BELLENGLISE
_Sept. 26th, 1918._ _Sept. 29th, 1918._
A great effort was to be made to break the Hindenburg Line.
Preliminary orders received on September 26th were to the effect that
the 46th Division, as part of a major operation (simultaneous attacks
by the British and French taking place at several other points), would
at an early date cross the St. Quentin Canal between Bellenglise and
Riquerval Bridge, and capture the Hindenburg Line. The general scheme
was that the 137th Brigade were to capture the canal and hold the
crossings, advancing as far as the "Brown Line" shown on the map,
whilst the 139th Brigade on the right and 138th Brigade on the left,
were to pass through them and consolidate up to and including the
"Green Line." If all went well the 32nd Division were to pass through
and make further progress. The 1st Division were to protect our right
flank, where the enemy were still occupying a large area of ground
which might be decidedly dangerous to us, and in the event of the
enemy withdrawing, they were to follow up and, if possible, capture
Thorigny and the high ground round about it. On our left the 30th
American Division, attached to the Australian Corps, were to seize the
Bellicourt Tunnel (where the canal ran underground) and continue the
attack in that direction. Tanks were to cross the canal by passing
over the tunnel and come down to operate with the 138th and 139th
Brigades and help them to reach their objectives.
In order to improve our position the 138th Brigade, who were holding
the line running along the high ground just East of "Victoria Cross
Roads," carried out an attack on September 27th against the German
trenches on the high ground North-East of "Chopper Ravine." This was
successful and the trenches were handed over to the 137th Brigade.
Unfortunately, the following morning the enemy delivered a heavy
counter-attack against the Staffords, and recovered so much ground
that at night the latter had to withdraw from the portions still held
and come back to our original line. This set-back, however, had no ill
result.
Our preparations had to be made on the assumption that the attack
would take place on the early morning of Sunday, September 29th, as it
did.
From the line held by the Division it was possible to get a good view
of the canal and the ground beyond for some distance, and such
reconnaissance as could be carried out in the time at our disposal was
made by observation from this line.
[Illustration: THE ST. QUENTIN CANAL, BELLENGLISE--LOOKING
NORTH--1918.]
Running diagonally across the front, through No Man's Land, down the
slope to the Riquerval Bridge, on the left, was a narrow road known as
"Watling Street." Immediately in front of our trenches was the ridge
which we had had to evacuate, and from there the land again sloped
down to the canal. Immediately the other side of the canal was the
village of Bellenglise, about three-quarters-of-a-mile from our
present front line, but looking much closer. The canal ran in a
cutting, into which it was not possible to see, but from descriptions
obtained from various sources it appeared that it had steep banks
twelve to eighteen yards deep, and we were told that where there was
water we might expect it to be seven to eight feet deep. As a matter
of fact the canal in some parts was quite dry, and in other parts the
water was held up by big dams of concrete. When we did properly see
it, it appeared to be more or less derelict. On the right towards
Bellenglise it was mostly dry. Rising from the canal on the other side
was a fairly gradual, but none the less decided, slope for some
distance, fortified with lines of trenches, barbed wire and concrete
machine gun emplacements, apparently a most unpromising position to
attack--indeed, we thought it impregnable, and no doubt the Boche did
so, too. It was an ideal spot for concealed dug-outs all along the
canal banks. Many were found there, and Bellenglise itself contained a
wonderfully constructed tunnel, estimated to be capable of holding at
least a thousand men.
The problem of dealing with any water that might be found in the canal
was a difficult but important one, as every preparation had to be made
for getting across on the assumption that all the bridges would be
destroyed. Accordingly the 137th Brigade were equipped with a number
of collapsible boats and rafts, also mats for getting across any soft
mud they might encounter, whilst almost at the last moment, numbers of
lifebelts were sent up for their use, taken from the leave boats.
As it was doubtless realised that this great stronghold would require
pounding almost to atoms, arrangements were made for getting together
what must have been the largest array of guns that ever was collected,
at any rate in such a short space of time. Battery after battery of
every known calibre took up positions in one or other of the ravines
and valleys behind the line. Indeed, there seemed no room for them all
and many of them were practically in the open.
Behind the line an immense amount of railway and road work was being
carried out in order to maintain supplies. Probably the most
interesting piece of work was the relaying of the railway line from
Roizel to Vermand, preparatory to its being continued into St.
Quentin as soon as the latter should be liberated. We enjoyed
watching the Canadian Engineers at work rebuilding bridges and
bringing up and relaying fresh sleepers and metals, all the old ones
having been removed by the enemy for several miles. The rapid
reconstruction of the line was of vital importance, as it would form
the main source of transport for all our supplies.
On the night of September 27/28th, we moved from bivouacs near
Vendelles, and marched to our preliminary assembly position in some
trenches near "Red Wood," about half-a-mile North-West of that
well-known landmark "The Tumulus," a high chalk mound from which an
excellent view could be obtained, but where it was not wise to pause
to admire the scenery. Battalion Headquarters was in a dug-out at
"Hudson's Post," between Red Wood and the "Twin Craters." This move
was carried out without casualty, but the very dark night, coupled
with a certain amount of gas shelling, and the absence of good guiding
marks, made going somewhat difficult. A section from the 139th Trench
Mortar Battery, which was to be attached to us for the battle, joined
us just before the move.
The attack was to be carried out under a creeping barrage, and the
objective allotted to us was the "Yellow Line" East of Bellenglise.
The frontage allotted to the Battalion was about 1,200 yards, and the
advance in its final stages was to be carried out with two Companies
in the front line and two in support. In each case there were to be
three Platoons leading, with one in support, each front Platoon thus
having a frontage of about 200 yards. The distance between front and
support Companies was to be 200 to 250 yards. The Artillery barrage
was to move at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes, making long
pauses after each objective had been gained in order to allow time for
the rear troops to continue the advance. A machine gun barrage also
was to be fired during the opening stages of the attack, and for this
purpose our Divisional Battalion was strengthened by the addition of
the 2nd Life Guards Machine Gun Battalion and the 100th Machine Gun
Battalion. By a happy coincidence some South Notts. Yeomanry were
included amongst these Machine Gunners. The Royal Engineers and
Monmouth Pioneers, detailed to put emergency bridges on cork piers
across the canal for foot traffic and artillery, were to follow in
rear of the 137th Brigade, and immediately in front of us. Second
Lieut. Davis with ten men was to keep touch with the last Battalion of
the 137th Brigade, whilst 2nd Lieut. Plant was detailed to act as
Liaison Officer with the 137th Brigade Headquarters. Second Lieut.
Bradish was to do similar duty with the 139th Brigade, and 2nd Lieut.
Winter with the 6th Battalion, who were to follow immediately behind
us, the 5th Battalion bringing up the rear. Guides from each Company
were detailed to follow the 137th Brigade and direct their Companies
to the canal crossings. Flags were to be carried to mark Battalion and
Company Headquarters. In addition to red flares for notifying the
position of the advanced troops to our 'contact aeroplanes,' a number
of tin discs were issued, which were to be waved by the men carrying
them so as to catch the eye of the Observers. "Success Signals"--rifle
grenades bursting into "white over white over white"--were to be fired
by the leading Companies as soon as they reached their objective. Pack
transport was arranged in readiness for taking forward ammunition,
water and other supplies, if required, as soon as it was possible to
get them across the canal.
Enough and more than enough work was entailed in all these details to
keep us busy during the short time available before the attack.
Nevertheless all was ready by the appointed time, and about 3 a.m. on
the morning of September 29th, after a most welcome issue of rum,
which fortunately arrived just in time, we began to move into our
final assembly position on the Eastern side of "Ascension Valley." The
valley never had been a place to linger in, as most nights and early
mornings the Hun was in the habit of treating it liberally with high
explosive and gas shells, and this occasion was no exception, a
combination of the two making things very unpleasant. Further, it was
a dark night, and, worse than all, a dense fog came down over
everything, so that movement over these more or less open spaces with
little or nothing to guide us was extremely difficult. However, in the
end everyone got into position in good time and without accident.
Fortunately most of the shells were then passing over us into the
valley behind. Companies were drawn up as follows: Right Front (A
Company), Capt. Thomas; Left Front (B Company), 2nd Lieut. Bloor;
Right Support (C Company), Lieut. Cairns, in the absence of Capt.
Miners on leave; Left Support (D Company), Capt. White. Capt. C. P.
Elliott was acting as Second-in-Command, Major Andrews being away on
leave.
Zero was fixed for 5.50 a.m., at which time the 137th Brigade were to
advance from our front line. At the same time the 1st Division were to
advance so as to protect our right flank up to a point near
Bellenglise Bridge.
Promptly at Zero an uncanny stillness was broken by an inferno of
noise. With a din and roar that can never be forgotten by those who
heard it, one of the greatest concentrations of artillery the World
had ever seen came into action. The crash and rattle were appalling.
Sandwiched as we were, with machine guns blazing away just in front,
and 18-pounders belching out fire just behind, it was perfect
pandemonium. Speech was impossible. Though it was now practically
daylight the fog was so intense that you could not see a yard in
front of you. All over the battlefield it was the same. We could only
imagine the difficulty with which the Staffords were going, if they
were going at all, and we could see nothing. Our right Company, A, had
been detailed to assist that Brigade to mop up the enemy trenches West
of the canal, and on completion re-form in the old German front line,
and await the arrival of the other Companies. This Company advanced in
Artillery formation as soon as the machine guns ceased firing, about
15 minutes after Zero, and reached these trenches without accident.
Little was found to be done there, and having distributed themselves
in the trenches, they awaited the time for the general advance to
begin. The rest of the Battalion moved forward at the same time in a
similar formation to "Nib" and "Quill" trenches on "Hélène Ridge."
Even for this short move direction could only be maintained by means
of compasses. We made ourselves as comfortable as possible there, as
we knew that we should have some time to wait before advancing
further. In any case we were not to move without orders from Brigade
Headquarters, and it was not intended that we should be involved in
the actual fighting until the 137th Brigade were East of the canal,
and then probably not for some time unless they were in difficulties.
The Boche had put down a counter-barrage directly after our attack
began, and a certain number of shells and some machine gun bullets
fell about the ridge where we were, but caused us little
inconvenience.
In spite of the fog wounded men were finding their way back, and odd
lots of German prisoners were being brought back by escorts of
Staffords. How they did it we never quite knew, but it was reported
that in one case the escort of a party of prisoners having been lost
in the fog, got a captured German Officer to act as guide by marching
due West on a compass bearing! For over three hours we were unable to
get any definite news as to the progress of the battle. The first
official message which reached our Brigade Headquarters to the effect
that the 137th Brigade were across the canal, arrived at 8.30 a.m.,
and orders were at once sent to the three Battalions to get on the
move and keep in close touch. Unfortunately our telephone line to
Brigade Headquarters was broken, and the message had to be sent by
runners, who after experiencing the greatest difficulty owing to the
fog, eventually reached us at 9.37 a.m. Orders were sent to Companies
as quickly as possible, and we moved off again in artillery formation,
keeping direction with our compasses. Progress, of course, was
extremely slow. By the time we reached the canal, which seemed much
further away than we had imagined, the fog began to clear and caused
us no more trouble. The canal was crossed by plank foot bridges,
which, fortunately, were still more or less intact, and Companies
pushed on in a direction practically half-right towards the villages
of Bellenglise on the right and La Baraque on the left.
Here our first real fighting began, considerable opposition being met
with from isolated snipers and machine gun posts, particularly on the
right, where A Company had a very rough time. Two Platoons of that
Company, under 2nd Lieuts. Bradwell and Shackleton, worked their way
along the bend of the canal sheltered by a large ditch, and rushed
several "pill-boxes" from the rear. At one large concrete dug-out a
Boche was discovered just emerging with his machine gun ready to fire.
Bradwell stopped him with a revolver bullet through the chest. The
bullet went through the next man behind him as well, and finished by
lodging in the throat of a third--a very useful shot! A little later
the same Officer got a sniper, who was obstinately holding up the
advance with a small group of men, by a rifle bullet neatly placed
between the eyes at 300 yards. The left of A Company also met with
opposition from machine gun nests in the ruins of the houses. Thomas
himself, in rushing one machine gun, had no time to draw his revolver,
but put one Boche out of action by a kick under the jaw. C Company
reinforced A and shared with them the clearing of Bellenglise, but in
doing so they also had a bad time. Stanley Cairns led them with great
dash, only to be killed in an attack on a group of Boches who were
holding up the left of A Company. They were, however, eventually
rushed and all bayoneted. On the left some of B Company lost direction
and strayed over to the 138th Brigade. Though the resistance on this
flank was not so great it was not altogether easy going, and there was
considerable shelling and machine gun fire. Bloor, in command, got
badly wounded, and Rawding, his very gallant Comp. Sergt.-Major also
fell, dying the next day. Mobilised with the Battalion he went out
with it as a Private and won promotion by sheer merit. All ranks of
the Battalion had the greatest regard for him and his loss was very
keenly felt. D Company, under Capt. White, ably assisted by 2nd Lieut.
Smith, acting as Second-in-Command, also gave a hand in the mopping
up. Casualties were, of course, mounting, as there was heavy shelling
going on most of the time, particularly on the Eastern edge of
Bellenglise. Eventually, however, the village was cleared and we got
to our next starting-point, the "Brown Line," with our right on the
canal, at 11.30 a.m. This was only ten minutes after our scheduled
time which, considering the almost insuperable difficulties caused by
the fog, must be considered excellent. It meant, of course, that our
barrage, which advanced again at 11.20 a.m. (five-and-a-half hours
after Zero) was slightly ahead of us, but that was now too late to be
altered and we had to make the best of it.
At this point we were to have been joined by a Company of five Tanks,
but they had not turned up. They arrived, however, a little later and
were going forward to help the attack of the 6th Battalion, who
followed us, when they were put out of action by enemy field guns
firing from South of the canal and at point blank range. Our final
advance, therefore, had to be continued without their help. We moved
off this time in extended order and met with little opposition, though
there was considerable machine gun fire from the South side of the
canal, which was not particularly accurate and did little damage. We
reached our final objective about 12.15 p.m., only a few minutes after
scheduled time, and the 6th Battalion immediately pushed on through
us.
Our right flank was somewhat exposed, as the enemy were still holding
the ground South of the canal, and one or two feeble attempts at
counter-attacks were made from that direction, but were easily broken
up. The 1st Division had been unable to advance to connect across with
us at Bellenglise, but by their demonstration they doubtless prevented
the enemy from concentrating for a counter-attack in that quarter,
which was a decidedly weak spot.
Our advance had been extremely rapid and to a certain extent our
success was due to that fact. The enemy in many cases were taken
before they had time to get to their battle positions. At the same
time every member of the Battalion was determined to "get there."
Particularly good work was done by Sergt. Peach, who was acting Comp.
Sergt.-Major of C Company, and himself accounted for three of the
enemy at one post, by Sergt. Oldham, Lance-Sergts. Field and Illger,
and Corpl. Slater, when in temporary command of Platoons, also by
Sergt. Claxton, Corpls. Gadsby, Skelton and W. Foster, L.-Corpl. R.
Harvey. and Pvtes. Cook, Titmus, Welbourne and Stapleton.
Communication throughout the day was almost entirely by runners, who
had an exceptionally strenuous time, but in spite of all their
difficulties they never failed to get their messages through.
Specially valuable work was done in this respect by Pvtes. B.
Smithurst, Feighery, Sully, Colton and Parker. The Signallers had a
thankless task in trying to keep their lines repaired. A special word
of praise is due to L.-Corpl. J. North for his work in this
connection. The Medical Officer, Capt. Homan, had a difficult task in
attending to the wounded in open trenches and often under heavy shell
fire. He got great help from Padre Sturt, who was always rendering
faithful service, and from a willing band of Stretcher Bearers, who
worked unceasingly throughout the battle, notably Corpl. Wrigglesworth
and Pvtes. Westnidge and Green. Comp. Sergt.-Major Stokes, who was
acting as Regt.-Sergt.-Major, was also of the greatest service in
looking after ammunition and other stores.
The sight presented by the enemy defences East of the canal gave no
room for doubt that our guns had done most deadly work. The ground was
literally torn to pieces, trenches and wire being blown to atoms in
all directions, and there seemed to be scarcely a spot that had not
been touched.
The prisoners taken by us numbered something like 300. There is no
doubt that our bombardment had caused many of them to become more or
less senseless. In many cases all they did was to retire to their
dug-outs and await the end. Full dug-outs emptied themselves at the
first word, and poured out their garrisons, which were as quickly
marshalled by our men and led off to the prisoner cages in batches, 50
or more in a batch, and very often not more than one of our men in
charge. In addition to prisoners we captured over 40 machine guns and
10 trench mortars. Guns did not come within our province, as they
were all beyond our objective.
Our casualties, considering all things, were small, and this was
doubtless due to the great rapidity with which the advance had been
carried out. In addition to the two Officer casualties, our losses
during the day were 14 other ranks killed and 80 wounded.
The battlefield after the fog lifted presented a sight never to be
forgotten. On the left, Tanks could be seen working their way along
the German trenches, followed by groups of Infantry, who at once took
possession of the ground gained. Behind, guns were limbering up and
being got forward to fresh positions; pack ponies and limbers were
being taken up with ammunition; parties of Boche prisoners were
wending their way back from the front areas in batches of 10's, 20's,
up to 200 or more, presenting a very bedraggled appearance. Many of
them had been requisitioned for duty at the forward aid posts and were
carrying back our wounded. Add to the whole, shells bursting here and
there--one knew not when or where the next was coming and didn't
care--and some idea may be formed of what the battlefield of
Bellenglise looked like. It was like an enormous circus.
The 138th Brigade on the left met with equal success, but North of
them the attack did not go so well, and at the end of the day the
Australians and Americans, though in a satisfactory position for
continuing the attack, were considerably behind their objective.
During the afternoon the 32nd Division came moving over the back areas
by Companies in artillery formation and pushed on through us, but
there was no time that day for them to make any fresh attacks, and
they had to be content with putting out outposts. There is no doubt
that could their attack have been pushed on at once the fighting of
the next few days would not have been necessary. As it was our line
did not get further than the final objective of the 5th Battalion, and
further preparation was required to push the Boche from the few
remaining points that he still held in the Hindenburg Line. By the
victory of the 46th Division on September 29th the main portion of
that line had been absolutely smashed and the last great turning-point
in the war passed, and from now onwards the final defeat of the enemy
was but a matter of days. It must be confessed that the fog, which
lasted practically the whole morning, largely accounted for our
success. Without it it is very difficult to conceive how we could have
managed to get possession of the canal and the high ground on the East
of it. A naturally strong defensive line itself, it formed with the
addition of the artificial defences made by the enemy, an almost
impregnable position. General Headquarters thought it _was_
impregnable.
It has since transpired that our fears that our attack was only in the
nature of a "demonstration" were only too well founded, as it appears
to be a fact that we were not expected to cross the canal at all.
Lieut.-General Sir John Monash, who commanded the Australian Corps on
our left, referring in his book, "The Australian Victories in France
in 1918,"[1] to the action of September 29th, says:--
"Quite early in the day news came in that the IX Corps on my
right hand had achieved an astonishing success, that Bellenglise
had been captured, and that the deep canal had been successfully
crossed in several places. It was the 46th Imperial Division to
which this great success was chiefly due.----There can be no
doubt that this success, conceived at first as a demonstration to
distract attention from the Australian Corps' front, materially
assisted me in the situation in which I was placed later on the
same day."
[Footnote 1: Published by Messrs. Hutchinson & Co.]
For once General Headquarters' arrangements for the 46th Division
miscarried.
Sappers got the Riquerval Bridge fit for transport early in the
afternoon, and by 3.0 p.m. guns and other horse transport were passing
over it. Later in the evening, after the 32nd Division had got clear,
some of our Transport and cookers came up, and our hardworking
Quarter-Master-Sergts. brought us very welcome and much-needed
refreshment after a most strenuous day.