THE ITALIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
The Italian expeditionary force, as we have seen, reached Macedonia
in August 1916; after a short stay at Salonica it was transferred
to the Krusha Balkan near Lake Doiran, and then to the Cerna loop,
where it remained until the offensive of September 1918. At Salonica
the Italian base was created, which subsequently became a detached
section of the _Intendenza_ at Taranto (commonly known in “initial”
language, adopted in the Italian Army in imitation of the British, as
the “U.S.I.A.M.”--_Ufficio staccato Intendenza Albania-Macedonia_). The
latter comprised the sanitary branch, the commissariat department, the
engineer command, artillery and engineer parks, the H.Q. of the M.T.
service, many depots of various kinds, ammunition dumps, the garrison
command, the _Comando di Tappa_ (where officers and men were forwarded
to their destinations) the court martial,[19] the convalescent camp,
the remount camp, etc. Part of these establishments were at Zeitenlik,
some 4 or 5 km. from the town, and on the outskirts were the three
military hospitals, one of which was the old Italian civilian hospital,
enlarged and militarized.
Our base had to be created in very difficult conditions, because when
we came to Salonica most of the scanty resources of the country had
already been requisitioned by the French and British Armies, who had
been in the country for ten months, so that we had to be content with
leavings. Furthermore, owing to the comparatively small size of our
contingent, we had to do without many institutions which would have
contributed to the welfare of our men as well as to our national
prestige. Unlike the British and French, we had few officers accustomed
to dealing with Oriental conditions. Nevertheless we managed to create
a base which in many respects was a model of its kind, and our soldiers
with their great ingenuity succeeded in making up for other material
deficiencies. A British medical officer, whom I escorted on a visit of
inspection to our military hospitals, was quite astonished at the sight
of what Italian soldiers had been able to create out of nothing, and at
the comparatively low cost at which these results had been achieved.
The men showed a love for their work which aroused the admiration of
everyone. When the Italian troops left the Krusha Balkan, where they
were relieved by the British, there was a certain bridge which they had
begun; the men engaged on the work asked to be left behind to finish
it, because they feared that their British successors might not carry
out the plan according to the original design.
The Italians at the base and on the lines of communication maintained
an excellent discipline, and were always noted for their good conduct
and almost total absence of drunkenness. Nor did one ever see Italian
officers take part in the outrageous orgies at the Tour Blanche or
other night resorts. If one criticism can be made it is addressed to
those who were responsible for selecting the officers to be sent to
Macedonia; only the most educated, best mannered and most gentlemanly
men should have been chosen for a force which was to be in such
constant contact with other armies. Whereas the great majority did
fulfil these requisites, the same cannot be said of all; if they never
got drunk, there were some who were not _à la hauteur_ as regards
character and conduct. The French made the same mistake, and indeed
not a few of their officers were sent to Macedonia as a punishment.
It was only the British who, as we have seen, made a point of sending
out their best men, especially those on Staff appointments. If this
insufficient consideration of character and manners is a general defect
of our whole bureaucratic system, a special effort should have been
made to overcome it in connexion with the Eastern expedition.
The excellent organization of our base services was largely due to the
merit of Major (now Colonel) Fenoglietto, director of the _Intendenza_,
who in all the confusion of Macedonian conditions never lost his
head or his temper, and succeeded in conciliating the most opposite
tendencies and the most crotchetty characters. Organizing capacity such
as his was particularly necessary, inasmuch as Salonica was our only
base for supplying a force of over 50,000 men; even when the Santi
Quaranta route was opened up and reinforcements and men going home
on leave or returning began to travel that way, supplies, munitions,
and material of all sorts continued to be landed at Salonica, and
everything was concentrated at that base.
There was not on the front in Italy a division or even an army corps
whose first lines were so far from their base as were those of the
35th Division. The distance from Salonica to Hill 1050 was not less
than 170 km., most of which had to be covered either by the Monastir
railway, which also supplied seven French divisions, all the Serbian
Army, and at different times sundry Greek and Russian units, or by the
high road, which also was in part used to supply those same forces. The
railway journey was not a pleasant experience; one spent the night in a
sordid dilapidated coach, often enlivened by bugs, with broken windows
and torn cushions. This _train de luxe_ conveyed us to Armenohor (the
station for Florina), whence one continued the journey by lorry. It
was more interesting to go the whole way by lorry or car, as well as
quicker and more comfortable.
On emerging from the narrow ill-paved streets of Salonica we get on to
the wide and very dusty Monastir road, overcoming numerous obstacles in
the shape of holes and other irregularities. Right and left the British
depots and dumps spread out over vast areas. Once the last huts and
sheds are left behind, we cross the wide desert plain of the Vardar,
partly marshy and very little cultivated, enclosed on the north-east
by the mountains behind Vodena. The vast pastures and the silvery
patches of water, with the background of distant blue mountains, remind
one of the Roman Campagna, but on a larger scale, less populated and
lacking in those stately ruins which render the country round Rome so
deeply suggestive and give it that sense of vitality derived from the
remains of the past. Here too there are historic memories in abundance,
for many splendid civilizations flourished in this land, but the
innumerable Barbarian invasions which devastated Macedonia have wiped
out almost every trace of them, and it would be necessary to excavate
in order to find ancient remains.
Shortly before reaching Yenidje-Vardar a strange-looking structure
appears to the right of the road; it consists of massive walls and
great blocks of stone into which iron pipes have been introduced,
whence water pours out in abundance. It is popularly known as the
Fountain of Alexander, and is, in fact, on the site of the ancient
Pellas, Alexander the Great’s capital; not far off, amid the fields,
the ruined arches of an ancient aqueduct may be seen. The fountain
has been restored by the Allied troops and is used by their pack and
transport animals. It was probably in the main piazza of the town;
there, where the horses of the great Macedonian king were watered
twenty-two centuries ago, those of the Chasseurs d’Afrique and of the
Cavalleggeri di Lucca and of the A.S.C. of the Armée d’Orient were
watered but yesterday.
Every now and then our car is held up by a Senegalese sentry--the
French make much use of these troops for their lines-of-communication
services--but as soon as he sees that it contains Allied officers
we are allowed to pass on. Soon after Alexander’s fountain we reach
Yenidje-Vardar. It is a large village, the only place of any importance
along the 85 km. between Salonica and Vodena, built on a ridge which
declines gradually towards the high road; it is very Oriental and
picturesque, dirty, and in a state of utter dilapidation. The open
shops, with their poor wares exposed on their window sills, are
typically Turkish; the narrow, tortuous, dirty side-streets, the
large trees and the abundance of greenery, and the numerous minarets
are signs that we are in the really Turkish East. The largest of
the mosques is externally handsome in appearance and imposing, but
internally almost a ruin. It had been occupied successively by Turkish
troops in flight, by Greeks in pursuit, and then by French, Serbs,
Italians and Russians passing through; even up to the end of the war
it served as a temporary shelter for French transport animals. The
walls around the courtyard had been adorned by the Greeks with the
names of their victories in the two Balkan wars--Yenidje-Vardar,
for it was here that the battle which decided the fate of Salonica
took place on November 1st-2nd, 1912,--a victory due to the Diadoch
Constantine--Kilkish (July 4th, 1913), Doiran (July 7th), etc. Close
to the mosque is the mausoleum, also in ruins, of the Hadji-Evremos
family, who have a curious history. Its founder was a Greek converted
to Islam in the reign of Osman (1317) and appointed Governor of
Brussa; in the expedition for the conquest of Salonica (1428), when
Yenidje-Vardar was the capital of Turkish Macedonia, several members
of the family distinguished themselves as stout warriors and pious
Moslems. For these merits the Sultan Murad II endowed them with the
tithe of Yenidje-Vardar in perpetuity, i.e. he granted them the right
to raise and enjoy the taxes in that district. This constituted an
important revenue, and the Hadji-Evremos became one of the wealthiest
families in the Empire, retaining their riches until our own times--a
rare distinction in Turkey. But with the Greek conquest of Salonica the
Hellenic Government refused to recognize their right which it regarded
as derogatory to the prerogatives of the State. There were protracted
discussions on this point during the peace negotiations, but the
Turkish Government in the end had to give way, and the Hadji Evremos
lost their revenues. The story of this family thus marks the beginning
and the end of Turkish rule in Salonica. Yenidje has lost almost all
its ancient importance. It is still frequented as an agricultural
centre in a townless territory; the country round is fertile and fairly
well cultivated, but malarious.
Some 25 km. further on, after crossing several branches of the Nisi
Voda river, we reach Vertekop, at the foot of the mountains; here we
again meet the Monastir railway, which has made a wide curve from
Salonica, passing Verria and Niaussa, before reaching Vertekop and
beginning the steep ascent. After Vertekop the road enters one of
the few really smiling tracts of land in this forbidding Macedonia.
The Nisi river falling from the heights of Vodena on to the plain,
whence it reaches the Vardar, forms innumerable cascades and runnels,
glimmering white amid the thick vegetation, reminding us of
The green steep
Whence Anio leaps
In floods of snow-white foam.
On reaching the plain below it divides again into many branches and
channels, irrigating a tract of country which is thus rendered green
and fertile. The road follows one of these streams, and the sight of
many fine trees, cultivated fields and orchards is very restful to
the eye. There are a few buildings amid the greenery, of the usual
Turco-Macedonian type, and the Orthodox monastery of Agia-Triada, in
whose grounds many antique fragments have been found, including some
fine statues. Along the route one occasionally encounters wayside posts
guarded by aged Serbian soldiers.
Then the road begins to ascend the steep incline up to the edge of
the cliff at Vodena. Looking back, we have a magnificent vista of
the Vardar plain, spreading out to the sea in the south-west and
surrounded by wild bare mountains. Vodena is a pleasant little town,
which the Greeks are trying to Hellenize, but they have not yet been
able to destroy its semi-Slav semi-Turkish appearance. Narrow streets,
flanked by picturesque houses of wood and plaster, the windows barred
by _musharabieh_ screens, all somewhat dilapidated; here and there a
few more pretentious modern buildings, large trees in the middle of
the streets and many runnels along the side walks, Oriental bazaars
and cafés--the usual Macedonian ensemble. Of antiquity we see no
trace, save a few fragments of ancient walls, but it is certain that
if excavations were made remains at least of the Byzantine epoch would
be unearthed. Amid the variegated Oriental crowd, French and Serbian
officers and soldiers strut about, and occasionally a few Senegalese.
Just beyond Vodena is Vladovo, a large Bulgarian village, after which
the road ascends a broad, fresh, green valley, the sides of which, in
spite of the ruthless destruction, are still clad with forests of high
trees and thick undergrowth. The forest of Kindrovo had been assigned
to our army, and it was there that timber was cut for trench and barbed
wire supports, and firewood for the bakeries and heating. There was
plenty of raw material, but every now and then a breakdown occurred on
the railway and for a time no more wood could be transported; and then
every expedient had to be resorted to to procure the indispensable fuel.
The scenery now becomes less smiling, and soon after we emerge into
the arid basin of Ostrovo with its pretty blue lake amid high bare
mountains. We are now in a rocky, mountainous region, without a tree or
a house; at every turn we have a fresh glimpse of the Lake of Ostrovo,
whose irregular bays penetrate into the folds of the mountains,
and then further off we see the silvery surface of Lake Petrsko.
Gornichevo, at the top of the pass, is a gloomy, forbidding village,
of primitive houses of rough stone, swept by icy winds in winter. Here
were fought fierce combats between Serbs and Bulgars in the summer of
1916, and here the former held up the advance of the enemy who, if
they had reached the lake, would have had an open road before them to
Vodena, and perhaps even to Salonica.
[Illustration: THE BAND OF THE 35TH DIVISION PLAYING IN THE PLACE DE LA
LIBERTÉ AT SALONICA.]
[Illustration: GENERAL GUILLAUMAT VISITS GENERAL MOMBELLI AT TEPAVCI.]
From Gornichevo the road descends by a series of hairpin bends into the
vast plain of Florina, which merges insensibly into that of Monastir
and Prilep. We pass through Vrbeni, a picturesque village, which
still bears the traces of the fighting in 1916, and close by are the
vast French and Italian dumps and depot of Sakulevo; here begins a
décauville which goes to Brod and beyond, and is used by the Italians,
the I Serbian Army and two French divisions. Just beyond is Hasan Oba,
where there is the Italian M.T. park. Here reigned my good friend Major
Anziani, famous throughout Macedonia for his exceptional efficiency and
cordial hospitality; he had made of his unit a model of its kind,
and indeed the Italian M.T. services in Macedonia, although far less
richly endowed than those of the other Allies, always worked admirably,
and in spite of the fearful strain to which they were subjected, never
broke down.
A few kilometres from Hasan Oba we pass the Græco-Bulgarian frontier,
but without noticing it because it is war time, and this is the
_Zone des Armées_, where only the writ of the inter-Allied Command
runs. The Serbs, however, clung to this, the first tract of their
fatherland to be reconquered, and although the civilian population
was still very scanty--the area was too near the front--the Serbian
Government had instituted prefects, sub-prefects and mayors, and even a
military-agricultural commission to introduce scientific improvements
in local farming. The first Serbian village is Batch, where the Crown
Prince often stayed, his H.Q. being the local school. Close by was
our aviation camp, with a flight commanded by Captain Aimone, a very
gallant officer, many times decorated for valour and a perfect fanatic
of flying, who, together with other Italian airmen, had occasion
to distinguish themselves several times during the campaign. Here,
too, but on the Greek side of the frontier, was one of the Scottish
Women’s hospitals, where, I believe, occurred the celebrated incident
of the Russian soldier, knocked down and injured by an Italian lorry,
conveyed in a French ambulance to a Scotch hospital in Greek territory
which looked after the Serbian wounded; there he was attended to by a
Canadian doctor, and the only language in which the two could converse
was German! This gives one some idea of the mixed conditions of the
Macedonian campaign.
After leaving Batch we reach Brod on the Cerna, where the décauville
divides into two branches, one going to the front of the I Serbian Army
and the other to the Italian lines. The Cerna, which is crossed here
by several military bridges, is a slow, muddy, winding river; it makes
a vast loop in the Monastir plain and amid the mountains west of the
Vardar, within which the whole of the Italian sector, as well as those
of the 16th and 17th French Colonial Divisions were comprised. A good
road, built by Italian soldiers, leads to Tepavci, which for twenty-two
months was our H.Q.
[Illustration: AREA OF THE ITALIAN FORCE.
To face p. 104.
]
Tepavci is a wretched little Macedonian village, half way up one of
the barest of the nameless hills of this barren land. Close by a
camp was made, which for six months sheltered the Italian Command.
But during one of the long periods of inactivity on this sector,
the interim commander thought of having a few stone huts built, as
it seemed as though this front were to remain immobile for years.
When General Mombelli took command he continued the work, and by the
autumn of 1917 there was a smart new village of stone, with quarters
for the officers, offices for the command, a wireless station, and
a commodious mess hut decorated with clever caricatures (types of
the Allied armies) by an Italian lorry driver, in which one was well
sheltered from the intolerable heat of the summer as from the rigours
of winter. The whole thing was done at a minimum of expense, as the
raw material was there in abundance and the labour was supplied by the
army. At no other H.Q. in Macedonia were the officers better housed and
fed, and nowhere else were passers-by more cordially and hospitably
received. General Mombelli did everything handsomely, and Tepavci
became a favourite resort for Allied officers. Many indeed were the
visitors to Tepavci, Italian and foreign. Among the latter was the
Crown Prince of Serbia, who came there often, and was always on the
best terms with General Mombelli; on the eve of the last offensive he
expressed his deep regret that the Serbian Army was not to be in direct
contact, during the coming operations, with the Italians, because,
as he said himself, there was always cordiality between Serbs and
Italians. The other Alexander, King of Greece, also came, a fanatic
of motoring and an excellent horseman. Besides the three successive
Commanders-in-Chief (Sarrail, Guillaumat and Franchet d’Espérey), and
many other French generals, several British officers came up, including
Generals Cory, the M.G.G.S., and Fairholme the Military Attaché at
Athens, where he had been a colleague of General Mombelli in the
work of thwarting German espionage. Comic relief was supplied by
a British north-country doctor who came out, not as a doctor, but as
something else; a dissenting parson wholly innocent of papers who got
through the _Zone des Armées_ goodness knows how; a well-known explorer
in black town clothes and a bowler hat who refused to put his horse to
a canter when the road was being heavily shelled from fear of breaking
his photographic plates, and was held up by the French on the charge of
supposed pro-German sentiments; and an aged and amiable Transatlantic
General who had not the remotest notion of what was going on in the
Balkans and was chiefly interested in the farming possibilities and
prospects of the country.
To get a good general idea of the Italian sector it was best to begin
with a visit to the Trident, as the divisional O.P. was called, reached
on horseback by mountain paths, or by motor along the new road built
partly by us and partly by the French (it also supplied the two French
divisions on our right). Some dug-outs had been arranged for the G.O.C.
and a few officers of his Staff, who often remained there for days at
a time when operations were in progress. The view was very extensive
and grand. Opposite arises the famous Hill 1050, with other peaks to
the right--the Piton Rocheux, the Piton Brûlé, Hill 1378, etc. Still
further to the right were the French positions. Between the O.P. and
Hill 1050 was a sea of rocks, gullies and hillocks, amid which the
second and third lines of defence wended their way; they had been
cleverly planned and executed by General Mombelli, and greatly reduced
the danger of an enemy break-through. Beyond Hill 1050 the broad plain
of Prilep spreads out, the _optatus alveus_ of our desires, which
seemed, when I ascended the Trident for the first time, so hopelessly
far and unattainable. Behind Prilep, to the north, were other
mountains, higher and more arduous yet--the Babuna and the Baba--so
that we could not help asking ourselves: “If we do succeed in piercing
the enemy lines on the terrible 1050 and reaching Prilep, shall we not
find ourselves faced by other obstacles equally formidable, guarded
by not less imposing defences?” More to the west lies the plain of
Monastir, once all cultivated with wheat, vegetables and fruit, but
now almost deserted as it was under enemy fire. A white patch at the
foot of the mountain is Monastir itself, and behind it we can make out
other terrible peaks--Hill 1248, the Tzervena Stena, the Peristeri,
and all the mighty barrier which separates Macedonia from Albania. To
the extreme right is another wild sea of mountains, peaks and rocks
extending to the Vardar--the area of the Serbian Army. Thus the whole
of the western half of the Macedonian front is spread out before us
like a topographical chart.
Hill 1050 is reached from Tepavci by a road, the first part of which
can be used by lorries; and during the last months of the war the
décauville from Brod had been prolonged almost to the foot of the
mountain. The landscape is quite fantastic. From a wilderness of stone
rise up pinnacles of black rock, suggestive of the scenery in the
pictures of the Italian primitives representing the hermitages of the
Thebaid, and one would hardly have been surprised if a thin, ascetic,
monkish figure had suddenly emerged from a cave, or from the crevices
of the rocks some monstrous dragon or serpent. Instead, we met Italian
infantrymen escorting heavily laden mules, and in the little valleys
we came upon A.S.C. camps or sanitary units, while from the dug-outs
emerged officers in shirt-sleeves, shaving. The last bit of the road
is on the flat, and being in sight of the enemy we always did it at
a canter. The enemy did not keep up a systematic fire on the lines
of approach, but the shell holes which we frequently encountered
proved that they did fire sometimes. On other parts of our sector the
approaches were so persistently shelled that supplies could only be
carried up after dark.
We descend into a gully where we are fairly sheltered, and cross a
broad torrent-bed, nearly dry in summer. Beyond it are sundry dug-outs
excavated out of the rock, as enemy shells and trench-mortar bombs are
frequently dropped. Here are detachments of Italian mountain artillery
and trench-mortar batteries and of the French field and medium calibre
artillery assigned to the Italian force, but the Italian guns and
trench mortars are not here; the former are higher up and further back
on the slopes towards the east, hidden amid the undergrowth and rocks,
whence they can fire without being discovered. The trench mortars are
also higher up, but further forward, half way up Hill 1050. We now
begin painfully to toil up the famous mountain, which for over twenty
months has been the centre of Italian military life in Macedonia.
All roads lead to 1050, all thoughts are concentrated on its hideous
slopes. Steamers convey hundreds of thousands of tons of food and
munitions to feed men and guns on the hill; the Santi Quaranta road
has been built in the face of immense difficulties so that lorries may
transport the reinforcements sent to take the place of the killed, the
wounded and the sick. From Italy and foreign countries all sorts of
improved scientific instruments are brought up to help in the study of
the 1050. A map department has been created at the Divisional H.Q.,
the principal duty of which is to portray the topography of 1050. Amid
these wild rocks and lower down towards the plain numerous cemeteries
have been made where sleep the victims of the pitiless monster,
and they are not few. The whole activity of the Italian Command is
concentrated on the study of the hill in all its details, the officers
on the Staff visit it day and night without respite, risking death so
that they may know it better, the officers and men of the infantry
regiments live on its slopes and in its caverns, and each one tries
to know his own sector stone by stone, sod by sod. Every peak, every
topographical detail, every gully, every tiny watercourse, every
irregularity has its own fancy name, conferred on it by the soldiers
on account of some fancied resemblance or remembrance--_Il Pane_
(bread), _Il Capello di Napoleone_ (Napoleon’s hat), _La Graziosa_ (the
gracious one), _L’Albero isolato_ (the lonely tree). Curiously enough,
the figure whereby the hill is known is inaccurate; it is called Hill
1050 owing to an error in the original triangulation, and is in fact
considerably higher. But as that figure appeared on the first maps of
the area it has always been maintained. Seen from a distance, the hill
looks like an enormous tooth, and indeed it is a poisoned tooth, which
pierces and kills. For the soldiers it has acquired a character of
almost diabolical malignity. Other positions on the sector--the Piton
Brûlé, the Piton Rocheux--are no less terrible, but none exercises the
same baleful fascination as the 1050.
The Italian sector is not all on 1050; it begins at the extreme western
end of the Cerna loop in the plain. The loop encircles a chain of
rocky heights, arid and broken, which are an extension of the Prilep
mountains, constituting what is known as the Selechka Planina, rising
here and there to the height of 1,500 metres. The Cerna, which has its
source in the mountains north of Monastir, flows across the plain in
a southerly direction, broadening out at certain points into a marshy
lake; south-east of Monastir it makes a conversion towards the east
at the foot of the Kaimakchalan, passing Brod and Skochivir, and then
turns northward through a narrow mountain gorge to its confluence with
the Vardar. The slopes of the Selechka Planina, high and steep in the
eastern part of the loop, decline towards the west, and all the western
part is flat. The Monastir-Prilep plain is one of the rare gaps through
the rugged mountain chains extending across the country from east to
west, a passage through which innumerable hordes and armies have made
their way since the dawn of history. It is, however, dominated by the
heights within the Cerna loop. The possession of those heights was
therefore indispensable for dominating the Monastir corridor; and as
half of them were in the hands of the Allies and half in those of the
enemy, neither side could be regarded as master of the plain and of the
passage. Had we lost our positions, the road would have been open to
the enemy towards Greece; if we had succeeded in capturing the whole
of the range all the enemy’s communications in the Vardar valley would
have been menaced. That is the meaning of the long-protracted struggle
for the possession of those arid rocks.
The lowest point of the ridge is the Makovo pass; to the north of
it a long spur stretches out, whose culminating point is the famous
1050. The position, as we have seen, had been reached by the Serbs
in the autumn of 1916, and its conquest had obliged the enemy to
evacuate Monastir. But the Serbs were so exhausted with the long and
desperate struggle that they were unable to hold their ground, and a
Bulgaro-German counter-attack drove them off the ridge. This enabled
the enemy to hold their own in the Monastir area for many months
longer. In order to secure the position the enemy Command garrisoned
it with some of their best troops and provided it with all the most
perfect defences known to the modern art of war. The fighting which
took place on these rocks left their traces in the corpses with which
they were covered, and the mere fact of remaining there cost the lives
of innumerable Italian, French, Serbian, Russian, Bulgarian and German
soldiers. The 1050 was as famous among the enemy as among our own men;
in the Bulgarian town of Dubnitza the chief restaurant was called--even
after the Armistice--the “Restaurant of Hill 1050 of the Cerna.”
The enemy line followed the crest of the mountains comprised within
the loop to north of the valley of the Morihovo torrent in the eastern
part, and that of Hill 1050 and of the great _pitons_ to the north of
the Suha torrent in the western part, and then crossed the plain to a
point north of Novak on the Cerna. The Allied line was a little below
the crest, but at many points very close to that of the enemy. The
total length of the line within the loop was about 25 km., of which the
western part (a little more than half) was held by the Italians, and
the rest by the French.
To the north of the Makovo pass rises a great mass of rock known as the
Piton Rocheux, from whose summit the enemy dominated our lines to the
right and the left, as well as the Morihovo and Suha valleys. In the
Piton Rocheux the enemy had excavated numerous caverns and dug-outs,
which hid machine-gun nests and sheltered the troops from the fire of
Allied artillery. The Italians here occupied a series of irregular
tooth-like rocks, between which were lines protected with sand-bags.
But they were dominated by the enemy on the Piton Rocheux, so that one
could not go from one position to another with comparative safety
except at night. Further west the enemy held another dominant position,
the Piton Brûlé, whose fire dominated the Italian positions which were
out of the range of that of the Rocheux. Our infantrymen in the front
lines had no other shelter in this part of the sector than the shallow
holes dug into the rock known as “Serb holes,” with low parapets of
heaped up stones and sand-bags in front of them; they were about 30 m.
from the enemy and 10 m. below them. The communication trenches between
these holes were so exposed that they could only be used after dark. In
no other sector of the Macedonian front were the troops more exposed to
the burning heat of summer, to cold, snow and wind in winter, and to
enemy fire at all seasons.
Beyond the Piton Brûlé the enemy trenches receded to some extent from
ours, ascending to the summit of 1050, which was also bristling with
machine guns. The enemy positions on 1050 and on the Rocheux sustained
each other mutually, so that if we had succeeded in occupying the one
we should have been exposed to an infernal fire from the other.
Hill 1050, seen from on high, may be compared to a long arrow-head
pointing towards the north-east, with two sharp barbs, and a triangular
depression between the two, about 1 km. broad at its widest. We held
the south-west barb and the depressions of the Meglentzi valley; our
line of main resistance ascended this spur, and at the head of the
Meglentzi valley met the first line. Thence it pushed on until just
below the highest ridge known as the _Castelletto_ (little castle).
From the Castelletto the enemy could observe the whole Italian front
from the Piton Rocheux to Novak, as well as the lines of approach,
except certain little gullies hidden beneath the steep rocks, where the
batteries were placed. Not a supply column, not a lorry, nor even an
isolated horseman or pedestrian could escape observation. In order to
give some shelter to the troops holding these positions trenches had
been cut out of the rocks, every little irregularity utilized, caverns
excavated in the mountain side. But the enemy bombardments, which were
often concentrated on these defences--sometimes as many as a thousand
shells were dropped in one day on a very narrow tract of the line--had
reduced the hill to a mass of shingle and sand which offered but slight
protection.
At the head of the Meglentzi valley our front line followed a zig-zag
course down into the triangular depression described. Although
comparatively far from the enemy, this was one of our worst positions
because it was exposed more directly to the fire of the trenches above.
Here no movement at all was possible along the line in day-time, and
even the wounded had to be evacuated at night, as the enemy did not
hesitate to fire on them. The communication trench with the line
of main resistance was equally impassable by day, although a whole
battalion had to be supplied by this, the only route.
The southern barb of Hill 1050 was cut at one point by a pass or
saddle, which separated the rocks of the 1050 proper from three
isolated heights known as the “Mamelons of Lebac,” on which were
Italian defensive works; they were very important because they
dominated the Meglentzi valley. The first line was here at about 1 km.
to the north of them and a little beyond the ruins of the village.
Below the pass there was a group of trees, which were soon reduced
to mere skeletons by the constant bombardment. On the crest of the
southern spur were enemy trenches, culminating in the O.P. known as
“Point A,” dominating the whole valley and our line as far as the
Cerna. The H.Q. of the battalion defending the positions below the
village of Meglentzi was in caverns dug into the side of a gully formed
by a torrent, which was so steep that in some places there were two
tiers of holes, one above the other.
From Meglentzi our lines followed the gully, being at one point very
close to those of the enemy. Finally they left the mountain area,
which here gradually declined, and crossed the swampy plain as far as
the Cerna. The last 6 km. of trenches were on the flat and at some
distance from the enemy. The 9 km. of mountainous front were held by
3 regiments, whereas for the 6 km. of plain one was enough. Beyond the
lines were elaborate wire entanglements. The centre of the defences
in the plain was the village of Novak, east of Monastir. A tumulus in
the second line, probably an ancient sepulchre, and the only eminence
over a wide stretch of country, made an excellent O.P. The trenches
here were all underground, and although the sector was quieter than the
mountainous part, the troops suffered from floods in winter and malaria
in summer.
The whole plain, which was once cultivated, was now a waste, but the
grass grew high and flourished, and at night the troopers of the
Lucca Cavalry went out beyond the barbed wire entanglements to mow
it and bring it back to their camp--often it was the only forage
available for the poor horses and mules of the 35th Division. In these
agricultural-military expeditions occasionally shots were exchanged,
generally without consequences.
The Cerna marked the end of our sector, and here the French area
began. A wooden bridge, well defended by earthworks armed with machine
guns, united the two areas. For a long time (in Macedonia units
seldom changed their quarters) the division adjoining ours was the
11th Colonial, with whose officers ours were always on the best of
terms. From this point a road led to Monastir, but although it was the
shortest route between that town and our H.Q. no one was allowed to go
along it on horseback or by motor, as it was under enemy fire. Monastir
itself, which could be reached by another road, although constantly
under fire, offered to those who lived on the Macedonian front the
attractions of a city. A large part of the population had returned, and
the shopkeepers simply coined money with their modest establishments,
as they could demand what prices they liked. By the end of the war
about two-thirds of the houses were in ruins, and few were those which
did not bear traces of the two years’ bombardment.
Let us now visit the front lines near the summit of 1050. Firing
trenches, communication trenches, dug-outs, shelters of all kinds, are
cut out of the living rock and it would be difficult to imagine more
uncomfortable positions than these. Near the summit our lines are but
a few metres from those of the enemy, and through the loop-holes one
may see the tin hats of the Germans and Bulgars. Here there have always
been some German battalions. After the operations of the autumn of
1916 the German units were to a large extent withdrawn from Macedonia,
and the number of German battalions from about twenty was gradually
reduced to three or four; but some of them constantly remained on 1050
opposite our troops. The enemy command considered this to be the most
important point of the whole defensive system, and therefore garrisoned
it with the troops in which it felt most confidence. A tour through
our trenches offered some curious sights. As most of the work had to
be done at night, a daylight visitor found the great majority of the
men fast asleep; he saw nothing but emerging feet, because the shelters
opened on to the communication trenches and the soldiers slept with
their heads inside and their feet stretching out towards the opening.
At intervals, in some wider space, he came upon groups of soldiers
washing, shaving, playing cards, reading or writing letters. There
were always some, officers or men, who “did the honours” and pointed
out the curiosities; it was impossible to pass near a mess without
being asked in to drink a glass of good wine and eat biscuits or even
cake, but if it was anywhere near meal time he was forced by friendly
and cordial comrades to stay to lunch or dinner. The ingenuity with
which officers and men managed to make themselves fairly comfortable in
quite impossible situations was really wonderful. Hanging on to a bare
mountain side, the summit of which was held by the enemy, who dominated
the lines of approach and supply, who spied our every movement, in
an extremely variable and always detestable climate, life under such
circumstances might have seemed well-nigh unbearable. Yet our men held
on there for nearly two years, in the face of an enemy stronger in
numbers and in material means, as well as in more favourable positions.
Nor should we forget the deadly grey monotony of life amid those rocks,
varied only by bombardments and raids--ours or the enemy’s--and more
rarely by attacks on a large scale, sometimes with poison gas. But
the men knew that they were holding one of the keystones of the whole
Macedonian defensive system, that if they gave way everything would
collapse, and that the Allied armies would risk being driven into the
sea. They were moreover kept up by a sense of pride and a desire to cut
a good figure before the other Allies. It was considered absolutely
indispensable that the Italian line should hold; and although
theoretically the position was untenable, it was held without wavering,
until the final victory.
There were of course long periods in which there was no fighting.
On some days not a shot was heard. But it sufficed for one man to
discharge his rifle to provoke a hurricane of fire from the other side.
Certain visitors to our front were not at all welcome because, wishing
to make themselves conspicuous, they insisted on firing a few shots
or throwing a hand grenade just for the fun of the thing. The enemy
replied, and a quiet day was converted into one of lively but quite
useless exchange of rifle fire and shelling. This of course happened
when the importunate visitor had already left for some more sheltered
spot.
When the Italian troops took over this sector from the Serbs in
December, 1916, it was almost completely unprotected. The Serbs had
not had time to carry out important defensive works, and had limited
themselves to digging those small holes in the earth or rock which I
have already described. General Petitti at once set to work to fortify
the area, and his work was continued, completed and extended by General
Mombelli. During the period of our occupation, over 100 km. of trenches
and communication trenches, two metres deep, were dug, 500 caverns cut
out of the rock as shelters, and 120 km. of wire entanglements laid
down. All this vast labour was accomplished by troops who were supposed
to be at rest, for while two of the brigades were in the line the third
was employed in preparing these defences.
During the early days of the campaign there was a tendency, as on all
other fronts, to concentrate the largest possible number of men in
the front line defences, but later the opposite tendency prevailed,
viz. that the first lines should be held by an indispensable minimum
of troops only, the rest of the forces being kept in reserve in
well-protected shelters, ready to hasten forward at the moment of
attack, and that powerful second and third lines of main resistance
should be constructed. In this way the constant drain of small losses
when there was no real fighting going on was avoided, and at the same
time the consequences of a possible break-through in the first line
were guarded against, as the enemy, in attacking the second lines would
have been exposed to the fire of batteries which could easily find
their range on ground perfectly well known to them. It was General
Mombelli who reconstructed and reinforced the second line and created
the third, which was the most powerful of the three, _ex novo_. The
enemy knew very little about these defences behind the first line, and,
in fact, on a German Staff map found on a prisoner, whereas the first
line is represented with a fair amount of accurate detail, the second
is barely sketched and in an inaccurate manner, while the third is
merely hinted at with the indication “old Bulgarian trenches.” This is
one of the signs that the enemy was less well-informed about the Allied
armies than was generally supposed.
The Italian front in Macedonia had, as we have seen, an extension
of 15 km., afterwards reduced, with the diminution of strengths, to
about 12. Several times, especially during Sarrail’s régime, the
C.A.A. tried to induce the Italian Command to extend the line towards
the right, but all the three generals who successively commanded the
Italian expeditionary force refused to do so, there being no reason for
making the 35th Division occupy a sector wholly out of proportion to
its strength as compared with those held by other Allied forces; the
fact that the sector in question was one of the hardest and had the
most difficult communications, so that all movements from one point
to another were anything but simple, had also to be considered. The
C.A.A., in fact, ended by dropping the matter.[20] It was not until the
summer of 1918 that we again somewhat extended our front in view of
the coming offensive. As compared with conditions in Italy the Italian
front in Macedonia was certainly less deadly, but in some respects it
was one of the most objectionable. Unlike the troops in Italy, those
in Macedonia were to a very large extent precluded from leave, and at
the time of the Armistice there were no less than 30,000 men, out of a
total of 50,000, who, although entitled to leave, were unable to avail
themselves of the privilege; among them there were 6,000 who had been
at the front for twenty-five months on end without leave. When General
Mombelli took command, eleven months after the arrival of the force, no
one had been on leave at all from Macedonia, and many had been at the
front for many months in Italy before crossing the sea. It was at that
time believed that leave for the troops in Macedonia was impossible,
because they must not be exposed to the risks of the long sea-crossing
when it was not absolutely indispensable, while even the journey via
Santi Quaranta by lorry (which involved a shorter crossing) seemed too
complicated and difficult. But General Mombelli realized the enormous
importance of leave, even if comparatively few men had a chance of
enjoying it; the mere thought of not being cut off from all hope of
leave exercised a very great and beneficial effect on the _moral_ of
the troops. He therefore succeeded in overcoming the thousand obstacles
in his way and organized the transport of leave parties by lorry via
Santi Quaranta. This was one of his services to the 35th Division, and
one which made him particularly popular with the men.
Yet in spite of the moral and material suffering, the unhealthy
climate, malaria, the constant small losses, and the long enervating
inaction, whenever there was something to be done, the men went to
the attack with the most admirable dash. Their _moral_ always remained
high, and there was never among the Italian soldiers any movement of
revolt or even an outward expression of discontent such as occurred
among certain French units, not to speak of the Greeks and Russians,
among whom mutinies were frequent.