POLITICAL PURITY
AND EFFICIENCY THE attainment of a stable peace is the first public
duty; the second is the achievement of an efficient government. Where
politics are corrupt and inefficient all social progress is obstructed;
and all such ideals of a reshaped human society as the Socialists yearn
toward must be postponed until we have learned to run the machinery
of government smoothly and effectively. The backward condition of peoples
whose government is unintelligent needs no examples. The Russo-Japanese
War brought into sharp contrast a nation of limitless resources and
fine human stock handicapped and crippled by a selfish bureaucracy,
and a much smaller nation, inexperienced and remote from the great
world currents, but strengthened and made efficient by an intelligent
and patriotic administration. In Persia and Mesopotamia we find poverty,
ignorance, desert, where once flourished mighty empires: bad government
is the cause. Greece and Italy and Egypt are struggling to recover
from centuries of misgovernment. In this country government has been
far wiser and more responsive to the community's needs; and yet the
apathy of the intelligent public and the intrusion of private greed
have distorted and obstructed legislation until social reformers throw
up their hands in despair. But there are hopeful signs. The causes
of this political mismanagement are being more generally recognized
today, and it is probable that the next few decades will witness great
strides toward improving the mechanism of American government and
banishing corruption.
What are the forces making for corruption in politics?
(1) By one means or other, unscrupulous rulers and officeholders have
always been able to replenish their private income by misuse of their
official powers. Since popular government was first tried there has
existed a class of professional politicians with little regard for
the public welfare and ready to do anything to keep themselves in power
and fatten their pocketbooks. We have in America the well-known phenomena
of the "machine," the "ring," and the "boss," whose motto is "Politics
is politics," and who are unashamed to put their interests above those
of the people at large. Their control of the machinery of government
enables them, unless ingenious provisions prevent, to wink at illegal
voting and fraudulent counting of votes, to get the dregs of the
population out to the polls, and perhaps intimidate their opponents
from voting. The police power has often been misused for such purposes;
the gerrymander is another clever method of manipulating the results
of elections. Such means, together with the use as bribe money of funds
deflected from the public treasury, the blackmail of vice, and the
acceptance of "contributions" from favored parties, create a vicious
circle which tends to keep in power corrupt officials who have once
got hold.
(2) But the power of unscrupulous politicians is made far greater by
the support of those whose personal interests they make a business
of furthering. Whole sections of the people are pleased and placated
and bribed by special legislation in their favor, and as many individuals
as possible are given positions. Behind every "boss" there are always
hundreds of men who owe their "jobs" to him, and many others who
cherish promises and hopes for personal favors. Jane Addams tells us
that upon one occasion when the reformers in Chicago tried to oust
a corrupt alderman they "soon discovered that approximately one out
of every five voters in the nineteenth ward at that time held a job
dependent upon the good will of the alderman." [Footnote: Twenty Years
at Hull House, p. 316.]
(3) Of especial importance are the great "interests" that are always
to be found behind a corrupt administration. These corporations are
so dependent upon the good will of the Government for their prosperity,
and even for their very existence, that from the primitive instinct
of self-preservation as well as from the greed of exorbitant profits,
they stand ready to give liberal bribes, or at least to back with money
and moral support the party machine that promises to favor them. They
control a large proportion of the newspapers and magazines, and are
thus able to distort facts, protect themselves from attack, and even
stir up a factitious distrust of would-be reformers. As every little
contractor naturally favors the "ring" that awards contracts to him,
so the great corporations publicly or secretly support it. The liquor
trade and the vice caterers-the keepers of gambling dens, illegal
"shows," and disorderly houses-back by their money and votes the
"machine" that they know will let them alone. But, indeed, the most
"respectable" trusts and public-service corporations are often most
culpable, and the greatest power behind the throne. Their interest
in the personnel of the Government is far keener than that of the average
citizen; they can usually succeed, by cleverly specious presentations
of the situation, in dividing the forces against them, and often, by
"deals," in effecting secret alliances of the "rings" in control of
supposedly opposing parties. The poor are right in supposing that these
powerful "interests" are their greatest enemy; as that keen observer
of our national life, Mr. Bryce, has put it, "the power of money is
for popular governments the most constant source of danger."
(4) But, after all, this combination of forces in defiance of the
common weal would not be effective but for the comparative indifference
of the people, which may thus be called a contributing factor. The
average voter feels no stimulus of self-interest in the matter; "what
is everybody's business is nobody's business," and the individual finds
his personal influence so slight that it seems hardly worth his pains
to do anything about it. Occasionally popular passions become aroused
and reform movements make a clean sweep; but the result is usually
temporary, and when the general attention is turned elsewhere the
bosses creep back to power. Modern life has so many more personal
interests in it than the ancient republics had, that public affairs
seldom become so big and absorbing an interest. And the more public
affairs become the concern of a special group of men with dubious
reputations, the more politics are shunned by the average citizen.
Home life and business, social life and amusements, aesthetic,
intellectual, and religious interests, are so much more attractive
to him, that he gives little heed to political conditions, lets himself
be duped by newspaper talk, and votes blindly some party ticket, without
realizing his gullibility and his poor citizenship.
What are the evil results of political corruption?
(1) The obvious result of these conditions is inefficiency of
administration and waste of the public moneys. The real interests of
city or State are neglected. Streets become filthy, unsanitary
tenements are built, firetrap factories and theaters allowed; every
effort to improve public health is sidetracked, and the will of the
people is subordinated to the will of the gang. Officials are nominated
or appointed not for their competence but for their subservience to
the organization; the boss himself, inexpert in administration,
responsible to no one, and usually bribable, dictates public policy.
The public funds disappear as in a quicksand; extravagant prices are
paid for building lots and contracts, in return for political support
or a share of the loot. Philadelphia before the reform movement of
1911 borrowed fifty-one million dollars in four years, and at the end
had practically nothing to show for it, with the city dirty, buildings
out of repair, and everything important neglected. One contractor in
the "ring" was paid $520,000 a year to remove the city garbage-a
privilege which is actually paid for in some cities, the value of the
garbage for fertilizer and the manufacture of other products making
the collection of it a profitable business.
(2) Another evil result lies in the subordination of general to local
interests. The scattered and ineffective "pork-barrel" appropriations
of Congress are dictated not by intelligent consideration for the
public weal, but by the desire to throw a sop to this and that section
of the country, and thereby win votes. Costly buildings are authorized
in many towns where they are not needed, river and harbor improvements
proceed at a halting pace in a hundred places at once, unnecessary
navy yards and custom houses are maintained at heavy cost, the army
is scattered at many small and expensive posts. Even the tariff is
largely a deal between various manufacturing interests, rather than
an instrument of the public good. Most officials consider themselves
bound to exert all their influence in favor of their particular
constituency's desires; if they cross those wishes they will probably
not be reelected, while if they sacrifice the interests of the people
as a whole they will be immune from punishment. Most of the state
universities, normal schools, asylums, and other institutions have
been located where they are as the result of a deal between different
sections rather than with a view to the most advantageous site.
(3) To these grave evils we must add the moral harm of selfish and
corrupt politics. Standards of honor are blurred, the spirit of public
service is almost lost sight of, and the cheap materialism to which
our prosperous age is too easily prone flourishes apace. The man who
would succeed in politics-unless he is a man of extraordinary personality
and favored by good fortune-must be disingenuous and a time-server,
must truckle to bosses and do favors for the ring; he must appeal to
prejudice and passion and put his personal advancement before his
ideals. No one can estimate the evil effect that corruption in politics
has had upon the national character. When we add the indirect effects-
the distortion of the public news-service, the protection of vice,
the insecurity of justice-the moral evils of political corruption are
seen to be of gravest importance.
What is the political duty of the citizen?
(1) In the present chaotic state of our machinery of government, where
corruption is so easy and efficiency so difficult to obtain, the burden
must rest upon every conscientious voter to play his part with
intelligence. He must study the situation, keep himself informed as
to candidates and issues, watch the conduct of officials, vote at
primaries and elections, however irksome and fruitless this effort
may seem. Above all, he must use independence of judgment, and not
let himself be duped by disingenuous appeals to "party loyalty"; where
blind party voting is prevalent there is little stimulus to party
managers to nominate able and honorable men or to promote needed
legislation. Public opinion must be kept aroused, the sense of
individual responsibility awakened, and political matters kept in the
glare of publicity. At election times whoever can spare the time
should, after learning the local situation, take some part in the
campaign, by public speaking, personal soliciting of is a shame that
the peaceable home-loving citizen should have to be dragged into this
business of politics, which ought to be
left to experts to manage; but at present there seems no help for it
in most communities.
(2) An important service lies in joining or forming local branches
of the leagues which now exist for the pushing of specific political
measures, for the investigation and publication of impartial records
of candidates, or for the investigation of the expenditures and results
of administrations. Under the first head we may classify, for example,
the National Short Ballot Organization; under the second head the Good
Government Association, that makes it its business to send to each
voter in a community a printed statement of the past history of each
candidate for office, including the record of his vote on important
matters; under the third head there are the Bureaus of Municipal
Research. The New York Bureau, incorporated in 1907, conducts a yearly
budget exhibit that shows graphically what is being done with the money
raised by taxation. Inefficiency and corruption are ferreted out, waste
is demonstrated, suggestions are made for economy, for the improvement
of administration in every detail, and the amelioration of evil social
conditions. By its determined publicity it can do much to energize
and modernize city government. [Footnote: Cf. World's Work, vol. 23,
p. 683. National Municipal Review, vol. 2. p. 48.]
(3) The outlook for clean and public-spirited young men, with expert
knowledge and ideals, who wish to enter a political career, is
gradually becoming more encouraging. The reformer in politics must
be not merely an idealist, but a man who can do things. He must show
his constituents that reform government serves them better than the
ringsters. Reform tactics have too often been negative; stopped, but
no positive measures for social welfare have been passed. To be
successful, a politician must show the people that he understands and
is able to satisfy their needs. More effective than any moral house-
cleaning in securing the tenure of an administration is its efficiency
in promoting better living and working conditions, improving
opportunities for recreation and education, or loosening the clutch
of the predatory "interests." Moreover, the politician must be a good
mixer, willing to work with those who do not share his idealism, good-
natured and conciliatory, ready to postpone the accomplishment of much
that he has at heart in order to get something done. As organization
is in most matters necessary for effectiveness, he must usually work
with a party, do a lot of distasteful detail work, and make compromises
for the sake of agreements. Happily, the Progressive party has made
an out- and-out stand for the application of morals to politics; and
the growing movement in the cities toward seeking experts to manage
their affairs gives hope that the way will soon be generally open for
men of scientific training and high ideals in political life.
What legislative checks to corruption are possible?
It is, of course, an unnatural situation when the ordinary citizen
has to spend a lot of time and effort if he would guard against being
misgoverned. He ought to be able to tend to his own affairs and leave
the machinery of government to those who have been trained to it and
whose business it is. And while no political mechanism will ever wholly
run itself, without watchfulness on the part of the people, experience
shows clearly that it is possible by a wise system to make corruption
much more difficult and more easily checked. We Americans are beginning
to awake from our complacent self-gratulation and realize that our
political machinery is clumsy and antiquated and a standing invitation
to inefficiency. The discussion of the relative advantages of
legislative schemes belongs to the science of government rather than
to ethics; but their bearing upon public morality is so important that
certain typical movements must be explained. The stages by which the
advanced form of popular government which we have now attained has
been reached need not, for our purposes, be considered-the extension
of suffrage to the masses, government by representatives, registration
laws, the secret ballot, and the like. We need only discuss several
reforms now being agitated and tried, whose aim is to make government
more responsive to the real wishes and needs of the people, and more
difficult of usurpation by selfish interests.
I. We may first speak of several reforms whose aim is to improve our
mechanism of election, in order that merit, rather than "pull," shall
lead to office, and that officials shall represent the people rather
than the political rings. It is not generally true that good and able
men are unwilling to accept public office; what they are unwilling
to do is to truckle to bosses, to do all the questionable things that
will keep them in with the ring, or to spend large sums of money in
advertising their claims to the public. So thoroughly have political
machines entrenched themselves that it is often practically useless
for any one to oppose the machine candidate. Appointees receive their
positions for "political services" rendered, or in return for a
"campaign contribution" for which they may hope to recoup themselves
when in office. To destroy utterly this political "graft" will be
impossible until human nature becomes more generally moralized; but
to render it more difficult and less common is the purpose of a number
of measures, of which we may mention the following:
(1) CIVIL SERVICE LAWS. These require appointments to
office, made by officials, to be made on the basis of competitive
examinations which shall test the ability and knowledge of the
applicants. By this means, within a generation, tens of thousands of
positions have been put beyond the reach of spoilsmen, and men of worth
have replaced political henchmen. Instead of a great overturn with
every new political regime, the man who has now fairly won his position
retains it for life, except in case of proved inefficiency. The quality
of the public service has been immeasurably improved, the subservience
of office-holders to political chiefs abolished. [Footnote: See
Atlantic Monthly, vol. 113, p. 270. National Municipal Review, vol.
1, p. 654; vol. 3, p. 316.] But there are still many thousands of offices
that have not been brought within the civil service, and there are
continual attempts on the part of politicians to withdraw from it this
or that class of appointments, that they may have "plums" to offer
their constituents. To the most important positions the civil service
method is, however, inapplicable; imagine a President having to appoint
as his Secretary of State the man who passed the best examination in
diplomacy! So many other considerations affect the availability of
a man for such posts that the elected officials must be given a free
hand in their choice and held responsible therefore to the people.
These important appointees will be enough in the public eye to make
it usually expedient for the career of the appointers that they pick
reasonably honest and able men-especially if the recall (of which we
shall presently speak) is in operation.
(2) The short ballot. As our government has grown more and more
complex, the number of officials for whom the citizen must vote has
increased, with the result that he has to decide in many cases among
rival candidates about none of whom he knows anything definitely. For
four or five offices he can be fairly expected the merits of the
candidates in the field; but to investigate or remember the relative
merits and demerits of a score or more is more than the average voter
will do. So he may "scratch" his party's candidate for governor or
mayor, but usually votes the "straight ticket" for the minor officials.
This works too well into the hands of the political machines. The
obvious remedy is to give him only a few officers to vote for and to
require the remaining offices to be filled by appointment instead of
election.
By this method, not only is the voter saved from needless confusion
and enabled to concentrate his attention upon the few big offices,
but the responsibility for misgovernment is far more clearly fixed,
and the possibility of remedying it made much easier. If a dozen state
officials are elected, the average citizen is uncertain who is to blame
for inefficiency; each official shoves the responsibility on to the
others' shoulders, and it is not plain what can be done except to
depose them all, one by one. If a governor only is elected, and is
required to appoint his subordinates, the entire blame rests upon his
shoulders. If dishonesty or misadministration is discovered, he must
take the shame; he may be recalled from office if he is not quick
enough in removing the guilty man and remedying the evil.
Further, the right to choose his own subordinates makes the work of
the chief much easier, brings a unity of purpose into an administration
which is likely to be absent when a number of different men,
simultaneously elected, perhaps representing different parties, have
to work together. The increased power and responsibility of the chief
offices attract able men, men of ideals and training, who do not care
for an office whose power is limited by that of various machine
politicians who, they know, will hamper them on every side in their
efforts for efficient administration. And, apart from this
consideration, a man able enough to win election as governor is a far
better judge of the men best fitted for the various technical duties
that fall to his subordinates than is the general public. Experience
shows that the men chosen by chiefs who are elected and held
responsible to the people are generally abler than those elected to
the same positions by popular vote.
The present movement toward a short ballot, with responsibility clearly
denned and concentrated, will doubtless do away ultimately with the
clumsy systems by which both States and cities in this country are
now governed-the two-chambered legislatures, with their inevitable
friction betwixt themselves and with the executive. This method of
checks and counter-checks was thought necessary as a safeguard against
tyranny, the bugbear of our forefathers, but is now the enemy of
efficiency and the haunt of corruption. The much simpler commission
form of government, which, originating in Galveston and Des Moines
a few years ago, has already, at date of writing, been adopted by over
three hundred cities, substitutes for the usual executive and legislative
branches a small group of elected officials - commonly five-who, with
the aid of appointed subordinates, carry on the whole business of the
city. Some such plan may eventually be adopted for states, and even
for the national government. [Footnote: R. S. Childs, Short Ballot
Principles, Story of the Short Ballot Cities. C. A. Beard, Loose Leaf
Digest of Short Ballot Charters. Free literature of the National Short
Ballot Organization (383 Fourth Avenue, New York City). C. R. Woodruff,
City Government by Commission. E. S. Bradford, Com- mission Government
in American Cities. National Municipal Review, vol. 1, pp. 40, 170, 372,
562; vol. 2, p. 661. The American City, vol. 9, p. 236. Outlook, vol. 92,
pp. 635, 829; vol. 99, p. 362. Forum, vol. 51, p. 354.]
(3) Direct primaries. Experience has conclusively shown
that the caucus system of making nominations for office plays directly
into the hands of the machine; its practical result has been that the
voter is usually restricted in his nominees of the bosses and the
"interests." The direct primary gives the independent candidate his
opportunity, and makes it more practicable for honest citizens to
determine between what candidates the final choice shall lie. It
implies effort on the part of the candidate to make himself known to
the voters; but such effort there must always be, unless the candidate
is already a conspicuous figure, in order that the citizen may have
grounds for his decision. It has in some places led to an exorbitant
expenditure for self-advertisement; but this expenditure can be pretty
well controlled by legislation. The argument that it does away with
the deliberation possible in a caucus wears the aspect of a joke, in
view of the sort of deliberation the caucus has in practice encouraged;
and discussion does, of course, take place in the public press, which
is the modern forum. It is possible, however, that some modified form
of the direct primary plan may be better still, such as the Hughes
plan, which provided for the election at each primary of a party
committee to present carefully discussed nominations for the following
year's primary to approve or reject.[Footnote: See Outlook, vol. 90,
p. 382; vol. 95, p: 507. North American Review, vol. 190, p. 1] Arena,
vol. 35, p. 587; vol. 36, p. 52; vol. 41, p. 550. Forum, vol. 42, p.
493. Atlantic Monthly, vol. 110, p. 41.
(4) PREFERENTIAL VOTING. A more radical movement would abolish
primaries altogether and settle elections upon one day by preferential
voting. The voter indicates his second choices, and any further choices
he may care to indicate. If no candidate receives a majority of first
choices, the first and second choices are added together; if necessary,
the third choices. In this way the danger, so often realized, of a
split vote and the election of a minority candidate, will be banished;
it will no longer be possible for a machine candidate, actually the
least majority of the people, to win a plurality over the divided
forces of opposition. The real wishes of the voter can be discovered
and obeyed more readily than with our present troublesome and expensive
system of double elections. [Footnote: National Municipal Review, vol.
1, p. 386; vol. 3, pp. 49, 83.]
(5) PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. By means of preferential voting it
is possible to make representative bodies a mirror not of the majority
party, but of the real divisions of opinion in a community. One of
the great evils in our present system of majority rule is the suppression
of the wishes of the minority-which may amount to nearly half the
community. [Footnote: Cf. Unpopular Review, vol. 1, p. 22.] Strong
parties may go for many years without any representation, or with
representation quite disproportionate to their numbers. By the method
of proportional representation, every man's vote counts, and every
considerable body of opinion can send its representative to council.
Men of marked personality, who have aroused too great hostility to
make them safe candidates as we vote today, because they would be
unlikely to win a majority, can get a constituency sufficient to elect
them, while the harmless nobody, elected today only to avoid a feared
rival, will have less chance. The evil gerrymander will be abolished,
and representative bodies will be divided along party lines in the
very proportions in which the people are divided.
Moreover, since on this plan every vote counts, the greatest source
of political apathy will be removed-that sense of hopelessness which
paralyzes the efforts of the members of a minority party. Corruption
will hardly pay; for whereas at present the boss has but to win the
comparatively few votes necessary to swing the balance toward a bare
majority, in order to have complete control, he will upon this plan
secure control only in actual proportion to the number of votes he
can secure.
Another advantage of the system lies in the stabler policy it will
ensure. Our present system results in frequent sharp overturns,
according as this party or that may get a temporary majority. But this
battledore and shuttlecock of legislation does not represent the far
more gradual changes in public opinion. A system whereby the number
of representatives of each party is always directly proportioned to
the number of votes cast for that party would make it possible to evolve
a careful machinery of government, as is not possible with our periodic
upheavals and reversals of personnel and policy.[Footnote: See
publications of the American Proportional Representation League
(Secretary C. G. Hoag, Haverford, Pennsylvania). National Municipal
Review, vol. 3, p. 92. American City, vol. 10, p. 319. Thomas Hare,
Representation. J. S. Mill, Representative Government, chap. VII.
Political Science Quarterly, vol. 29, p. 111. Atlantic Monthly, vol.
112, p. 610.]
(6) THE SEPARATION OF NATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL ISSUES. The obtrusion
of national party lines into state and municipal affairs has
continually confused issues and blocked reforms in the narrower
spheres. Masses of voters will support a candidate for governor or
mayor simply because he is a Republican or Democrat, although the
national party issues in no way enter into the campaign. Bosses
skillfully play on this blind party allegiance, and many a scoundrel
or incompetent has ridden into office under the party banner. The
separation of local from national elections has proved itself a
necessity; in the most advanced communities they are now put in
different years, that the loyalties evoked by one campaign may not
carry over blindly into another. The direct election of United States
Senators has this great advantage, among others, of separating issues;
in former days the alternative was often forced upon the citizen of
voting for a state legislator who stood for measures of which he
disapproved, or of voting for a better legislator who would not vote
for the United States Senator he wished to see elected.
(7) Space forbids the further discussion of reforms that aim at
improving the machinery of election. The value of anti-bribery laws
is obvious, as of the laws that require publicity of campaign accounts,
forbid campaign contributions by corporations, and limit the legal
expenditures of individuals. [Footnote: Cf. Outlook, vol. 81, p. 549.]
The publication at public expense and sending to every voter of a
pamphlet giving in his own words the arguments on the strength of which
each candidate seeks election has recently been tried in the West.
But this is sure, that in one way or other the American people will
evolve a mechanism which will make it easier for able and honest men
to attain office than for the rogues and their incompetent henchmen.
II. A second set of reforms bears rather upon the quality of
legislation than upon the selection of men for office. It is not enough
that the way be made easy for good men to attain office; they must,
when elected, be freed from needless temptations and given every
inducement to work for the interests of the community they represent.
Every possible pressure is valuable that can counteract the pull of
sectional interests, party interests, or the interests of the great
corporations, away from the general welfare. For even the best
intentioned officials may yield to the insistence of local or partisan
wishes, to the arguments of "big business," or to the lure of personal
advantage.
(1) REPRESENTATION AT LARGE. The method of legislation by
representatives of local districts leads inevitably to laws that are
a compromise or bargain between the interests of the several districts,
rather than the result of a desire to further the best interests of
the entire community. Congressmen are continually beset by their
constituents to secure special favors for them, aldermen are expected
to push the interests of their respective wards. Each representative
stands in danger of political suicide if he refuses to use his
influence for these often improper ends; and legislation takes the
form of a quid pro quo:-"You vote for this bill which my section desires,
and I'll vote for the bill yours demands." This evil is so great that
it may be necessary eventually to do away entirely with district
representation.[Footnote: See Outlook, vol. 95, p. 759.]
(2) DELEGATED GOVERNMENT. Another plan, which evades the
pressure of local interests while allowing district representation, also
avoids the friction and deadlocks which result from government by a
group of representatives of sharply opposed parties or principles. By
this plan, a representative body is elected, by districts, or at large,
by proportional representation; but this body, instead of itself deciding
or executing the state or municipal policy, serves merely to select
and watch experts, who carry on the various phases of government.
These experts remain responsible to the representatives, who in turn
are responsible to the people. This method promises to combine
concentration of responsibility, efficiency, and business-like
government, with democracy, that is, responsiveness to popular control.
The national Congress may, for example, appoint a commission of experts
on the tariff, agreeing to consider no tariff legislation except such
as they recommend; in this way they are freed from all requests to
propose this or that alteration in the interests of their State or
one of its industries, while the commissioners, not being responsible
to any localities, are under no pressure to yield to such requests.
Similarly, the right to recommend-or even to enact-legislation on
pensions, on river and harbor appropriations, or what not, may be
delegated to an appointed body responsible only to the Congress at
large; and all the "pork-barrel" legislation, which the better class
of legislators hate, but which is forced upon them by the threat of
political ruin, may be obviated. [Footnote: Cf. the new (1914) Public
Health Council of six members, in New York State, to whom has been
delegated all power to make and enforce laws bearing upon the public
health throughout the State (except in New York City). See World's
Work, vol. 27, p. 495.] The plan of delegating power to appointed
experts has very recently been winning approval in municipal
government, where it is commonly called the "City Manager " plan.
A small body of commissioners are elected and held responsible for
the city government; these men may remain in their private vocations,
and draw a comparatively small salary from the city. Their duty is
to select an expert city manager who will receive a high salary, and
conduct personally and through his appointees the whole business of
the city. The commissioners may dismiss him if his work is not
satisfactory and engage another to take his place. Responsibility is
concentrated; mismanagement can be stopped at once, more readily even
than by the recall; unity and continuity of policy become possible;
in short, the same successful methods that have made American business
the admiration of the world can be applied to politics. If this plan
becomes widely adopted, as it bids fair to be, politics can become
a trained profession, and we can be governed by experts instead of
by politicians. [Footnote: See The City Manager Plan of Municipal
Government (printed by the National Short Ballot Organization)
National Municipal Review, vol. 1, pp. 33, 549; vol. 2, pp. 76, 639;
vol. 3, p. 44. Outlook, vol. 104, p. 887.]
(3) THE RECALL. Many of the newer plans for government include a method
by which an inefficient or dishonest official can be removed from
office by the people, without the cumbersome process of an impeachment.
It would not be wise to apply the recall to local representatives,
who would then be still more at the mercy of local wishes; but with
a short ballot and the concentration of responsibility upon executives
or small commissions who represent the community as a whole, it is
highly desirable to have a method available for quickly remedying
mistakes. The danger of being recalled from office is a salutary
influence upon a weak or a self-willed man. And the possibility of
it allows the election of officials for longer terms, which are desirable
from several points of view: they bring a more stable government, freed
from too frequent breaks or reversals of policy; they permit the
acquiring of a longer political experience, and stimulate abler men
to run for office; they save the public the bother and expense of too
frequent elections. [Footnote: See National Municipal Review, vol.
1, p. 204. Forum, vol. 47, p. 157. North American Review, vol. 198,
p. 145.]
(4) THE REFERENDUM. A less drastic instrument of popular control
over legislation is the referendum, which refers individual measures
back to the people for approval or rejection. An official may be
efficient and free from corruption, yet opposed to the general wish
on some particular matter. In this, then, he may be overruled by the
referendum without being humiliated or required to resign his office.
Thus not only the improper influence of the machine or the interests
may be guarded against by the public, but the unconscious prejudices
of generally efficient officials. Of course there is, in the case of
both recall and referendum, the possibility that the official may be
right and the people wrong. But that danger is inherent in democratic
government. The best that can be done is to make government responsive
to the sober judgment of the majority; if that is mistaken, nothing
but time and education can correct it. [Footnote: See W. B. Munro,
The Initiative, Referendum and Recall; The Government of American Cities,
p. 321. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 26, p. 415; vol. 28, p.
207. National Municipal Review, vol. 1, p. 586. Nation, vol. 95, p.
324.]
The air is full of suggestions, and experiments are being tried in
every direction. There is every hope that America may yet learn by
her failures and evolve a system of government that shall be her pride
rather than her shame. Our National Government has worked far better
than our state and local government, but even that can be further freed
from the pull of improper motives, made much more efficient and
responsive to the general will. We are in a peculiar degree on trial
to show what popular government can accomplish. The Old World looks
to us with distrust, but with hope. And though the solution of our
political problem involves many technical matters, it has deep underlying
moral bearings, and affects profoundly the success of every great moral
campaign.
R. C. Brooks, Corruption in American Politics and Life. L. Steffens,
The Shame of the Cities. J. Bryce, The Hindrances to Good Government.
W. E. Weyl, The New Democracy, chaps. VIII, IX. Jane Addams, Democracy
and Social Ethics, chap. VII. A. T. Hadley, Standards of Public
Morality, chaps. IV, V. T. Roosevelt, American Ideals. C. R. Henderson,
The Social Spirit in America, chap. XI. Edmond Kelly, Evolution and
Effort, chap. IX. W. H. Taft, Four Aspects of Civic Duty. E. Root,
The Citizen's Part in Government. D. F. Wilcox, Government by All the
People. L. S. Rowe, Problems of City Government. H. E. Deming, The
Government of American Cities. Publications of the National Municipal
League (703 North American Building, Philadelphia). Political Science
Quarterly, vol. 18, p. 188; vol. 19, p. 673;