WASHINGTON'S OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHERN STATES. 1779.
We have seen that Washington had gone from his winter quarters near
Middlebrook in the Jerseys to hold a conference with Congress on the
subject of the invasion of Canada. When this matter had been disposed of
there still remained many subjects demanding the joint attention of the
supreme Legislature and the Commander-in-Chief, and accordingly he spent
a considerable part of the winter of 1778-9 at Philadelphia consulting
with Congress on measures for the general defense and welfare of the
country. Washington felt extreme anxiety at the inadequate means at
his disposal for conducting the campaign of 1779. The state of Congress
itself, as we have already shown, was sufficiently embarrassing to
him, but there were other causes of uneasiness in the general aspect of
affairs. The French alliance was considered by the people as rendering
the cause of independence perfectly safe; with little or no exertion on
our part England was supposed to be already conquered in America, and,
moreover, she was threatened with a Spanish war. Hence the States
were remiss in furnishing their quotas of men and money. The currency,
consisting of Continental bills, was so much depreciated that a silver
dollar was worth forty dollars of the paper money. The effect of this
last misfortune was soon apparent in the conduct of the officers of the
Jersey brigade.
In pursuance of Washington's plan of chastising the Indians, to which we
referred in the last chapter, it was resolved to lead a force into those
villages of the Six Nations which were hostile to the United States and
destroy their settlements.
As the army destined for this expedition was about to move alarming
symptoms of discontent appeared in a part of it. The Jersey brigade,
which had been stationed during the winter at Elizabethtown, was ordered
early in May (1779) to march by regiments. This order was answered by
a letter from General Maxwell stating that the officers of the First
regiment had delivered a remonstrance to their colonel, addressed to the
Legislature of the State, declaring that unless their complaints on the
subjects of pay and support should obtain the immediate attention of
that body, they were, at the expiration of three days, to be considered
as having resigned, and requesting the Legislature, in that event, to
appoint other officers to succeed them. They declared, however, their
readiness to make every preparation for obeying the orders which had
been given, and to continue their attention to the regiment until a
reasonable time should elapse for the appointment of their successors.
"This," added the letter of General Maxwell, "is a step they are
extremely unwilling to take, but it is such as I make no doubt they
will all take; nothing but necessity--their not being able to support
themselves in time to come and being loaded with debts contracted in
time past--could have induced them to resign at so critical a juncture."
The intelligence conveyed in this letter made a serious impression on
Washington. He was strongly attached to the army and to its interests,
had witnessed its virtues and its sufferings, and lamented sincerely its
present distresses. The justice of the complaints made by the officers
could no more be denied than the measure they had adopted could be
approved. Relying on their patriotism and on his own influence, he
immediately wrote a letter to General Maxwell to be laid before them
in which, mingling the sensibility of a friend with the authority of
a general, he addressed to their understanding and to their love of
country, observations calculated to invite their whole attention to the
consequences which must result from the step they were about to take.
"The patience and perseverance of the army," proceeds the letter, "have
been, under every disadvantage, such as to do them the highest honor
both at home and abroad, and have inspired me with an unlimited
confidence of their virtue, which has consoled me amidst every
perplexity and reverse of fortune to which our affairs, in a struggle of
this nature, were necessarily exposed. Now that we have made so great a
progress to the attainment of the end we have in view, so that we cannot
fail without a most shameful desertion of our own interests, anything
like a change of conduct would imply a very unhappy change of
principles, and a forgetfulness as well of what we owe to ourselves as
to our country. Did I suppose it possible this could be the case, even
in a single regiment of the army, I should be mortified and chagrined
beyond expression. I should feel it as a wound given to my own honor,
which I consider as embarked with that of the army at large. But this I
believe to be impossible. Any corps that was about to set an example
of the kind would weigh well the consequences, and no officer of common
discernment and sensibility would hazard them. If they should stand
alone in it, independent of other consequences, what would be their
feelings on reflecting that they had held themselves out to the world in
a point of light inferior to the rest of the army? Or if their
example should be followed, and become general, how could they console
themselves for having been the foremost in bringing ruin and disgrace
upon their country? They would remember that the army would share
a double portion of the general infamy and distress, and that the
character of an American officer would become as infamous as it is now
glorious.
"I confess the appearances in the present instance are disagreeable, but
I am convinced they seem to mean more than they really do. The Jersey
officers have not been outdone by any others in the qualities either of
citizens or soldiers; and I am confident no part of them would seriously
intend anything that would be a stain on their former reputation. The
gentlemen cannot be in earnest; they have only reasoned wrong about the
means of obtaining a good end, and, on consideration, I hope and flatter
myself they will renounce what must appear to be improper. At the
opening of a campaign, when under marching orders for an important
service, their own honor, duty to the public and to themselves, and
a regard to military propriety, will not suffer them to persist in a
measure which would be a violation of them all. It will even wound their
delicacy, coolly to reflect that they have hazarded a step which has
an air of dictating terms to their country, by taking advantage of the
necessity of the moment."
This letter did not completely produce the desired effect. The officers
did not recede from their claims. In an address to Washington, they
expressed their unhappiness that any act of theirs should give him pain,
but proceeded to justify the step they had taken. Repeated memorials
had been presented to their Legislature which had been received with
promises of attention, but had been regularly neglected. "At length,"
said they, "we have lost all confidence in our Legislature. Reason
and experience forbid that we should have any. Few of us have private
fortunes; many have families, who already are suffering everything that
can be received from an ungrateful country. Are we then to suffer all
the inconveniences, fatigues, and dangers of a military life, while our
wives and our children are perishing for want of common necessaries at
home--and that without the most distant prospect of reward, for our pay
is now only nominal? We are sensible that your Excellency cannot wish
nor desire this from us. We are sorry that you should imagine we meant
to disobey orders. It was and still is our determination to march with
our regiment and to do the duty of officers until the Legislature should
have a reasonable time to appoint others, but no longer.
"We beg leave to assure your Excellency that we have the highest sense
of your ability and virtues; that executing your orders has ever given
us pleasure; that we love the service, and we love our country--but when
that country gets so lost to virtue and justice as to forget to support
its servants, it then becomes their duty to retire from its service."
This letter was peculiarly embarrassing to Washington. To adopt a stern
course of proceeding might hazard the loss of the Jersey line, an event
not less injurious to the service than painful to himself. To take up
the subject without doing too much for the circumstances of the army
would be doing too little for the occasion. He therefore declined taking
any other notice of the letter than to declare through General Maxwell,
that while they continued to do their duty in conformity with the
determination they had expressed he should only regret the part they had
taken and should hope they would perceive its impropriety.
The Legislature of New Jersey, alarmed at the decisive step taken by
the officers, was at length induced to pay some attention to their
situation--they consenting on their part to withdraw their remonstrance.
In the meantime they continued to perform their duty and their march was
not delayed by this unpleasant altercation.
In communicating this transaction to Congress Washington took occasion
to remind that body of his having frequently urged the absolute
necessity of some general and adequate provision for the officers of the
army. "I shall only observe," continued the letter, "that the distresses
in some corps are so great, either where they were not until lately
attached to any particular State, or where the State has been less
provident, that the officers have solicited even to be supplied with the
clothing destined for the common soldiery, coarse and unsuitable as it
was. I had not power to comply with the request.
"The patience of men animated by a sense of duty and honor will support
them to a certain point, beyond which it will not go. I doubt not
Congress will be sensible of the danger of an extreme in this respect,
and will pardon my anxiety to obviate it."
Before the troops destined for the grand expedition were put in motion
an enterprise of less extent was undertaken which was completely
successful. A plan for surprising the towns of the Onondagas, one of the
nearest of the hostile tribes, having been formed by General
Schuyler and approved by Washington, Colonel Van Schaick assisted by
Lieutenant-Colonel Willet and Major Cochran marched from Fort Schuyler
on the morning of the 19th of April at the head of between five and six
hundred men and on the third day reached the point of destination. The
whole settlement was destroyed after which the detachment returned
to Fort Schuyler without the loss of a single man. For this handsome
display of talents as a partisan, the thanks of Congress were voted to
Colonel Van Schaick and the officers and soldiers under his command.
The cruelties exercised by the Indians in the course of the preceding
year had given a great degree of importance to the expedition now
meditated against them, and the relative military strength and situation
of the two parties rendered it improbable that any other offensive
operations could be carried on by the Americans in the course of the
present campaign. The army under the command of Sir Henry Clinton,
exclusive of the troops in the southern department, was computed at
between sixteen and seventeen thousand men. The American army, the
largest division of which lay at Middlebrook under the immediate command
of Washington, was rather inferior to that of the British in real
strength. The grand total, except those in the southern and western
country, including officers of every description amounted to about
16,000. Three thousand of these were in New England under the command of
General Gates, and the remaining 13,000 were cantoned on both sides of
the North river.
After the destruction of Forts Clinton and Montgomery in 1777, it had
been determined to construct the fortifications intended for the future
defense of the North river at West Point, a position which being more
completely embosomed in the hills was deemed more defensible. The works
had been prosecuted with unremitting industry but were far from being
completed.
King's Ferry, some miles below West Point, where the great road, the
most convenient communication between the middle and eastern States,
crossed the North river, is completely commanded by two opposite points
of land. That on the west side, a rough and elevated piece of ground, is
denominated Stony Point; and the other, on the east side, a flat neck
of land projecting far into the water, is called Verplanck's Point.
The command of King's Ferry was an object worth the attention of either
army, and Washington had comprehended the points which protect it within
his plan of defense for the Highlands. A small but strong work called
Fort Fayette was completed at Verplanck's and was garrisoned by a
company commanded by Captain Armstrong. The works on Stony Point were
unfinished. As the season for active operations approached Sir Henry
Clinton formed a plan for opening the campaign with a brilliant _coup
de main_ up the North river and toward the latter end of May made
preparations for the enterprise.
These preparations were immediately communicated to Washington who was
confident that Clinton meditated an attack on the forts in the Highlands
or designed to take a position between those forts and Middlebrook, in
order to interrupt the communication between the different parts of
the American army, to prevent their reunion and to beat them in detail.
Measures were instantly taken to counteract either of these designs.
The intelligence from New York was communicated to Generals Putnam and
M'Dougal, who were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to march, and
on the 29th of May (1779) the army moved by divisions from Middlebrook
toward the Highlands. On the 30th the British army commanded by Clinton
in person and convoyed by Sir George Collier proceeded up the river, and
General Vaughan at the head of the largest division, landed next morning
about eight miles below Verplanck's. The other division under the
particular command of General Patterson, but accompanied by Clinton,
advancing further up, landed on the west side within three miles of
Stony Point.
That place being immediately abandoned, General Patterson took
possession of it on the same afternoon. He dragged some heavy cannon and
mortars to the summit of the hill in the course of the night (June 1,
1779), and at five next morning opened a battery on Fort Fayette at the
distance of about 1,000 yards. During the following night two galleys
passed the fort and anchoring above it prevented the escape of the
garrison by water while General Vaughan invested it closely by land.
No means of defending the fort or of saving themselves remaining the
garrisons became prisoners of war. Immediate directions were given
for completing the works at both posts and for putting Stony Point in
particular in a strong state of defense.
Washington determined to check any further advance of the enemy, and
before Clinton was in a situation to proceed against West Point, General
M'Dougal was so strengthened and the American army took such a position
on the strong grounds about the Hudson that the enterprise became too
hazardous to be further prosecuted.
After completing the fortifications on both sides of the river at King's
Ferry, Clinton placed a strong garrison in each fort and proceeded down
the river to Philipsburg. The relative situation of the hostile armies
presenting insuperable obstacles to any grand operation they could be
employed offensively only on detached expeditions. Connecticut, from
its contiguity to New York and its extent of sea coast, was peculiarly
exposed to invasion. The numerous small cruisers which plied in the
sound, to the great annoyance of British commerce, and the large
supplies of provisions drawn from the adjacent country for the use of
the Continental army, furnished great inducements to Clinton to direct
his enterprises particularly against that State. He also hoped to draw
Washington from his impregnable position on the North river into the low
country and thus obtain an opportunity of striking at some part of
his army or of seizing the posts which were the great object of the
campaign. With these views he planned an expedition against Connecticut,
the command of which was given to Governor Tryon, who reached New Haven
bay on the 5th of July (1779) with about 2,600 men.
Washington was at the time on the lines examining in person the
condition of the works on Stony and Verplanck's Points, in consequence
of which the intelligence which was transmitted to headquarters that the
fleet had sailed could not be immediately communicated to the Governor
of Connecticut, and the first intimation which that State received
of its danger was given by the appearance of the enemy. The militia
assembled in considerable numbers with alacrity, but the British
effected a landing and took possession of the town. After destroying
the military and naval stores found in the place, they re-embarked and
proceeded westward to Fairfield which was reduced to ashes. The spirited
resistance made by the militia at this place is attested by the apology
made by General Tryon for the wanton destruction of private property
which disgraced his conduct. "The village was burnt," he says, "to
resent the fire of the rebels from their houses and to mask our
retreat."
From Fairfield the fleet crossed the sound to Huntington bay where it
remained until the 9th (July, 1779), when it recrossed that water. The
troops were landed in the night on a peninsula on the east side of the
Bay of Norwalk. About the same time a much larger detachment from
the British army directed its course towards Horse Neck and made
demonstrations of a design to penetrate into the country in that
direction.
On the first intelligence that Connecticut was invaded, General Parsons,
a native of that State, had been directed by Washington to hasten to the
scene of action. Placing himself at the head of about 150 Continental
troops who were supported by considerable bodies of militia, he attacked
the British on the morning of the twelfth as soon as they were in motion
and kept up an irregular distant fire throughout the day. But, being
too weak to prevent the destruction of any particular town on the coast,
Norwalk was reduced to ashes, after which the British re-embarked and
returned to Huntington bay there to await for reinforcements. At this
place, however, Tryon received orders to return to Whitestone where in
a conference between Clinton and Sir George Collier it was determined to
proceed against New London with an increased force.
On the invasion of Connecticut, Washington was prompt in his exertions
to send Continental troops from the nearest encampments to its aid, but
before they could afford any real service Clinton found it necessary to
recall Tryon to the Hudson.
Washington had planned an enterprise against the posts at King's Ferry,
comprehending a double attack to be made at the same time on both. But
the difficulty of a perfect cooperation of detachments, incapable of
communicating with each other, determined him to postpone the attack on
Verplanck's and to make that part of the plan dependent on the success
of the first. His whole attention, therefore, was turned to Stony Point
and the troops destined for this critical service proceeded on it as
against a single object.
The execution of the plan was entrusted by Washington to General Wayne
who commanded the light infantry of the army. His daring courage had
long since obtained for him the sobriquet of "Mad Anthony." He accepted
the command with alacrity. Secrecy was deemed so much more essential to
success than numbers that no addition was made to the force already on
the lines. One brigade was ordered to commence its march so as to reach
the scene of action in time to cover the troops engaged in the attack
should any unlooked-for disaster befall them, and Maj. Henry Lee of
the light dragoons, who had been eminently useful in obtaining the
intelligence which led to the enterprise, was associated with Wayne as
far as cavalry could be employed in such a service. The night of the
15th (July, 1779), and the hour of twelve, were chosen for the assault.
Stony Point is a commanding hill projecting far into the Hudson which
washes three-fourths of its base. The remaining fourth was in a great
measure covered by a deep marsh, commencing near the river on the upper
side and continuing into it below. Over this marsh there was only one
crossing place, but at its junction with the river was a sandy beach
passable at low tide. On the summit of this hill stood the fort which
was furnished with heavy ordnance. Several breastworks and strong
batteries were advanced in front of the main work, and about half way
down the hill were two rows of abattis. The batteries were calculated to
command the beach and the crossing place of the marsh, and to rake and
enfilade any column which might be advancing from either of those points
toward the fort. In addition to these defenses several vessels of war
were stationed in the river and commanded the ground at the foot of
the hill. The garrison consisted of about 600 men commanded by Colonel
Johnson.
Wayne arrived about eight in the evening at Springsteel's, one and a
half miles from the fort and made his dispositions for the assault.
It was intended to attack the works on the right and left flanks at the
same instant. The regiments of Febiger and of Meigs with Major Hull's
detachment formed the right column, and Butler's regiment, with two
companies under Major Murfree, formed the left. One hundred and fifty
volunteers led by Lieutenant-Colonel Fleury and Major Posey constituted
the van of the right, and 100 volunteers under Major Stewart composed
the van of the left. At 11:30 the two columns moved to the assault, the
van of each with unloaded muskets and fixed bayonets. They were
each preceded by a forlorn hope of twenty men, the one commanded by
Lieutenant Gibbon and the other by Lieutenant Knox. They reached the
marsh undiscovered and at 12:20 commenced the assault.
Both columns rushed forward under a tremendous fire of grape-shot and
musketry. Surmounting every obstacle, they entered the works at the
point of the bayonet and without discharging a single musket obtained
possession of the fort.
The humanity displayed by the conquerors was not less conspicuous nor
less honorable than their courage. Not an individual suffered after
resistance had ceased.
All the troops engaged in this perilous service manifested a degree
of ardor and impetuosity which proved them to be capable of the most
difficult enterprises, and all distinguished themselves whose situation
enabled them to do so. Colonel Fleury, who had distinguished himself in
defense of the forts on the Delaware in 1777, was the first to enter
the fort and strike the British standard. Major Posey mounted the works
almost at the same instant and was the first to give the watch-word,
"The fort's our own." Lieutenants Gibbon and Knox performed the service
allotted to them with a degree of intrepidity which could not be
surpassed. Of twenty men who constituted the party of the former,
seventeen were killed or wounded. [1] Sixty-three of the garrison were
killed, including two officers. The prisoners amounted to 543, among
whom were 1 lieutenant-colonel, 4 captains, and 20 subaltern officers.
The military stores taken in the fort were considerable.
The loss sustained by the assailants was not proportioned to the
apparent danger of the enterprise. The killed and wounded did not exceed
100 men. Wayne, who marched with Febiger's regiment in the right
column received a wound in the head which stunned him. Recovering
consciousness, but believing the wound to be mortal, he said to his
aids, "Carry me into the fort and let me die at the head of my column."
Being supported by his aids he entered the fort with the regiment.
Lieutenant-Colonel Hay was also among the wounded.
Although the design upon Fort Fayette had yielded to the desire of
securing the success of the attack on Stony Point it had not been
abandoned. Two brigades under General M'Dougal had been ordered to
approach the works on Verplanck's, in which Colonel Webster commanded,
and be in readiness to attack them the instant Wayne should obtain
possession of Stony Point. That this detachment might not permit the
favorable moment to pass unimproved Wayne had been requested to direct
the messenger who should convey the intelligence of his success to
Washington to pass through M'Dougal's camp and give him advice of that
event. He was also requested to turn the cannon of the fort against
Verplanck's and the vessels in the river. The last orders were executed
and a heavy cannonade was opened on Fort Fayette and on the vessels,
which compelled them to fall down the river. Through some misconception,
never explained, the messenger dispatched by Wayne did not call on
M'Dougal, but proceeded directly to headquarters. Thus, every advantage
expected from the first impression made by the capture of Stony Point
was lost, and the garrison had full leisure to recover from the surprise
occasioned by that event and to prepare for an attack. This change
of circumstances made it necessary to change the plan of operation.
Washington ordered General Howe to take the command of M'Dougal's
detachment to which some pieces of heavy artillery were to be annexed.
He was directed, after effecting a breach in the walls, to make the
dispositions for an assault and to demand a surrender, but not to
attempt a storm until it should be dark. To these orders explicit
instructions were added not to hazard his party by remaining before
Verplanck's after the British should cross Croton river in force.
Through some unaccountable negligence in the persons charged with the
execution of these orders the battering artillery was not accompanied
with suitable ammunition, and the necessary entrenching tools were not
brought. These omissions were supplied the next day, but it was then too
late to proceed against Verplanck's.
On receiving intelligence of the loss of Stony Point and of the danger
to which the garrison of Fort Fayette was exposed, Sir Henry Clinton
relinquished his views on Connecticut and made a forced march to Dobb's
Ferry. Some troops were immediately embarked to pass up the river and
a light corps was pushed forward to the Croton. This movement relieved
Fort Fayette.
The failure of the attempt to obtain possession of Verplanck's Point,
leaving that road of communication still closed, diminished the
advantages which had been expected to result from the enterprise so
much that it was deemed unadvisable to maintain Stony Point. On
reconnoitering the ground Washington believed that the place could not
be rendered secure with a garrison of less than 1,500 men--a number
which could not be spared from the army without weakening it too much
for further operations. He determined, therefore, to evacuate Stony
Point and retire to the Highlands. As soon as this resolution was
executed Clinton repossessed himself of that post, repaired the
fortifications, and placed a stronger garrison in it, after which he
resumed his former situation at Philipsburg.
The two armies watched each other for some time. At length, Clinton,
finding himself unable to attack Washington in the strong position he
had taken or to draw him from it, and being desirous of transferring
the theater of active war to the south, withdrew to New York and was
understood to be strengthening the fortifications erected for its
defense, as preparatory to the large detachments he intended making to
reinforce the southern army.
Although this movement was made principally with a view to southern
operations, it was in some degree hastened by the opinion that New
York required immediate additional protection during the absence of the
fleet, which was about to sail for the relief of Penobscot.
Scarcely had Sir George Collier, who had accompanied Clinton up the
Hudson to take possession of Stony Point, returned to New York, when he
was informed that a fleet of armed vessels with transports and troops
had sailed from Boston to attack a post which General M'Lean was
establishing at Penobscot in the eastern part of the province of
Massachusetts bay. He immediately got ready for sea that part of the
naval force which was at New York, and on the 3d of August sailed to
relieve the garrison of Penobscot.
In the month of June (1779) General M'Lean, who commanded the royal
troops in Nova Scotia, arrived in the bay of Penobscot with nearly 700
men, in order to establish a post which might at once be a means
of checking the incursions of the Americans into Nova Scotia and of
supplying the royal yards at Halifax with ship timber, which abounded in
that part of the country. This establishment alarmed the government of
Massachusetts bay, which resolved to dislodge M'Lean, and, with great
promptitude, equipped a fleet and raised troops for that purpose.
The fleet, which consisted of fifteen vessels of war, carrying from
thirty-two to twelve guns each with transports, was commanded by
Commodore Saltonstall; the army, amounting to between three and four
thousand militia, was under the orders of General Lovell.
General M'Lean chose for his post a peninsula on the east side of
Penobscot bay, which is about seven leagues wide and seventeen deep,
terminating at the point where the river Penobscot flows into it.
M'Lean's station was nine miles from the bottom of the bay. As that part
of the country was then an unbroken forest he cleared away the wood on
the peninsula and began to construct a fort in which he was assisted
and protected by the crews of three sloops-of-war which had escorted him
thither. M'Lean heard of the expedition against him on the 21st of July
(1779), when he had made little progress in the erection of his fort.
On the 25th the American fleet appeared in the bay, but, owing to the
opposition of the British sloops-of-war and to the bold and rugged
nature of the shore, the troops did not effect a landing until the 28th.
This interval M'Lean improved with such laborious diligence that his
fortifications were in a state of considerable forwardness. Lovell
erected a battery within 750 yards of the works, and for nearly a
fortnight a brisk cannonade was kept up and preparations were made to
assault the fort. But, on the 13th of August (1779), Lovell was informed
that Sir George Collier with a superior naval force had entered the
bay; therefore in the night he silently embarked his troops and cannon,
unperceived by the garrison, which was every moment in expectation of
being assaulted.
On the approach of the British fleet the Americans, after some show
of preparation for resistance, betook themselves to flight. A general
pursuit and unresisted destruction ensued. The Warren, a fine new
frigate of thirty-two guns, and fourteen other vessels of inferior
force, were either blown up or taken. The transports fled in confusion
and, after having landed the troops in a wild and uncultivated part
of the country, were burnt. The men, destitute of provisions and other
necessaries, had to explore their way for more than 100 miles through
an uninhabited and pathless wilderness and many of them perished before
reaching the settled country. After this successful exploit Sir George
Collier returned to New York, where he resigned the command of the fleet
to Admiral Arbuthnot, who had arrived from England with some ships of
war and with provisions, stores, and reinforcements for the army.
On descending the river, after replacing the garrison of Stony Point,
Sir Henry Clinton encamped above Harlem, with his upper posts at
Kingsbridge. Washington remained in his strong position in the
Highlands, but frequently detached numerous parties on both sides of
the river in order to check the British foragers and to restrain the
intercourse with the Loyalists. Major Lee ("Light Horse Harry"), who
commanded one of those parties, planned a bold and hazardous enterprise
against the British post at Paulus Hook on the Jersey bank of the river,
opposite New York. That post was strongly fortified and of difficult
access, and therefore the garrison thought themselves secure. But Lee
determined to make an attempt on the place and chose the morning of the
20th of August (1779) for his enterprise, when part of the garrison was
absent on a foraging excursion. Advancing silently at the head of
300 men the sentinel at the gate mistook his party for that which had
marched out the preceding day, and allowed them to pass unchallenged,
and almost in an instant they seized the blockhouse and two redoubts
before the alarm was given. Major Sutherland, commandant of the post,
with sixty Hessians, entered a redoubt and began a brisk fire on the
assailants. This gave an extensive notice of the attack, and the firing
of guns in New York, and by the shipping in the roads, proved that the
alarm was widely spread. In order, therefore, not to hazard the loss
of his party, Lee retreated with the loss of two men killed and three
wounded, carrying along with him about 150 prisoners. Notwithstanding
the difficulties and dangers which he had to encounter, he effected his
retreat. It was not his design to keep possession of the place, but
to carry off the garrison, reflect credit on the American arms, and
encourage a spirit of enterprise in the army. [2]
The expedition planned by Washington for chastising the Indians who had
committed such atrocities last year on the frontier and particularly at
Wyoming, was the most important of this campaign. Washington entrusted
the command of it to General Sullivan. The largest division of the army
employed on that service assembled at Wyoming. Another division, which
had wintered on the Mohawk, marched under the orders of Gen. James
Clinton and joined the main body at the confluence of the two great
sources of the Susquehanna. On the 22d. of August (1779), the united
force, amounting to nearly 5,000 men, under the command of General
Sullivan, proceeded up the Cayuga or western branch of the last-named
river which led directly into the Indian country. The preparations for
this expedition did not escape the notice of those against whom it was
directed, and the Indians seem fully to have penetrated Sullivan's plan
of operation. Formidable as his force was they determined to meet him
and try the fortune of a battle. They were about 1,000 strong, commanded
by the two Butlers, Guy Johnson, M'Donald, and Brandt. They chose their
ground with judgment and fortified their camp at some distance above
Chemung and within a mile of Newtown.
There Sullivan attacked them and, after a short but spirited resistance,
they retreated with precipitation. The Americans had thirty men killed
or wounded; the Indians left only eleven dead bodies on the field,
but they were so discouraged by this defeat that they abandoned their
villages and fields to the unresisted ravages of the victor, who laid
waste their towns and orchards, so that they might have no inducement
again to settle so near the settlements of the whites.
The severity of this proceeding has been censured by some writers,
but it requires no apology. Nothing could convince the savages of
the injustice and inhumanity of their usual system of warfare on the
frontier so effectually as to give them a specimen of it, even in a
milder form, in their own country. Sullivan desolated their villages and
farms, but we do not learn that he took any scalps or murdered any
women or children, or tortured any of his prisoners. The measure of
retaliation which he dealt to the miscreants who sacked Wyoming was
gentleness and humanity when compared with their proceedings. It is only
to be regretted that his retaliation could not have been applied to the
homes of the British and Tories who assisted the Indians at Wyoming.
Sullivan and his army received a vote of thanks from Congress, but the
general's health failing, he soon resigned his commission and retired
from the service.
Sullivan's orders from Washington exculpate him from all blame as to the
mode of punishing the Indians. "Of the expedition," Washington says,
in writing to him, "the immediate objects are the total destruction and
devastation of their settlements and the capture of as many prisoners
of every age and sex as possible." Washington knew that this kind of
warfare was the only possible means of putting an end to Indian wars.
Any other mode of proceeding, he was fully aware, was treachery and
cruelty to his own countrymen.
A few days after the surprise of Paulus Hook by Major Lee, the
long-expected fleet from Europe, under the command of Admiral Arbuthnot,
having on board a reinforcement for the British army, arrived at New
York. This reinforcement, however, did not enable Clinton to enter
immediately on that active course of offensive operations which he had
meditated. It was soon followed by the Count D'Estaing, who arrived on
the southern coast of America with a powerful fleet, after which Clinton
deemed it necessary to turn all his attention to his own security. Rhode
Island and the posts up the North river were evacuated and the whole
army was collected in New York, the fortifications of which were carried
on with unremitting industry.
The Count D'Estaing and Admiral Byron having sailed about the same time
from the coast of North America, met in the West Indies, where the
war was carried on with various success. St. Lucia surrendered to the
British in compensation for which the French took St. Vincent's and
Grenada. About the time of the capture of the latter island D'Estaing
received reinforcements which gave him a decided naval superiority,
after which a battle was fought between the two hostile fleets, in which
the count claimed the victory and in which so many of the British ships
were disabled that the admiral was compelled to retire into port in
order to refit.
Early in May (1779) Sir Henry Clinton had dispatched from New York
a squadron under Sir George Collier with 2,500 troops under General
Mathews, who entered Chesapeake Bay, and, after taking possession of
Portsmouth, sent out parties of soldiers to Norfolk, Suffolk, Gosport,
and other places in the neighborhood, where there were large deposits
of provisions and military and naval stores, and many merchant vessels,
some on the stocks and some laden with valuable cargoes. These were all
burnt and the whole neighborhood subjected to plunder and devastation.
This was a severe blow to the commerce on which Congress placed great
dependence for supplies to the army and for sustaining its own credit.
In compliance with the solicitations of General Lincoln and the
authorities of South Carolina, D'Estaing directed his course to the
coast of Georgia with twenty-two ships of the line and eleven frigates
having on board 6,000 soldiers, and arrived so suddenly on the southern
coast of America that the Experiment, of fifty guns, and three frigates,
fell into his hands. A vessel was sent to Charleston with information of
his arrival and a plan was concerted for the siege of Savannah.
General Lincoln, who, after the fall of Savannah, had been sent to
Charleston to take command of the southern department of the army, was
to cooperate with D'Estaing's fleet and army in the siege. Instead of
assaulting the place at the earliest practicable moment, they granted
Prevost, the British commander at Savannah, an armistice of twenty-four
hours, during which he received reinforcements and set them at defiance.
They then commenced a siege by regular approaches on land and cannonade
and bombardment from D'Estaing's formidable fleet in the harbor. This
lasted for three weeks.
On the 9th of October (1779), without having effected a sufficient
breach, the united French and American forces stormed the works. Great
gallantry was displayed by the assailants. The French and American
standards were both planted on the redoubts. But it was all in vain.
They were completely repulsed, the French losing 700 and the Americans
340 men. Count Pulaski was among the slain.
The loss of the garrison was astonishingly small. In killed and wounded
it amounted only to fifty-five--so great was the advantage of the
cover afforded by their works. After this repulse the Count D'Estaing
announced to General Lincoln his determination to raise the siege. The
remonstrances of that officer were unavailing, and the removal of the
heavy ordnance and stores was commenced. This being accomplished, both
armies moved from their ground on the evening of the 18th of October
(1779). The Americans, recrossing the Savannah at Zubly's Ferry, again
encamped in South Carolina, and the French re-embarked. D'Estaing
himself sailed with a part of his fleet for France; the rest proceeded
to the West Indies.
Although the issue of this enterprise was the source of severe chagrin
and mortification the prudence of General Lincoln suppressed
every appearance of dissatisfaction, and the armies separated with
manifestations of reciprocal esteem. The hopes which had brought the
militia into the field being disappointed they dispersed, and the
affairs of the southern States wore a more gloomy aspect than at any
former period.
During the siege of Savannah an ingenious enterprise of partisan warfare
was executed by Colonel White of the Georgia line. Before the arrival
of the French fleet in the Savannah, a British captain with in men had
taken post near the river Ogeeche, twenty-five miles from Savannah. At
the same place were five British vessels, four of which were armed, the
largest with fourteen guns, the least with four, and the vessels were
manned with forty sailors. Late at night, on the 30th of September
(1779), White, who had only six volunteers, including his own servant,
kindled a number of fires in different places so as to exhibit the
appearance of a considerable encampment, practiced several other
corresponding artifices, and then summoned the captain instantly to
surrender. That officer, believing that he was about to be attacked by a
superior force and that nothing but immediate submission could save him
and his men from destruction, made no defense. The stratagem was carried
on with so much address that the prisoners, amounting to 141, were
secured and conducted to the American post at Sunbury, twenty-five miles
distant.
On receiving intelligence of the situation of Lincoln, Congress passed a
resolution requesting Washington to order the North Carolina troops,
and such others as could be spared from the northern army, to the aid of
that in the South and assuring the States of South Carolina and Georgia
of the attention of government to their preservation, but requesting
them, for their own defense to comply with the recommendations formerly
made respecting the completion of their Continental regiments, and the
government of their militia while in actual service.
Washington had already received (November 1779) intelligence of the
disastrous result of D'Estaing and Lincoln's attack on Savannah, and had
formed his plans of operation before Congress sent assurances of aid
to the South. Giving up all expectation of cooperation from the French
fleet, he disbanded the New York and Massachusetts militia and made his
arrangements for the winter. He ordered one division of the army under
General Heath to the Highlands to protect West Point and the posts
in that neighborhood, and with the other division he went into winter
quarters near Morristown, the army being quartered in huts, as at Valley
Forge. The cavalry were sent to Connecticut.
Washington had already penetrated the design of the enemy to make the
southern States their principal field of operation, and accordingly he
dispatched to Charleston the North Carolina brigade in November, and the
whole of the Virginia line in December. On the other hand, Clinton and
Cornwallis embarked with a large force in transports convoyed by Admiral
Arbuthnot with a fleet of five ships of the line and several frigates,
and sailed on the 26th of December 1779, for Savannah. Knyphausen was
left in command of the garrison of New York. [3]
Washington's own summary of the operations of this campaign (1779)
is contained in a letter to Lafayette in the following terms: "The
operations of the enemy this campaign have been confined to the
establishment of works of defense, taking a post at King's Ferry, and
burning the defenseless towns of New Haven, Fairfield, and Norwalk,
on the Sound, within reach of their shipping, where little else was
or could be opposed to them than the cries of distressed women and
children; but these were offered in vain. Since these notable exploits
they have never stepped out of their works or beyond their lines. How a
conduct of this kind is to effect the conquest of America, the wisdom of
a North, a Germaine, or a Sandwich can best decide. It is too deep and
refined for the comprehension of common understandings and the general
run of politicians."
1. Footnote: For their bravery and good conduct at Stony Point, Wayne
received a gold, and Stewart and Fleury silver medals, with the thanks
of Congress. A separate medal was designed and struck for each of them.
2. Footnote: Lee, for this exploit at Paulus Hook, was presented with a
gold medal by Congress.
3. Footnote: Irving