INTER-ALLIED CO-OPERATION
An axiom for propaganda--Results of a successful conference--Policy,
Means and Methods.
Experience gained at Crewe House proved that it is as necessary for
Allies to co-ordinate propaganda against a common enemy as to unify
military command. To conduct propaganda without a policy is bad enough;
but to shut up sets of propagandists working independently of each
other in a number of water-tight compartments, each set representative
of a different nationality, is to court ridicule instead of attracting
serious attention from an intelligent enemy, and to result in the
production of contradictory thoughts and confusion in the minds of
unintelligent adversaries.
An axiom for propaganda of allies in future wars is that a clear
common policy must be defined, based upon such a foundation of fact
and justice that it need not be altered in its essential principles,
but can be, _and must be_, rigidly adhered to. It will doubtless be
necessary to lay down such a policy for each nation of an opposing
alliance, in the event of the enemy not being a single nation.
Clearly, too, it should be recognised that propaganda policy, or
policies, must accord with the policy of the diplomatic, military, and
naval authorities. Possessing no administrative function, propaganda
is dependent upon them to make policy operative. Here, again, lack of
co-ordination would involve the risk of confusion, contradiction, and
consequent inefficiency. Propaganda may well and rightly be in advance
of these other departments as a forerunner (with what success other
chapters of this book record) or it may follow, but it must be in
agreement with them.
Lord Northcliffe had always conceived it to be a fundamental
principle of propaganda against enemy countries that when a line
of policy had been laid by him before the British Government and
sanctioned as a basis for propaganda, the Allied Governments should
be asked for their assent to it, so that their propaganda departments
might act in conformity. In practice it was found that most rapid
co-ordination could be attained by representatives of the Allied
propaganda departments meeting together. One of Lord Northcliffe’s
earliest acts was to convene an inter-Allied gathering at Crewe House
which was attended by Lord Beaverbrook (Minister of Information), M.
Franklin-Bouillon (France), and Signor Gallenga-Stuart (Italy), as well
as by a number of other British, French, Italian, and United States
representatives.
To some extent this gathering paved the way for the close Allied
co-operation in Italy. Lord Northcliffe would have desired the
immediate establishment of an inter-Allied body for propaganda in
enemy countries, but difficulties were encountered which postponed
the formation of such a body until a later date. Meanwhile, as close
touch as possible was kept with the French and Italian departments
concerned. But the course of events in the summer made it obvious to
Lord Northcliffe and his advisers that an inter-Allied conference on
Enemy Propaganda was indispensable to success. With the assent of the
British War Cabinet, therefore, he issued invitations to the French,
Italian, and United States Governments to send delegates to an official
conference in London. These invitations were cordially accepted and the
Conference assembled at Crewe House on August 14, 1918.
In addition to representatives of Lord Northcliffe’s department,
and of the Allied propaganda departments, there were also present
representatives of the British Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty,
Air Ministry, and Ministry of Information.
The full list of delegates was:
Great Britain:
Viscount Northcliffe (Chairman). } Department
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir } of Propaganda
Campbell Stuart. } in Enemy
Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart, M.P. } Countries.
Mr. Wickham Steed. }
Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald }
Hall (Director of Naval }
Intelligence). } Admiralty.
Captain Guy Gaunt. }
Commander G. Standing. }
Brigadier-General G. K. }
Cockerill (Deputy-Director }
of Military Intelligence). } War Office.
Major The Earl of Kerry, M.P. }
Captain P. Chalmers Mitchell. }
Colonel E. H. Davidson. Air Ministry.
Mr. C. J. Phillips. Foreign Office.
Sir Roderick Jones (representing }
the Minister of Information). } Ministry of
} Information.
Mr. Cunliffe-Owen (Controller }
of Propaganda against Turkey). }
France:
M. Klobukowski.
M. Haguenin.
M. Sabatier D’Espeyran.
Major-General le Vicomte de la Panouse.
M. le Capitaine Prince Pierre d’Arenberg.
Lieutenant le Comte Stanislas de Montebello.
M. Comert.
Lieutenant P. Mantoux.
Italy:
Professor Borgese.
Signor G. Emanuel.
Captain Count Vicino-Pallavicino.
Lieutenant R. Cajrati-Crivello.
United States of America:
Mr. James Keeley.
Captain Walter Lippmann. }
Captain Heber Blankenhorn. } Present as
Lieutenant Charles Merz. } observers.
Lieutenant Ludlow Griscom. }
In the speech with which, as Chairman, Lord Northcliffe opened the
Conference, he pointed out that the organisation of British Propaganda
in Enemy Countries had reached a stage at which greater co-ordination
of Allied purpose and effort was required if its objects were to be
achieved in full measure. Propaganda in enemy countries presupposed:
_a._ The definition, for propaganda purposes at least, of Allied
policy in regard to our enemies;
_b._ The public manifestation of this policy; and
_c._ The study of technical means of bringing its main features to
the knowledge of the enemy.
He suggested that the Conference should resolve itself into a number of
Committees to examine and to report upon these and other matters. Such
Committees would be concerned with:
1. The great subject of the policy of propaganda;
2. The difficult question of means of distribution:
(_a_) Military.
(_b_) Civil.
3. Propaganda material;
4. Educative work among prisoners of war who might return to Germany
to tell their compatriots the real facts.
Unless based on a definite policy, propaganda could only be
fragmentary and superficial. On the basis of a clear policy it might
become destructive of enemy _moral_, a valuable adjunct to military
operations, and constructive of the necessary conditions of a lasting
peace.
The three enemy countries with which his Department was mainly
concerned were Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Germany. He cited
Austria-Hungary first, because, of all our enemies, the Hapsburg
Monarchy was the field where positive results were most readily
attainable.
In the early months of 1918, when he began that work, Germany was
too flushed with her facile triumphs in Russia to be susceptible to
propaganda, and the attitude of Bulgaria was too closely bound up with
German fortunes to be at that moment easily affected by propaganda.
Allied policy in regard to Bulgaria was, moreover, closely connected
with the general Balkan policy of the Allies, the formulation of which
necessarily depended, in its turn, upon the adoption of a definite
policy towards Austria-Hungary. All these considerations pointed to
Austria-Hungary as the foremost object of attack, and therefore as the
country in regard to which a clear propaganda policy was most urgently
required.
Lord Northcliffe then outlined the steps taken in regard to
Austria-Hungary, described fully in Chapter III. He went on to state
that there was abundant evidence that the work thus begun had helped
to prevent an Austrian offensive in April, and to check it when it
was finally launched in June. There was also strong reason to believe
that, had action on these lines been taken earlier, far greater results
might have been obtained. This was an aspect of the vital connection
between propaganda policy and military operations to which he earnestly
directed attention. He trusted that the Policy Committee of the
Conference might be able to make valuable recommendations in this
respect.
One important aspect of propaganda against Austria-Hungary and, indeed,
against all our enemies, was the dissemination of knowledge of the
greatness of the war effort of the American people. With that effort
he had had personal acquaintance; and on that very day he had received
a secret report that the Germans had little idea of the supreme effort
which the Americans were making. To this aspect he attributed great and
growing significance.
In regard to Bulgaria, he had also ventured to lay before the British
Government an outline of propaganda policy, which had received general
approval. Its main features were the necessity of a definite Allied
decision in regard to the Jugo-Slav and Rumanian questions, before any
direct attempt could be made to influence Bulgaria by propaganda. A
definite Jugo-Slav and Rumanian policy presupposed, however, a definite
Allied policy in regard to Austria-Hungary. Upon the details of this
important subject the Policy Committee would be fully informed. Broadly
speaking, he considered it at once inexpedient and dangerous to enter
into any direct or indirect negotiations with Bulgaria or to make to
her proposals even as propaganda until a complete change of attitude
had actually taken place in Bulgaria itself. Until then, propaganda
could consist only in conveying information to the Bulgarian troops
and people as to the fate that inevitably awaited them unless they
reversed completely their attitude; and in preparing by agreement
among the Allied Governments an outline of Balkan policy, aiming at
a solution of the various Balkan questions as nearly as possible on
ethnographical lines. In this way, Allied propaganda might eventually
help to prepare the way for a League of Balkan States.
Though for many reasons it had not thereto been possible to develop
British propaganda in Germany as fully or as efficiently as it had been
developed in Austria-Hungary, Lord Northcliffe said his department had,
in co-operation with the military authorities, and by the utilisation
of secret channels, been able to introduce into Germany a certain
amount of propaganda literature. The decision of the British military
authorities not to allow the use of aeroplanes on the British Front
in France for the distribution of propaganda had naturally retarded
and hampered the necessary extension of his work. He trusted that this
question of the use of aeroplanes for propaganda purposes would be most
carefully considered by the committee on military distribution. In
the meantime, balloons had been employed, though they were manifestly
far inferior to aeroplanes as instruments of distribution. The view
seemed to prevail that propaganda was not worth casualties. Were this
view well-founded it would be hard to understand why the Germans
should have taken such drastic measures against British airmen accused
of dropping propaganda leaflets. The Germans, who ought to be good
judges, evidently feared our leaflets more than they feared our bombs.
But the main issue was the determination of an Allied propaganda
policy in regard to Germany--a matter of no little difficulty. As he
had said in relation to Austria-Hungary, one of the chief features
of Allied propaganda--apart from questions of policy--would be the
constant dissemination of knowledge of the immensity and of the growing
efficiency of American effort. This feature he had endeavoured to
develop, and he intended to develop it increasingly. On the subject of
policy, however, he had submitted to the British Government an outline
comprising the following points, which it was necessary to bring home
to the Germans.
1. The determination of the Allies to continue the war until Germany
accepted the Allied peace terms.
2. The existing alliance as a fighting league of free nations would
be deepened and extended and the military, naval, financial, and
economic resources of its members would be pooled until its military
purpose was achieved and peace could be established on lasting
foundations. He had suggested further that, as German minds were
peculiarly susceptible to systematic statement, the Allies should
prepare a comprehensive scheme of world organisation as a counterpart
to the German schemes represented by the phrases “Berlin-Baghdad” and
“Mittel-Europa.” As a preliminary to the drafting of such a scheme,
he had urged that the lines of a practical League of Free Nations
should be studied and laid down.
Pending the formulation of this scheme, he thought that Allied
propaganda should insist upon Allied control of raw materials, of
shipping, and on the Allies’ power to ostracise for an indefinite
period enemy peoples, until the terms of the Allied peace settlement
were fully accepted. At the same time it should be pointed out that
nothing stood between enemy people and a lasting peace except the
designs of their ruling dynasties and of their military and economic
castes. The primary war aim of the Allies was the changing of Germany,
not only in their own interest, but also in that of the German
people itself, since, without the honest co-operation of a reformed
Germany, disarmament on a large scale might be impossible, and without
disarmament social and economic reconstruction would be impracticable.
He trusted that this question of Allied propaganda policy in regard to
Germany would be carefully weighed by the Policy Committee.
There remained the extremely important question of the co-ordination of
Allied propaganda effort. It was obvious, he said, that if each Ally
carried on its propaganda in enemy countries without reference to what
the other Allies were doing, there must result great dispersion of
effort, overlapping, and, possibly, some conflict of statement if not
of aims. In order to secure the greatest possible military efficiency,
the Allied Governments had established the Versailles Council, and
had agreed to the appointment of an Allied Commander-in-Chief. Up
till then the only Inter-Allied propaganda institution set up was
the Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission at Padua. The working of this
Commission had revealed the great advantages of concerted effort,
but it had also revealed certain defects which only fuller Allied
co-ordination in matters of propaganda seemed likely to overcome. He
would therefore submit a proposal, definite in aim, though variable
in detail, that there be created a central body for the conduct of
propaganda in enemy countries. By such a step it seemed to him many
delays might be avoided, great economy of energy and expense might
be secured, and progress be made towards the unification of Allied
propaganda policy and of the means for carrying it into effect.
In conclusion, he asked pardon for reverting once more to the great
importance of a true conception of propaganda in enemy countries, not
only as a means of winning the war, but also and especially as a means
of winning the peace. It was a work that demanded all the intelligence
of the best minds in Allied countries, and the sustained support of
responsible Allied statesmen.
M. Klobukowski, the head of the French delegation, who followed Lord
Northcliffe with an eloquent speech in French, which Lieutenant Mantoux
interpreted, concurred in all that Lord Northcliffe had said. The
French Government, he said, answered willingly to the invitation sent
to them by the British Government to send their representatives to the
Inter-Allied Conference on Propaganda in Enemy Countries. It seemed to
them necessary to call it to intensify by methodical co-operation and
concerted direction the powerful means of action at the disposal of
the Allies. To see exactly what could be done; to know exactly where
they meant to go--that was the principal aim which must inspire their
propaganda.
The campaign of systematic untruth which was being waged by the enemy
need not for one moment divert the Allies from their line. Honesty had
never seemed to the Allies to be an inferior policy. In the second
place, French propaganda had taken care to put in a strong light the
responsibility for the war. The war, on the part of our enemies, was
a war of aggression and the service of a policy of conquest and the
enslavement of nationalities. On the Allied side it was a purely
defensive war, for the defence not only of territories, but also of the
great cause of Right violated in Belgium, as in Alsace-Lorraine, in
Poland, in the Ukraine, in Serbia, in Rumania, and in all the Balkan
countries. “We try,” said M. Klobukowski, “to reach in enemy countries
consciences which have hitherto shut out free examination and which
cannot yet control themselves. We try to open eyes and ears now shut by
the most extraordinary education of discipline which has at any time
dominated men. And this with the help not only of arguments taken from
facts which might be considered as arbitrary in practice and intention,
but also with the help of what is admitted by our enemies themselves
in declarations (the sincerity of which is incontestable for they come
from their own agents) from those who dared write what they know, like
Prince Lichnowsky and Dr. Muehlon.”
Co-operation in the work of liberating the oppressed nationalities
(continued M. Klobukowski) defined clearly one of the ends of our
action against Austria-Hungary; but although we cannot speak of
immediate results, Allied propaganda was not least indispensable
in Germany. If Austria was guilty towards her peoples, Germany was
guilty towards the whole of mankind. Since the war began, the French
Government had been constantly preoccupied with the propaganda to be
effected in Germany. Faced with the monstrous distortion of facts which
the Imperial Government tried to force upon the world, the first French
Yellow Book, in December, 1914, gave the full list of responsibilities
for the war, and showed, by going back to its origin, that Germany
prepared and finally launched the war.
One of the essential objects of Allied propagandists, therefore, must
be to come back frequently to the origin of the war, in the hope that
such effort will not be in vain. The experience of the publication of
the Lichnowsky memorandum was very encouraging from that point of view,
but that was not enough, as the majority of the German nation had still
confidence in the official versions of the causes of the world conflict
such as had been given to them by the Imperial Government. The Germans
must not be allowed to lower the Allies’ defensive war to the level of
a war of conquest. The Allies must never be tired of insisting that
they were victims of a deliberate aggression.
On the other hand, it was their interest to insist more and more upon
the character of the struggle in which they were engaged. They were
upon the defensive; they were defending themselves, they were defending
right and humanity; that was their war aim, and all other war aims
were only consequences of it. Deeply imbued as the German nation might
be with doctrines of historical realism, hostile as their Government
might be to the notion of a policy founded upon the respect of right,
the day nevertheless must come when their ideas would triumph over
their resistance, when gradually on one hand the revelations (daily
becoming more definite) would show the criminal complicities which were
the cause of the war. On the other hand the gradual failure of that
bid for domination would oblige the Germans themselves to look for the
culprits. The anxiety about the injustice of their own cause would
finally penetrate into the German nation.
It was also important clearly to show how useless was the effort made
by the enemy to sever the link between the Powers of the Entente.
The enemy Press was never tired of giving its readers the imaginary
spectacle of divisions between their enemies. After their tales about
France being conquered by the British Army, they proceeded to announce
that the Americans were going to get hold of France.
Every peace offensive undertaken by the German Government in the hour
of military difficulty gave evidence of the naïve confidence which the
best-informed among them employed in such an attempt to divide us. To
show that the Allied front was indissolubly united, to show that the
Alliance extends still further than the war, that it will extend from
the military to the economic field--that would be the efficient answer
of the Allies.
It must be said above all that the Allies would conquer and that they
had the means to conquer. They must not let themselves be led towards
discussions. There was always a danger of seeing the enemy get hold
of Allied formulæ, after having emptied them of what they contained.
The German mind, so complex and treacherous, had great ability in the
art of turning to its own account the principles laid down by others.
Germany might attempt once more to mislead the peoples by writing
on her own flag their mottoes while they reserved to themselves the
possibility of giving to those mottoes later on an interpretation
diametrically opposed to the real one.
Nothing was more important than to defend Allied public opinions
against such enterprises, which would certainly be undertaken by
Germany. The liberation of the peoples, affirmation of the justice of
the Allied cause, demonstration of the violation of right perpetrated
by the Central Empires--such must be the basis of Allied propaganda.
That was in full harmony with the general policy of principles and
tended to assure to all the peoples the right freely to develop, as
the constitutions of the Allied States had given the same right to
every individual. So Allied victory would have that character of moral
elevation which was the character of the great Allied nations during
their history. But until they reached that victory of liberty and
right, according to the strong words of M. Clemenceau, “let us make
war!”
Signor Borgese, the representative of Italy, said that he agreed
generally with all the ideas and proposals that had been made by Lord
Northcliffe.
The Italians had of late been particularly active on the field of
anti-enemy propaganda. For example, they had one office in Rome whose
chief duty it was to spread news arriving from the enemy in order
that his position in the world, and his internal resistance, might
be weakened. They had also in Switzerland a large organisation, the
principal aim of which was to secure daily knowledge of what was going
on in enemy countries, and to utilise to the full every possible means
of securing information about their internal condition.
The first act of Allied joint propaganda against the enemy was the
Rome Congress in April, which was due largely to the concord and the
friendship of the most enlightened and intelligent elements of public
opinion in England and in Italy. As a result of that Congress, great
consequences had followed in Austria-Hungary, and generally in the
world of the enemy; and the principal task was to pursue the way that
had thus been opened by the Rome Congress. The peculiar position
of Italy as the enemy of Austria naturally entered largely into
the motives that inspired Italian action. The declarations of Lord
Northcliffe--whose influence upon the question of enemy propaganda
was immense--and the declaration of M. Klobukowski were entirely
anti-Austrian in tendency.
As regards the Italians, they had been enemies of Austria not only
because Austria was their enemy, but also because they felt that it was
the most direct and sure way of being the enemies of Germany and of
Germanism. Those Italians who had understood the true position since
the beginning of the war had always been enemies of Austria in this
sense, and had sought the best means of attacking and annihilating
German militarism through Austria. Although German militarism was not
completely invulnerable, and although the vulnerability of Germany
was not so certain as that of Austria, Austria was the Achilles’ heel
of Germany. Two important conditions that had rendered possible such
action against Austria, were that the necessity of disintegrating
Austria had become generally realised throughout the world, and that
Austria’s responsibility for the war had been generally acknowledged
not only by the Allies, but also by the enemy. Lichnowsky and Muehlon
had acknowledged that the chief and immediate responsibility for the
war rested with Austria. The question of guilt was certainly one of
the chief questions with which propaganda had to deal; and it would
be examined by the committees, because he believed that it might be
possible to accelerate movements of opinion in Germany and in Austria
if a confession of guilt as to the origin of the war were made widely
known.
As to what had been done by Italian propaganda during the last few
months, he had mentioned the offices at Rome and at Berne, to which he
would refer in more detail in the committees. As to the work of the
Padua Inter-Allied Commission, it was assuredly a very great work,
if one were to judge of its activity not only by personal convictions
but by the convictions of the foe, who had publicly acknowledged
that the defeat on the Piave was partly caused by the efforts of the
Padua Commission, and by information that had been brought to them
by the Jugo-Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks. Allied propaganda must be a
propaganda of truth. The chief difficulty lay in making a distinction
between copying the enemy’s system of actual military operations
and imitating his methods in the war of ideas. It was true that the
military technique of war must be dependent upon that of the adversary,
unless we were to be at a disadvantage; but there was a danger that we
might imitate methods adopted by the enemy in the war of ideas--that
is to say, that we might copy German methods of propaganda. Although
there were people who thought that the Allies should copy lies and
hypocritical statements of German propaganda, he was convinced that
their real arm in the propaganda war was the truth. The Allies could
tell the truth because they were persuaded that they were right. It
was easy for them to have a system of ideas, because they believed
in them as in a kind of religion. Germany and Austria-Hungary would
listen intently to the words that we should say--not necessarily in
that Conference, but to the words of our Governments. Political action
and propaganda would have very great importance at the end of this
campaign, and therefore he hoped that Italians would be able to make
their contribution to the shortening and to the victorious decision of
the war.
One circumstance that gave them absolute certainty of victory, and was
a certificate of the moral purity of the Allied cause, was the action
of the United States, whom no one--not even the enemy--could accuse
of any selfish motive or interest. While it was conceivable that the
European Allies might be charged, however unjustly, with having some
thought of their direct interests, the United States could not by any
stretch of imagination be regarded as having intervened for any issue
save that of high principle. Therefore, he agreed entirely with Lord
Northcliffe and M. Klobukowski that the more the significance of the
American effort, both in its material and its moral aspects, were
brought to the knowledge of enemy peoples, the more rapid would be the
decline of their _moral_, and the surer the attainment of the just
peace which was the great common aim of the Allies and the purpose of
their action, both military and propagandist.
Mr. James Keeley, the representative of the United States, said that he
received his appointment through the Committee on Public Information
of the United States Government. Four U.S. military officers were
present, from the Military Intelligence Branch of the General Staff, as
observers. They all met the Conference as pupils, having a most earnest
desire to learn so that they might do their part as whole-heartedly in
this as in all other phases of Allied effort.
Learning from those who have had experience, they would be enabled to
devote whatever resources they had to the common purpose. They would
report to the American Government what men of experience in this work
had to recommend, and on the basis of that report it was hoped that an
American organisation could be created as quickly as possible, which
should work in the fullest, frankest, and most effective co-operation
with the corresponding organisations of the Allied nations. It would
not be amiss, perhaps, to suggest that, in addition to material
equipment, the United States could contribute one element that might
possibly be of peculiar importance in this work. Its population
contained a large representation of all the peoples of Central Europe.
These peoples were well organised in the United States, and, with a
few exceptions perfectly well-known, were loyal to the Allied cause.
Those peoples, of course, had intimate connections with the peoples of
Central Europe, and it was more than possible that they might be, in
various ways, of great use in carrying messages across the frontiers.
On this point, particularly, they would be glad of the advice of the
Conference.
After these speeches the four Committees referred to by Lord
Northcliffe were appointed to deliberate on policy, distribution,
material, and prisoners of war. The members of the Conference were
suitably distributed among the different committees, which accomplished
most invaluable work in a business-like manner, and presented their
reports to the full Conference for consideration at its sitting on the
third day.
The Policy Committee, presided over by M. Klobukowski, considered
exhaustively the problems of propaganda policy in all its fields
and phases of action. Its discussion crystallised into a series
of resolutions and recommendations for sanction, modification
or rejection by the Allied Governments. It was, of course, fully
understood that such resolutions could be only _ad referendum_ and not
binding on the respective Governments.
In regard to propaganda against Austria-Hungary, the Committee found
itself in complete agreement with the scheme of policy sanctioned
by the British Government for purposes of propaganda, and amplified
by the decisions of the British, French and Italian Governments at
the time of, or in connection with, the Rome Congress of Oppressed
Austro-Hungarian Nationalities. It recognised that such extensions of
policy, while springing from considerations of Allied principles, had,
in part, corresponded to the real demands of the propaganda situation,
which, in their turn, had sprung from the exigencies of the military
situation and, in particular, from the necessity of utilising the
established principles of the alliance for the purpose of impeding or
hampering the Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy. Subsequent
acts and declarations on the part of Allied Governments and of the
Government of the United States made it clear that the joint policy of
the Allies was tending increasingly towards the constructive liberation
of the subject Austro-Hungarian races. The main task of the Committee
in relation to propaganda in Austria-Hungary seemed, therefore, to
be one of unifying for propaganda purposes these various acts and
declarations, and of preparing, if possible, the way for a joint Allied
declaration that might complete and render more effective the work of
Allied propaganda both in the interior of Austria-Hungary and among
Austro-Hungarian troops at the Front.
The discussion upon the expediency and the possibility of such a joint
Allied declaration was exhaustive and illuminating. In view of the
position already taken up by the Allied Governments and by the United
States in regard to the Czecho-Slovaks, the Poles, and the Rumanians,
it appeared that the main issue awaiting definition concerned the
question of Jugo-Slav unity and independence, and of the attitude of
Italy towards them. The Committee adopted the following recommendation:
“With reference to the best means of aiding Allied Propaganda in
favour of the freedom of the Austro-Hungarian subject races, the
Committee expresses a strong hope that all controversial discussions
of the frontiers between Italy and the future Jugo-Slav State will be
avoided by the Jugo-Slav Press and the Jugo-Slav leaders both outside
and, as far as the Jugo-Slav leaders may be able to exert their
influence, also inside the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, just as they
have been avoided of late by the most important organs of the Italian
Press and in the public speeches of influential Italian leaders.”
During the debate upon this recommendation it became clearly apparent
that the Committee regarded, and was confident that the Conference
would regard, the Italian national claims to the union with Italy
of the cities and regions of Trent, Trieste, and the other regions
of Italian character as not only entirely justified, but also as
an elementary dictate of the Allies’ respect for the principles of
nationality and of ethnical justice. Precisely because the Committee
supported the principles formulated in the Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement of
last March and saw in them the basis of fruitful co-ordination between
Italy, Jugo-Slavia, and the other nationalities then oppressed of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, it held the Italian national rights above
mentioned to be imprescriptible and not open to discussion.
The Committee also felt that both for reason of propaganda and from
the point of view of the future independence and moral and political
security of the Italian nation a foremost part in the work of creating
a free and united Jugo-Slav State naturally fell to Italy. Therefore,
after the most careful consideration, it unanimously adopted--and
recommended to the Conference--the following resolution:
“Considering the adhesion of the Italian Government, by the Prime
Minister’s speech of April, 1918, to the resolutions of the Rome
Congress of Austro-Hungarian subject races (which embodied the
agreement between the Jugo-Slavs and the Italian Committee) and by
his recent telegram to the Prime Minister of Serbia, M. Pashitch;
“Considering the exemplifications of Allied Policy towards
Austria-Hungary in the French and Italian Convention with the
Czecho-Slovak National Council, the British declaration recognising
the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied Nation, the Allied declaration at the
Versailles Conference of June 3rd, 1918 in favour of the unity and
independence of Poland and Mr. Lansing’s statement of the 28th June,
that all branches of the Slav races should be completely freed from
German and Austrian rule;
“Considering further the extreme expediency, especially in view
of possible military developments on the Italian front, that the
Allied policy of liberating the oppressed Hapsburg peoples should
be represented, in the first place, by Italy, on whose front Allied
propaganda against Austria-Hungary is principally located;
“The Policy Committee of the Inter-Allied Propaganda Conference
resolves to suggest that the Italian Government take the initiative
in promoting a joint and unanimous public declaration that all the
Allies regard the establishment of a free and united Jugo-Slav State,
embracing Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as one of the conditions of a
just and lasting peace, and of the rule of right in Europe.”
Passing to the consideration of propaganda against Bulgaria, the
Committee recognised the essential connection between Allied propaganda
policy towards Austria-Hungary and Allied propaganda policy in the
Balkans. Without the adoption by the Allied Governments of a definite
policy in regard to Jugo-Slav and Rumanian unity and independence, it
was impossible to formulate any effective propaganda policy in regard
to Bulgaria. Upon the merits of propaganda in Bulgaria, the Committee
unanimously adhered to the principles laid down in Lord Northcliffe’s
opening statement, that is to say, that an essential preliminary to
any conversations or negotiations with Bulgaria must be a complete
and effective reversal of the policy hitherto pursued by Bulgaria as
the enemy of the Allies; and until this reversal had taken place,
the objects of the Allied propaganda should be to bring home to the
Bulgarian people a sense of the dangers that threatened them unless
they could convince the Allies by their conduct of their sincere
repentance. The Committee was also of the opinion that pending this
necessary change, their Serbian and Greek Allies should not be left in
ignorance of the propaganda policy which the chief Allied Powers might
adopt.
With reference to Poland, the Chairman of the Committee made a brief
but pregnant statement, declaring the policy of propaganda in regard
to the Poles to be identical with that laid down by President Wilson
and President Poincaré and formulated by the Allied Prime Ministers on
June 3 in the words: “The creation of a united and independent Polish
State, with free access to the sea, constitutes one of the conditions
of a solid and just peace and of the rule of right in Europe.” He added
that the growth of Prussian power for evil, and the present position
of Prussia in the world, had their origin in the partition of Poland.
Consequently he urged that the reunion of the various parts of Poland
would be not only the reparation of an historical injustice, but would
constitute a strong guarantee against any revival of the Prussian
system. He claimed that the greater the strength of Poland, the firmer
would be the security of Europe and the world against any renewal of
aggressive Prussian militarism.
In the discussion which followed, general agreement was expressed with
this view; but it was pointed out that a reunited Poland might be
stronger in proportion as its territory was ethnographically compact
and did not include other neighbouring racial elements with whom Poland
would have every interest to live in concord, but which, were they
included against their will within her frontiers, might become sources
of disturbance and weakness. It was also considered desirable that the
Polish National Committee, in order to become not less valuable to
the Allies as an adjunct and agency of propaganda in enemy countries
than were the Czech and Jugo-Slav Committees, might extend the basis
of its representation, so as to secure more unanimous support from
the various sections of Polish opinion. The Committee adopted, and
submitted to the approval of the Conference, the following resolution
and recommendation. It proposed to communicate the recommendation to
the Polish National Committee:
“The Conference records its conviction that the creation of a united
and independent Polish State, with free access to the sea, is an
essential requirement of lasting peace in Europe, and expresses the
belief that the more closely the frontiers of this future Polish
State follow ethnographical lines, the stronger will it be to play
its part in safeguarding that peace, and the more harmonious will be
its relations with neighbouring peoples which, like the Poles, are
striving to secure a free existence.
“The Conference, anxious that Allied propaganda may truly express
the desires of the Polish people, as a whole, and may tend to promote
its welfare, expresses the hope that the Polish National Council may
extend the basis of its representation so as to be in a position to
lend still further aid to Allied Propaganda in enemy countries.”
On the question of Alsace-Lorraine, the Committee found itself in
entire agreement with its Chairman’s declaration that the return of
the two provinces to France was an imperative demand of international
justice and not a concession to be made by the Allies to French
national feeling. The undoing of the flagrant wrong done by Germany in
1871 was so clearly a condition of any just peace that it required no
further demonstration; quite apart from the historical justification
of the French claim to the reincorporation of these provinces in
France by their disannexation from Germany, the title of the people of
Alsace-Lorraine to determine their own allegiance proceeded from their
voluntary adhesion to France in 1790, no less than from the protests
of their elected representatives against the Treaty of Frankfurt in
the French National Assembly at Bordeaux in 1871, and in the German
Reichstag in 1874. In regard to Alsace-Lorraine, the Committee was
convinced that Allied Propaganda in Germany should make known to
the German people the determination of the Allies to insist in all
circumstances upon this vindication of rights.
Consequently it adopted the following resolutions:
1. Propaganda on the subject of Alsace-Lorraine should be unified and
conducted on general lines indicated by France.
2. The argument to which first place should always be given is that
of outraged right and of the will of the inhabitants as expressed in
their solemn and repeated protests.
3. The question of Alsace-Lorraine is a question of international
right, the solution of which interests the whole world.
As to propaganda addressed to the German people themselves in regard
to the future position of Germany, the Committee was in full agreement
with the policy recommended by Lord Northcliffe with the approval of
the British Government and summarised in his opening statements. It
believed that Allied propaganda should make it clear that the chief
object of the Allies was the changing of Germany, not the destruction
of the German people; and that the German people could hope for
an adequate position in the world, and for admission into a future
society of nations, when they had qualified themselves for partnership
with civilised communities by making the necessary reparations and
restorations (primarily in the case of Belgium) by overthrowing the
system known as Prussian militarism, and when they had effectively
abandoned all designs of mastery over Europe. At the same time, the
Committee laid stress upon the importance of bringing home to the
German people a sense of the economic pressure which the Allies, and
above all the United States of America, were in a position to exercise,
and would exercise, until the conditions of a just peace were accepted.
To this end the Committee strongly urged that, in the various Allied
countries and in the United States, a comprehensive scheme of world
organisation be studied and worked out, and that, in particular,
the steps already taken to co-ordinate the economic policy of the
Allies and of the United States be publicly explained and brought to
the knowledge of the Germans. The Committee, therefore, adopted and
recommended to the Conference the following resolution:
“In consideration of the fact that the Allied Governments have in
their own respective fields of action and by their joint action begun
to give effect to economic co-operation, which is to-day a powerful
instrument of war, and which may, after the war, serve as a basis for
the systematic organisation of the resources of the world:
“The Conference expresses its satisfaction with the results already
attained and believes that it would be expedient to make plain to
enemy public opinion, by means of a service of information, which
would set forth both the principles of Allied economic action and
their results as worked out in daily practice, the gravity of the
danger by which the enemy is threatened, and the advantages assured
to those who are admitted to co-operation with the Allies.”
The Committee adopted the following resolution:
“That in view of the great importance of co-ordinating the Allies’
policies and organisations for the conduct of propaganda in enemy
countries, a permanent body be constituted for this purpose;
“That this body consist of four members, representing respectively
the four propaganda departments which have taken part in this
Conference; each member having the power to nominate an assistant or
a substitute, or both, if necessary;
“That the provisional headquarters of the body shall be at Crewe
House, London, until permanent headquarters be determined;
“That the establishment expenses be shared equally between the four
Governments; and that a permanent secretariat be appointed thereto.”
In adhering to this resolution, and in deciding that it be recommended
for adoption by the Allied Governments and by the United States,
the Policy Committee had been influenced especially by the hope
that the proposed arrangement might expedite the co-ordination of
Allied propaganda policy, facilitate the preparation of concordant
declarations by the Allied Governments at suitable moments, and assist
in the proper organisation of congresses.
The discussions of the Distribution Committee were exceedingly
interesting and fruitful. They ranged over the whole field of
propaganda effort, and the Committee’s report summarised the means
of distribution of propaganda in use and assessed their respective
values. So far as military means were concerned, it was found that
the Italians employed aeroplanes, projectiles, and contact patrols;
the French, aeroplanes, projectiles, and balloons; the British,
only balloons on the Western Front, but aeroplanes in the East; and
that seaplanes might be employed to reach special objectives in the
Mediterranean. Each country gave favourable reports on the methods they
employed, but all were agreed that a constant exchange of information
as to results was required. In certain cases, such as the mountainous
Italian Front, where very limited targets had to be reached, the
dropping of propaganda in bulk was necessary; but in most cases methods
that secured a wide scattering of the leaflets, so that those might
be secured and hidden by individuals, were necessary. The French
explained a device, in its experimental stage, to secure an automatic
scattering from aeroplanes. The “releases” of English balloons were
agreed to produce a most adequate scattering. Various devices employed
in projectiles were successful in the case of leaflets when the angle
of projection was high and the wind was favourable, but hitherto had
not been successful with pamphlets. It was recognised that aeroplanes
were the best means of reaching distant targets with accuracy; that
for shorter distances, from a few hundred yards up to ten miles,
projectiles would secure great accuracy.
With regard to range, it was recognised that aeroplanes had the widest
limits, and the scattering of literature in Berlin by the French and
in Vienna by the Italians was considered an accomplishment of great
brilliancy and promise of usefulness, and that the types of paper
balloons in use were thoroughly effective for ranges up to twenty or
thirty miles, and with less certainty of aim up to 100 or 150 miles;
but that with larger balloons (such as the fabric balloons in the
possession of the English, or the new larger “doped” paper balloons
then being prepared in England, or the reinforced paper balloons being
experimented with in France) the distances could be increased to
several hundred miles.
As to the bulk that could be distributed, it was stated that each of
the standard balloons, then used by the English and French, carried
4 lb. 2 oz. of literature, and that projectiles could take from a few
ounces up to 8 or 9 lb. The large fabric balloons then available at
G.H.Q. could carry up to 15 lb.
It was recognised that there were no objections to the use of balloons,
as the operations did not interfere with other work and did not excite
retaliation from the enemy. The use of projectiles was apt to provoke
retaliation unless it were carried out at night or to a limited extent.
There was difference of experience and opinion with regard to the use
of aeroplanes. The Italians and French stated that no action had been
taken by the enemy in the case of their airmen who had been captured,
and that they found no difficulty in imposing this duty on their
airmen. The British, however, stated that the Germans had taken strong
measures, and had threatened their continuance, against airmen captured
after distributing leaflets. The representative of the British Air
Ministry stated that, after giving full consideration to the matter,
and notwithstanding their appreciation of the value of propaganda,
they were opposed to the use of aeroplanes for this purpose, partly
on the ground of the bad psychological effect of such work on young
pilots and aviators and partly because the supply of trained men and of
machines was no more than sufficient for the direct purposes of this
arm of the Forces. The representative of G.H.Q., France, said that the
British Army had accepted this view. He added that balloons could be
employed on the Western Front three days a week on the average, and
that there was no mechanical reason why the method by balloons could
not be increased to meet every reasonable requirement.
A French representative in the course of a discussion as to the utility
of throwing some leaflets in bombing expeditions, reported the opinion
of a well-known pro-ally German citizen that in the case of the Rhine
towns and rich cities of Germany the propaganda of fear, that is to
say, the actual dropping of bombs, was more useful than the dropping of
literature.
It was agreed that the suggested use of aeroplanes to scatter leaflets
at great heights parallel with the enemy lines encountered most of the
objections to, and none of the dangers of, their direct use by crossing
the lines. A device which had been worked out experimentally in
England, but was not employed because of the danger it might occasion
to aeroplanes, was explained and the apparatus shown. It consisted in
sending up leaflets to be liberated at the necessary height for wind
driftage by means of a messenger travelling up and down the cable of
a box kite. This means was recognised to be cheap and efficient for
employment where it would not be dangerous to aeroplanes.
The Committee agreed that the regular exchange of information as to
methods employed by the Allies, and as to the results actually obtained
by these, would be of great value, and recommended that a permanent
bureau should be established to collect and exchange such information
and reports.
As regards civil means of distribution, the Committee recommended that
increased attention be paid to the insertion of news and articles in
neutral organs which were either read or quoted in the enemy countries.
Special stress was laid on the importance of establishing effective
relations with organs which had a reputation for strict neutrality or
pro-enemy bias.
The Committee also recommended that each Power should seek through
its agencies to establish channels through which enemy newspaper
correspondents could be influenced or provided with information. The
task of approaching all sufficiently important correspondents with
whom contact had not been established should be apportioned among the
agencies of the Powers according to the opportunities of approach
available. Channels created under a scheme of this kind should be made
mutually available to the respective Allied agents in the localities
concerned.
Having regard to the extent to which the ordinary book trade channels
into Germany were still operating, the Committee recommended the
publication in neutral countries of works which, though not directly
bearing on the issues of the war, were expressly calculated to educate
enemy opinion in a democratic sense. The Committee held that, in view
of its great utility, clandestine circulation in the enemy countries of
carefully-chosen literature, especially if actually written by enemy
subjects of pro-Ally or revolutionary tendencies, should be secured
through every available channel. In view of the precarious and delicate
nature of this work, the Committee desired specially to emphasise the
necessity of seeking out and developing new channels for distribution
of this kind.
The main part of the time which the Committee on Material gave to the
discussion of its subject was devoted to the question of the most
effective forms of propaganda and to the special methods desirable
for putting these forms into practice. There was general agreement
that the best way to depress the _moral_ of the German troops and the
German population was to show them that it was against their interest
to continue the war; that the longer they went on the worse they
would fare both during the war and after; and that their only hope of
regaining their place in the community of nations lay in throwing over
the bad advisers who had led them into the war, and whose repeated
promises of success had been one after the other falsified. Thereto the
Germans had always had a hope before them. They were taught to hope
for great advantage from the downfall of Russia, from the unrestricted
U-boat warfare, from the last offensive on the Western Front. For the
first time their leaders did not know what hope to dangle before them.
Therefore, the moment was one peculiarly favourable for propaganda if
undertaken upon the right lines.
It appeared to the Committee that the best lines upon which to work
would be to emphasise as much as possible the great American effort,
both in the field and at home in the factory, the shipyard, and the
farm. At the same time the dark commercial outlook for Germans, the
dangers lying latent for them in the control of raw materials by
the Allies, the discovery of so many of their trade secrets, and
the building up in France, Italy, England, and the United States of
industries in which they had almost a monopoly before the war ought
also to be brought as vividly as possible before them. They should
be told the truth about the food situation in France and England,
which so far had been kept from them. They should be given news as
quickly as possible of Allied successes. They should be depressed as
much as possible, yet at the same time care should be taken not to
let them think they were for ever excluded from relations of business
and friendship with the peoples then fighting against them. If they
were made to believe this, their backs would be stiffened to fight
on desperately as long as possible. A sound line of propaganda, the
Committee considered, would be to leave open a doorway through which
if they got rid of Pan-Germanism and renounced its theories of world
domination by blood and iron they would in time be admitted again to
the same intercourse as before. It was agreed that for soldiers the
most elementary propaganda was the best. More elaborate arguments
and demonstrations should be kept for pamphlets to be smuggled into
Germany and for articles in neutral papers. Use should be made wherever
possible of diagrams appealing instantly to the eye.
A long discussion took place on the question of revolutionary
propaganda. The opinion was expressed that it was better to denounce
the Pan-German party generally and throw upon them the responsibility
for the war and for all the misfortunes which Germany had suffered
and would still further suffer from it, rather than to attack the
Emperor. On the other hand, it was pointed out that attacks on an
individual are always more effective than attacks on a party. Finally,
it was agreed that anything said against the Hohenzollern dynasty
should be taken, either in reality or in appearance, from German
sources, so as to avoid the risk that attacks clearly emanating from
Allied sources might strengthen rather than weaken the Emperor’s
hold upon the people of Germany. While a good deal of material was
available from German anti-Imperial sources, it was suggested that
the advantage of circulating, for example, speeches of Socialists,
might be counterbalanced by the disadvantage that it would make such
speakers less inclined to talk. Some Socialists had appealed to the
French Government not to use their speeches for propaganda, because
this weakened their efforts. It was agreed that incitements to German
soldiers to desert were legitimate and might be useful. The sending
into Germany of photographs of prisoners of war taken immediately after
their capture, when they were usually in a deplorable condition, and
after two months of captivity, when their physical condition was good,
was recommended.
With regard to Austria-Hungary, the Committee discussed whether it was
illegitimate to exploit the land hunger among the Magyar peasants and
the discontent among the German proletariat. It was agreed that it
would do no harm to support the agrarian agitators in Hungary, but, as
regards Bolshevik propaganda among the Austro-German working classes,
that the Allies ought only to circulate their own literature. It was
suggested that the United States, in mobilising its Slav elements,
might spare members of each of the Slav nationalities for propaganda
work in England and in France.
Propaganda in Bulgaria depended on the policy which the Entente Powers
and the United States decided to follow with regard to that country.
Until such a policy was settled little could be done in a large way. It
was useful, however, to make the Bulgarians acquainted with a number
of facts of which they were ignorant, as for example, the failure of
U-boats to reduce England to the verge of starvation, the large number
of American troops already in France, and so on. Leaflets on these and
other topics were being dropped regularly by aeroplanes on the Salonica
front in considerable quantities. A good deal, it was suggested, could
be done through Bulgars in Switzerland. But so long as the Bulgarians
believed that the United States was their friend and would see them
through whatever happened, little impression could be made upon them.
With regard to co-operation between the various bodies engaged in
propaganda, it was proposed that closer relations should be established
between the local agents of the Allied Powers in neutral countries;
that they should meet from time to time to exchange ideas and to give
each other full information as to their activities. Special stress
was laid upon the necessity of these local agents working in union
with the diplomatic and military representatives and with any other
agencies engaged in the same kind of work. The Committee unanimously
accepted this suggestion, with the proviso that the local agents
should, if possible, be under the direction of the Central Committee,
to which they could refer for instructions and advice. Pending the
establishment of such a central body, arrangements were made for the
various Propaganda Departments to begin at once to exchange information
about all that they were doing and that each should send out copies of
all the material produced by it to the other departments. It was, of
course, agreed that such circulation of material produced would be one
of the chief activities of the proposed central body, which would do it
with greater rapidity and effect.
It was also agreed that such a central body could be most useful
in employing methods for testing the effectiveness of propaganda.
The means of doing this were generally admitted to be defective.
Only by co-ordinating effort and by comparing information could
they be improved. It was decided that the existing system of
examining prisoners of war for purposes of military information
ought to be supplemented by a special further examination for the
purposes of propaganda information, and it was suggested that special
representatives of the Enemy Propaganda Departments should be allowed
to conduct such examinations.
Some important points connected with propaganda brought to bear upon
Germany through neutral countries were raised, and it was agreed
that the work of controlling and distributing films for moving
picture theatres, which was to be done by an Inter-Allied Commission
in Switzerland, ought to be extended to other neutral countries,
especially Sweden. Information before the Committee bore testimony that
German-owned picture theatres had of late increased very much in number
both in Switzerland and in Scandinavia, and that these relied for the
lighter part of their entertainments upon films from Allied countries,
Germany supplying special propaganda films. By controlling the supply
of films from Allied countries, the activity of these theatres could be
very much diminished and possibly brought to an end.
It was also agreed that it would be advisable to invite a number of
neutral editors and newspaper writers to pay a visit to the United
States. It was considered that articles describing what they saw and
what they were able to judge of the feeling of the American nation
would have a very useful effect upon German opinion.
With a view to influencing German opinion, it was agreed that more news
agencies, to all appearance independent and self-supporting, might well
be established in other neutral countries; that more efforts should be
made to get articles inserted in enemy newspapers, not controversial
articles, but statements of what the Allies were doing, especially
in the economic field, written as a German might write them who was
anxious about the future of his country; and that dispatch of Allied
newspapers to neutral countries should be improved and extended so that
there might be more chance of their finding their way into Germany.
The discussions of the Prisoners of War Committee showed that agreement
existed as to the soundness of the methods adopted by Crewe House for
this particular work, and the report took the form of a recommendation
that they should be generally adopted by the Allies.
At the final plenary session of the Conference, on August 17, 1918,
it was unanimously resolved that the Committees’ reports should be
accepted, and submitted by the heads of the four Missions to their
respective Governments for their approval and adoption. The Conference
resolved to constitute (as suggested by the Policy Committee) a
permanent inter-Allied body for the conduct of propaganda in enemy
countries and by so doing made a great advance. In order to maintain
close touch with the French propaganda authorities, Lord Northcliffe
appointed Colonel Lord Onslow as resident representative of Crewe
House in Paris. By the time the Armistice was signed the different
Governments had nominated their delegates to the permanent Inter-Allied
body and all the necessary preliminary arrangements had been
satisfactorily made. This organisation would have opened a new chapter
in the history of war propaganda but for the conclusion of hostilities.
As Lord Northcliffe said in his final speech to the Conference, the
constitution of a permanent Inter-Allied body was a step towards that
general co-ordination of Allied purpose and organisation which the
experience of the war had proved to be a postulate of rapidity and
efficiency of action. The work of the Conference itself, however, was
invaluable as it surveyed the policy and organisation of propaganda
against the enemy in all its phases and from many points of view at
a time when propaganda had just passed into the intensive stage. Its
reports in themselves form a text-book in the science and art of
propaganda.
[Illustration: “DRIFTING DOWN IN WHITE SHOWERS”: LEAFLETS (INSTEAD OF
BOMBS), FROM ITALIAN AEROPLANE SQUADRON, DROPPING ON VIENNA--AN AIR
PHOTOGRAPH.
_Photograph supplied by the Photographic Studios of the Italian Air
Service. By kind permission of the “Illustrated London News.”_]
[Illustration: MR. ROBERT DONALD.
MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.
_Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd._]
[Illustration: SIR SIDNEY LOW.
MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE
_Photo: Elliott & Fry. Ltd_]
[Illustration: MR. JAMES O’GRADY, M.P.
MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.]