JAPANESE POLICY AND ITS RESULTS
The lack of Allied cohesion produced by the defection of American policy
from that of the European Powers may change completely the status and
future of American enterprise in Siberia. America has transformed a
friendly population into at least a suspicious, if not a hostile, one.
Japan, on the other hand, has steadily pursued her special interests and
taken full advantage of every American mistake, until she is now looked
upon as the more important of the two.
The attitude of Japan to the Russian problem made a complete somersault
in the course of the year August, 1918, to August, 1919. When Japan sent
her 12th Division, under General Oie, to the Ussurie in 1918, she did so
with a definite policy. Her ambitions were entirely territorial in
character; they doubtless remain so. The line of her advance has,
however, completely changed. In 1918 she had made up her mind that
Germany was bound to win the war; that Russia was a conquered country;
that any day she might be called upon to repudiate her English alliance
and her Entente engagements, and assist Germany and her Bolshevik Allies
in driving the Entente Powers from the eastern end of the Tsar's
dominions. Provided Germany defeated the Allies on the Western front,
as she confidently anticipated, this task was well within her power. So
insignificant was the task assigned to her in this eventuality that she
confidently expected the immediate surrender of such scattered Allied
and American forces as would find themselves marooned in this back end
of the world. Believing this to be the position, she acted accordingly,
treating the Russians and the other Allied forces in the stupidly
arrogant manner I have already described. With the _naïveté_ of a young
Eastern prodigy she not only made demands upon her Allies, but at the
same time made definite proposals to such Russian authorities as
retained a precarious control over the territory she had already
assigned to herself. On landing her troops at Vladivostok she presented,
through her proper diplomatic agents, to the commander of that province
a set of proposals which would have placed her in control of the Russian
maritime provinces. The Russian commander asked that these demands
should be put in writing, and the Japanese agent, after some demur,
agreed, on the understanding that the first demands should not be
considered as final but only as an instalment of others to come. The
first proposal was that Japan should advance the commander 150,000,000
roubles (old value) and the commander should sign an agreement giving
Japan possession of the foreshore and fishing rights up to Kamchatka, a
perpetual lease of the Engilsky mines, and the whole of the iron (less
that belonging to the Allies) to be found in Vladivostok.
The Town Commander appears to have been quite honest about the
business, for in correspondence he pointed out that he was not the
Government of Russia, neither could he sign the property or rights of
Russia away in the manner suggested. The Japanese reply was simple and
to the point: "Take our money and sign the agreement, and we will take
the risks about the validity." The old Directorate, with Avkzentieff,
Bolderoff & Co. standing sponsors for the Russian Convention, were
supposed to control Russian affairs at this time. Directly the
commandant refused to agree to the Japanese demands they transferred
their claims to the old Directorate. The Directorate sent Evanoff Renoff
to "Vlady" to conduct the negotiations, and I suppose to collect the
money. When I was at "Vlady," in June, 1919, huge stores of iron were
being collected, and some of it had already been shipped to Japan.
Avkzentieff was exiled and Bolderoff was living in comfort and safety in
Japan. These were the things that were above and could be seen; what
happened to the other part of the first instalment of Japanese proposals
for "helping" Russia will doubtless be known later.
At the end of August, 1918, it was decided that until some sort of
central authority to act as the organ of Government was set up, it was
futile to hope for the return of orderly government. For this purpose
the British went forward to Omsk and asked the Japanese to do likewise.
The Japanese would not move, first because they wished to consolidate
their power in the provinces nearest Japan, and secondly secure as many
concessions as possible before America arrived on the scene. When
America did arrive she still tarried to watch American operations. The
British moved off into the unknown with a 5,000-mile line of unguarded
communications; the Japanese, true to type, opened negotiations with the
Directorate for the absolute possession of the railway to the Urals, and
also asked what concessions she could expect to receive, territorial and
mineral, as compensation for the use of her army for the Directorate's
protection. A convention had just been signed, or was on the point of
signature, between the Japanese and the Directorate, placing the entire
railway under Japanese hands, when the Directorate fell. The first act
of the Supreme Governor, Admiral Koltchak, was to inform the Japanese
that the change in the Government involved a change in policy with
regard to the advance of Japanese troops and the occupation of the
railway. The Japanese protested, but the admiral stood firm.
This attitude of the Supreme Governor was a serious setback to Japanese
policy, and they became alarmed for their position in the Far East
should his authority extend in that direction; but it is not difficult
as a rule to find tools for any kind of work in Russia. Ataman Semianoff
had for some time been kept by the Japanese in reserve for such an
occasion. His forces were ranged around Chita, and his influence and
authority extended from the Manchurian border to Lake Baikal. On
receiving intimation of the change in policy from Admiral Koltchak, the
Japanese ordered Semianoff to repudiate the Supreme Governor's
authority; they gave the same instructions to Kalmakoff, who occupied a
similar position on the Ussurie Railway and so placed an effective
barrier between themselves, their Eastern concessions, and the Supreme
Governor. The Supreme Governor ordered his Staff to clear these two
mutineers off the line, but the Japanese Staff informed the Supreme
Governor that these two Russian patriots and their forces were under the
protection of Japan, and if necessary they would move the Japanese Army
forward to their succour.
The successful resistance of Semenoff and Kalmakoff to the Omsk
Government, backed up by the armed forces of one of the Allies, had a
disastrous effect upon the situation throughout Siberia. If Semianoff
and Kalmakoff could, with Allied help and encouragement, openly deride
the Omsk Government's orders, then it was clear to the uninitiated that
the Allies were hostile to the supreme Russian authority. If Semianoff
and Kalmakoff can wage successful hired resistance to orderly government
at the bidding of a foreign Power, why cannot we do so, to retain the
land and property we have stolen and prevent the proper administration
of justice for the crimes we have committed? It was intended as a
deliberate attack upon authority and an incentive to the disorderly
elements to continue the prevailing anarchy. A united, well organised
Russia is not the kind of Russia Japan wishes to see established. If
Japan is to succeed in her territorial ambitions in the Far East, Russia
must be kept in a state of mental disorder and physical paralysis.
Germany used the Russian love of conspiracy and intrigue to create
disorder and destroy the Muscovite power; Japan intends, if possible,
to continue that disorder for her own political reasons.
Directly it became known that Semianoff and Kalmakoff had set the Omsk
Government at defiance, numerous other would-be Semenoffs came on the
scene until the very residence of the Supreme Governor and his
Headquarters Staff scarcely escaped attack, and it became necessary to
show the British Tommy on the side of order. This was the position up
till the early days of December, 1918.
Just about this time the fact that Germany was beaten began to take
shape in the Japanese military mind, and the fact was hammered home by
the terms of the Armistice. For some days the Japanese Mission at Omsk
flatly refused to believe the cables; their national pride refused to
admit that they had so far misunderstood the power of Britain and her
Allies. It was a terrible awakening to the self-styled "Lords of the
East" that all their schemes should be brought to nought, that British
and American squadrons might be expected to cruise in the Sea of Japan,
and perhaps hold the scales fair between her and her temporarily
helpless neighbour. I do not suppose it will ever come to that, but such
was her fear. From this time on, while the objects of Japan in Siberia
were still the same, she pursued them by quite different methods.
The first sign of change was that Japanese soldiers were allowed to
salute British officers and were no longer allowed to use the butts of
their rifles on inoffensive Russian citizens. Their military trains no
longer conveyed contraband goods to their compatriots who had
_acquired_ the Russian business houses in the main trading centres along
the railway. The Staff no longer commandeered the best buildings in the
towns for alleged military purposes and immediately sub-let them to
private traders. Japan at once re-robed herself with the thin veil of
Western morals and conduct which she had rapturously discarded in 1914.
While Hun methods were in the ascendancy she adopted the worst of them
as her own. She is in everything the imitator _par excellence_, and
therefore apparently could not help herself.
The British and French mildly protested against the attitude of Japan
towards Semianoff and Kalmakoff, but it was continued until the anarchy
created threatened to frustrate every Allied effort. Not until the Peace
Conference had disclosed the situation did a change in policy take
place. From this time on the conduct of Japan (both civil and military)
became absolutely correct. President Wilson brought forward his famous,
but impossible, proposal that the different Russian belligerents should
agree to an armistice and hold a conference on the Turkish "Isle of
Dogs." If patriotism is the maintenance of such rules of human conduct
and national life as will justify one man in killing another, then no
Russian patriot could meet in friendly conference those who had
destroyed and murdered their own country and people. Russia during the
previous two years had shown that there could be no compromise between
anarchy and order, or their several adherents. This was, however, the
policy of America, and as such received the blessing of every
representative, Jew or Gentile, of the U.S.A. in Siberia. Japan saw a
kink in the American armour and took full advantage of the chance to
damage U.S.A. prestige. She rallied Russian patriotism to her side by
advising that no notice be taken of this harebrained suggestion. Japan's
advice received the secret blessing of both French and English who knew
the situation, though in our case we had to admit that the British
Premier had stood sponsor for this international monstrosity. This gave
Japanese diplomacy its first clear hold upon Russian patriotism and
enabled her to appear as a true friend of orderly government.
American diplomacy in Russia had received its first great shock, but
with careful handling it was still possible to recover the lost ground.
With the utter failure of the "Isle of Dogs" policy, Russian rage
quickly subsided and a normal condition soon returned. The Allies had
received a salutary warning, and most of them took the hint, but America
continued on her debatable course. Having failed diplomatically to
effect a compromise, she tried to force her views by military means. The
neutral zone system of her commanders was the natural outcome of
President Wilson's proposal. The intention was excellent, that the
results would be disastrous was never in doubt. It forced the American
command to adopt a sort of local recognition of the Red Army within the
zone, and enabled the Japanese to appear as the sole friend of Russian
order. The Japanese were attacked by Red forces collected in these
zones, with American soldiers standing as idle spectators of some of the
most desperate affairs between Red and Allied troops. Japan was
entitled to reap the kudos such a situation brought to her side, while
America could not expect to escape the severest censure.
Profiting by the blunders of her great antagonist, Japan managed in six
months to recover all the ground she had lost while suffering under the
illusion of a great Hun victory that was to give her the Lordship of the
East. From a blustering bandit she has become a humble helper of her
poor, sick, Russian neighbour. In which role she is most dangerous time
will show. The world as a rule has little faith in sudden conversions.
This, then, was the situation in the Far East in June, 1919. As I was
leaving Vladivostok I heard that the Red forces that had been organised
in the American neutral zones had at last boldly attacked their
protectors. If this was correct, it may be the reason why Admiral
Koltchak was able to report their defeat and rout over the Chinese
border and we were back again at the point at which British and Czech
co-operation had arrived a year previously.