RAMICOURT AND MONTBREHAIN
_Sept. 30th, 1918._ _October 4th, 1918._
September 30th was spent in dug-outs and trenches in the region of our
objective of the previous day, between Bellenglise and Lehaucourt.
Early that morning the 1st Division advanced and occupied Thorigny and
Talana Hill, South of the canal, thus securing our right flank, the
retreating enemy offering splendid targets for our Lewis guns. The
same day St. Quentin fell to the French.
In the afternoon the 32nd Division moved forward to the attack,
supported by Cavalry, which it was hoped it would be possible to use
if the Infantry broke through the last remaining fragment of the
Hindenburg Line. This was known as the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line and
ran more or less North and South about midway between Joncourt and
Ramicourt. It consisted of a strong barbed wire entanglement and a
double line of shallow trenches about a foot deep, with concrete
machine gun emplacements every 50 yards. The whole was in a very
incomplete state, but at the same time constituted a strong line of
defence. Unfortunately the 32nd Division were unable to break this
line, which the enemy were holding in force. Similarly, the 1st
Division on the right were unable to make any further progress, and
the 2nd Australian Division met with no greater success on the left.
In consequence the Cavalry had to withdraw behind the canal.
The arrival of the Cavalry a few days previously behind our lines had
presented one of the most picturesque scenes one could wish to see.
Two abreast they came in almost endless streams along the roads and
side-tracks and passed on to forward positions behind the canal, and
the sight was one never to be forgotten. Not less wonderful, perhaps,
was the unceasing flow of transport of every conceivable kind
backwards and forwards along the Vadencourt-Bellenglise Road. The
surface of the road was in excellent condition and in an incredibly
short period the Sappers, who were now having very strenuous times,
erected an Inglis bridge over the canal at Bellenglise, capable of
carrying lorries and guns of all calibres. The way all this work was
pushed on was little short of marvellous, and one could not help being
struck by the enormous amount of organisation it all entailed, and the
care with which every detail connected with the advance had been
arranged.
The 139th Brigade were now temporarily attached to the 32nd Division,
whilst the 137th and 138th Brigades were concentrated near the canal.
We were supposed at this moment to be ready either for another battle
or for moving forward according to the ordinary rules of warfare, with
advanced guards and so on, if the enemy should give way. Preliminary
orders were indeed received that portions of the Brigade were to be
employed as Advanced Guard to the Corps, with their objective as Le
Cateau.
With the object, therefore, of reorganising as far as possible, we
were withdrawn from our position near Lehaucourt on October 1st, and
moved about a mile North, to the trench system in "Springbok Valley,"
just behind Magny la-Fosse. On the same day the Transport,
Quarter-Master's Stores and Battle Details which had previously moved
to a field near "Hart Copse," a few hundred yards North-West of the
Twin Craters, moved further forward and established themselves in
Chopper Ravine, near the canal. This was not a specially comfortable
spot, and the Quarter-Master's Department was constantly put out of
order by the arrival from time to time of odd shells from a German
long-range gun. Several of the riding horses, the cookers and some of
the ammunition and Lewis gun limbers were up with the Battalion, so
that the amount of transport left behind was not great. Both men and
horses were now having a most strenuous time, and we were lucky at
this juncture in getting back Capt. A. Bedford from a tour of duty at
home. He arrived on September 29th and was at once appointed Transport
Officer. We had been obliged to leave behind at Bernes large
quantities of stores, including packs and Lewis gun tin boxes, owing
to lack of transport, and it was a most trying business, when everyone
was wanting lorries, to get the extra transport necessary to bring
them along. To make matters worse the Hun was just now particularly
active with his aeroplanes, and with fine nights he made frequent
trips over our lines, dropping bombs. When the nights were very dark
he often used to let off brilliant white parachute lights, and as they
descended he was able to get some view of the roads and transport
lines and any movement there might be. Usually he flew extremely low,
and there is no doubt that he did considerable damage; especially as
there were such masses of troops and transport concentrated in a
particularly small area. We unfortunately lost several horses, but
casualties amongst personnel were insignificant. His best bombing
effort was on the evening of October 3rd. Having evidently seen a
large party of men near La Baraque cross-roads, the airman promptly
made for them and let loose two bombs, which fell right amongst them.
Between 40 and 50 were blown to bits, whilst nearly as many were badly
wounded, and the rest scared out of their wits. What the airman
doubtless did not know was that they were a party of Boche prisoners!
Only about six British soldiers were killed. It made a ghastly mess at
the cross-roads, which was a most uninviting spot to pass for days
afterwards.
During the short time at our disposal we did the best we could to
reorganise our somewhat reduced forces. In spite of our losses at
Bellenglise we still had 46 Officers and 752 other ranks, so were
fairly well off. Second Lieut. Winter was put in command of B Company,
and Capt. Miners, who had just returned from leave, resumed command of
C.
On October 2nd orders were received that we were to take part in
another big attack in conjunction with the 2nd Australian Division.
Our Divisional Commander only received his orders for this attack at
4.30 p.m. on that day, and the operation was to take place early the
next morning, so that there was very little time to get orders passed
to the lower commanders and the necessary arrangements made. The
orders were explained by the Brigade Commander to Battalion Commanders
at a conference at Brigade Headquarters at Magny-la-Fosse about 9
p.m., and it was after 10 p.m. before Col. Dempster was able to give
his orders out to Companies. The general scheme was that the 139th
Brigade were to break through the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line and capture
the villages of Ramicourt and Montbrehain, whilst the 137th Brigade on
the right and the 2nd Australian Division on the left, were to attack
at the same time, and the 1st Division, on the right of the 137th
Brigade, were to capture Sequehart.
The objective of the 5th and 8th Battalions was the "Red Line" running
North-West to South-East, just West of Montbrehain, the 5th Battalion
being on the right and the 8th on the left, whilst the 6th Battalion
was to pass through, capture Montbrehain and push out outposts as far
as the "dotted blue line." This was something like 4,000 yards from
our present Outpost Line. A Company of nine Tanks were to co-operate
with the Brigade, advancing immediately behind the first line. The
attack was to be launched at dawn and was to be carried out under an
artillery barrage which, after delaying six minutes on the opening
line, was to move at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes. The delay
was to enable the Infantry to adjust their distance behind the
barrage, which was to open a good deal further in front of them than
usual, owing to the fact that the Artillery had mostly to move into
fresh positions, and we could not, therefore, risk getting up close to
its assumed line, whilst allowance also had to be made for the
attacking troops not being exactly in their right position, owing to
the difficulty of forming up in the dark on an uncertain mark.
Our jumping-off line ran from near Joncourt Cemetery to the Railway
Cutting. The Battalion frontage was approximately 1,000 yards and was
divided into two Company lengths. A (Thomas) on the right, and B
(Winter) on the left were to lead, with C (Miners) and D (White) in
support about 150 yards behind them. Second Lieut. Plant was sent as
Liaison Officer to the Australian Battalion on our left, 2nd Lieut.
Newton to Brigade Headquarters, and 2nd Lieut. Jacques to the 5th
Battalion. Some additional work was to be thrown on C and D Companies,
who were to follow up the 6th Battalion, mop up for them in
Montbrehain and then return to the "Red Line." There was no time for
reconnaissance. All we knew of the country was what we had gathered
from maps or our Intelligence Department. From personal observation we
knew nothing. Even the front held by the 32nd Division was not at all
certain. We did know, however, that the enemy were holding the
Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line in force and that the country was of a fairly
open type, sloping gently down to Ramicourt in the valley and up again
beyond to Montbrehain, which would probably be a difficult problem to
tackle.
It was in these circumstances that we set out shortly before midnight
in the pitch darkness from Springbok Valley. Guides from the 32nd
Division met us at the entrance to Joncourt and conducted us to the
forming-up line, A and B Companies throwing out a screen of scouts in
front as a precaution before we formed up. Though this was a most
precarious proceeding it was carried out successfully, and by 5.30
a.m. on October 3rd, all troops were in their assembly positions,
leading Companies extended in two lines and support Companies in lines
of "section-blobs." During this operation the enemy did a certain
amount of shelling, but not enough to cause us any great trouble.
There was some fog at first, and this in the early stages of the
battle, combined with smoke from a screen put down by the Artillery to
hide the Tanks, made direction somewhat difficult. Later on it cleared
and the day became quite bright and fine.
There was not such a concentration of guns as we had had on September
29th, nor had we anything like so many heavies, though there was a
certain number of them firing on a few special targets, such as
villages and other points behind the lines. The Guards Machine Gun
Battalion again helped with the preliminary barrage, which opened
promptly at 6.5 a.m., just as it was beginning to get light. We
adjusted our position to the line of bursting shells and followed on
as soon as the guns lifted. The rate of progress, 100 yards in four
minutes, was throughout found to be too slow in this more open
fighting, and we were constantly either waiting for the barrage to
move on or running into it--not at all a pleasant proceeding.
It was not long before we began to encounter, in addition to the
enemy's counter-barrage, opposition of a serious nature from his
Infantry. The inevitable delay since we crossed the canal on September
29th had given the enemy time to bring up large reserves, and on this
occasion the 46th Division had opposed to it four Boche Divisions--two
tired and two fresh. Doubtless the enemy realised that every effort
must be made to retain this, his last organised defence on this part
of the front, and certainly the men holding the line we had to attack
put up a most strenuous fight, and in hundreds of cases died bravely,
fighting to the last.
The Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line was strongly held. In addition to many
machine guns in the line itself, there were also machine gun sections
in rifle-pits immediately behind it. Unfortunately the barrage put
down by our guns was somewhat thin. There had been no previous
bombardment, and as a result we found that the defences of this line
were practically intact. No machine gun emplacements had been touched
and not a single gap made in the wire, which was very strong, and we
had to manipulate it as best we could.
A good deal of resistance in the early part of the fight was met with
from the neighbourhood of Wiancourt on the left, and the high ground
South-East of Swiss Cottage, and it was found that the Australians had
not been able to make much progress and were practically held up. This
being the case it was realised that the village of Wiancourt, which
should have been taken by them, would be a serious menace to our left
flank, and it was, therefore, decided that we should go out of our way
and take it in the general advance. Two Platoons of A Company, with
portions of B and D (Companies having got somewhat mixed owing to loss
of direction), penetrated into the village and opened heavy Lewis gun
and rifle fire on its defenders, who offered a stubborn resistance,
mainly from machine gun posts. Eventually some of them were seen to
run back, and our line immediately rushed forward with the bayonet
and killed or captured the whole of the garrison. Several were killed
whilst still holding the handles of their machine guns. Comp.
Sergt.-Major Attenborough, of A Company, here performed several
gallant feats in leading rushes against machine gun groups, and later
did most valuable work in trying to establish liaison with the
Australians, who unfortunately, even after the capture of Wiancourt,
were unable to advance so as to help us.
Meanwhile the right was not making much headway, and C Company, from
support, had become one with the attacking Company. The advance here
being held up by machine gun fire, L.-Corpl. Vann with much gallantry
crawled forward and managed to knock out the gun team which was
causing most of the trouble. A trench something like 100 yards long,
crowded with the enemy, was thus taken in the flank, and those who did
not surrender were killed in trying to escape. They had, however,
caused us many casualties, including 2nd Lieut. Dunkin and Sergt. Hurt
killed, besides many wounded. One of the most gallant N.C.O.'s in the
Battalion, Sergt. Hurt had already won the D.C.M. and M.M., and his
death was a very great loss.
Similar actions had been taking place in other parts of the line.
Again and again nests of machine guns were rushed at the point of the
bayonet, which weapon undoubtedly did more deadly work on this
occasion than on any other in our experience. Where they could not be
taken by frontal attack, parties worked round their flanks and rushed
them from the rear. The intensity of the fighting can be imagined from
the fact that after the battle nearly 200 dead Germans were found
along this line of trenches on the front of the 139th Brigade alone.
The main Fonsomme Line was now ours, though won at heavy cost.
Direction had improved, though we were all too far to the left and
much disorganised. We had to make the best of it and try to straighten
out as we pushed on into the valley towards Ramicourt. Here we were
met with fire from Boche guns firing from behind Montbrehain with open
sights, causing many casualties. The position was as exposed as it
could be, the only shelter being provided by one or two sunken roads.
At the same time four or five of the Tanks, which for some reason had
got behind at the start, had now come up and did much useful work in
the outskirts of Ramicourt, though the same Boche guns brought most
effective fire to bear on them, one of them getting five direct hits.
On the left, B Company, who under Winter's excellent leadership, had
done much fighting, now mixed up with A and reinforced by D, were also
suffering heavily from the enemy artillery fire, and advanced by
section rushes covered by Lewis gun fire. It was here that 2nd Lieut.
T. F. Mitchell, commanding a Platoon of D Company, which he led with
supreme gallantry, caring nothing for his own safety, was mortally
wounded, dying the next day.
Ramicourt was eventually reached by oddments of A, C and D Companies,
the remainder of the Battalion having got too far left, and passing
through its Northern outskirts. There were several machine guns in the
village, and snipers were active from the windows of the houses. These
were all successfully mopped up with the help of the 6th Battalion,
who pushed up a Company and their Battalion Headquarters, as there
were so few troops at this point, the 5th Battalion having edged off
through the Southern outskirts of the village. Jack White was seen in
the village, wandering round quite unconcerned, revolver in holster--a
small cane which he carried being apparently his most trusty weapon.
Having completed the capture of the village, which yielded a total of
something like 400 prisoners, the remnants of the troops there were
gathered together and the advance continued. A machine gun nest at
Ramicourt Station having been rushed with the aid of a Tank, we pushed
on to our objective, which, except on the extreme left, we reached
practically up to scheduled time, 10.30 a.m., most of the troops being
disposed in sunken roads on the West of Montbrehain. It had not been a
good day for the Tanks, which in the end were all knocked out, though
the last one working with the 5th Battalion on the right had a good
run and knocked out no fewer than 16 machine guns before being put out
of action.
As soon as the barrage lifted from the "Red Line," the 6th Battalion
began to push on. They had met with an appalling disaster soon after
crossing the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line, where Col. Vann, once more
gallantly leading his Battalion and in the forefront of the battle,
was killed, shot through the head. The 5th Battalion too, lost Col. A.
Hacking, who was wounded in the arm. Thus two old Officers of the 8th
were put out of action almost at the same moment, both leading
Battalions in our own Brigade. Alfred Hacking had done invaluable work
during the few months he had commanded the 5th Battalion, and for his
excellent leadership and gallantry during the fighting of September
29th and October 3rd was awarded the D.S.O. and Bar. Bernard Vann,
affectionately known to some of his earlier friends as "Vasi," was
described on one occasion by General Allenby, as the most fearless
Officer he had ever met, whilst a brother Officer writes of him: "I
can think of him only as a fighter, not merely against the enemy in
the field, but a fighter against everything and everybody that was not
an influence for good to his men. It was his extraordinary courage and
tenacity which will be remembered by all who knew him: he inspired
all by his wonderful example of courage and energy." Wounded at least
eight times, and awarded the M.C. and Bar, and the French Croix de
Guerre with Palm, it was fitting that his constant gallantry and
magnificent example should be further recognised--alas! after his
death--by the award of the Victoria Cross.
On continuing the advance the 6th Battalion edged towards the South,
going through the centre and right of Montbrehain, and leaving the
Northern portion alone. This left us considerably exposed, and an
enemy machine gun firing from a position at the cross-roads on our
left front, was doing much damage. White, Thomas and Miners held a
hasty conference and decided to rush it, and the two former with a
reconnoitring party went into the village to see if it could be
outflanked from the region of the cemetery. At this moment a little
"Joey" came in with "hands up," and it was decided to try a ruse. It
was suggested to him that he should go and tell his friends to
surrender, and after a little persuasion he went. The Machine gun
stopped firing and he approached the post and disappeared into the
ground, thus telling us what we wanted to know--the way in. Action was
taken at once to deal with it. Second Lieut. Harrap, who had already
done much valuable work, got together some Lewis guns and opened
frontal fire on the position, whilst Miners and Sergt. Stimson worked
round the flank from the village side and by a careful manoeuvre
rushed on to the post the instant Harrap's guns stopped firing. Much
to their surprise the post was found to be a quarry containing
something like ten or a dozen machine guns and 60 or 70 men! A few
bombs and revolver shots and the white flag went up. Harrap, who had
rushed his men forward across the intervening 200 yards, was also at
hand, and the capture of the post was complete. Second Lieut. Barker's
Platoon (A Company) also assisted with rifle and Lewis gun fire,
Barker himself being wounded.
Out of the medley of troops which collected there--of all Battalions
in the Brigade--some attempt was then made to organise a Company, and
posts were pushed further forward. The rest of the village after a
hard struggle fell into the hands of the 6th Battalion about the
scheduled time, 11.30 a.m. Loud explosions, heard soon after the
village was entered, were caused by the blowing up by the Boche of two
houses in the main street near the Church. Attempts were made to push
out Platoons to the "line of exploitation," beyond the village, but
this was found to be impossible owing to heavy machine gun fire.
Both in Ramicourt and Montbrehain we found French civilians, whose
pleasure at being at last released from the Hun terror knew no bounds.
About 70 all told had remained behind, refusing to be evacuated by the
Boche. They gave us a great welcome and in spite of shells and
bullets, brought out coffee to our men as they passed by. Later, under
the guidance of the Brigade Interpreter, M. Duflos, they were taken
back to safer regions.
It soon became evident that further trouble was in store for us owing
to the fact that our left flank was again in the air. The Australians
were not up with us and we were very uncertain of their whereabouts,
though apparently not altogether out of touch with them, for one of
their Officers, who was met in hospital later in the day, reported
having received from someone in our Battalion the laconic message: "We
are at ----. Where is the Australian Corps?" The enemy were still
holding in force a position at no great distance from our left flank,
and indeed, at one time were reported to be massing for a
counter-attack which, however, did not mature. But on the right of the
Brigade the situation was far worse. There the 137th Brigade, after
making some progress, had eventually to give ground, and their left
was now considerably behind our right. We were thus in a most awkward
salient with both flanks exposed. It was, therefore, not surprising to
find soon after noon very evident signs of a real counter-attack being
prepared against the Brigade exposed right flank, and when a little
later this attack was launched, the enemy managed to get round the
South-East of Montbrehain and into that corner of the village in some
strength, and it was decided to withdraw from it. This was
successfully carried out under great difficulties, and eventually the
Brigade took up a line just East of Ramicourt, the 8th Battalion
occupying the railway and sunken road North-East of that village. The
enemy soon reoccupied the whole of Montbrehain, but was unable to
advance further.
We were now very short of ammunition as no supplies had been sent
forward. This was mainly due to the fact that we had depended on a
"Supply Tank," which did not fetch up quite where we expected.
Fortunately no ill results accrued, but it taught the lesson that the
supply of ammunition to advanced troops in moving warfare requires
very careful prearrangement.
Company Commanders again conferred and decided to alter their
dispositions, and with a view to protecting our left flank, B and C
Companies moved across to bridge the gap there, leaving A and D
Companies in the railway cutting. In these positions we were left for
the rest of the day more or less in peace.
In spite of a slight set-back it had been a glorious day for the 8th
Battalion. There was really no comparison between this battle and that
of September 29th. The attack on September 29th was undoubtedly more
spectacular, but in our humble judgment, having regard to the
extremely short notice received, the strength of the enemy and the
many difficulties encountered, the breaking of the Fonsomme Line on
October 3rd may truly be counted as one of the most gallant exploits
of the whole war.
Where one and all did so well and so many gallant deeds were performed
it is difficult to single out any for special praise, but it is
desired to note specially the good work of the following in addition
to those already mentioned: Sergt. H. Wilson, L.-Sergt. Wicks, Corpl.
Clark, L.-Corpl. Creamer, and Pvtes. Draper, Crowe, Slater, Wesley,
Starr, Baxter, Jackson, and Martin. The day, however, had cost us
much. Our casualties were one Officer and 20 other ranks (including
Sergt. Gurdens) killed, and three Officers (2nd Lieuts. T. F.
Mitchell, who died the next day, Barker, and F. T. W. Saunders), and
86 other ranks wounded.
Captain Homan had his Regimental Aid Post with Battalion Headquarters
in a dug-out in the sunken road near our jumping-off line. Here he and
Padre Sturt worked for something like 24 hours on end, attending to
the wounded, though both badly gassed, whilst a willing band of
Stretcher Bearers again performed a prodigious amount of work under
most trying circumstances. Particular praise is due to Corpls.
Wrigglesworth and J. Wright, and to Pvtes. L. Thomas and F. Green, the
latter of whom was awarded a bar and the former a second bar to his
M.M., for gallant work on this occasion.
It was impossible to estimate the actual number of prisoners captured
by us, as there was one "pool" for the whole Brigade, but undoubtedly
we had a very large share of the total, which was 36 Officers and
nearly 1,500 other ranks; in addition to which large numbers were left
on the ground dead. Of machine guns too, we captured a very large
number, but owing to the impossibility of collecting them, little idea
of the total could be formed.
[Illustration: MAP TO ILLUSTRATE--BATTLE OF RAMICOURT OCT: 3rd 1918.
Red, Blue & Dotted Blue Lines represent various objectives.]
During much of the day Horse Artillery and numbers of light
rapid-moving Tanks, known as "Whippets," had been waiting in the
valleys behind Joncourt, ready to push on once the line was broken,
and endeavour to make a clean break through. Unfortunately their
services could not be used, and once more they had to withdraw.
Late at night we got news that we were being relieved by the 4th
Leicesters. They turned up alright to take over from B and C
Companies, but owing to some error failed to relieve A and D, who were
left holding the line, with little ammunition and no rations, and were
not relieved until the afternoon of October 4th, when they made their
way back to the valley just in front of Magny-la-Fosse and joined the
rest of the Battalion in tents and bivouacs put up by "Tony" Bradish
and Hallam, with the help of the Battle Details. "Bedder" too, was
there, with Regt.-Quarter-Master-Sergt. Pritchard (who during these
strenuous times had to carry on without a Quarter-Master), and the
four Quarter-Master-Sergeants, all of whom did their utmost to make
everyone comfortable.