AMERICAN POLICY AND ITS RESULTS
At Nikolsk my train was stopped as the No. 4 Post train from Vladivostok
had been wrecked by Bolsheviks, a startling situation considering that
eleven months previously the whole power of Bolshevism had been
destroyed in these maritime provinces. The station commandant was an old
friend, who had given me his own private official carriage at the time
when our little yellow brother had decided to lower the prestige of his
white Ally in Eastern eyes by making British officers travel in
cattle-trucks. He came into my car and began to explain how the
cross-purposes of the American and Japanese forces were producing a
state of uncertainty and disorder as bad, if not worse, than existed
under the Bolshevik régime. Our conversation was cut short by the
receipt of a telegram from the station-master at Kraevesk. It was to the
effect that he was using his own line from his house, because a few
minutes previously a detachment of the Red Guard had entered the station
and, in the presence of the American soldiers who were guarding the
railway, had placed himself and his staff under arrest and taken
possession of the station; that the Reds had sent a message to Shmakovka
ordering all Russian railway officials and staff to leave their posts,
as the Bolshevik army, with the sanction of the American forces, was
about to take over the line. The Red Guard officer in proof of his order
stated "that fifteen American soldiers are now standing in the room from
which I am sending this message." Having issued these orders in the
presence of the Americans, they had removed the telegraph and telephone
apparatus, and the station-master wished to know what he was to do and
whether any help could be sent him. Imagine my utter astonishment at
this message, containing, as it undoubtedly did, evidence of
co-operation and understanding between the Bolshevik forces and one of
our Allies.
In one of my numerous interviews with Admiral Koltchak at Omsk he had
made some very serious statements regarding the American policy in the
Far East, which he feared would result in reproducing the previous state
of disorder. I assured him that the policy of the Allies was to resist
disorder and support order, and that I could not believe America had
come to Siberia to make his task more difficult, but to help him in
every reasonable way. He agreed that such was the intention of the
American people, but he feared that the American command was being used
for quite other purposes. His officers had informed him that out of
sixty liaison officers and translators with American Headquarters over
fifty were Russian Jews or the relatives of Russian Jews; some had been
exiled from Russia for political and other offences, and had returned as
American citizens, capable of influencing American policy in a direction
contrary to that desired by the American people. I assured him that
this could not be, and that his people might themselves in this matter
be under the influence of a near Eastern neighbour not friendly to
American interference in Eastern affairs, and that under this influence
they might greatly magnify the danger. My words seemed to ease the
admiral's mind, but he regretfully replied that the reports were so
voluminous and categorical in character that he thought I, as a
representative of the people of England, as well as an officer of His
Majesty's Army, ought to be made acquainted with the situation.
This matter had almost disappeared from my mind, but the message from
the station-master at Kraevesk revived it with the vividness of a sudden
blow. I at once determined to make myself acquainted as far as possible
with the policy of the American commanders, and with this object in view
I interviewed many American officers and soldiers. I found that both
officers and men were most anxious to render all the help possible to
maintain Koltchak's authority and crush disorder in the Far East, and,
as they put it, "justify their presence in Siberia." Many felt that at
the time they were only helping the Bolsheviks to recover their lost
hold upon the people by providing neutral territory for Bolshevik
propaganda; that when they arrived in the country in August, 1918, the
English, Czechs, and Japanese, with the aid of such Russian units as
then existed, had reduced the maritime provinces to order, but that
their own efforts had produced a state of affairs similar to, if not
worse than, those which existed during the actual Bolshevik occupation.
I learnt from these American troops that their officers and officials,
from General Graves downwards, had been in actual correspondence with
Red Guard officers, and that more than one understanding had been
arrived at between them; that for a time the ordinary American soldiers
thought the understanding between the two forces was so general and
friendly in character that no further hostile acts were to be
contemplated between them. It was true that this wrecking of trains and
attacks on the line guarded by American soldiers made things look
serious, but they felt sure that the confidence existing between the
American and Red Guard Headquarters was so well established that these
acts of brigandage could only be due to some misunderstanding. The
Kraevesk affair appeared to be only a symptom of a much wider policy,
and not the foolish act of a negligent subordinate officer.
Following up my inquiries there fell into my hands a letter, dated May
24, from the American officer (Captain ----) commanding the American
forces at Svagena, addressed to the officer commanding the Red Guard
operating in that district. The American officer addressed the Red Guard
commandant as a recognised officer of equal military standing. The
American officer complained that after a recent fraternisation of the
two forces which had taken place in accordance with previous
arrangements near the "wood mill," on the departure of the Red troops he
received reports that the Red Guard officer had ordered the destruction
of certain machinery at the mill, and had also torn up two sections of
the line at points east and west of the station at Svagena. The American
captain enumerated other accusations against the Red Guard, such as
threats to bayonet certain orderly disposed people who would not join
the Bolshevik army, and warned the Red Commissar that these acts were
contrary to the _agreement_ entered into by the chiefs of the American
and Red forces, and if such acts were repeated he would take steps to
punish those who committed such breaches of _their joint understanding_.
I think this letter from the American officer at Svagena is positive
proof of some local or general understanding between the American
authorities and the Red army operating in the maritime provinces, and
further, that this understanding had existed for many months; that it
was this understanding which prevented the American forces joining in
the combined Allied expedition to relieve the besieged Russian garrison
in the Suchan district; that under this American-Bolshevik agreement the
small scattered Red Guard bands who were dispersed by the Allies at the
battle of Dukoveskoie in August, have collected together and formed
definite military units. In other words, that the American policy,
unconsciously or otherwise, has produced a state of indecision amongst
the Allies, and unrest and anarchy amongst the population of the
Transbaikal and Ussurie Provinces, which may prove disastrous to the
rapid establishment of order in Russia.
There are other indications that the presence of the American forces in
Siberia has been used by somebody for purposes not purely American. The
business of the American command is to secure order in those districts
which have been placed under its control by the Council of Allied
Commanders. There is another self-evident and obvious duty, namely, to
shape their conduct in such manner as to create friendly relations with
such elements of Russian authority and order as are gradually appearing
here and there, under the influence of the Supreme Governor, and also
provide as little space and opportunity as possible for the collection
and reorganisation of the elements of disorder. The policy of the
American command, quite unintentionally perhaps, has been quite the
reverse. Their policy has resulted in turning every Russian authority
against them, or, where this has not happened, they have themselves
turned against Russian authority. They have prepared plans and created
opportunities for the reorganisation of the forces of disorder which, if
it does not actually create a serious situation for themselves, will do
so for those Allies who are trying to bring order out of chaos. The
reduction of the whole country to order, to enable it to decide its own
future form of Government, is as much an American as a British object.
That some sinister underground influence has deflected American policy
from this straight and honest course is quite obvious.
Contrary to general Allied opinion, the American command declared a
neutral zone in the Suchan district. Armed operations by Russian, i.e.
Admiral Koltchak's or Red Guard forces, were prohibited within this
zone. Lenin and Trotsky's officers jumped at this order and at once
began to collect their scattered forces together. Within three weeks
they raised their Bolshevik flag on their own headquarters, under the
protection of the flag of the United States. From this neutral American
zone the Bolsheviks organised their forces for attacking the Japanese on
the Amur, for destroying British and other supply trains on the Ussurie
Railway, and finally exchanged shots with the Russian sentries near
Vladivostok itself, always bolting back to the American zone when
attacked by the forces of the Supreme Governor.
The other Allies and the Russians having got the measure of this neutral
zone business, naturally took steps to protect their men and property,
and for a time the operations of this very energetic Lenin officer were
confined to robbing and destroying a few isolated villages in the
maritime provinces; but the utter absurdity of American policy was at
last brought home to the Americans themselves. The Red Guard commandant,
chafing under the restrictions imposed upon him by the Russian and
Japanese forces (in which the British also joined when Captain Edwards
could get near with his good ship _Kent_), decided to attack the
unsuspecting Americans themselves. The Red Guard were very clever in
their operations. The American troops were guarding the
Vladivostok-Suchan Railway; the neutral zone was situated at the extreme
end of the line. If the Red Guard had attacked the end near the zone
their tactics would have been discovered at once. They therefore usually
marched out from the American zone, made a detour through villages and
forest, and struck the railway at a point as far distant as possible.
Destroying a bit of line--perhaps, if they had good luck, burning a
bridge--they usually exchanged a few shots with the American troops, and
if pressed, marched back to the zone under the protection of a section
of the very forces they had been raiding. The American command naturally
became more vigilant on the distant sections of the line, and this
forced the Bolsheviks to operate nearer and nearer the protected zone;
but in the meantime they managed to kill several Russian soldiers, wound
a few Americans, and destroy five different sections of the railway.
Then they operated too near the zone, and the American troops pressed
them straight into their own zone, where, to add insult to injury, they
claimed that in accordance with the American proclamation they could not
be molested as military operations were prohibited within the zone!
Instead of proceeding to root out this nest of pirates, someone
suggested that a more comprehensive and binding arrangement was
necessary between the American and Red Guard forces, to prevent such
regrettable occurrences in future. It was common talk that a conference
between the Red Guard commander and General Graves, the American G.O.C.,
was actually arranged, but was dropped when the Supreme Governor's
representative in the Far East declared to General Graves personally
that his proposed conference with the enemies of the Russian Government
would be considered as a hostile act. The breaking off of these
negotiations caused great annoyance to the Soviet Government at Moscow,
and they ordered their commissars in Ussurie to use the forces which had
been organised under American protection to attack their protectors,
which they at once proceeded to do. This doubtless altered the
relationship of these two parties, though the chances are that the
powerful influence which forced the American commanders into this
ill-fated policy will be powerful enough to prevent an open American
declaration against the Reds in the Far East.
It is well at this stage to estimate the effect this American muddle has
had, and will continue to exert, upon the effort of the Allies to secure
some sort of order in the Russian Empire, and upon the position of the
Americans themselves in their future relations with the Russian people.
The American troops were spread over the whole province from Vladivostok
to Nevsniudinsk, a point just east of the Sea of Baikal. They were
almost entirely confined to the railway, but in this country the railway
is the centre and heart of all things. American policy at Vladivostok
applied to the whole of this area, which is really the Transbaikal
provinces, or all Siberia east of Baikal. In the early days of
September, 1918, when I passed with my battalion towards Omsk, this
immense area had been reduced to order by the efforts of the Allies, at
the head of which I place the gallant Czechs. The American forces
arrived too late to take part in the military operations, but began to
settle down to the work of administration with energy and ability. The
French moved forward after myself, and the Italian unit followed later,
leaving the American and Japanese, with such isolated local Russian
forces as had called themselves into being, in absolute possession of
Transbaikal Siberia. There was not a single band of Red Guards one
thousand strong in the whole territory. After nine months of Allied
occupation the Reds organised, largely under American protection, two
divisions (so called) of from 5,000 to 7,000 men, and numerous
subsidiary units of a few hundred, who murdered and robbed in every
direction, and destroyed every semblance of order which the Supreme
Governor and the Allies had with so much labour attempted to set up.
Thus this huge province in a short time descended from comparative order
to sporadic disorder, simply because America had no Russian policy of
her own, and rejected that of her friends.
It was a major mistake of England and France to leave America and Japan
cheek by jowl without a moderating influence, to wreck the good work
they had accomplished in the Far East. The rivalries of these two Powers
in this part of the world were well known and should have been provided
for. It was too much to expect that they would forget their concession
and trade rivalries in a disinterested effort to help Russia. States are
not usually philanthropic organisations, these two least of all. The
work has therefore to be largely done over again, either by us or by the
Supreme Governor, Admiral Koltchak. Or the Allies, finding the task too
great, may retire and allow this huge province, probably the wealthiest
part of the world, to recede back to the barbarism of the Bolshevik.