmental head of the political
branch, in a brief interview that I had with him on the 26th, summed up
his exposition in these words: "Everything depends on Russia." I should
rather have thought that everything depended on Austria, and on the way
in which she would carry out her threats against Serbia.
On the following day I was received by Herr Zimmermann, who adopted the
same line of argument, following it in all its bearings from the origin
of the dispute.
It was not at our prompting [he said], or in accordance with our advice,
that Austria took the action that you know of towards the Belgrade
Cabinet. The answer was unsatisfactory, and to-day Austria is
mobilizing. She can no longer draw back without risking a collapse at
home as well as a loss of influence abroad. It is now a question of life
and death to her. She must put a stop to the unscrupulous propaganda
which, by raising revolt among the Slav provinces of the Danube valley,
is leading towards her internal disintegration. Finally, she must exact
a signal revenge for the assassination of the Archduke. For all these
reasons Serbia is to receive, by means of a military expedition, a stern
and salutary lesson. An Austro-Serbian War is, therefore, impossible to
avoid.
[Sidenote: Attempts to limit conflict.]
England has asked us to join with her, France, and Italy, in order to
prevent the conflict from spreading and a war from breaking out between
Austria and Russia. Our answer was that we should be only too glad to
help in limiting the area of the conflagration, by speaking in a pacific
sense to Vienna and St. Petersburg; but that we could not use our
influence with Austria to restrain her from inflicting an exemplary
punishment on Serbia. We have promised to help and support our Austrian
allies, if any other nation should try to hamper them in this task. We
shall keep that promise.
If Russia mobilizes her army, we shall at once mobilize ours, and then
there will be a general war, a war that will set ablaze all Central
Europe and even the Balkan peninsula, for the Rumanians, Greeks,
Bulgarians, and Turks will not be able to resist the temptation to come
in.
As I remarked yesterday to M. Boghitchevitch [the former Serbian Charge
d'Affaires, who was on a flying visit to Berlin, where he had been
greatly appreciated during the Balkan War], the best advice I can give
Serbia is that she should make no more than a show of resistance to
Austria, and should come to terms as soon as possible, by accepting all
the conditions of the Vienna Cabinet. I added, in speaking to him, that
if a universal war broke out and went in favor of the Triplice, Serbia
would probably cease to exist as a nation; she would be wiped off the
map of Europe. I still hope, though, that such a widespread conflict may
be avoided, and that we shall succeed in inducing Russia not to
intervene on Serbia's behalf. Remember that Austria is determined to
respect Serbia's integrity, once she has obtained satisfaction.
I pointed out to the Under-Secretary that the Belgrade Cabinet's reply,
according to some of my colleagues who had read it, was, apart from a
few unimportant restrictions, an unqualified surrender to Austria's
demands. Herr Zimmermann said that he had no knowledge of this reply (it
had been handed in two days before to the Austrian Minister at
Belgrade!) and that, in any case, there was no longer any possibility of
preventing an Austro-Hungarian military demonstration.
[Sidenote: Serbian reply.]
The Serbian document was not published by the Berlin newspapers until
the 29th. On the previous day they all reproduced a telegram from
Vienna, stating that this apparent submission was altogether inadequate.
The prompt concessions made by the Pasitch Cabinet, concessions that had
not been anticipated abroad, failed to impress Germany. She persisted in
seeing only with Austria's eyes.
[Sidenote: Zimmermann's arguments.]
Herr Zimmermann's arguments held solely on the hypothesis that, in the
action brought by Austria against Serbia, no Power had the right to
come forward as counsel for the defendant, or to interfere in the trial
at all. This claim amounted to depriving Russia of her historic role in
the Balkans. Carried to its logical conclusion, the theory meant
condemning unheard every small State that should be unfortunate enough
to have a dispute with a great Power. According to the principles of the
Berlin Cabinet, the great Power should be allowed, without let or
hindrance, to proceed to the execution of its weak opponent. England,
therefore, would have had no right to succor Belgium when the latter was
invaded by Germany, any more than Russia had a right to protect Serbia
from the Austrian menace.
Russia, it was asserted at the Wilhelmstrasse, ought to be satisfied
with the assurance that Austria would not impair the territorial
integrity of Serbia or mar her future existence as an independent State.
What a hollow mockery such a promise would seem, when the whole country
had been ravaged by fire and sword! Surely it was decreed that, after
this "exemplary punishment," Serbia should become the lowly vassal of
her redoubtable neighbour, living a life that was no life, cowed by the
jealous eye of the Austrian Minister--really the Austrian Viceroy--at
Belgrade. Had not Count Mensdorff declared to Sir Edward Grey that
before the Balkan War Serbia was regarded as gravitating towards the
Dual Monarchy's sphere of influence? A return to the past, to the tame
deference of King Milan, was the least that Austria would exact.
[Sidenote: German opinion is misled.]
The version given out by the Imperial Chancellery, besides being
intended to enlighten foreign Governments, had a further end in view.
Repeated _ad nauseam_ by the Press, it aimed at misleading German
public opinion. From the very opening of the crisis, Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg and his colleagues strove, with all the ingenuity at
their command, to hoodwink their countrymen, to shuffle the cards, to
throw beforehand on Russia, in case the situation should grow worse, the
odium of provocation and the blame for the disaster, to represent that
Power as meddling with a police inquiry that did not concern her in the
least. This cunning man[oe]uvre resulted in making all Germany, without
distinction of class or party, respond to her Emperor's call at the
desired moment, since she was persuaded (as I have explained in a
previous chapter) that she was the object of a premeditated attack by
Tsarism.
VI
[Sidenote: German diplomacy.]
The game of German diplomacy during these first days of the crisis, July
24 to 28, has already been revealed. At first inclined to bludgeon, it
soon came to take things easily, even affecting a certain optimism, and
by its passive resistance bringing to naught all the efforts and all the
proposals of the London, Paris, and St. Petersburg Cabinets. To gain
time, to lengthen out negotiations, seems to have been the task imposed
upon Austria-Hungary's accomplice in order to promote rapid action by
the Dual Monarchy, and to face the Triple Entente with irrevocable
deeds, namely the occupation of Belgrade and the surrender of the
Serbians. But things did not go as Berlin and Vienna had hoped, and the
determined front shown by Russia, who in answer to the partial
mobilization of Austria mobilized her army in four southern districts,
gave food for reflection to the tacticians of the Wilhelmstrasse. Their
language and their frame of mind grew gentler to a singular degree on
the fifth day, July 28. It may be recalled, in passing, that in 1913,
during the Balkan hostilities, Austria and Russia had likewise proceeded
to partial mobilizations; yet these steps had not made them come to
blows or even brought them to the verge of hostilities.
[Sidenote: The Kaiser returns to Berlin.]
On the evening of the 26th the Emperor's return was announced in Berlin.
Why did he come back so suddenly? I think I am justified in saying that,
at this news, the general feeling among the actors and spectators of the
drama was one of grave anxiety. Our hearts were heavy within us; we had
a foreboding that the decisive moment was drawing near. It was the same
at the Wilhelmstrasse. To the British Charge d'Affaires Herr von
Zimmermann frankly confessed his regret at this move, on which William
II had decided without consulting any one.
Nevertheless, our fears at first seemed to be unwarranted. The 28th was
marked by a notable loosening of Germany's stiff-necked attitude. The
British Ambassador, who had returned to Berlin on the previous day, was
summoned in the evening by the Chancellor. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg,
while rejecting the conference proposed by Sir Edward Grey, promised to
use his good offices to induce Russia and Austria to discuss the
position in an amicable fashion. "A war between the Great Powers must be
averted," were his closing words.
It is highly probable that the Chancellor at that time sincerely wanted
to keep the peace, and his first efforts, when he saw the danger coming
nearer and nearer, succeeded in curbing the Emperor's impatience for
forty-eight hours. The telegram sent by William II to the Tsar on the
evening of the 28th is friendly, almost reassuring: "Bearing in mind
the cordial friendship that has united us two closely for a long time
past, I am using all my influence to make Austria arrive at a genuine
and satisfactory understanding with Russia."
How are we to explain, then, the abrupt change of tack that occurred the
following day at Berlin, or rather, at Potsdam, and the peculiar
language addressed by the Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the
evening of the 29th? In that nocturnal scene there was no longer any
question of Austria's demands on Serbia, or even of the possibility of
an Austro-Russian war. The centre of gravity was suddenly shifted, and
at a single stride the danger passed from the southeast of Europe to the
northwest.
[Sidenote: Will England be neutral?]
What is it that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg wants to know at once, as he
comes straight from the council held at Potsdam under the presidency of
the Emperor? Whether Great Britain would consent to remain neutral in a
European war, provided that Germany agreed to respect the territorial
integrity of France. "And what of the French colonies?" asks the
Ambassador with great presence of mind. The Chancellor can make no
promise on this point, but he unhesitatingly declares that Germany will
respect the integrity and neutrality of Holland. As for Belgium,
France's action will determine what operations Germany may be forced to
enter upon in that country; but when the war is over, Belgium will lose
no territory, unless she ranges herself on the side of Germany's foes.
[Sidenote: A bargain proposed.]
Such was the shameful bargain proposed to England, at a time when none
of the negotiators had dared to speak in plain terms of a European war
or even to offer a glimpse of that terrifying vision. This interview was
the immediate result of the decisive step taken by German diplomacy on
the same day at St. Petersburg. The step in question has been made known
to us through the diplomatic documents which have been printed by the
orders of the belligerent Governments, and all of which concur in their
account of this painful episode. Twice on that day did M. Sazonoff
receive a visit from the German Ambassador, who came to make a demand
wrapped up in threats.
[Sidenote: Germany's demands on Russia.]
Count de Pourtales insisted on Russia contenting herself with the
promise, guaranteed by Germany, that Austria-Hungary would not impair
the integrity of Serbia. M. Sazonoff refused to countenance the war on
this condition. Serbia, he felt, would become a vassal of Austria, and a
revolution would break out in Russia. Count de Pourtales then backed his
request with the warning that, unless Russia desisted from her military
preparations, Germany would mobilize. A German mobilization, he said,
would mean war. The results of the second interview, which took place at
two o'clock in the morning, were as negative as those of the first,
notwithstanding a last effort, a final suggestion by M. Sazonoff to
stave off the crisis. His giving in to Germany's brutal dictation would
have been an avowal that Russia was impotent.
To the Emperor William, who had resumed the conduct of affairs since the
morning of the 27th--the Emperor William, itching to cut the knot,
driven on by his Staff and his generals--to him and no other must we
trace the responsibility for this insolent move which made war
inevitable. "The heads of the army insisted," was all that Herr von
Jagow would vouchsafe a little later to M. Cambon by way of explanation.
The Chancellor, and with him the Foreign Secretary and Under-Secretary,
associated themselves with these hazardous tactics, from sheer inability
to secure the adoption of less hasty and violent methods. If they
believed that this summary breaking off of negotiations would meet with
success, they were as grievously mistaken as Count de Pourtales, whose
reports utterly misled them as to the sacrifices that Russia was
prepared to make for Serbia.
At all events this upright man, when he realized the appalling effects
of his blunder, gave free play to his emotion. Such sensitiveness is
rare indeed in a German, and redounds entirely to his credit.
[Sidenote: Russian military development.]
[Sidenote: French military situation.]
But the Emperor and his council of generals--what was their state of
soul at this critical moment? Perhaps this riddle will never be wholly
solved. From the military point of view, which in their eyes claimed
first attention, they must have rejoiced at M. Sazonoff's answer, for
never again would they find such a golden opportunity for vanquishing
Russia and making an end of her rivalry. In 1917 the reorganization of
her army would have been complete, her artillery would have been at full
strength, and a new network of strategic railways would have enabled her
to let loose upon the two Germanic empires a vast flood of fighting men
drawn from the inexhaustible reservoir of her population. The struggle
with the colossus of the North, despite the vaunted technical
superiority of the German army, would in all likelihood have ended in
the triumph of overwhelming might. In the France of 1917, again, the
three years' term of service would have begun to produce its full
results, and her first-line troops would have been both more numerous
and better trained than at present.
On the other hand, William II could cherish no false hopes as to the
consequences of this second pressure that he was bringing to bear on
St. Petersburg. Had it succeeded in 1914 as in 1909, the encounter
between Germany and the great Slav Empire would only have been put off
to a later day, instead of being finally shelved. How could the Tsar or
the Russian people have forgiven the Kaiser for humbling them once more?
If they had pocketed the affront in silence, it would only have been in
order to bide their time for revenge, and they would have chosen the
moment when Russia, in possession of all her resources, could have
entered upon the struggle with every chance of winning.
[Sidenote: William II and Russia.]
Here an objection may be raised. The German Emperor, some may hold,
fancying that the weight of his sword in the scale would induce the Tsar
to shrink from action, had foreseen the anger of the Slav nation at its
sovereign's timorous scruples, and looked forward to revolutionary
outbreaks which would cripple the Government for years to come and make
it unable to think of war, if indeed they did not sweep the Romanoffs
from the throne. I would answer that this Machiavellian scheme could
never have entered the head of such a ruler as William II, with his deep
sense of monarchial solidarity, and his instinctive horror of anarchist
outrages and of revolution.
[Sidenote: The Kaiser eager to act.]
No: the Emperor, together with the military authorities whose advice he
took, wished to profit by a juncture which he had awaited with longing,
and which fickle Fortune might never again offer to his ambition.
Everything proves it, down to his feverish haste, as soon as M.
Sazonoff's reply was conveyed to him, to learn the intentions of
England, and to suggest, on that very day, a bargain that might purchase
her neutrality. This is why Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg received orders to
summon the British Ambassador on the night of the 29th. The Emperor
could not wait until the following morning, so eager was he to act. Is
this impatience the mark of one who was the victim of a concerted
surprise? If he had not wanted war, would he not have tried to resume
negotiations with Russia on a basis more in keeping with her dignity as
a Great Power, however heavy a blow it was to his own pride that he had
failed to intimidate her?
VII
The abortive efforts to overawe St. Petersburg and the offers made to
the British Ambassador, as if Great Britain's inaction could be sold to
the highest bidder, brought results that were not hard to foresee.
[Sidenote: Sir Edward Grey's telegram.]
In London, Sir Edward Grey's indignation found immediate vent in the
following passage of his telegram of July 30 to Sir Edward Goschen: "It
would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the
expense of France--a disgrace from which the good name of this country
would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain
away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality
of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either."
Through the brazen overtures of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, however, the
British Cabinet henceforth came to occupy itself, before all things,
with the fate allotted to our country by the Imperial Government in the
war that it was preparing. In order to tear off the mask from German
statesmanship, the surest method was to ask it a straightforward
question. On July 31, Sir Edward Grey, following the example of the
Gladstone Ministry of 1870, inquired both of Germany and France whether
they would respect the neutrality of Belgium. At the same time he gave
Belgium to understand that Britain counted on her doing her utmost to
maintain her neutrality.
[Sidenote: Neutrality of Belgium.]
The answer of the Republican Government was frank and unhesitating. It
was resolved to respect Belgian neutrality, and would only act otherwise
if the violation of that neutrality by some other Power forced it to do
so in self-defence.
The Belgian Government, for its part, hastened to assure the British
Minister at Brussels of its determination to resist with might and main
should its territory be invaded.
At Berlin, however, the Foreign Secretary eluded Sir Edward Goschen's
questions. He said that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor.
In his opinion, any answer would entail the risk, in the event of war,
of partly divulging the plan of campaign. It seemed doubtful to him,
therefore, whether he would be able to give a reply. This way of
speaking was perfectly clear in its ambiguity. It did not puzzle Sir
Edward Grey for a moment. On the following day he declared to the German
Ambassador that the reply of the German Government was a matter of very
great regret. Belgian neutrality, he pointed out, was highly important
in British eyes, and if Belgium was attacked, it would be difficult to
restrain public feeling in his country.
On the same day, August 1, in accordance with instructions from my
Government, I read to the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (at the
same time giving him a copy) a dispatch drafted beforehand and addressed
to the Belgian Ministers attached to the Powers that had guaranteed our
neutrality. This dispatch affirmed that Belgium, having observed, with
scrupulous fidelity, the duties imposed on her as a neutral State by the
treaties of April 19, 1839, would manifest an unshaken purpose in
fulfilling them; and that she had every hope, since the friendly
intentions of the Powers towards her had been so often professed, of
seeing her territory secure from all assault, if hostilities should
arise near her frontiers. The Belgian Government added that it had
nevertheless taken all the necessary steps for maintaining its
neutrality, but that, in so doing, it had not been actuated by a desire
to take part in an armed struggle among the Powers, or by a feeling of
distrust towards any one of them.
Herr Zimmermann listened without a word of comment to my reading of this
dispatch, which expressed the loyal confidence of my Government in
Germany's goodwill. He merely took note of my communication. His silence
did not surprise me, for I had just learnt of Herr von Jagow's evasive
reply to the British Government concerning Belgium; but it bore out all
my misgivings. His constrained smile, by the way, told me quite as much
as his refusal to speak.
[Sidenote: Russia and Germany hasten preparations.]
[Sidenote: Austria mobilizes.]