THE BATTLE OF GOMMECOURT
_April 22nd, 1916._ _July 2nd, 1916._
At the time of our relief in the Vimy sector, plans at General
Headquarters must have been in a forward state for the great
offensive, which was to take place later in the year, and the part
which the 46th Division was to play in that offensive must also have
been fixed, and all our preparations now were for operations on a
large scale.
We soon got rid of the mud and filth of the trenches, and were
fortunate in finding at Tincques excellent baths run by the 51st
Division, of which we made the best possible use, and having got our
clothes and boots into respectable order, and everyone generally
tidied up, it was not long before we were in very good form and fit
for anything. Whilst this and other work connected with the interior
economy of the Battalion was going on, some of the Officers had to
spend a rather long day on Easter Monday, April 24th, in making a
reconnaissance of the Corps line between Maroeuil and Mont St. Eloy.
On April 26th, we were inspected by General Shipley, and felt rather
pleased with the result of our efforts at cleaning, for the Battalion
looked well, and the General expressed his pleasure at the smart
turnout.
The weather now was improving fast, and though excellent for training,
it seemed too lovely on some of those delightful Spring days, to be
spending our time learning how to kill people. Training included the
new form of bayonet fighting, expounded by Officers and others on
their return from the Third Army School, where they had been duly
instructed in its art by that expert, Major Campbell, who always
succeeded in his inimitable way in so impressing his hearers, that
they were not likely to forget for many a long day that "two inches
well placed" was ample, and many other similar maxims. Many tips were
also given us in bayonet fighting by Sergt.-Major Curly, one of the
travelling Physical Training Instructors, who often came to see us,
and made a great impression on all who ever came under his instruction
by his extraordinary keenness and energy. Eventually we passed on to
practise the attack in "waves," and were initiated into the art of
doing this under the shelter of a smoke screen. In this form of
attack, the advance from the moment of leaving the trenches, was
carried out behind a smoke barrage, formed by lighting smoke bombs in
the front line trench, and heaving them forward over the parapet. If
they were good, a dense cloud of smoke was produced, and, provided the
wind was in the right direction, it was possible to advance concealed
behind the smoke cloud for a considerable distance. This method
depended almost entirely for its success on the strength and direction
of the wind. Later on, when the method was improved in the light of
experience gained, smoke grenades fired from rifles were used,
together with smoke shells fired by the artillery, so that a barrage
could be put down at any required point, and, except in very strong
winds, the smoke made to drift across any desired portion of the front
of attack. In many of the later attacks this was done extensively, and
was on the whole very successful. We practised at Tincques with hand
smoke bombs only, and found it was not very difficult to keep
direction through the smoke, whilst at the same time we were screened
from the vision of the enemy.
Our period of training at this juncture was not a long one, as we were
required nearer the front to begin the many operations necessary to
prepare for the big attack. During that short period, however, we had
to change our billets, and moved on April 29th, to Averdoignt, a
pretty little village near St. Pol, where we were well housed and very
comfortable. From there we were called upon to send a detachment for a
few weeks' duty at Third Army Headquarters, at St. Pol, and a
composite company consisting of 60 of B Company, and 100 of C under
Major G. S. Heathcote were entrusted with the task. They must have
done excellent work and evidently made a good impression, as a letter
of special praise on their smartness and good work, was sent to the
Battalion, on their return by the Army Commander, General Allenby.
We moved by easy steps from this area, which we left on May 6th,
marching that day to Rebreuviette, the following day to Gaudiempré,
and on the 10th to Bienvillers. The Transport remained behind at
Gaudiempré, but moved from there on the 11th to La Bazéque Farm, near
Humbercamps. This move brought us into the VII Corps, commanded by
Lieut.-General T. D'O. Snow.
Up to the time of our arrival this part of the line was reputed to be
almost the quietest on the whole of the Western Front. It was said
that Company Commanders slept in pyjamas, even when holding the front
line, and certainly the personnel of Battalion Headquarters at
Foncquevillers, which was only about 1000 yards from the enemy line,
lived there for all the world, as if in a peaceful country village in
England. The dug-outs were made for comfort rather than safety, and
were in many cases artistically decorated with pictures, doubtless got
from houses in the village, and surrounded with elegant little garden
plots, which showed evident signs of careful tending on the part of
our predecessors. Together they formed a kind of miniature "Garden
City." This comparative quietness lasted for a considerable time
after our arrival; indeed we often failed to understand why the enemy
refrained from shelling, as on many occasions we must have offered
exceptionally favourable targets. Day by day work went on often in
full view of the Hun, and within a range of between one and two miles,
and the roads almost daily were a mass of transport of every kind,
moving to and fro in broad daylight, and literally asking for trouble.
There can be no question that the chief reason was a great shortage of
ammunition at this time amongst the Germans, who were under very
strict orders as to its conservation, otherwise no doubt we should
have had a very disagreeable time. Doubtless they made careful note of
all our doings, and the fact that something big was going to take
place must have been perfectly obvious to them. That it was so we
found afterwards, when in a successful attack, the diary of the German
regiment opposite to us (55th R.I.R.) was captured, and from it we
learned that they had been able to foresee exactly where the attack
was coming. This diary was most interesting reading, as it noted each
day their observations of our doings, and the conclusions they drew
from them.
The attack of the 46th Division was to be directed against the German
trenches West of Gommecourt, immediately opposite the village of
Foncquevillers. The German trench line here, forming the Gommecourt
salient, was the most Westerly point that they ever held as a
permanent line. The general object of the attack was to cut off this
salient. The 56th Division were to attack on the South, and join hands
with our Division East of the village of Gommecourt, and so establish
the left flank of the whole Somme attack.
All the efforts of the troops of our Division who were not actually
holding the line, were concentrated on preparing the Divisional front
for the attack. The chief work that we were concerned with, was the
digging out of old communication trenches from Foncquevillers to the
front line, a distance of about 700 yards. There were something like
ten or a dozen of these, several of which were named after our
Division. The principal were "Stafford Avenue," "Lincoln Lane,"
"Leicester Street," "Nottingham Street," "Derby Dyke," "Roberts
Avenue," "Rotten Row," "Regent Street," "Raymond Avenue," and
"Crawlboys Lane." All these had to be dug out about two feet below
their existing level, making them about seven feet deep, and boarded
with trench grids from end to end, which entailed an enormous amount
of work. In addition, the front line had to be cleared of the barbed
wire, with which the unoccupied portions had been filled, support and
reserve trenches had to be prepared for the supporting troops in the
attack, forward or "jumping-off" trenches to be dug at the last
moment, for the assaulting troops to attack from, "Russian saps" to be
dug out into No Man's Land to form communication trenches, by knocking
in the thin covering of earth left to hide them, dug-outs to be made
for forward Battalion Headquarters, and several miles of narrow cable
trench to be dug about six feet deep for the protection of telephone
wires from forward Headquarters back to Brigade, Division and
Artillery Headquarters. In addition to all this navvying work, large
quantities of stores had to be carried up to forward dumps in the
trenches, ready for taking forward if the attack succeeded, shelters
had to be made at various points in side trenches, convenient to get
at from communication trenches, for storing large quantities of bombs
of all kinds, small arm ammunition, iron rations, water, picks,
shovels, sandbags, and other Royal Engineers' material likely to be
required to consolidate the ground we hoped to win in the attack. The
transport of all these stores, and of all the necessary Royal
Engineers' material, and the work entailed in all these preparations
was colossal, and our first real experience of anything of the kind.
It is probable that at this time the mass and variety of material
required in an attack, reached a degree of complication never equalled
either before or after. The German comment on this contained in the
diary already mentioned is of interest. "It must be acknowledged," it
states, "that the equipment and preparation of the English attack were
magnificent. The assaulting troops were amply provided with numerous
machine guns, Lewis guns, trench mortars, and storming-ladders. The
Officers were provided with excellent maps, which shewed every German
trench system actually named and gave every detail of our positions.
The sketches had been brought up to date with all our latest work, and
the sectors of attack were shewn on a very large scale. Special
sketches shewing the objectives of the different units, also aeroplane
photographs were found amongst the captured documents."
During our week at Bienvillers from May 10th to 18th, we were mostly
engaged in improving the defences of the village, and the approach
trenches behind Foncquevillers, and in work on cable trenches. It was
here that one or two civilians roused our suspicions, as they insisted
on ploughing and carrying on their cultivations so very near the
front, some days working with grey horses, others with brown, and our
Battalion Scouts were told to keep a special eye on them. Nothing,
however, happened so far as we were aware that in any way altered the
course of the war, as a result of our or their action.
On May 19th, we relieved the 5th North Staffords in Foncquevillers,
being then in reserve to our 5th, 6th, and 7th Battalions, who were
holding the front line. Our Transport moved the following day to
Souastre.
This was a somewhat uneventful period, and after a few days in the
front line mostly spent in improving trenches, we were relieved on
June 5th, by the 4th Leicesters, and marched back to huts at
Humbercamp, preparatory to moving further back for our final training
for the "Big Push." We left there the following night, and arrived in
the early hours of June 7th at Le Souich, where we were destined to
spend one of the least enjoyable periods out of the line that we ever
experienced. We were only there for a week, but into that short time
was crammed an immense amount of work both in training, and in cutting
wood and making wattle hurdles in Lucheux Forest. The weather was very
wet, and our billets were anything but comfortable. In our humble
opinion the training here was too strenuous. We had to march out four
miles to the training ground, and four miles back in full marching
order, practise the attack for two hours through fields of growing
corn three or four feet high soaked with rain, and complete six hours
training daily (not including the marching) with bayonet fighting,
physical exercises, and drill in the fields near our billets. It takes
very little of such intensive training to make men stale.
The form of attack practised was that ordered for the general attack,
which we now knew was to take place about the end of June: this
allowed each Battalion a frontage of 250 yards, with three Companies
in front, and one in support, each Company having its four platoons
echelonned in depth at distances of about 50 yards, thus forming four
"waves," the men in each wave being extended to about four paces. In
the attack the leading wave was to go through to the final objective,
the other waves occupying and mopping up the trenches passed over by
the leading wave.
A full size model of the German lines at Gommecourt that we were to
attack, was made near Sus-St. Leger, the trenches being dug to a
depth of about two feet. Tape lines were laid for the men to form up
on, and the whole attack was practised time and again as a "drill,"
until eventually we were able to carry it out without losing
direction, with a fair amount of success.
We were now stronger in Officers than we had ever been during the
campaign, our strength being 38. This was due to the recent arrival of
several reinforcements, including Capt. Piggford and Lieut. Hindley,
rejoined, and 2nd Lieuts. H. de C. Martelli, J. B. White, C. J. Wells,
A. G. T. Lomer, T. G. Day, E. A. Huskinson, H. I. Newton, and A. A.
Field. We had, however, lost Capt. Lawson, who left for a tour of duty
at home, and Major E. H. Heathcote, Capt. Gray, and 2nd Lieut. Hodgson
invalided to England, also 2nd Lieut. Peerless, who unfortunately got
badly hurt one day by accidentally kicking a live rifle grenade, which
had been left lying on the bombing practice ground. His place as
Battalion Grenade Officer was taken by 2nd Lieut. Duff. Lieut. Simonet
had gone to hospital, and was succeeded as Lewis Gun Officer by 2nd
Lieut. Tomlinson. Major G. S. Heathcote was attached to Headquarters,
Third Army, and was succeeded in command of C Company by Capt.
Piggford, whilst Major Ashwell became Second-in-Command. We were not
particularly strong in other ranks, something less than 500 being
available for the attack, though we had recently received over 100
reinforcements, including a very good draft of 61 from the 2nd
Sherwood Foresters. Fortunately General Headquarters had taken an
excellent step in laying down that certain Officers and other ranks
known as "Battle Details," were now to be left out of every attack to
form a nucleus for carrying on Battalions in the event of their
suffering heavy casualties. This was a very wise precaution, and was
adopted by us for the first time in the attack at Gommecourt.
[Illustration: REGTL.-SERGT.-MAJOR W. MOUNTENEY, D.C.M.]
[Illustration: COMP. SERGT.-MAJOR W. STOKES, D.C.M. and SERGEANTS OF C
COMPANY, 1917.]
On June 15th, we marched to Humbercamp, the Transport at the same time
moving to lines at La Bazéque Farm. Capt. H. Kirby was now Transport
Officer, having taken over from Capt. Davenport, who, after being
attached for some time to XVII Corps Light Railway Company, Royal
Engineers, went to Brigade Headquarters to learn Staff work. The
transport vehicles had somewhat camouflaged themselves, having been
decorated on all sides by wonderful and mystic signs, so as to show to
the initiated to what unit they belonged. If you enquired you would be
told that the dark blue square meant "First Line Transport," the
narrow light green oblong edged with white placed on the left of this
square was for the "8th Sherwood Foresters," whilst the square divided
diagonally into red and green, and bordered with white, was the sign
of the "46th Division." It was not an easy matter to arrange all these
coloured patches clear of the odds and ends carried on the different
vehicles, and this problem was still exercising the minds of those in
authority nearly up to the Armistice--such an important part did it
play in the ultimate winning of the war!
We now knew that in our Brigade we were to be the Battalion in
reserve, the 5th and 7th Battalions having to carry out the assault,
with the 6th Battalion in immediate support. As a consequence much of
the "dirty" work during the final preparations for the attack fell to
our lot. This consisted chiefly in holding the trenches during our
preliminary bombardment, and putting up with such retaliation as the
Hun might choose to carry out, and in completing the final
arrangements in our own trenches. After three days at Humbercamp,
during which we found large working parties for digging cable
trenches, and putting up screens to conceal the approaches to
trenches, we moved to Foncquevillers on June 18th, and took over part
of the left sub-sector from the 5th Lincolns. An immense amount of
work had been done whilst we had been away; the prospects seemed
bright, and our hopes rose. Our Headquarters at Foncquevillers became
a centre of attraction to all and sundry. At every hour of the day and
night we had callers, from the Divisional Commander downwards. The
Brigadier and his staff constantly paid us visits. Gunners galore came
to sample what we kept, and incidentally to see about finding
observation posts. Royal Engineer gentlemen requested our help at
every turn and corner, usually wanting working parties rather larger
than our total strength, whilst "Tock Emma" Officers were on our
doorstep day and night. Indeed so great was the crowd that at one time
we almost had to put Corpl. Cross on to regulate the queue, and all
the time our poor stock of victuals and drinks was getting less and
less.
All went well until the afternoon of June 23rd, when there was a
violent thunderstorm, which practically undid the whole of the work we
had carried out in the trenches, filling them in most cases to a depth
of two feet or more with mud and water. This area was a difficult one
to drain, and it was impossible to get the water away, so that all
hands had to be got on as soon as possible to man trench pumps, and
endeavour to clear the trenches in that way. This method was extremely
laborious, and very little real progress was made, though every
available man was put on to the work. Our poor dug-outs were knee deep
in water, and the newly constructed bomb and other stores were too
weak to stand such a storm, and in most cases collapsed. Our hopes
sank, for we realised how much depended on all the careful
preparations which had been made, and that the time left before the
attack would be all too short for us to get the damage repaired.
It is impossible to give anything like an adequate idea of our plight
for the next few days. The artillery scheme, including a six days'
bombardment, began on the following day with wire cutting, causing a
certain amount of retaliation, which added to our trouble. This got
worse on the following days, doubtless owing partly to the fact that
we dug a new advanced trench. This was in a deplorable mess, and our
men who had to occupy it had a most distressing time. Casualties rose
rapidly, especially in B Company, whose front line trench was
enfiladed from Adinfer Wood. Our carrying parties, who had to take up
Royal Engineer material, ammunition of all sorts, rations and other
stores to various points in the line, mostly adopted the very suitable
dress of a sandbag kilt and boots. They were objects of much interest,
but it was the most workmanlike rig-out for our trenches, which in
many cases remained knee deep in mud and water for several days. The
carrying had to go on whatever happened, and continued night and day,
assistance being got from the 6th and 7th Battalions, from the Machine
Gun Company, and from the Transport men of all units, parties of whom
marched up nightly for the purpose. With trenches in such a state, it
is needless to say that it was impossible for men to hold the line for
many days, and in order to give us a brief respite, we were relieved
by the 5th Battalion on the night of June 27th, and moved back to
Pommier.
The nine strenuous days during which we had held the line, had been a
severe trial, and where everyone did so well it is difficult to single
out any for special mention, but we feel we must say how much we owed
to Capts. Turner, Vann and Hill, for the excellent way in which they
worked to keep up the spirits of their men during those trying times,
and to Sergts. Slater and Rawding, for the splendid way they kept
their men together during several particularly unpleasant "straffs" by
the Boche of our front trenches. During that time, too, much
excellent patrolling was done by Marshall, who unfortunately was
wounded one day when taking rather too great risks in observing the
Boche lines, and Martelli, ably helped by L.-Corpl. Hickman, and Pvte.
E. C. Bryan. Our casualties during those nine days included Capt.
Vann, slightly wounded, Lieut. Hindley, who got a nasty splinter wound
on the nose, 16 other ranks killed, and 44 wounded.
The chief incident during our two days' stay at Pommier, occurred on
the afternoon of June 30th, when the Huns began shelling the church.
John Turner, Michie and Harvey, were having tea in their mess, which
was only a few yards from the church, when a 5.9 blew in the end of
the house, practically bursting inside the room where they were
sitting. Their escape was little short of a miracle. John Turner,
however, as one would expect, came into Headquarters smiling and
perfectly cool, though covered with dust and blood. Harvey and Michie
were a bit shaken, the former having to go to hospital.
The attack, having been postponed owing to the bad weather, was
eventually fixed to take place on the morning of July 1st, and we left
Pommier again the night before to take up our position at
Foncquevillers. Our cookers were taken down to the Western edge of the
wood behind the village, where we were issued with soup and rum on
arrival at about 10 p.m. Each man carried in addition to the following
day's ration, his iron ration, and a bacon and bread sandwich.
Equipment carried included 200 rounds small arm ammunition, four
sandbags, two Mills grenades, two gas helmets, haversack, waterproof
sheet, and a supply of wire cutters and gloves. The new pattern "tin
hat," with which we had by this time all been supplied, formed a by no
means unimportant part of our dress. It was not a thing of beauty,
and took a little while to get used to, but it proved a good friend to
many in the days that were to come.
The attack by the 46th Division was to be carried out with two
Brigades, Staffords and Sherwood Foresters, with the Lincolns and
Leicesters in reserve. The 139th Brigade on the left was to attack
between the Northern edge of Gommecourt Wood and the "Little Z," the
5th Battalion being on the right, and 7th on the left, the 6th
Battalion in support, and 8th in Reserve; the German first, second and
third lines were to be captured, and in conjunction with the 56th
Division on the right, our line was to be carried to a point just East
of Gommecourt village.
We reached our assembly positions early on the morning of July 1st.
Our bombardment opened at 6.25 a.m. and the discharge of smoke from
our front line began an hour later. Under cover of this the assaulting
Battalions moved off from our advanced trenches at 7.30 a.m. A heavy
and accurate barrage was immediately put down on our front and support
lines by the enemy, who were evidently well aware of the extent of the
attack and ready for it. The attack by the 139th Brigade is described
in the following extracts from the captured diary of the 55th R.I.R.,
the times given being German:--
"G1. sector 7.30 a.m. An extremely violent bombardment began,
overwhelming all the trenches and sweeping away the wire.
8.30 a.m. The enemy's fire lifted. The enemy's attack, which was
made under cover of gas bombs, was perceived. In consequence of
the sharp look-out kept by the Commander of the 4th Company, and
by a Platoon Commander holding the most dangerous portion of the
line, the shell holes were occupied exactly at the right moment,
and the attackers were received with hand grenades. The barrage
fire which had been called for began at once.
8.40 a.m. Strong hostile skirmishing lines deployed from Pilier
Farm. They were at once met by heavy machine gun and infantry
fire. Second Lieut. ----, of the 2nd Company who was holding the
3rd support line of G1, recognised the superior strength of the
enemy's attack which was being carried out against No. 4 Company.
In spite of the intense bombardment he decided to advance with
his Platoon over the open, and, crossing the second line, reached
the front line of G1 at the decisive moment to reinforce No. 4
Company.
The enemy built up his firing line and attempted to press forward
with bombers and flame-projectors, but was repulsed everywhere.
10.30 a.m. The fine spirit of the troops of the 2nd and 4th
Companies succeeded by their stubborn resistance in annihilating
the thick charging waves of the English. The ground was covered
with numbers of dead, and in front of our trench lay quantities
of English arms and equipment. Gradually the artillery fire
recommenced on the front line trenches and rose to a pitch of
extreme violence in the course of the afternoon. The fact that
all attacks were completely repulsed without the enemy gaining a
footing in the front line of G1. at any point is due, next to the
bravery of the troops, to the carefully thought-out arrangements
of Major ----, to the care of the Officer Commanding No. 4
Company, and to the energy of the Platoon Commanders."
To resume our own story. At about 8.0 a.m., as the forward trenches
were cleared of troops, we began to move forward, but everywhere found
the trenches, which were still in many parts deep in mud and water,
blown in, or blocked by dead bodies, or wounded men trying to make
their way back. Little progress was possible, and there was nothing to
be done but to await further developments.
Although little news came through, it soon became evident that the
attack on our front had not succeeded. We learnt later that, owing to
the difficulty experienced by the supporting waves in getting across
our own water-logged trenches, they lost the advantage of the barrage,
and that the smoke cleared long before the bulk of the assaulting
troops had got across No Man's Land. In spite of our long protracted
artillery bombardment comparatively little damage had been done to the
German trenches and wire, and our men met with heavy rifle and machine
gun fire, not only from their front, but also from the right flank,
where the 137th Brigade were unable to gain the German front line
owing to uncut wire. A few of both the 5th and 7th Battalions got into
the German trenches, but they were soon surrounded and overwhelmed.
Some who were wounded before reaching the wire, crawled for shelter
into shell holes, where in several instances, they were deliberately
bombed or shot by the Boche from their trenches. At 3 p.m. a fresh
bombardment was begun by the right Brigade, and continued on our
front, with a view to an attack being made by two Companies of the 6th
Battalion, but this was cancelled.
At 5.5 p.m. we were ordered to send out daylight patrols to ascertain
the position of affairs in front. Several volunteers, amongst whom
were Corpls. G. Clay, and C. E. Bryan, L.-Corpls. Moss and Hickman,
and Pvtes. Charles, Brett, Adams, and Nightingall, remained out for
some time, and brought back useful information. Meanwhile much gallant
work was also being done by the Stretcher Bearers and others. Pvtes.
Holbery, Thomas, Nelson, and Shearman worked continuously for nearly
36 hours carrying in wounded, often under heavy fire, whilst Comp.
Sergt.-Major T. Powell, who brought in three wounded men by daylight,
and Sergt. Grainger, who controlled his men with great skill during
the battle and also rescued a wounded man, are deserving of special
mention.
At 6.10 p.m. we received instructions to take over the original front
and advanced trenches from the 6th, and remnants of the 5th and 7th
Battalions, who were there, and this was done. Later, however, the 5th
Lincolns took over the line as they had been ordered to carry out
another attack at midnight, in order to try and rescue some of the 5th
and 7th Battalions, who it was thought were still in the Boche
trenches. This, however, was not pressed, and finally A Company of our
Battalion were given the melancholy task of scouring No Man's Land to
find the dead and wounded. Eventually the 5th Lincolns took over from
us on the morning of the 2nd July, and we withdrew the same day to
billets at Gaudiempré.
Even as we left Foncquevillers ill-luck pursued us, for a premature
burst of a shell from one of our guns took place close to us as we
were formed up behind the wood ready to move off, and wounded four,
fortunately not seriously. Otherwise our casualties during the actual
battle had not been heavy, amounting to three killed, two missing
(attached to Trench Mortar Battery) and 37 wounded.
We cannot look back with anything but regret on that awful battle,
when so many lives were sacrificed apparently to no purpose. July 1st
is not our happiest of days--indeed on two successive occasions it was
our most unfortunate day of the year. It must have been quite obvious
to the enemy that this was to be the flank of the Somme attack,
although some demonstration was made by the 37th Division on our left.
The enemy, therefore, were able to bring all their guns from the
direction of Adinfer Wood to bear on No Man's Land on our front. Lack
of troops had necessitated the employment of the attacking Battalions
in the most exacting fatigues up to the very eve of the assault.
Probably, barely a man had had a full night's sleep for a week prior
to the attack, and there had been scarcely a day or night when rain
had not fallen consistently and heavily, and working parties had not
been soaked through to the skin. Those of us, who eight months later,
stood on some of the German concrete machine gun emplacements
opposite, commanding a magnificent field of fire from positions proof
against the heaviest shells, saw still the lines of dead bodies lying
in No Man's Land, a tragic and pitiable witness, if witness were
needed, that the failure of the attack was in no measure due to any
lack of dash or courage on the part of our indomitable Infantry.
Practically every Officer of the attacking Battalions was killed or
wounded, and a large proportion of the men, and but an insignificant
proportion fell alive into the hands of the enemy.
It was some slight comfort to receive from the Corps Commander an
appreciation of our efforts, which had kept busy a large number of the
enemy's best troops, and to know that we had a share in the success of
the great Somme attack, and that our terrible losses were not entirely
in vain.