THE SERBIANS
OF all the peoples who participated in the Great War the fate of the
Serbs represent the most tragic. Our subsequent disagreements with the
Yugo-Slavs should not make us forget the heroic part played by the
Serbians even though unfortunately they have forgotten the immense
benefits which we conferred upon them. It is the merit of the Italians
if the miserable remnants of the Serbian Army, after the disastrous
retreat through Albania, were saved from death by starvation, together
with thousands and thousands of Serbian civilians, who found a refuge
and a warm welcome in Italy, when their country was overrun by the
enemy. Let us hope that in the not too distant future the Serbs will
remember these facts, and also remember the many Italians who died on
Serbian soil fighting for the liberation of Serbia.
After the retreat through Albania the Serbian Army found itself in the
most appalling condition. Before the third enemy invasion it comprised
some 400,000 men, with 70,000 horses and 65,000 oxen (the mechanical
transport service was extremely limited). By the time it reached the
Adriatic it was reduced by hunger, cold and sickness, as well as by
fighting, to barely 150,000 men, 40,000 horses and 10,000 oxen. Part
of the army marched towards Scutari and Alessio and the rest towards
Durazzo. The second group was accompanied by several thousand civilian
refugees, and also by old King Peter, who was seriously ill, and the
Prince Regent Alexander, who was ill, too, for a part of the time. As
regards armament, equipment and food, everything was lacking. The
soldiers had been living for many months on 200 to 300 grammes of
biscuit every five days.
The work of the Italian Navy in saving the Serbians has often been
ignored. The Serbians appear to have forgotten or altogether denied
it, as have also some of their foreign apologists. It may therefore
be of interest to repeat what Admiral Sechi, the Italian Minister
of Marine, said in the Senate on July 19, 1920 in this connexion.
After reminding his hearers that the transport of the remnants of the
Serbian Army with their supplies, from the ports of Northern Albania,
where they had arrived exhausted and famished, to Valona, was the work
of the Italian Navy, it was, he said, one of the Allied Governments
that, at the end of October 1915 requested the Italian Government to
provide for these necessities, and “in spite of the almost insuperable
difficulties of the operation, especially on account of the insidious
enemy attacks, and the almost total lack of any landing facilities in
the places of disembarkation, the Italian Navy granted the request and
the transport was carried out successfully and without interruption.”
It was the Italian Navy which provided the transport of supplies for
the Serbian Army (about 28,000 tons). In all about 245,000 Serbian
soldiers, 25,000 Austrian prisoners whom they brought with them, over
10,000 animals, and a great deal of material, was thus transported. In
spite of the ever-present danger of enemy submarines, in all this vast
movement not a single ship was lost, nor did a single Serbian soldier
die.[14] But we did not only provide transport and food for these most
unfortunate warriors and civilians. Our military and naval medical
officers worked admirably for the assistance of the Serbians, saving
thousands from death by hunger, exhaustion and infection, as typhus
and cholera were raging among the Serbians. An English writer has
described in eloquent language this work in a book on the Italian Navy.
“Day and night,” writes Archibald Hurd, “caring nothing for the risk
of infection, striving with all weapons of modern research to prevent
this plague spot from infecting half a continent, the naval and
military doctors, with their sailor and soldier orderlies, fed, tended,
bandaged, and with hands soft as women’s nursed these poor spectres of
fellow creatures.”[15] On December 17 it was decided to send the Serbs
to Corfu. They were now reduced to 100,000 men with 54,000 rifles,
160 machine guns, and 70 guns. When they were transported to Valona
King Peter also went to Corfu and embarked on the Italian torpedo
boat destroyer, _G. C. Abba_. He wished to receive the salute of the
officers of the ship thanking them with generous words for all they
had done and the dangers they had faced on their mission of charity.
Reminding them of Garibaldi, their own national hero--to many of them
already, perhaps, almost a legendary figure--he told them that he had
himself twice met that famous soldier. Recalling to them the dark pages
of their own national history, with its eventual triumph, he suggested
to them that possibly Serbia might be the Piedmont of all the Serbians,
and even in this, its blackest hour, the forerunner of an undreamed of
and triumphant unity.[16] The Austrian prisoners were re-embarked for
Italy and interned in Sardinia, but many of them died of cholera during
the voyage. It may be added that while the most generous material
assistance was lavished on the Serbians by our Command, as well as by
our officers and men, the moral treatment accorded them by one or two
of our officers left something to be desired. Although this does not in
any way justify the ingratitude which the Serbs have subsequently shown
towards Italy, it may serve in part to explain it. Even a cruel phrase
or a lack of consideration for anyone who has suffered so terribly
are enough to cancel the memory of the great benefits received. As we
shall see, Generals Petitti and Mombelli did everything in their power
to make the Serbians forget these unfortunate incidents, and they
succeeded, at least for the time being.
The bulk of the Serbian troops were concentrated at Corfu, save a small
number at Bizerta. The first convoy embarked on January 6, 1916 and
during the winter the Allies, especially the British and the French,
set to work to re-equip and reorganize the army, and it must be said
the soldiers were greatly desirous of going to Salonica as soon as
possible to take part once more in the struggle against the invader,
although at that time to hope for success seemed madness. The Serbian
Government and Parliament also established themselves at Corfu, where
they remained until after the Armistice. The reorganization of the army
was carried out fairly quickly, and about the middle of April the first
detachments began to arrive at Salonica; to these were added the troops
who escaped from Monastir or down the Vardar Valley. Throughout the
second half of 1916 and the winter of 1916–17 the Serbians continued
to arrive, and in May 1917 the army was complete. But the Serbs did
not wait until then to begin fighting, because, as we have seen, they
took a very prominent part in the operations of the summer and autumn
of 1916. As each detachment reached Salonica it was first concentrated
in the Serbian camp at Mikra near the city, and then sent towards
the front, and its training in modern war methods was completed in
Macedonia.
The reorganized Serbian Army then comprised about 150,000 men, divided,
as we have seen, into 3 armies of 2 divisions each. Each division
comprised 3 regiments of 3 battalions each. As regards armament they
were fairly well equipped, and the number of rifles[17] was higher than
in the other armies in Macedonia because they had very few transport
or lines-of-communication troops. The Allies to a very great extent
supplied them with these services.
[Illustration: GENERAL MOMBELLI INAUGURATING A SCHOOL FOR SERB CHILDREN
BUILT BY ITALIAN SOLDIERS AT BROD.]
[Illustration: ITALIAN BRIDGE OVER THE CERNA AT BROD.
To face p. 88.
]
The Crown Prince Alexander, nominally Commander-in-Chief, kept his
modest Court at Salonica, but he spent a good part of the year at
the Serbian front with the soldiers, with whom he was very popular.
King Peter also resided habitually at Salonica, where he led an
extremely retired life an account of his illness, and he saw hardly
anyone. The military household of the Prince was composed for the most
part of field officers who had been seriously wounded, and as Minister
of the Royal Household he afterwards appointed M. Balugich, who was
considered to be one of the shrewdest diplomats in the Balkans. The
various foreign Governments had their representatives at Corfu, as the
Serbian Foreign Office was there, but the Prince Regent wished to have
a small diplomatic corps attached to his own person. The British and
French Governments acceded to this wish immediately, the former sending
Admiral Troubridge and the latter Commander Picot as honorary A.D.C.’s.
Later on he also wished to have an Italian officer, in the person of
Colonel Bodrero, formerly Commander of the Italian troops in Salonica
and afterwards in Valona, and the request was finally granted. Admiral
Troubridge, an attractive type of naval officer, had been Commander
of the squadron which had pursued the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ at the
beginning of the war, and had afterwards commanded the British naval
batteries on the Danube. After the Serbian _débâcle_ he followed the
remnants of the army to Corfu, and it was on that occasion that Prince
Alexander got to know and appreciate him. Admiral Troubridge had great
affection for Italy, whose language and literature he knew extremely
well, and he liked to be in the company of Italian officers whom he
often invited to his house, and in turn, he often went to their mess.
He did his best to maintain friendly relations between Serbians and
Italians, and gave excellent advice to Prince Alexander.
The actual Commander-in-Chief of the Serbian Army was the Chief of the
General Staff, General Boyovich, and the armies, afterwards reduced to
two, were commanded by the Voivods Michich and Stepanovich.
In the spring of 1916, Voivod Michich, Commander of the I Army, was
appointed Chief of the General Staff in the place of General Boyovich,
who took command of the said army in his place. The change was made on
the eve of the general offensive, because the plan of operation was to
a large extent the work of Michich himself. Although General Boyovich
was an excellent soldier and had always greatly distinguished himself,
Voivod Michich was a man of genius, one of the ablest leaders that the
Balkans has ever produced. Personally he was a very sympathetic figure,
jovial, always serene and good-tempered, even in the most tragic
moments, and always certain of final victory. The soldiers had such
great confidence in him that during the long period in which illness
kept him in hospital, they used to say: “We shall never be able to
return to our country if we have not Michich to lead us to victory.”
He never ceased to show cordiality towards Italy, and even after the
Armistice, in spite of the infatuation of hatred against Italy with
which the Serbian people had been filled, probably as a result of
a propaganda conducted by persons interested in sowing dissension,
his feelings towards us never changed, and if one day Italo-Serbian
relations improve, it will certainly be due in part to the work of the
gallant Voivod. His death, which occurred a short time ago, is a real
loss from every point of view.
In a general way the Serbians in Salonica conducted themselves
modestly, as was but becoming in their condition of exiles living on
charity--I use the word without any intention of offence. In this
connexion they offered a notable contrast to the Russian officers
after the Bolshevik revolution. Even their Commands and offices were
very simple, and their leaders were singularly free from bureaucratic
formalities.
The Serbs were supplied by the British and French, but even the
material supplied by the former reached them through the French
_Intendance_. They were not however, satisfied with this system, and
often complained of the manner in which the French treated them, both
on account of the insufficiency and the bad quality of part of the
supplies--they actually declared that the goods of excellent quality
supplied by the British were exchanged during transit through the
French offices, for others of inferior quality. They also objected
to the tone which the French adopted towards them, never letting
them forget that it was they (the French) who were maintaining them.
The French on their part complained of the excessive demands of the
Serbians, to whom they attributed what they called _la mentalité des
sinistrés_.
Relations between officers and soldiers were not always good. The
soldiers complained of being neglected and ill-treated by their
officers, and even accused some of them of financial dishonesty. An
American doctor, who had lived long in Serbia and with the Serbian
Army and knew the language well, assured me that these accusations
were justified, and that the Serbian civil and military administration
was both corrupt and incompetent. He believed, indeed, that when the
Serbian Government succeeded in re-establishing itself in Serbia it
would encounter serious difficulties with the population because the
Austrian Government, although politically oppressive, had accustomed
it to a more honest and competent civil service than that of the
Serbian State. These difficulties were due in part, according to
this same American, to the great gap existing between the slightly
educated classes, to whom the officers belonged, and the ignorant
peasants, who formed the common soldiers. The officers did not take
sufficient care for the well-being of their men, and a very large
number of them lived comfortably at Salonica, where they had little
to do, while the soldiers and the rest of the officers were fighting
and suffering great hardships at the front. There is certainly some
exaggeration in all this, but there is also some truth. In a general
way, the officers of the old Serbian Army were excellent, but as a
really educated bourgeoisie does not exist in the country, most of the
reserve officers, drawn from the semi-educated middle classes, left a
great deal to be desired. Another difficulty was due to the fact that
the Government was at Corfu while the army, which represented all that
remained of the nation, was in Macedonia, and the former soon lost all
touch with the latter. The atmosphere of Corfu had become a hotbed of
personal ambitions, intrigues and petty spite. The Serbians themselves
called it their Capua. Among the Serbians moreover, as I have said,
secret societies flourished, and these found a field of great activity
in the conditions of the moment. Even exile did not make the Serbians
forget the habit of conspiracy.
From the moment the Serbian Army took up its position in Macedonia its
front extended from the eastern arm of the Cerna to the neighbourhood
of Nonte. Divided after its reorganization into 3 armies, these were
as we have seen, in consequence of the reduction of the effectives,
reduced to 2 of 3 divisions each, plus the cavalry division. The I Army
(Drina, Morava and Timok Divisions) commanded by Voivod Michich, had
its H.Q. at Votchtaran and occupied the western sector; the II (Vardar,
Danube and Shumadia Divisions), commanded by Voivod Stepanovich,
occupied the eastern sector, with its H.Q. at Dragomantzi. Although the
Serbian G.H.Q. was at Salonica, there was also an advanced G.H.Q. near
Mount Floka. The ground on the Serbian front was extremely rough, with
huge masses of rock, high peaks and great forests spread over it. The
area of the II Army was a particularly uncomfortable one, as it was
almost everywhere exposed to the enemy fire. The roads were few and
bad, and communications extremely difficult. For its supplies, the I
Army made use of the Monastir railway as far as Sakulevo, then of the
décauville for a few kilometres, and finally of the ordinary roads.
The II Army could not use the railway beyond Vertekop. At the railway
terminus there were motor parks supplied by the British, who organized
an excellent service, principally with small Ford lorries which could
go anywhere, even over the most impossible roads. The Serbians knew
how to make the best use of the scanty agricultural resources of the
country, and although they complained that the least fertile areas had
been assigned to them, they managed so well that their horses never
lacked forage and always appeared fat and well fed. They were indeed
excellent horse-masters.
In the early days of the Macedonian campaign our relations with the
Serbs were somewhat cold. We could not help admiring their splendid
military qualities and burning patriotism, although we did not fail to
notice their serious defects of character, due to Oriental tradition.
The Serbs, on their part, were irritated against us on account of the
incidents in Albania already mentioned. General Petitti, however, made
every effort to eliminate misunderstandings by means of a conciliatory
and cordial policy. He began by the cession of materials, of which
the Serbians were in sore need, and did it with the greatest possible
tact, so as to avoid in any way hurting their feelings. The Serbs, as
we have said, were dependent on the French for their services, and
General Petitti, knowing that the latter were not always adequate,
often assisted them with motor vehicles, movable huts, etc., whenever
the occasion arose. As it was necessary to evacuate the civilian
population from a part of the Italian area, he made a point of always
consulting the Serbian authorities, to whom he showed the greatest
possible deference, before taking any action, and he provided transport
and even food for the people who were being evacuated. Relations
between our troops and the Serbian troops and the civilian population
never gave rise to any incident, and the Serbians could not help
admiring the order and efficiency of our transport and other services
and the condition of our animals, to which they were not accustomed
in Macedonia, except in the case of their own horses. In his work of
conciliating the Serbians, General Petitti found useful collaborators
in Lieutenant Cangià, Italian liaison officer with the I Serbian Army,
in Captain Goad, British liaison officer with the 35th Division, and in
Dr. Reiss the Swiss scientist, who was a good friend of ours and of the
Serbians.
When General Petitti was requested to grant facilities for the journey
of Voivod Michich’s wife from Italy, he arranged that she should cross
on one of our best steamers and then travel on an Italian staff car
from Santi Quaranta, escorted by an Italian officer. The Voivod had
first applied to the French authorities, who informed him that his wife
must travel via Patras. He therefore preferred that she should avail
herself of the facilities offered by the Italians.
On the occasion of the fighting in February 1917 on Hill 1050, Voivod
Michich, who had been present, sent a message to General Petitti[18]
expressing his unbounded admiration for the dash and gallantry of our
troops, which was sent to Italy and published, and made a very good
impression.
Personal relations between our officers and soldiers and the Serbians
went on improving, and many cordial individual friendships were
formed. General Mombelli continued General Petitti’s policy for a
_rapprochement_ with the Serbians and intensified it. He was on
excellent terms with the Prince Regent and neglected nothing to render
himself a _persona grata_ with him and his army. Our Command was very
generous in concessions of motor transport to Serbian officers and
officials travelling between Salonica, the Serbian front, and Corfu,
and they constantly applied to us for this purpose, preferring our
service even to that which was subsequently instituted by their own
Command.
We also co-operated in Serbian propaganda in Macedonia. In the small
strip of Serbian territory reoccupied after the capture of Monastir,
there was a mixed Serbo-Bulgarian population of somewhat uncertain
political sentiments, but predominantly Bulgarian. The Serbian
Government did everything to spread the Serbian idea among the
inhabitants by means of schools and propaganda. In the villages of Brod
and Tepavci, which were in our military area, General Mombelli had some
schools built by Italian soldiers for the native children. The Serbian
Relief Fund (a British association) and the American Red Cross provided
food, clothes, furniture etc. and also some nurses, while the Serbian
Government provided the teachers. The inauguration of the school at
Brod was a very pleasant festival of Italo-Serb cordiality.
The great weakness of the Serbian Army was its deficiency in
effectives, and this became more serious day by day. While all the
Allies in Macedonia suffered from the same trouble, because the
Governments and General Staffs were reluctant to send reinforcements
(only our expeditionary force was kept up to strength, at all events
until the autumn of 1917), the condition of the Serbs was far more
serious, because, save for small groups of volunteers from Europe and
America, very often of advanced age and unable to endure hardships,
there was no source whence reinforcements could be drawn to make
good the constant losses caused by fighting and sickness. “Our
reinforcements,” said a field officer attached to the Serbian G.H.Q.,
“are always the same--the men who come out of hospital more or less
cured.” This was a cause of great depression among the Serbians, and in
spite of their intense patriotism, there were, as we shall see, moments
in which their faith faltered and they contemplated the possibility of
concluding a separate peace. This tendency among certain parties was
very marked, and resulted in sundry plots and intrigues.