OPERATIONS AGAINST BULGARIA AND OTHER ACTIVITIES
Peculiar difficulties of propaganda against Bulgaria--Educative work
among prisoners of war.
Operations against Bulgaria--the other objective of Crewe House
activities--were somewhat dissimilar to those against either
Austria-Hungary or Germany. There were complications due to the general
state of Balkan affairs and politics, and to the fact that technically
the United States was not at war with Bulgaria. The definition of
propaganda policy against Bulgaria called for most delicate expression,
lest any offence should be given to Serbia, Roumania, or Greece.
Lord Northcliffe, in submitting to the Foreign Office a statement of
policy proposed for use against Bulgaria, pointed out that he and his
advisers felt that there was need for a definite Allied policy in
regard to the Jugo-Slav and Roumanian questions. These, in their turn,
were dependent upon Allied policy in regard to Austria-Hungary. On May
25, 1918, Lord Northcliffe wrote to the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs:
“After careful consideration, and with the advice of our most
competent authorities on Bulgarian and Balkan affairs, I beg to
submit to you the following scheme of Allied policy in regard to
Balkan countries as the framework within which any propaganda in
Bulgaria should be carried out. I would especially direct your
attention to the need for a Government decision in regard to the
Southern Slav, Greek, and Roumanian questions before any definite
proposals from Bulgaria are entertained:
“The adoption of a clear and comprehensive Balkan policy by the
British and Allied Governments is an essential condition of any
propaganda in Bulgaria.
“Without such a policy any propaganda in Bulgaria would resolve
itself into competitive bargaining between the Allies on the one
hand and the Austro-Germans on the other.
“This bargaining would tend to estrange and to dishearten the
Serbians and the Greeks. In attempting it the Allies would be,
moreover, at a disadvantage, inasmuch as Bulgaria already occupies,
as a member of the enemy Alliance, considerably more than all the
territories that would be the subject of the bargaining.
“The aim of Allied policy in the Balkans should be a lasting
territorial and political settlement, framed as nearly as possible
on lines of ethnography, with the object of paving the way for a
permanent League of the Balkan Nations.
“Bulgaria cannot possess all the territories ethnographically
Bulgarian unless she retain at the peace districts held by Serbia,
Greece, and Roumania before the war. Serbia, Greece, and Roumania,
on the other hand, cannot fairly be asked or compelled to abandon
those districts unless they, in their turn, be united with
territories ethnographically Serbo-Croatian (Jugo-Slav), Greek, and
Roumanian.
“Allied policy should therefore deliberately aim at the solution
of the Southern Slav, Hellenic, and Roumanian questions in the
sense of the fullest possible racial unity and independence.
“The chief difficulty in defining the just claims of Bulgaria lies
in the uncertainty as to the proper delimitation of Bulgarian
Macedonia. A purely ethnographical delimitation might involve
economic and strategical injustice to Serbia and Greece, unless
it were accompanied by due provision, internationally guaranteed,
for Serbian and Greek rights of way. Similarly, the retention of
ports like Salonika and Kavalla by Greece would involve hardship
to Bulgaria unless adequate provision, internationally guaranteed,
were made for a Bulgarian right of way to those ports.
“Should it prove impossible to obtain, by persuasion or pressure,
the assent of Serbia and Greece to the retention of ethnographical
Macedonia by Bulgaria, an autonomous Macedonia might be set up,
proper provision being made for the maintenance of order and for
the repression of armed Serbian and Greek or Bulgarian ‘propaganda’
by an international force of _gendarmerie_. One advantage of an
autonomous Macedonia would be that it would meet the wishes of
the Macedonian Bulgars themselves, who would prefer autonomy to
annexation outright by Bulgaria.
“The Allied policy in the Balkans should be made known to the
Bulgarians by the Allies and by the United States. The necessary
ethnographical delimitation of Bulgarian, or of autonomous
Macedonian territory should be undertaken by a competent Allied
Commission, possibly under the presidency of the United States.
The announcement of Allied policy should be accompanied by an
intimation that only by accepting it can Bulgaria hope to escape
economic and political ostracism for an indefinite period; but that
acceptance of the Allied policy would, on the contrary, carry with
it a claim to financial and economic support.
“Bulgaria should at the same time be told that the Allies would
guarantee to her the Enos-Midia line as her minimum frontier on the
east, provided that she refrained from further active co-operation
with the enemies of the Allies. Active co-operation on the side of
the Allies should be rewarded by a frontier yet more favourable to
her aspirations, _e.g._ by the line Midia-Rodosto. The inclusion of
Silistria in the future Bulgarian territory should likewise be made
contingent upon the behaviour of Bulgaria before the conclusion of
peace.
“May I ask you to give me your views on this scheme of policy as
early as possible?
“I wish to send to Salonika, without delay, a competent mission to
begin propaganda on this, or some similar basis, but cannot authorise
its departure unless the ideas it would propagate have the explicit
approval of His Majesty’s Government.”
Mr. Balfour replied on June 6, 1918:
“I have carefully considered your letter of May 25, in which you were
so kind as to furnish me with your ideas as to the lines on which we
should conduct our propaganda in the Balkans.
“I fully agree with the general ideas underlying your policy.
“I feel, indeed, that it will be of value if our own efforts in this
direction, which, for obvious reasons, can at present be only of
the most tentative nature, are preceded by discreet and intelligent
propaganda, such as will not only appeal to our enemies but enlighten
our friends.”
It was well-known that influential Bulgarians realised the meaning
of the trend of events in the main theatres of war and would have
welcomed the opening of negotiations with the Allies. But it was
obviously impossible to begin territorial bargaining with Bulgarian
representatives of any party, because Bulgaria already possessed more
territory than that to which she was ethnographically entitled. On
the other hand, strictly to follow the ethnographic principle would
raise difficulties to which Lord Northcliffe referred in the foregoing
letter. As it would obviously require long and patient negotiations
with our Allies to establish a just basis, it was deemed to be strongly
advisable to restrict immediate propaganda to telling the Bulgarians
the fate which must inevitably befall them and that unless they made a
complete and effective reversal of their policy, the Allies would do
nothing to save them from that fate or to alleviate their position.
Four preliminary conditions were laid down as essential to the
establishment of relations with Bulgaria:
“(_a_) The expulsion of King Ferdinand and his family;
“(_b_) A complete rupture with Germany;
“(_c_) Establishment of a democratic Government;
“(_d_) The orientation of Bulgarian policy in the direction of a
Balkan Confederation under the _ægis_ of the Allied Powers and of the
United States.”
These lines were suggested as the suitable basis for a reply to secret
overtures which had been made by Bulgarian emissaries claiming to speak
for the new Premier, M. Malinof.
In due course, Crewe House was authorised to convey an informal message
to the effect “that until Bulgaria had given proof that a complete
reversal of her policy had actually been brought about, we are not
prepared to entertain any suggestions from her.” The Bulgarian agents
were duly notified in this sense, and it is to be presumed that so firm
a message was not without its effect upon the Malinof Government.
Meanwhile propaganda material in this sense was prepared, reinforced
by pamphlets, such as, for example, that by Lichnowsky, and another
giving full particulars of American preparations. These were translated
into Bulgarian, and this was a matter of some difficulty, as was the
subsequent arrangement for printing. Distribution was principally
arranged through naval and military channels and through secret
agencies of the character operating against other enemy countries.
Most painstaking work was undertaken to prepare for the publication of
a newspaper in Bulgarian to be smuggled into Bulgaria. When a series
of perplexing difficulties had been surmounted and all arrangements
were in train for an immediate start, the news came that Bulgaria had
surrendered.
In this connection, too, Ludendorff pays tribute to the effect of
propaganda. “A few days after the 15th (September, 1918), a secret
report of the French General fell into my hands which made it
evident that the French no longer expected any resistance from the
Bulgarian army. Entente propaganda and money, and the United States
representatives who had remained in Sofia, had done their work. In this
instance again the Entente had made a thoroughly good job of it.” (“My
War Memories.”)
Besides the work in enemy countries, Crewe House also undertook the
enlightenment of prisoners of war in the camps of Great Britain. The
first necessity was the eradication of innate ideas of militarism,
if it had left them with any illusions which their own experience
had failed to shatter. Then the advantages of democratic government
would be inculcated. Rightly it was thought that if these men could
be taught that government of a country must be by the free will and
assent of the governed, a small step at least would have been taken in
the right direction. Such beneficent influences as could be brought
to bear upon them would affect their compatriots on their return home
and might fructify in the expression of changed views in their letters
to their friends. There were several Prisoners of War camps scattered
about Great Britain, each of them being in charge of a Commandant
responsible to the War Office. The late Sir Charles Nicholson, Bt.,
a valued member of the Enemy Propaganda Committee, took charge of
this section of Crewe House work, his usual procedure being to have a
personal interview with each of the Commandants, in order to ascertain
from them what newspapers and books were allowed inside the camps,
and what were the English and German newspapers which were most read
by the prisoners. He then submitted to the Commandant a list of books
and newspapers which were approved for such purposes, and suggested to
them that these should be circulated among the prisoners and added to
the library which existed in each of the camps. Among the newspapers
in German which were found to be useful for this purpose were the
_Arbeiterzeitung_ of Vienna, the _Vorwärts_, the _Frankfurter Zeitung_,
the _Berliner Tageszeitung_, and the _Volkstimme_, and such pamphlets
as Prince Lichnowsky’s “_Meine Londoner Mission_,” Hermann Fernau’s
“_Gerade weil ich Deutscher bin_,” Dr. Karl Liebknecht’s “_Brief an
das Kommandanturgericht_,” Dr. Muehlon’s “_Die Schuld der Deutschen
Regierung am Kriege_” and “_Die Verheerung Europas_,” Dr. Anton
Nystroem’s “_Vor dem Tribunale_,” and, in addition, German translations
of Mr. H. G. Wells’s “Mr. Britling Sees it Through,” and copies of Mr.
James W. Gerard’s “My Four Years in Germany.”
Letters which were sent out by the prisoners of war to their friends
at home were, of course, examined by the postal censor. Sometimes
this examination indicated that certain of the prisoners would prove
susceptible to influence, and a point was made of seeing that such
prisoners were specially supplied with literature. The examination of
prisoners of war was useful, too, in ascertaining what were the ideas
prevalent in the minds of the Germans as to the cause of the war, the
progress of events, and the prospect of ultimate success or failure.
[Illustration: THE LATE SIR CHARLES NICHOLSON, BART., M.P. MEMBER OF
ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND DIRECTOR OF PRISONERS OF WAR SECTION.
_Photo: Russell & Sons._]
[Illustration: SIR RODERICK JONES, K.B.E.
MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.
_Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd._]
[Illustration: COLONEL THE EARL OF DENBIGH, C.V.O.
MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.
_Photo: Speight_]