figure, and there was that about his badly folded turban which bespoke
the parvenu. Like the muzzle of some wolf, his pock-marked visage
glowered on a couple of prostrated litigants before him, as they
fiercely strove to prove each other wrong. Near his feet was squatted
his private secretary, and at the door stood policemen awaiting
instructions to imprison one or both of the contending parties. The
dispute was over the straying of some cattle, a paltry claim for
damages. The plaintiff having presented the kaïd with a loaf of sugar
and a pound of candles, was in a fair way to win his case, when a
suggestive sign on the part of the defendant, comprehended by
the judge as a promise of a greater bribe, somewhat upset his
calculations, for he was summarily fined a couple of dollars, and
ordered to pay another half dollar costs for having allowed the gate
of his garden to stand open, thereby inviting his neighbour's cattle
to enter. Without a word he was carried off to gaol pending payment,
while the defendant settled with the judge and left the court.
Into the midst of this scene came another policeman, gripping by the
arm a poor Jewish seamstress named Mesaôdah, who had had the temerity
to use insulting language to her captor when that functionary was
upbraiding her for not having completed some garment when ordered,
though he insisted on paying only half-price, declaring that it was
for the governor. The Jewess had hardly spoken when she lay sprawling
on the ground from a blow which she dare not, under any provocation,
return, but her temper had so far gained the mastery over her, that as
she rose she cursed her tormentor roundly. That was enough; without
more ado the man had laid his powerful arm upon her, and was dragging
her to his master's presence, knowing how welcome any such case would
be, even though it was not one out of which he might hope to make
money.
Reckless of the governor's well-known character, Mesaôdah at once
opened her mouth to complain against Mahmood, pitching her voice in
the terrible key of her kind.
"My Lord, may God bless thee and lengthen...."
A fierce shake from her captor interrupted the sentence, but did not
keep her quiet, for immediately she continued, in pleading tones, as
best she could, struggling the while to keep her mouth free from the
wretch's hand.
"Protect me, I pray thee, from this cruel man; he has struck me: yes,
my Lord."
"Strike her again if she doesn't stop that noise," cried the kaïd, and
as the man raised his hand to threaten her she saw there was no hope,
and her legs giving way beneath her, she sank to the ground in tears.
"For God's sake, yes, my Lord, have mercy on thine handmaid." It was
pitiful to hear the altered tones, and it needed the heart of a brute
to reply as did the governor, unmoved, by harshly asking what she had
been up to.
"She's a thief, my Lord, a liar, like all her people; God burn their
religion; I gave her a waistcoat to make a week ago, and I purposed it
for a present to thee, my Lord, but she has made away with the stuff,
and when I went for it she abused me, and, by thy leave, thee also, my
Lord; here she is to be punished."
"It's a lie, my Lord; the stuff is in my hut, and the waistcoat's half
done, but I knew I should never get paid for it, so had to get some
other work done to keep my children from starving, for I am a widow.
Have mercy on me!"
"God curse the liar! I have spoken the truth," broke in the policeman.
"Fetch a basket for her!" ordered the kaïd, and in another moment a
second attendant was assisting Mahmood to force the struggling woman
to sit in a large and pliable basket of palmetto, the handles of which
were quickly lashed across her stomach. She was then thrown shrieking
on her back, her bare legs lifted high, and tied to a short piece of
pole just in front of the ankles; one man seized each end of this, a
third awaiting the governor's orders to strike the soles. In his hand
he had a short-handled lash made of twisted thongs from Tafilált, well
soaked in water. The efforts of the victim to attack the men on either
side becoming violent, a delay was caused by having to tie her hands
together, her loud shrieks rending the air the while.
"Give her a hundred," said the kaïd, beginning to count as the blows
descended, giving fresh edge to the piercing yells, interspersed with
piteous cries for mercy, and ribbing the skin in long red lines, which
were soon lost in one raw mass of bleeding flesh. As the arm of one
wearied, another took his place, and a bucket of cold water was thrown
over the victim's legs. At first her face had been ashy pale, it was
now livid from the blood descending to it, as her legs grew white all
but the soles, which were already turning purple under the cruel lash.
Then merciful unconsciousness stepped in, and silence supervened.
"That will do," said the governor, having counted eighty-nine. "Take
her away; she'll know better next time!" and he proceeded with the
cases before him, fining this one, imprisoning that, and bastinadoing
a third, with as little concern as an English registrar would sign an
order to pay a guinea fine. Indeed, why should he do otherwise. This
was his regular morning's work. It was a month before Mesaôdah could
touch the ground with her feet, and more than three before she could
totter along with two sticks. Her children were kept alive by her
neighbours till she could sit up and "stitch, stitch, stitch," but
there was no one to hear her bitter complaint, and no one to dry her
tears.
One day his faithful henchman dragged before the kaïd a Jewish broker,
whose crime of having bid against that functionary on the market, when
purchasing supplies for his master, had to be expiated by a fine of
twenty dollars, or a hundred lashes. The misguided wretch chose the
latter, loving his coins too well; but after the first half-dozen had
descended on his naked soles, he cried for mercy and agreed to pay.
[Illustration: _Photograph by Dr. Rudduck._
JEWESSES OF THE ATLAS.]
Another day it was a more wealthy member of the community who was
summoned on a serious charge. The kaïd produced a letter addressed
to the prisoner, which he said had been intercepted, couched in the
woefully corrupted Arabic of the Moorish Jews, but in the cursive
Hebrew character.
"Canst read, O Moses?" asked the kaïd, in a surly tone.
"Certainly, yes, my Lord, may God protect thee, when the writing is in
the sacred script."
"Read that aloud, then," handing him the missive.
Moses commenced by rapidly glancing his eye down the page, and as he
did so his face grew pale, his hand shook, and he muttered something
in the Hebrew tongue as the kaïd sharply ordered him to proceed.
"My Lord, yes, my Lord; it is false, it is a fraud," he stammered.
"The Devil take thee, thou son of a dog; read what is set before thee,
and let us have none of thy impudence. The gaol is handy."
With a trembling voice Moses the usurer read the letter, purporting to
have been written by an intimate friend in Mogador, and implying
by its contents that Moses had, when in that town some years ago,
embraced the faith of Islám, from which he was therefore now a
pervert, and consequently under pain of death. He was already crouched
upon the ground, as is the custom before a great man, but as he
spelled out slowly the damnatory words, he had to stretch forth his
hands to keep from falling over. He knew that there was nothing to be
gained by denial, by assurances that the letter was a forgery; the
kaïd's manner indicated plainly enough that _he_ meant to be satisfied
with it, and there was no appeal.
"Moses," said the kaïd, in a mock confidential tone, as he took back
the letter, "thou'rt in my power. All that thou hast is mine. With
such evidence against thee as this thy very head is in my hands. If
thou art wise, and wilt share thy fortune with me, all shall go well;
if not, thou knowest what to expect. I am to-day in need of a hundred
dollars. Now go!"
An hour had not elapsed before, with a heart still heavier than the
bag he carried, Moses crossed the courtyard again, and deposited the
sum required in the hands of the kaïd, with fresh assurances of his
innocence, imploring the destruction of that fatal document, which
was readily promised, though with no intention of complying with the
request, notwithstanding that to procure another as that had been
procured would cost but a trifle.
These are only instances which could be multiplied of how the Jews
of Morocco suffer at the hands of brutal officials. As metal which
attracts the electricity from a thunder-cloud, so they invariably
suffer first when a newly appointed, conscienceless governor comes to
rule.
With all his faults the previous kaïd had recognized how closely bound
up with that of the Moors under his jurisdiction was the welfare of
Jews similarly situated, so that, favoured by his wise administration,
their numbers and their wealth had increased till, though in outward
appearance beggarly, they formed an important section of the
community. The new kaïd, however, saw in them but a possible mine, a
goose that laid golden eggs, so, like the fool of the story, he set
about destroying it when the supply of eggs fell off, for there was of
necessity a limit to the repeated offerings which, on one pretext or
another, he extorted from these luckless "tributaries," as they are
described in Moorish legal documents.
When he found that ordinary means of persuasion failed, he had resort
to more drastic measures. He could not imagine fresh feasts and public
occasions, auspicious or otherwise, on which to collect "presents"
from them, so he satisfied himself by bringing specious charges
against the more wealthy Jews and fining them, as well as by
encouraging Moors to accuse them in various ways. Many of the payments
to the governor being in small and mutilated coin, every Friday he
sent to the Jews what he had received during the week, demanding a
round sum in Spanish dollars, far more than their fair value.
Then when he had forced upon them a considerable quantity of this
depreciated stuff, he would send a crier round notifying the public
that it was out of circulation and no longer legal tender, moreover
giving warning that the "Jew's money" was not to be trusted, as it was
known that they had counterfeit coins in their possession. It was then
time to offer them half price for it, which they had no option but
to accept, though some while later he would re-issue it at its full
value, and having permitted its circulation, would force it upon them
again.
The repairs which it was found necessary to effect in the kasbah, the
equipment of troops, the contributions to the expenses of the Sultan's
expeditions, or the payment of indemnities to foreign nations, were
constantly recurring pretexts for levying fresh sums from the Jews as
well as from the Moors, and these were the legal ones. The illegal
were too harrowing for description. Young children and old men were
brutally thrashed and then imprisoned till they or their friends paid
heavy ransoms, and even the women occasionally suffered in this
way. On Sabbaths and fast days orders would be issued to the Jews,
irrespective of age or rank, to perform heavy work for the governor,
perhaps to drag some heavy load or block of stone. Those who could
buy themselves off were fortunate: those who could not do so were
harnessed and driven like cattle under the lashes of yard-long whips,
being compelled when their work was done to pay their taskmasters.
Indeed, it was Egypt over again, but there was no Moses. Men or women
found with shoes on were bastinadoed and heavily fined, and on more
than one occasion the sons of the best-off Israelites were arrested in
school on the charge of having used disrespectful language regarding
the Sultan, and thrown into prison chained head and feet, in such a
manner that it was impossible to stretch their bodies. Thus they were
left for days without food, all but dead, in spite of the desire of
their relatives to support them, till ransoms of two hundred dollars
apiece could be raised to obtain their release, in some cases three
months after their incarceration.
XXIX
CIVIL WAR IN MOROCCO
"Wound of speech is worse than wound of sword."
_Moorish Proverb._
Spies were already afield when the sun rose this morning, and while
their return with the required information was eagerly expected, those
of Asni who would be warriors took a hasty breakfast and looked to
their horses and guns.
Directly intelligence as to the whereabouts of the Aït Mîzán arrived,
the cavalcade set forth, perforce in Indian file, on account of the
narrow single track, but wherever it was possible those behind pressed
forward and passed their comrades in their eagerness to reach the
scene of action. No idea of order or military display crossed their
minds, and but for the skirmishers who scoured the country round as
they advanced, it would have been easy for a concealed foe to have
picked them off one by one. Nevertheless they made a gallant show in
the morning sun, which glinted on their ornamented stirrups and their
flint-locks, held like lances, with the butts upon the pummels before
them. The varied colours of their trappings, though old and worn,
looked gay by the side of the red cloth-covered saddles and the
gun-cases of similar material used by many as turbans. But for the
serious expression on the faces of the majority, and the eager
scanning of each knoll and shrub, the party might have been intent on
powder-play instead of powder-business.
For a mile or two no sign of human being was seen, and the ride was
already growing wearisome when a sudden report on their right was
followed by the heavy fall of one of their number, his well-trained
horse standing still for him to re-mount, though he would never more
do so. Nothing but a puff of smoke showed whence the shot had come,
some way up the face of a hill. The first impulse was to make a charge
in that direction, and to fire a volley; but the experience of the
leader reminded him that if there were only one man there it would not
be worth while, and if there were more they might fall into an ambush.
So their file passed on while the scouts rode towards the hill slope.
A few moments later one of these had his horse shot under him, and
then a volley was fired which took little effect on the advancing
horsemen, still too far away for successful aim.
They had been carefully skirting a wooded patch which might give
shelter to their foes, whom they soon discovered to be lying in
trenches behind the first hill-crests. Unless they were dislodged,
it would be almost impossible to proceed, so, making a rapid flank
movement, the Asni party spurred their horses and galloped round to
gain the hills above the hidden enemy. As they did so random shots
were discharged, and when they approached the level of the trenches,
they commenced a series of rushes forward, till they came within
range. In doing so they followed zig-zag routes to baffle aim, firing
directly they made out the whereabouts of their assailants, and
beating a hasty retreat. What success they were achieving they could
not tell, but their own losses were not heavy.
Soon, as their firing increased, that from the trenches which they
were gradually approaching grew less, and fresh shots from behind
awoke them to the fact that the enemy was making a rear attack. By
this time they were in great disorder, scattered over a wide area; the
majority had gained the slight cover of the brushwood to their rear,
and a wide space separated them from the new arrivals, who were
performing towards them the same wild rushes that they themselves had
made towards the trenches. They were therefore divided roughly into
two divisions, the footmen in the shelter of the shrubs, the horsemen
engaging the mounted enemy.
Among the brushwood hardly was the figure of friend or foe
discernible, for all lay down behind any available shelter, crawling
from point to point like so many caterpillars, but firing quickly
enough when an enemy was sighted. This style of warfare has its
advantages, for it greatly diminishes losses on either side. For the
horsemen, deprived of such shelter, safety lay in rapid movements and
unexpected evolutions, each man acting for himself, and keeping as far
away from his comrades as possible. So easily were captures made that
it almost seemed as if many preferred surrender and safety to the
chances of war, for they knew that they were sure of honourable
treatment on both sides. The prisoners were not even bound, but
merely disarmed and marched to the rear, to be conveyed at night in a
peaceful manner to their captors' tents and huts, there to be treated
as guests till peace should result in exchange.
By this time the combatants were scattered over a square mile or so,
and though the horsemen of Asni had driven the Aït Mîzán from the
foremost trenches by the bold rushes described, and their footmen had
engaged them, no further advantage seemed likely to accrue, while they
were terribly harassed by those who still remained under cover. The
signal was therefore given for a preconcerted retreat, which at once
began. Loud shouts of an expected victory now arose from the Aït
Mîzán, who were gradually drawn from their hiding-places by their
desire to secure nearer shots at the men of Asni as they slowly
descended the hill.
At length the Aït Mîzán began to draw somewhat to one side, as they
discovered that they were being led too far into the open, but this
movement was outwitted by the Asni horsemen, who were now pouring down
on the scene. The wildest confusion supervened; many fell on every
hand. Victory was now assured to Asni, which the enemy were quick to
recognize, and as the sun was by this time at blazing noon, and energy
grew slack on both sides, none was loth to call a conference. This
resulted in an agreement by the vanquished to return the stolen cattle
which had formed the _casus belli_, for indeed they were no longer
able to protect them from their real owners. As many more were
forfeited by way of damages, and messages were despatched to the women
left in charge to hand them over to a party of the victors. Prisoners
were meantime exchanged, while through the medium of the local "holy
man" a peace was formally ratified, after which each party returned to
its dead, who were quickly consigned to their shallow graves.
Such of the Asni men as were not mourners, now assembled in the open
space of their village to be feasted by their women as victors.
Basins, some two feet across, were placed on the ground filled with
steaming kesk'soo. Round each of these portions sat cross-legged some
eight or ten of the men, and a metal bowl of water was handed from one
to the other to rinse the fingers of the right hand. They sat upon
rude blankets spread on mats, the scene lit by Roman-like olive-oil
lamps, and a few French candles round the board of the sheïkh and
allied leaders.
A striking picture, indeed, they presented, there in the still night
air, thousands of heaven-lights gleaming from the dark blue vault
above, outrivalling the flicker of those simple earth-flames on their
lined and sun-burnt faces. The women who waited on them, all of middle
age, alone remained erect, as they glided about on their bare feet,
carrying bowl and towel from man to man. From the huts and the tents
around came many strange sounds of bird, beast, and baby, for the
cocks were already crowing, as it was growing late,[23] while the
dogs bayed at the shadow of the cactus and the weird shriek of the
night-bird.
[23: A way they have in Barbary.]
"B'ism Illah!" exclaimed the host at each basin ("In the Name of
God!")--as he would ask a blessing--when he finished breaking bread
for his circle, and plunged his first sop in the gravy. "B'ism Illah!"
they all replied, and followed suit in a startlingly sudden silence
wherein naught but the stowing away of food could be heard, till one
of them burnt his fingers by an injudiciously deep dive into the
centre after a toothsome morsel.
In the midst of a sea of broth rose mountains of steamed and buttered
kesk'soo, in the craters of which had been placed the contents of the
stew-pot, the disjointed bones of chickens with onions and abundant
broad beans. The gravy was eaten daintily with sops of bread, conveyed
to the mouth in a masterly manner without spilling a drop, while the
kesk'soo was moulded in the palm of the right hand into convenient
sized balls and shot into the mouth by the thumb. The meat was divided
with the thumb and fingers of the right hand alone, since the left may
touch no food.
At last one by one sat back, his greasy hand outstretched, and after
taking a sip of cold water from the common jug with his left, and
licking his right to prevent the waste of one precious grain, each
washed his hands, rinsed his mouth thrice, polished his teeth with his
right forefinger, and felt ready to begin again, all agreeing that "he
who is not first at the powder, should not be last at the dish."
XXX
THE POLITICAL SITUATION
"A guess of the informed is better than the assurance of the ignorant."
_Moorish Proverb._
Ever since the accession of the present Sultan, Mulai Abd el Azîz IV.,
on his attaining the age of twenty in 1900, Morocco has been more than
ever the focus of foreign designs, both public and private, which have
brought about a much more disturbed condition than under his
father, or even under the subsequent Wazeer Regent. The manifest
friendlessness of the youth, his lack of training for so important a
part, and the venality of his entourage, at once attracted birds of
prey, and they have worked their will.
Since the death of El Hasan III., in 1894, the administration had been
controlled by the former Lord High Chamberlain, or "Curtain" of the
shareefian throne, whose rule was severe, though good, and it seemed
doubtful whether he would relinquish the reins of authority. The other
wazeers whom his former master had left in office had been imprisoned
on various charges, and he stood supreme. He was, however, old and
enfeebled by illness, so when in 1900 his end came instead of his
resignation, few were surprised. What they were not quite prepared
for, however, was the clearing of the board within a week or two by
the death of his two brothers and a cousin, whom he had promoted to
be respectively Commander-in-chief, Chamberlain, and Master of the
Ceremonies--all of them, it was declared, by influenza. Another
brother had died but a short while before, and the commissioner sent
to Tangier to arrange matters with the French was found dead in his
room--from asphyxia caused by burning charcoal. Thus was the Cabinet
dissolved, and the only remaining member resigned. There then rose
suddenly to power a hitherto unheard of Arab of the South, El Menébhi,
who essayed too much in acting as Ambassador to London while still
Minister of War, and returned to find his position undermined; he has
since emigrated to Egypt. It was freely asserted that the depletion
of the Moorish exchequer was due to his peculation, resulting in his
shipping a large fortune to England in specie, with the assistance
of British officials who were supposed to have received a handsome
"consideration" in addition to an enormous price paid for British
protection. Thus, amid a typically Moorish cloud, he left the scene.
From that time the Court has been the centre of kaleidoscopic
intrigues, which have seriously hampered administration, but which
were not in themselves sufficient to disturb the country.
What was of infinitely greater moment was the eagerness with which the
young ruler, urged by his Circassian mother, sought advice and counsel
from Europe, and endeavoured to act up to it. One disinterested and
trusted friend at that juncture would have meant the regeneration of
the Empire, provided that interference from outside were stayed. But
this was not to be. The few impartial individuals who had access to
the Sultan were outnumbered by the horde of politicians, diplomats,
adventurers, and schemers who surrounded him, the latter at least
freely bribing wazeers to obtain their ends. In spite of an
unquestionable desire to do what was best for his country, and to act
upon the good among the proffered advice, wild extravagance resulted
both in action and expenditure.
Thus Mulai Abd el Azîz became the laughing-stock of Europe, and the
butt of his people's scorn. His heart was with the foreigners--with
dancing women and photographers,--he had been seen in trousers, even
on a bicycle! What might he not do next? A man so implicated with
unbelievers could hardly be a faithful Muslim, said the discontented.
No more efficacious text could have been found to rouse fanaticism
and create dissatisfaction throughout his dominions. Black looks
accompanied the mention of his name, and it was whispered that the
Leader of the Faithful was selling himself and his Empire, if not to
the Devil, at least to the Nazarenes, which was just as bad. Any other
country would have been ripe for rebellion, as Europe supposed that
Morocco was, but scattered and conflicting interests defeated all
attempts to induce a general rising.
One of the wisest measures of the new reign was the attempt to
reorganize finances in accordance with English advice, by the
systematic levy of taxes hitherto imposed in the arbitrary fashion
described in Chapter II. This was hailed with delight, and had it
been maintained by a strong Government, would have worked wonders
in restoring prosperity. But foreign _protégés_ refused to pay, and
objections of all sorts were raised, till at last the "terteeb," as it
was called, became impossible of collection without recourse to arms.
Fearing this, the money in hand to pay the tax was expended on guns
and cartridges, which the increasing demand led foreigners to smuggle
in by the thousand.
It is estimated that some millions of fire-arms--a large proportion of
them repeating rifles with a large supply of ammunition--are now in
the hands of the people, while the Government has never been worse
supplied than at present. Ship-load after ship-load has been landed on
the coast in defiance of all authority, and large consignments have
been introduced over the Algerian frontier, the state of which has
in consequence become more than ever unsettled. In short, the benign
intentions of Mulai Abd el Azîz have been interpreted as weakness, and
once again the Nazarenes are accused--to quote a recent remark of an
Atlas scribe--of having "spoiled the Sultan," and of being about to
"spoil the country."
Active among the promoters of dissatisfaction have been throughout the
Idreesi Shareefs, representatives of the original Muslim dynasty in
Morocco; venerated for their ancestry and adherence to all that is
retrogressive or bigoted, and on principle opposed to the reigning
dynasty. These leaders of discontent find able allies in the Algerians
in Morocco, some of whom settled there years ago because sharing their
feelings and determined not to submit to the French; but of whom
others, while expressing equal devotion to the old order, can from
personal experience recommend the advantages of French administration,
to which even their exiled brethren or their descendants no longer
feel equal objection.
The summary punishment inflicted a few years ago on the murderer of
an Englishman in the streets of Fez was, like everything else,
persistently misinterpreted through the country. In the distant
provinces the story--as reported by natives therefrom--ran that the
Nazarene had been shot by a saint while attempting to enter and
desecrate the sacred shrine of Mulai Idrees, and that by executing him
the Sultan showed himself an Unbeliever. When British engineers were
employed to survey the route for a railway between Fez and Mequinez
this was reported as indicating an absolute sale of the country, and
the people were again stirred up, though not to actual strife.
Only in the semi-independent district of the Ghaïáta Berbers between
Fez and Táza, which had never been entirely subjugated, did a flame
break out. A successful writer of amulets, hitherto unknown, one
Jelálli Zarhôni, who had acquired a great local reputation, began to
denounce the Sultan's behaviour with religious fervour. Calling on the
neighbouring tribesmen to refuse allegiance to so unworthy a monarch,
he ultimately raised the standard of revolt in the name of the
Sultan's imprisoned elder brother, M'hammed. Finally, the rumour
ran that this prince had escaped and joined Jelálli, who, from his
habitual prophet's mount, is better known throughout the country
as Boo Hamára--"Father of the She-ass." According to the official
statement, Jelálli Zarhôni was originally a policeman (makházni),
whose bitterness and subsequent sedition arose from ill-treatment then
received. Although exalted in newspaper reports to the dignity of a
"pretender," in Morocco he is best known as the "Rogi" or "Common
One."
Fez clamoured to see M'hammed, that the story might be disproved, and
after much delay, during which he was supposed to be conveyed from
Mequinez, a veiled and guarded rider arrived, preceded by criers who
proclaimed him to be the Sultan's brother. But as no one could be sure
if this were the case or not, each party believed what it wished, and
Jelálli's hands were strengthened. Boldly announcing the presence
with him of Mulai M'hammed, in his name he sought and obtained the
allegiance of tribe after tribe. Although the Sultan effected a
reconciliation with his presumed brother--whose movements, however,
still remain restricted--serious men believe him to be in the rebel
camp, and few know the truth.
At first success attended the rebellion, but it never spread
beyond the unsettled eastern provinces, and after three years it
ineffectually smoulders on, the leader cooped up by the Sultan's
forces near the coast, though the Sultan is not strong enough to stamp
it out.
By those whose knowledge of the country is limited to newspaper news a
much more serious state of affairs is supposed to exist, a "pretender"
collecting his forces for a final coup, etc. Something of truth there
may be in this, but the situation is grossly exaggerated. The local
rising of a few tribes in eastern Morocco never affected the rest of
the Empire, save by that feeling of unrest which, in the absence of
complete information, jumps at all tales. Even the so-called "rout"
of an "imperial army" three years ago was only a stampede without
fighting, brought about by a clever ruse, and there has never been
a serious conflict throughout the affair, though the "Rogi" is well
supplied with arms from Algeria, and his "forces" are led by a
Frenchman, M. Delbrel. Meanwhile comparative order reigns in the
disaffected district, though in the north, usually the most peaceful
portion of the Empire, all is disturbed.
There a leader has arisen, Raïsûli by name, who obtained redress for
the wrongs of tribes south of Tangier, and his own appointment as
their kaïd, by the astute device of carrying off as hostages an
American and an Englishman, so that the pressure certain to be brought
to bear by their Governments would compel the Sultan to grant his
demands. All turned out as he had hoped, and the condign punishment
which he deserves is yet far off, though a local struggle continues
between him and a small imperial force, complicated by feuds between
his sometime supporters, who, however, fight half-heartedly, for fear
of killing relatives pressed into service on the other side. Those
who once looked to Raïsûli as a champion have found his little finger
thicker than the Sultan's loins, and the country round Tangier is
ruined by taxation, so that every one is discontented, and the
district is unsafe, a species of civil war raging.
The full name of this redoubtable leader is Mulai Ahmad bin Mohammed
bin Abd Allah er-Raïsûli, and he is a shareef of Beni Arôs, connected
therefore with the Wazzán shareefs; but his prestige as such is low,
both on account of his past career, and because of his acceptance of a
civil post. His mother belonged to Anjera, near Tangier, where he was
born about thirty-six years ago at the village of Zeenát, being well
educated, as education goes in Morocco, with the Beni M'sawah. But
falling into bad company, he first took to cattle-lifting, afterwards
turning highwayman, as which he was eventually caught by the Abd
es-Sadok family--various members of which were kaïds from Ceuta to
Azîla--and consigned to prison in Mogador. After three or four years
his release was obtained by Háj Torres, the Foreign Commissioner in
Tangier, but when he found that the Abd es-Sadoks had sequestrated
his property, he vowed not to cut his hair till he had secured their
disgrace. Hence, with locks that many a woman might envy, he has
plotted and harassed till his present position has been achieved. But
as this is only a means to an end, who can tell what that may be?
Raïsûli is allowed on all hands to be a peculiarly able and well-bred
man, full of resource and determination. Though his foes have
succeeded in kidnapping even his mother, it will certainly be a
miracle if he is taken alive. Should all fail him, he is prepared to
blow his brains out, or make use of a small phial of poison always to
hand. It is interesting to remember that just such a character, Abd
Allah Ghaïlán, held a similar position in this district when Tangier
was occupied by the English, who knew him as "Guyland," and paid him
tribute. The more recent imitation of Raïsûli's tactics by a native
free-booter of the Ceuta frontier, in arresting two English officers
as hostages wherewith to secure the release of his brother and others
from prison, has proved equally successful, but as matters stand at
present, it is more than doubtful whether the Moorish Government is in
a position to bring either of these offenders to book, and the outlook
in the north is decidedly stormy. It is, indeed, quite in accordance
with the traditions of Moorish history, throughout which these periods
of local disorganization have been of constant recurrence without
danger to the State.
[Illustration: _Photograph by Dr. Rudduck._ THE KAÏD.
A MOORISH KAÏD AND ATTENDANTS.]
In the south things are quiet, though a spirit of unrest pervades the
people, especially since it has been seen that the Sultan no longer
either collects the regular taxes or maintains the regular army. There
the immediate result of the failure to collect the taxes for a year or
two was that the people had more to spend on cattle and other stock,
which rapidly rose in price, no one needing to sell unless he wished.
Within the last two years, however, the kaïds have recommenced their
oppressive treatment, under the pretext of a levy to put down the
rising in the eastern provinces. Men and money were several times
furnished, but though now more difficult to raise, the demands
continue. The wonder is that the people remain so quiet, but they are
of a more peaceable nature than the Berbers of the north.
Three of the Sultan's brothers have been for some time camped in as
many centres, engaged in collecting funds, but tribe after tribe has
refused to pay, declaring that they have been exempted by their lord,
and until he returns they will submit to no kaïd and pay no dues. It
is only in certain districts that some of the funds demanded have
been forthcoming, and the kaïds have full authority, but these are
officials of long standing and great repute, whose jurisdiction has
been much extended in consequence. Changes among the less important
kaïds have been continual of late. One man would buy the office and
struggle to establish himself, only to find a new man installed over
his head before he was settled, which has frequently led to local
disorders, fighting and plundering. In this way the Government has
quite lost prestige, and a strong hand is awaited.
The Moors would have preferred another Ismáïl the Bloodthirsty, who
could compel his will, and awe all other rascals in his dominions, to
the mild and well-intentioned youth now at the helm. Some would even
welcome any change that would put an end to present insecurity, but
only the French _protégés_ desire to see that change effected by
France, and only those under the German flag already would hail that
with joy. The Jews alone would welcome any, as they have good cause to
do.
Such was already the condition of things when the long-threatening
clouds burst, and the Anglo-French Agreement was published in April,
1904. Rumours of negotiations for the sale of British interests in
Morocco to France had for some time filled the air, but in face of
official denials, and the great esteem in which England was held by
the Moors, few gave credence to them. Mulai Abd el Azîz had relied
especially on Great Britain, and had confidently looked to it for
protection against the French; the announcement of the bargain between
them broke him down.
It may have been inevitable; and since an agreement among all the
Powers concerned was so remote a possibility, an understanding between
the three most interested may have been the wisest course, in view of
pending internal troubles which would certainly afford excuses for
interference. It was undoubtedly good policy on their part to decide
who should inherit the vineyard, and on what terms, that conflict
between them might be avoided. But on the unconsulted victim it came a
cruel blow, unexpected and indefensible. It is important not to forget
this.
But the one absorbing thought of all for nearly a year past has
been the drought and consequent famine. Between November, 1904, and
October, 1905, there was practically no rainfall over a large portion
of the country, and agriculture being interfered with, grain rose to
five times its normal price. Although relief has now come, it will be
months before the cattle are in proper condition again, and not till
after next year's harvest in May and June, should it prove a good one,
will contentment be restored. Under such conditions, though more ready
than ever to grumble, the people have had no heart to fight, which
has, to some degree, assisted in keeping them quiet. The famine has,
however, tried them sore, and only increased their exasperation.
Added to this, the general feeling of dissatisfaction regarding the
Sultan's foreign predilections, and the slumbering fanaticism of the
"learned" class, there is now a chronic lack of funds. The money which
should have been raised by taxation has been borrowed abroad and
ruthlessly scattered. Fortunes have been made by foreigners and
natives alike, but the Sultan is all but bankrupt. Yet never was his
entourage so rich, though many who to-day hold houses and lands were a
few years ago penniless.
As for the future, for many years the only answer possible to
tediously frequent inquiries as to what was going to happen in Morocco
has been that the future of the Shareefian Empire depended entirely
on what might happen in Europe, not to any degree on its own internal
condition. The only way in which this could affect the issue was by
affording an excuse for outside interference, as in the present case.
Corrupt as the native administration may be, it is but the expression
of a corrupt population, and no native government, even in Europe, is
ever far in advance of those over whom it rules. In spite, too, of the
pressure of injustice on the individual here and there, the victim of
to-day becomes the oppressor of to-morrow, and such opportunities
are not to be surrendered without a protest. The vast majority is,
therefore, always in favour of present conditions, and would rather
the chances of internecine strife than an exotic peace. No foreign
ruler, however benign, would be welcome, and no "penetration," however
"pacific," but will be endured and resented as a hostile wound. Even
the announcement of the Anglo-French Agreement was sufficient to
gravely accentuate the disorders of the country, and threaten
immediate complications with Europe, by provoking attacks on Europeans
who had hitherto been safe from interference save under exceptional
circumstances. A good deal of the present unrest is attributable to
this cause alone.
It is, therefore, a matter of deep regret that the one possible
remedy--joint action of the Powers in policing the Moors, as it were,
by demanding essential reforms in return for a united guarantee of
territorial integrity--was rendered impossible by the rivalries
between those Powers, especially on the part of France. Great
Britain's step aside has made possible the only alternative, the
surrender of the coveted task to one of their number, in return for
such _quid pro quo_ as each could obtain. Had the second-class
Powers been bargained with first, not only would they have secured
substantial terms, which now it is no use their asking, but the
leading Powers could have held out for terms yet undreamed of.
France did well to begin with Great Britain, but it was an egregious
diplomatic error to overlook Germany, which was thereby promoted to
the hitherto unhoped-for position of "next friend" and trusted adviser
of Morocco. Up to that point Germany had played a waiting game so
patiently that France fell into the trap, and gave her all she wanted.
It is inconceivable how the astute politicians of the Quai d'Orsay
committed such a blunder, save on the assumption that they were so
carried away by the ease with which they had settled with Great
Britain, that they forgot all other precautions--unless it was that
they feared to jeopardize the conclusion of the main bargain by delay
in discussing any subsidiary point.
When the Agreement was made known, the writer pointed out in the
_Westminster Review_, that, "Portugal, Italy and Austria have but to
acquiesce and rest assured of the 'most favoured nation' treatment, as
will all the other Powers save one. That one, of course, is Germany,
_whose sole interest in Morocco is the possibility of placing a
drag on France_. She will have to be dealt with. Having disposed of
England, which had real interests at stake, in the command of the
straits and the maintenance of Gibraltar, France should be able to
accomplish this as well. Five and twenty years ago Germany had not
even a commercial interest in Morocco. Great Britain did three-fourths
of the trade, or more, France about a tenth, Spain and others dividing
the crumbs between them. But an active commercial policy--by the
encouragement and support of young firms in a way that made Britishers
envious, and abusive of their own Foreign Office--has secured for
Germany a growing share of the trade, till now she stands next to
Great Britain, whose share is reduced to one-half."[24]
[24: It is curious, indeed, how little the German Empire or its
component States figure in the history of diplomatic relations
with Morocco. One has to go back to the time of Rudolf II., in
1604, to find an active policy in force with regard to Moroccan
affairs, when that remarkable adventurer or international
diplomatist, Sir Anthony Sherley, was accredited to Abd el Azîz
III., the last of the Moorish rulers to bear the same name as
the present one. This intrepid soldier, a man after the Kaiser's
own heart, had been accredited to Germany by the great Shah of
Persia, Abbás, whose confidence he had won to a marvellous
degree, and he appears to have made as great an impression on
Rudolf, who sent him as his envoy to Morocco. Arrived there,
he astonished the natives by coolly riding into the court of
audience--a privilege still reserved to the Sultan alone. But
the Ameer, as he was called in those days, was too politic or
too polite to raise the question, only taking care that the
next time the "dog of a Christian" should find a chain stretched
across the gateway. This Sir Anthony could not brook, so rode
back threatening to break off negotiations, and it affords a
striking lesson as to the right way of dealing with orientals,
that even in those days the Moors should have yielded and
imprisoned the porter, permitting Sir Anthony's entrance on
horseback thereafter. The treaty he came to negotiate was
concluded, and relations with the Germans were established on
a right footing, but they have been little in evidence till
recent years.]
After all, the interests of Germany in Morocco were but a trifling
consideration, meaning much less to her than ours do to us, and it was
evident that whatever position she might assume, however she might
bluster, she, too, had her price. This not being perceived by the
ill-informed Press of this country, the prey of political journalists
in Paris, Cologne and Madrid--more recently even of Washington,
whence the delusive reports are now re-echoed with alarming
reverberations--there was heated talk of war, and everything that
newspapers could do to bring it about was done. Even a private visit
of the Kaiser to Tangier, the only important feature of which was the
stir made about it, was utilized to fan the flame. However theatrical
some of the political actions of Wilhelm II. may have been, here was
a case in which, directly he perceived the capital being made of
his visit, he curtailed it to express his disapprobation. It was in
Tangier Bay that he received the newspaper cuttings on the subject,
and although the visit was to have extended in any case but to a few
hours, he at once decided not to land. It was only when it was urged
upon him what disappointment this would cause to its thirty thousand
inhabitants and visitors for the occasion, that he consented to pay
one short visit to his Legation, abandoning the more important part
of the programme, which included a climb to the citadel and an
interchange of visits with a kinsman of the Sultan. Nothing more
could have been done to emphasize the private nature of the visit,
in reality of no greater moment than that of King Edward to Algeria
almost at the same time.
Neither such a personal visit, nor any other action should have been
required to remind Great Britain and France that they and Spain
alone were affected by their agreements, and that not even official
notification to Morocco or the other Powers could restrict their
perfect liberty of action. When, therefore, the distracted Sultan
turned to Germany as the most influential Power still faithful to its
undertakings, the response of Germany was perfectly correct, as was
his own action. But Germany, although prepared to meet him with a
smile, and not averse to receiving crumbs in the form of concessions,
had no more intention of embroiling herself on his behalf than Great
Britain. Extraordinary rumours, however, pervaded the country, and
the idea of German intervention was hailed with delight; now general
disappointment is felt, and Germany is classed with England among the
traitors.
Mulai Abd el Azîz had but one resource, to propose another conference
of the Powers, assured that France and Germany would never come to an
understanding, and that this would at least ward off the fatal day
indefinitely. Yet now that France and Germany have agreed, it is
probable that this step is regretted, and that, since the two have
acted in concert, the Moorish Court has been at its wits' ends; it
would now regard as a God-send anything which might prevent the
conference from being held, lest it should strengthen the accord among
its enemies, and weaken its own position.
The diplomatic negotiations between Fez, Berlin, and Paris have been
of a character normal under the circumstances; and as the bickerings
and insinuations which accompanied them were foreign to Morocco, the
Sultan's invitation only serving as an opportunity for arriving at an
understanding, they need not be dwelt on here. It is the French Press
which has stirred up the commotion, and has misled the British Public
into the belief that there has been some "Morocco Tangle." The facts
are simply these: since 1880, the date of the Madrid Convention
regarding the vexed question of foreign rights of protecting natives
and holding property in Morocco, all nations concerned have been
placed on an equal footing in their dealings with that country. The
"most favoured nation" clause has secured for all the advantages
gained by any in its special treaties. Nothing has since occurred
to destroy this situation. In asking his "friends" to meet again in
conference now, the Sultan acted wisely and within his rights. The
fact that any two or three of them may have agreed to give one of
their number a "free hand," should it suit her purposes to upset the
_status quo_, does not theoretically affect the position, though it
has suggested the advisability of further discussion. It is only in
virtue of their combined might that the Powers in question are enabled
to assume the position they do.
Spain, the only power with interests in Morocco other than commercial,
had been settled with by a subsequent agreement in October, 1904,
for she had been consulted in time. Special clauses dealing with her
claims to consideration had even been inserted in the Anglo-French
Agreement--
Art. VII. "This arrangement does not apply to the points now
occupied by Spain on the Moorish shore of the Mediterranean.
Art. VIII. "The two Governments, animated by their sincerely
friendly sentiments for Spain, take into particular consideration
the interests she possesses, owing to her geographical position
and to her territorial possessions on the Moorish shore of the
Mediterranean, in regard to which the French Government will make
some arrangement with the Spanish Government ... (which) will be
communicated to the Government of His Britannic Majesty."
These Articles apply to Ceuta, which Spain withheld from the
Portuguese after the brief union of the crowns in the sixteenth
century; to Veléz, an absolutely worthless rock, captured in 1564 by
Garcia de Toledo with fifteen thousand men, the abandonment of which
has more than once been seriously urged in Spain; to Alhucemas, a
small island occupied in 1673; to Melilla, a huge rock peninsula
captured, on his own account, by Medina Sidonia in 1497; and to the
Zaffarine (or Saffron) Islands, only one of which is used, in the
seizure of which the French were cleverly forestalled in 1848. All are
convict stations; unless heavily fortified in a manner that at present
they are not, they would not be of sufficient value to tempt even a
foe of Spain. Ceuta and Melilla alone are worthy of consideration, and
the former is the only one it might ever pay to fortify.
So far have matters gone. The conference asked for by Morocco--the
flesh thrown to the wolves--is to form the next Act. To this
conference the unfortunate Sultan would like to appeal for protection
against the now "free hand" of France, but in consenting to discuss
matters at all, she and her ally have, of course, stipulated that what
has been done without reference to treaty shall not be treated of, if
they are to take part, and as an act of courtesy to us, the United
States has followed suit. Other matters of importance which Mulai Abd
el Azîz desired to discuss have also been ruled out beforehand, so
that only minor questions are to be dealt with, hardly worth the
trouble of meeting.
Foremost among these is the replenishing of the Moorish exchequer by
further loans, which might more easily have been arranged without a
conference. Indeed, there are so many money-lenders anxious to finance
Morocco on satisfactory terms, that the competition among them has
almost degenerated into a scramble. But all want some direct guarantee
through their Governments, which introduces the political element,
as in return for such guarantee each Power desires to increase its
interests or privileges. Thus, while each financier holds out his
gold-bags temptingly before the Sultan, elbowing aside his rival, each
demands as surety the endorsement of his Government, the price of
which the Sultan is hardly prepared to pay. He probably hopes that by
appealing to them all in conference, he will obtain a joint guarantee
on less onerous terms, without affording any one of them a foothold in
his country, should he be unable to discharge his obligations. He is
wise, and but for the difficulties caused by the defection of England
and France from the political circle, this request for money might
alone have sufficed to introduce a reformed _régime_ under the joint
auspices of all. As it is, attempts to raise funds elsewhere, even to
discharge the current interest, having failed, his French creditors,
who do possess the support of their Government, have obligingly added
interest to capital, and with official sanction continue to roll the
snowball destined one day to overwhelm the State. In the eyes of the
Moors this is nothing less than a bill-of-sale on the Empire.
A second point named by the Sultan for submission to the conference
is the urgency of submitting all inhabitants of the country without
distinction to the reformed taxation; a reasonable demand if the taxes
were reasonable and justly assessed, but who can say at present that
they are either? The exchequer is undoubtedly defrauded of large sums
by the exemptions enjoyed by foreigners and their _protégés_, on
account of the way in which these privileges are abused, while, to
begin with, the system itself is unfair to the native. Here again
is an excellent lever for securing reforms by co-operation. Let the
Sultan understand that the sole condition on which such a privilege
can be abandoned is the reform of his whole fiscal and judicial
systems, and that this effected to the satisfaction of the Powers,
these privileges will be abandoned. Nothing could do more to promote
the internal peace and welfare of Morocco than this point rightly
handled.
A third demand, the abolition of foreign postal services in his
country, may appear to many curious and insignificant, but the
circumstances are peculiar. Twenty years ago, when I first knew
Morocco, there were no means of transmitting correspondence up country
save by intermittent couriers despatched by merchants, whom one had to
hunt up at the _cafés_ in which they reposed. On arrival the bundle
of letters was carried round to likely recipients for them to select
their own in the most hap-hazard way. Things were hardly more formal
at the ports at which eagerly awaited letters and papers arrived
by sea. These were carried free from Gibraltar, and delivered on
application at the various consular offices.
At one time the Moorish Government maintained unsatisfactory courier
services between two or three of the towns, but issued no stamps, the
receipt for the courier's payment being of the nature of a postmark,
stamped at the office, which, though little known to collectors, is
the only genuine and really valuable Moorish postage stamp obtainable.
All other so-called Morocco stamps were issued by private individuals,
who later on ran couriers between some two Moorish towns, their income
being chiefly derived from the sale of stamps to collectors. Some were
either entirely bogus services, or only a few couriers were run
to save appearances. Stamps of all kinds were sold at face value,
postmarked or not to order, and as the issues were from time to time
changed, the profits were steady and good. The case was in some ways
analogous to that of the Yangtse and other treaty ports of China,
where I found every consul's wife engaged in designing local issues,
sometimes of not inconsiderable merit. In Morocco quite a circle of
stamp-dealers sprang up, mostly sharp Jewish lads--though not a few
foreign officials contracted the fever, and some time ago a stamp
journal began to be issued in Tangier to promote the sale of issues
which otherwise would not have been heard of.
Now all is changed; Great Britain, France, Spain and Germany maintain
head postal offices in Tangier, the British being subject to that of
Gibraltar, whose stamps are used. All have courier services down the
coast, as well as despatching by steamer, and some maintain inland
mails conveyed by runners. The distance from Tangier to Fez, some
hundred and fifty miles, is covered by one man on foot in about three
days and a half, and the forty miles' run from Tangier to Tetuan is
done in a night for a dollar, now less than three shillings.
But a more enlightened Sultan sees the advantage it would be to him,
if not to all parties, to control the distribution of the growing
correspondence of both Europeans and natives, the latter of whom
prefer to register their letters, having very little faith in their
despatch without a receipt. And as Mulai Abd el Azîz is willing
to join the Postal Union, provided that the service is placed in
efficient European hands there is no reason why it should not be
united in one office, and facilities thereby increased.
France, however, in joining the conference, has quite another end in
view than helping others to bolster up the present administration, and
that is to obtain a formal recognition by all concerned, including
Morocco, of the new position created by her agreement with Great
Britain. That is to say, without permitting her action to be
questioned in any way, she hopes to secure some show of right to what
at present she possesses only by the might of herself and her friends.
She has already agreed with Germany to recognize her special claim for
permission to "police" the Morocco-Algerian frontier, and those who
recall the appropriation of Tunisia will remember that it originated
in "policing" the Khomaïr--known to the French as "Kroumirs"--on the
Tunisian frontier of Algeria.
It is, indeed, a curious spectacle, a group of butchers around the
unfortunate victim, talking philanthropy, practising guile: two of the
strongest have at last agreed between themselves which is to have the
carcase, but preparations for the "pacific" death-thrust are delayed
by frantic appeals for further consultation, and by the refusal of
one of their number who had been ignored to recognize the bargain.
Consultation is only agreed to on conditions which must defeat its
object, and terms are arranged with the intervener. Everything,
therefore, is clear for the operation; the tender-hearted are soothed
by promises that though the "penetration" cannot but be painful, it
shall at least not be hostile; while in order that the contumacious
may hereafter hold their peace, the consultation is to result in a
formal but carefully worded death-warrant.
Meanwhile it is worth while recalling the essential features of the
Madrid Convention of 1880, mainly due to French claims for special
privileges in protecting natives, or in giving them the rights of
French citizens. This was summoned by Spain at the suggestion of Great
Britain, with the concurrence of Morocco. Holland, Sweden and Norway,
Denmark, Belgium, Portugal, France, Germany, the United States, Italy,
Brazil, and Austria-Hungary accepted the invitation in the order
named, but Brazil was ultimately unrepresented. Russia was also
invited as an after-thought, but did not consider it worth while
accepting. The scope of the conference was limited to the subject of
foreign protection, though the question of property was by mutual
consent included.
The representatives of the conferring Powers accredited to the Spanish
Court were nominated as members--the English Plenipotentiary acting
for Denmark--as it was felt that those accredited to Morocco already
held too decided views of the matter. The Moorish Foreign Minister
attended on behalf of Morocco, and Señor Canovas, President of the
Council, represented Spain. Seventeen meetings were held, under the
presidency of Señor Canovas, between May 19 and July 3, the last being
purely formal. The Convention then signed contained little that was
new, but it re-stated clearly and harmonized with satisfactory results
rights previously granted to one and another. In several particulars,
however, its provisions are faulty, and experience of their working
has long led to demands for revision, but conflicting interests, and
fears of opening up larger issues, have caused this to be postponed.
Now that the time has arrived for a re-definition of the whole
position and rights of foreigners and their Governments in Morocco,
it is earnestly to be hoped that the opportunity may not be lost. The
great fault of the Madrid Convention is that while it recognizes the
right of foreigners to acquire land in Morocco, it stipulates for
the previous consent of the native authorities, which is only to be
obtained, if at all, by liberal "presents." But the most pressing need
is the establishment of an international tribunal for the trial of
cases involving more than one nationality, to replace the present
anarchy, resulting from the conflict in one case of any of the
thirteen independent jurisdictions at present in force in Morocco.
Such a measure would be an outcome of more value than all possible
agreements to respect the independence and integrity of Morocco till
it suited the purpose of one party or another to encroach thereon.
In lands knowing but one jurisdiction it is hard to conceive the
abuses and defeats of justice which result from the confusion
reigning in Morocco, or those which existed in Egypt previous to
the establishment of international tribunals there. For instance,
plaintiff, of nationality A., sues defendants, of nationalities B.,
C., and D., for the return of goods which they have forcibly carried
off, on the ground that they were pledged to them by a party of
nationality E., who disputes their claim, and declares the goods sold
to original plaintiff. Here are five jurisdictions involved, each with
a different set of laws, so that during the three separate actions
necessitated, although the three defendants have all acted alike and
together, the judgment in the case of each may be different, _e.g._
case under law B. dismissed, that under law C. won by plaintiff, while
law D. might recognize the defendants' claim, but condemn his action.
Needless to follow such intricacies further, though this is by no
means an extreme case, for disputes are constantly occurring--to say
nothing of criminal actions--involving the several consular courts,
for the most part presided over by men unequipped by legal training,
in which it is a practical impossibility for justice to be done to
all, and time and money are needlessly wasted.
XXXI
FRANCE IN MOROCCO
"Who stands long enough at the door is sure to enter at last."
_Moorish Proverb._
In a previous work on this country, "The Land of the Moors," published
in 1901, the present writer concluded with this passage: "France alone
is to be feared in the Land of the Moors, which, as things trend
to-day, must in time form part of her colony. There is no use
disguising the fact, and, as England certainly would not be prepared
to go to war with her neighbour to prevent her repeating in Morocco
what she has done in Tunis, it were better not to grumble at her
action. All England cares about is the mouth of the Mediterranean, and
if this were secured to her, or even guaranteed neutral--were that
possible--she could have no cause to object to the French extension.
Our Moorish friends will not listen to our advice; they keep their
country closed, as far as they can, refusing administrative reforms
which would prevent excuses for annexation. Why should we trouble
them? It were better far to come to an agreement with France, and
acknowledge what will prove itself one day--that France is the normal
heir to Morocco whenever the present Empire breaks up."
Unpopular as this opinion was among the British and other foreign
subjects in the country, and especially among the Moors, so that it
had at first no other advocate, it has since been adopted in Downing
Street, and what is of more moment, acted upon. Nay more, Great
Britain has, in return for the mere recognition of a _fait accompli_
in Egypt, agreed to stand aside in Morocco, and to grant France a free
hand in any attempt to create there a similar state of things. Though
the principle was good, the bargain was bad, for the positions of the
two contracting Powers, in Egypt and Morocco respectively, were by no
means analogous. France could never have driven us out of Egypt save
with her sword at our throat; England had but to unite with other
Powers in blocking the way of France in Morocco to stultify all her
plans. Had England stood out for terms, whether as regarding her
commercial interests in Morocco, which have been disgracefully
sacrificed, or in the form of concessions elsewhere, a very much more
equal-handed bargain might have been secured.
The main provisions of the agreement between the two countries,
concluded April 8, 1904, are--
Art. II. "The British Government recognizes that it appertains
to France, more especially as being the Power in contiguity with
Morocco, to control the peace of the country, and to lend its
assistance in all administrative, economical, financial, and
military reforms. The British Government declares that it will not
interfere with the action of France in this regard, provided that
this action will leave intact the rights which, in virtue of
treaties, conventions, and usages, Great Britain enjoys in
Morocco, including the right of coasting between the Morocco
ports, of which English vessels have had the benefit since 1901."
Art. VII. "In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of
Gibraltar, both Governments agree not to allow fortifications or
any strategic works to be erected on that part of the Moorish
coast between Melilla and the heights which dominate the right
bank of the Sebu exclusively."
France has secured all that she wanted, or rather that her aggressive
colonial party wanted, for opinions on that point are by no means
identical, even in France, and the Agreement at once called forth the
condemnation of the more moderate party. What appears to be permissive
means much more. Now that Great Britain has drawn back--the Power to
which the late Sir John Drummond Hay taught the Moors to look with an
implicit confidence to champion them against all foes, as it did in
the case of the wars with France and Spain, vetoing the retention of
a foot of Moorish soil--Morocco lies at the feet of France. France,
indeed, has become responsible for carrying out a task its eager
spirits have been boiling over for a chance of undertaking. Morocco
has been made the ward of the hand that gripped it, which but recently
filched two outlying provinces, Figig and Tûát.
Englishmen who know and care little about Morocco are quite incapable
of understanding the hold that France already had upon this land.
Separated from it only by an unprotected boundary, much better defined
on paper than in fact, over which there is always a "rectification"
dispute in pickle, her province of Algeria affords a prospective
base already furnished with lines of rail from her ports of Oran and
Algiers. From Oojda, an insignificant town across the border from
Lalla Maghnîa (Marnia), there runs a valley route which lays Fez in
her power, with Táza by the way to fortify and keep the mountaineers
in check. At any time the frontier forays in which the tribes on both
sides indulge may be fomented or exaggerated, as in the case of Tunis,
to afford a like excuse for a similar occupation, which beyond a doubt
would be a good thing for Morocco. Fez captured, and the seaports kept
in awe or bombarded by the navy, Mequinez would fall, and an army
landed in Mazagan would seize Marrákesh.
All this could be accomplished with a minimum of loss, for only the
lowlands would have to be crossed, and the mountaineers have no army.
But their "pacification" would be the lingering task in which lives,
time, and money would be lost beyond all recompense. Against a
European army that of the Sultan need not be feared; only a few
battalions drilled by European officers might give trouble, but they
would see former instructors among the foe, and without them they
would soon become demoralized. It would be the tribal skirmishers, of
whom half would fall before the others yielded to the Nazarenes, who
would give the trouble.
The military mission which France has for many years imposed on the
Sultan at his expense, though under her control, which follows him in
his expeditions and spies out the land, has afforded a training-ground
for a series of future invading leaders. Her Algerian Mohammedan
agents are able to pass and repass where foreigners never go, and
besides collecting topographical and other information, they have lost
no opportunity of making known the privileges and advantages of French
rule. In case it may be found advisable to set up a dummy sultan under
a protectorate, the French have an able and powerful man to hand in
the young Idreesi Shareef of Wazzán, whom the English refused to
protect, and who, with his brother, received a French education.
But while we, as a nation, have been unable to comprehend the French
determination to possess Morocco, they have been unable to comprehend
our calm indifference, and by the way in which they betray their
suspicions of us, they betray their own methods. Protestant
missionaries in Algeria and Tunisia, of whatever nationality, are
supposed to be the emissaries of the British Government, and in
consequence are harassed and maligned, while tourists outside the
regular beat are watched. When visiting Oojda some years ago, I myself
was twice arrested in Algeria, at Tlemçen and Lalla Maghnîa, because
mingling with natives, and it was with difficulty that I could
persuade the _juges d'instruction_ of my peaceful motives.
Determined and successful efforts to become acquainted with the
remotest provinces of Morocco, the distribution of its population, and
whatever could be of use to an invading or "pacifying" force have long
been made by France, but the most valuable portion of this knowledge
remains pigeon-holed, or circulates only in strictly official
_mémoires_. Many of the officials engaged here, however, have amused
themselves and the public by publishing pretty books of the average
class, telling little new, while one even took the trouble to write
his in English, in order to put us off the scent!
If ever means could justify an end, France deserves to enjoy the fruit
of her labours. No longer need she foment strife on the Algerian
frontier, or wink at arms being smuggled across it; no longer need the
mis-named "pretender" be supplied with French gold, or intrigues be
carried on at Court. Abd el Azîz must take the advice and "assistance"
of France, whether he will or no, and curse the British to whom he
formerly looked. This need not necessarily involve such drastic
changes as would rouse the people to rebellion, and precipitate a
costly conquest. There are many reforms urgently required in the
interests of the people themselves, and these can now be gradually
enforced. Such reforms had been set on foot already by the young
Sultan, mainly under British advice; but to his chagrin, his advisers
did not render the financial and moral support he needed to carry them
out. France is now free to do this, and to strengthen his position, so
that all wise reforms may be possible. These will naturally commence
with civil and judicial functions, but must soon embrace the more
pressing public works, such as roads, bridges, and port improvements.
Railways are likely to be the first roads in most parts, and Mulai Abd
el Azîz will welcome their introduction. The western ideas which he
has imbibed during the last few years are scoffed at only by those who
know little of him. What France will have to be prepared for is Court
intrigue, and she will have to give the Moors plainly to understand
that "Whatsoever king shall reign, she'll still be 'boss of the show,'
sir."
As one of the first steps needed, but one requiring the co-operation
of all other Powers on treaty terms with the Moors, the establishment
of tribunals to which all should be amenable, has already been touched
upon. These must necessarily be presided over by specially qualified
Europeans in receipt of sufficient salary to remove them from
temptation. A clear distinction should then be made between a civil
code administered by such tribunals and the jurisdiction of the Muslim
law in matters of religion and all dependent upon it. But of even more
pressing importance is the reform of the currency, and the admission
of Morocco to the Latin Union. This could well be insisted on when the
financial question is discussed at the Algeciras Conference, as well
as the equally important establishment in competent hands of a State
Bank. This and the reform of the whole fiscal system must precede
every other measure, as they form the ground-work of the whole.
Whatever public works may be eventually undertaken, the first should
be, as far as possible, such as the Moors themselves can execute under
European direction, and as they can appreciate. Irrigation would
command enthusiasm where railways would only provoke opposition, and
the French could find no surer way of winning the hearts of the people
than by coping at once with the agricultural water supply, in order to
provide against such years of famine as the present, and worse that
are well remembered. That would be a form of "pacific penetration," to
which none could object.
Education, too, when attempted, should be gradually introduced as a
means of personal advancement, the requirements of the public
service being raised year by year, as the younger generation has had
opportunities of better qualifying themselves. Above all, every post
should be in theory at least thrown open to the native, and in
practice as soon as the right man turned up. Better retain or instal
more of the able Moors of to-day as figureheads with European
advisers, than attempt a new set to start with. But a clean sweep
should be made of the foreigners at present in the Moorish service,
all of whom should be adequately pensioned off, that with the new
order might come new men, adequately paid and independent of
"commissions." It is essential that the people learn to feel that
they are not being exploited, but that their true welfare is sought.
Every reform should be carried out along native lines, and in
conformity with native thought.
[Illustration: _Albert, Photo., Tunis._
TUNISIA UNDER THE FRENCH--AN EXECUTION.]
The costly lesson of Algeria, where native rights and interests were
overthrown, and a complete detested foreign rule set up, has taught
the French the folly of such a system, however glorious it may appear
on paper. They have been wiser in Tunisia, where a nominally native
government is directed by Frenchmen, whom it pays, and sooner or later
Morocco is almost certain to become a second Tunisia. This will not
only prove the best working system, but it will enable opposition to
be dealt with by Moorish forces, instead of by an invading army, which
would unite the Berber tribes under the Moorish flag. This was what
prolonged the conquest of Algeria for so many years, and the Berbers
of Morocco are more independent and better armed than were those of
Algeria seventy years ago. What France will gain by the change beyond
openings for Frenchmen and the glory of an extended colonial empire,
it is hard to imagine, but empty glory seems to satisfy most countries
greedy of conquest. So far the only outward evidences of the new
position are the over-running of the ports, especially of Tangier, by
Frenchmen of an undesirable class, and by an attempt to establish a
French colony at the closed port of Mehedîya by doubtful means, to say
nothing of the increased smuggling of arms.
How the welfare of the Moors will be affected by the change is a much
more important question, though one often held quite unworthy of
consideration, the accepted axiom being that, whether they like it or
not, what is good for us is good for them. Needless to say that
most of the reforms required will be objected to, and that serious
obstacles will be opposed to some; the mere fact that the foreigner,
contemptuously called a "Nazarene," is their author, is sufficient to
prejudice them in native eyes, and the more prominent the part played
by him, the more difficult to follow his advice. But if the Sultan and
his new advisers will consent to a wise course of quiet co-operation,
much may be effected without causing trouble. It is astonishing
how readily the Moors submit to the most radical changes when
unostentatiously but forcibly carried out. Never was there a greater
call for the _suaviter in modo, fortiter in re_. Power which makes
itself felt by unwavering action has always had their respect, and
if the Sultan is prepared not to act till with gold in his coffers,
disciplined troops at his command, and loyal officials to do his
behest, he can do so with unquestioned finality, all will go well.
Then will the prosperity of the people revive--indeed, achieve a
condition hitherto unknown save in two or three reigns of the distant
past, perhaps not then. The poor will not fear to sow their barren
fields, or the rich to display their wealth; hidden treasure will come
to light, and the groan of the oppressed will cease. Individual cases
of gross injustice will doubtless arise; but they will be as nothing
compared with what occurs in Morocco to-day, even with that wrought by
Europeans who avail themselves of existing evils. So that if France is
wise, and restrains her hot-heads, she may perform a magnificent work
for the Moors, as the British have done in Egypt; at least, it is to
be hoped she may do as well in Morocco as in Tunisia.
But it would be idle to ignore the deep dissatisfaction with which the
Anglo-French Agreement has been received by others than the Moors.[25]
Most British residents in Morocco, probably every tourist who has been
conducted along the coast, or sniffed at the capital cities; those
firms of ours who share the bulk of the Moorish trade, and others who
yearned to open up possible mines, and undertake the public works
so urgently needed; ay, and the concession-prospectors and
company-mongers who see the prey eluding their grasp; even the
would-be heroes across the straits who have dreamed in vain of great
deeds to be done on those hills before them; all unite in deploring
what appears to them a gross blunder. After all, this is but natural.
So few of us can see beyond our own domains, so many hunger after
anything--in their particular line--that belongs to a weaker
neighbour, that it is well we have disinterested statesmen who take a
wider view. Else had we long since attempted to possess ourselves
of the whole earth, like the conquering hordes of Asia, and in
consequence we should have been dispossessed ourselves.
[25: See Appendix.]
Even to have been driven to undertake in Morocco a task such as we
were in Egypt, would have been a calamity, for our hands are too full
already of similar tasks. It is all very well in these times of peace,
but in the case of war, when we might be attacked by more than one
antagonist, we should have all our work cut out to hold what we
have. The policy of "grab," and dabbing the world with red, may be
satisfactory up to a certain point, but it will be well for us as a
nation when we realize that we have had enough. In Morocco, what is
easy for France with her contiguous province, with her plans
for trans-Sáharan traffic, and her thirst to copy our colonial
expansion--though without men to spare--would have been for us costly
and unremunerative. We are well quit of the temptation.
Moreover, we have freed ourselves of a possible, almost certain, cause
of friction with France, of itself a most important gain. Just as
France would never have acquiesced in our establishing a protectorate
in Morocco without something more than words, so the rag-fed British
public, always capable of being goaded to madness by the newspapers,
would have bitterly objected to French action, if overt, while
powerless to prevent the insidious grasp from closing on Morocco by
degrees. The first war engaging at once British attention and forces
was like to see France installed in Morocco without our leave. The
early reverses of the Transvaal War induced her to appropriate Tûát
and Figig, and had the fortune of war been against us, Morocco would
have been French already. These facts must not be overlooked in
discussing what was our wisest course. We were unprepared to do
what France was straining to do: we occupied the manger to no one's
good--practically the position later assumed by Germany. Surely we
were wiser to come to terms while we could, not as in the case of
Tunisia, when too late.
But among the objecting critics one class has a right to be heard,
those who have invested life and fortune in the Morocco trade; the men
who have toiled for years against the discouraging odds involved, who
have wondered whether Moorish corruption or British apathy were their
worst foe, in whom such feeling is not only natural but excusable.
Only those who have experienced it know what it means to be defrauded
by complacent Orientals, and to be refused the redress they see
officials of other nations obtaining for rivals. Yet now they find all
capped by the instructions given to our consuls not to act without
conferring with the local representatives of France, which leads
to the taunt that Great Britain has not only sold her interests in
Morocco to the French, but also her subjects!
The British policy has all along been to maintain the _status quo_ in
spite of individual interests, deprecating interference which might
seem high-handed, or create a precedent from which retraction would be
difficult. In the collection of debts, in enforcing the performance of
contracts, or in securing justice of any kind where the policy is to
promise all and evade all till pressure is brought to bear, British
subjects in Morocco have therefore always found themselves at a
disadvantage in competition with others whose Governments openly
supported them. The hope that buoyed them up was that one day the tide
might turn, and that Great Britain might feel it incumbent on her to
"protect" Morocco against all comers. Now hope has fled. What avails
it that grace of a generation's span is allowed them, that they may
not individually suffer from the change? It is the dream of years that
lies shattered.
Here are the provisions for their protection:
Art. IV. "The two Governments, equally attached to the principle
of commercial liberty, both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that
they will not lend themselves to any inequality either in the
establishment of customs rights or other taxes, or in the
establishment of tariffs for transport on the railways.... This
mutual agreement is valid for a period of thirty years" (subject
to extensions of five years).
Art. V. secures the maintenance in their posts of British
officials in the Moorish service, but while it is specially
stipulated that French missionaries and schools in Egypt shall not
be molested, British missionaries in Morocco are committed to the
tender mercies of the French.
Thus there can be no immediate exhibition of favouritism beyond the
inevitable placing of all concessions in French hands, and there is
really not much ground of complaint, while there is a hope of cause
for thankfulness. Released from its former bugbears, no longer open to
suspicion of secret designs, our Foreign Office can afford to impart a
little more backbone into its dealings with Moorish officials; a much
more acceptable policy should, therefore, be forthwith inaugurated,
that the Morocco traders may see that what they have lost in
possibilities they have gained in actualities. Still more! the French,
now that their hands are free, are in a position to "advise" reforms
which will benefit all. Thus out of the ashes of one hope another
rises.