Remedies for Sweating.
§ 1. Factory Legislation. What it can do.--Having now set forth the
three aspects of the industrial disease of "Sweating"--the excessive
supply of unskilled labour, the multiplication of small employers, the
irresponsibility of capital--we have next to ask, What is the nature of
the proposed remedies? Since any full discussion of the different
remedies is here impossible, it must suffice if we briefly indicate the
application of the chief proposed remedies to the different aspects of
the disease. These remedies will fairly fall into three classes.
The first class aim at attacking by legislative means, the small
workshop system, and the evils of long hours and unsanitary conditions
from which the "sweated" workers suffer. Briefly, it may be said that
they seek to increase and to enforce the legal responsibility of
employers, and indirectly to crush the small workshop system by turning
upon it the wholesome light of publicity, and imposing certain irksome
and expensive conditions which will make its survival in its worst and
ugliest shapes impossible. The most practical recommendation of the
Report of the Lords' Committee is an extension of the sanitary clauses
of the Factory Act, so as to reach all workshops.
We have seen that the unrestricted use of cheap labour is the essence of
"sweating." If the wholesome restrictions of our Factory Legislation
were in fact extended so as to cover all forms of employment, they would
so increase the expenses of the sweating houses, that they would fall
before the competition of the large factory system. Karl Marx writing a
generation ago saw this most clearly. "But as regards labour in the so-
called domestic industries, and the intermediate forms between this and
manufacture, so soon as limits are put to the working day and to the
employment of children, these industries go to the wall. Unlimited
exploitation of cheap labour power is the sole foundation of their power
to compete."[28]
The effectiveness of the existing Factory Act, so far as relates to
small workshops, is impaired by the following considerations--
1. The difficulty in finding small workshops. There is no effectual
registration of workshops, and the number of inspectors is inadequate to
the elaborate and tedious method of search imposed by the present
system.
2. The limitation as to right of entry. The power of inspectors to
"enter, inspect, and examine at all reasonable times by day or night, a
factory or a workshop, and every part thereof, when he has reason to
believe that any person is employed therein, and to enter by day any
place he has reasonable cause to believe to be a factory or workshop,"
is in fact not applicable in the case of dwelling-rooms used for
workshops. In a large number of cases of the worst form of "sweating,"
the inspector has no right of entrance but by consent of the occupant,
and the time which elapses before such consent is given suffices to
enable the "sweater" to adjust matters so as to remove all evidence of
infringements of the law.
3. The restricted power in reference to sanitation. A factory inspector
has no sanitary powers; he cannot act save through the sanitary officer.
The machinery of sanitary reform thus loses effectiveness.
Compulsory registration of workshops, adequate inspection, and reform of
machinery of sanitary reform, would be of material value in dealing with
some of the evils of the small workshop. But it would by no means put an
end to "sweating." So far as it admitted the continuance of the small
workshop, it would neither directly nor indirectly abate the evil of low
wages. It is even possible that any rapid extension of the Factory Act
might, by limiting the amount of employment in small workshops, increase
for a time the misery of those low-skilled workers, who might be
incapable of undertaking regular work in the larger factory. It is, at
any rate, not evident that such legislative reform would assist low-
class workers to obtain decent wages and regular employment, though it
would improve the other conditions under which they worked.
Again, existing factory legislation by no means covers even
theoretically the whole field of "sweating." Public-houses, restaurants,
all shops and places of amusement, laundries, and certain other
important forms of employment, which escape the present factory
legislation, are in their lower branches liable to the evils of
"sweating," and should be included under such factory legislation as
seeks to remedy these evils.
§ 2. Co-operative Production.--The organization of labour is the second
form of remedy. It is urged that wherever effective organization exists
in any trade, there is no danger of sweating. We have therefore, it is
maintained, only to organize the lower grades of labour, and "sweating"
will cease to exist. There are two forms of organization commonly
advocated, Co-operation and Trade Unionism.
The suggestion that the poorer grades of workers should by co-operative
production seek to relieve themselves from the stress of poverty and the
tyranny of the "sweating system," is a counsel of perfection far removed
from the possibility of present attainment. No one who has closely
studied the growth of productive co-operation in England will regard it
as a practicable remedy for poverty. Productive co-operation is
successful at present only in rare cases among skilled workmen of
exceptional morale and education. It is impossible that it should be
practised by low-skilled, low-waged workers, under industrial conditions
like those of to-day. It is surprising to find that the Lords' Committee
in its final report should have given prominence to schemes of co-
operation as a cure for the disease. The following paragraph correctly
sums up experience upon the subject--
"Productive societies have been from time to time started in East
London, but their career has been neither long nor brilliant. They have
often had a semi-philanthropic basis, and have been well-meant but
hopeless attempts to supersede 'sweating' by co-operation. None now
working are of sufficient importance to be mentioned."[29]
The place which productive and distributive co-operation is destined to
occupy in the history of the industrial freedom and elevation of the
masses doubtless will be of the first importance. To look forward to a
time when the workers of the community may be grouped in co-operative
bodies, either competing with one another, or related by some bond which
shall minimize the friction of competition, while not impairing the
freedom and integrity of each several group, is not perhaps a wild
utopian vision. To students of English industrial history the transition
to such a state will not appear more marked than the transition through
which industry passed under the Industrial Revolution to the present
capitalist system. But the recognition of this possible future does not
justify us in suggesting productive co-operation as a present remedy for
the poverty of low-skilled city workers. These latter must rise several
steps on the industrial and moral ladder before they are brought within
the reach of the co-operative remedy. It is with the cost and labour of
these early steps that the students of the problem of present poverty
must concern themselves.
§ 3. Trade Unionism. Ability of Workers to combine. Trade Unionism is a
more hopeful remedy. Large bodies of workers have by this means helped
to raise themselves from a condition of industrial weakness to one of
industrial strength. Why should not close combination among workers in
low-paid and sweating industries be attended with like results? Why
should not the men and women working in "sweating" trades combine, and
insist upon higher wages, shorter hours, more regular employment, and
better sanitary conditions? Well, it may be regarded as an axiom in
practical economies, that any concerted action, however weak and
desultory, has its value. Union is always strength. An employer who can
easily resist any number of individual claims for higher wages by his
power to replace each worker by an outsider, can less easily resist the
united pressure of a large body of his workmen, because the
inconvenience of replacing them all at once by a body of outsiders, is
far greater than the added difficulty of replacing each of them at
separate intervals of time. This is the basis of the power of concerted
action among workers. But the measure of this power depends in the main
upon two considerations.
First comes the degree of effectiveness in combination. The prime
requisites for effective combination are a spirit of comradeship and
mutual trust, knowledge and self-restraint in the disposition of united
force. Education and free and frequent intercourse can alone establish
these elements of effective combination. And here the first difficulty
for workers in "sweating" trades appears. Low-skilled work implies a low
degree of intelligence and education. The sweating industries, as we
have seen, are as a rule those which escape the centralizing influence
of the factory System, and where the employés work, either singly or in
small groups, unknown to one another, and with few opportunities of
forming a close mutual understanding. In some employments this local
severance belongs to the essence of the work, as, for example, in the
case of cab-drivers, omnibus-drivers, and generally in shop-work, where,
in spite of the growth of large stores, small masters still predominate;
in other employments the disunion of workers forms a distinct commercial
advantage which enables such low-class industries to survive, as in the
small workshop and the home-labour, which form the central crux of our
sweating problem. The very lack of leisure, and the incessant strain
upon the physique which belong to "sweating," contribute to retard
education, and to render mutual acquaintanceship and the formation of a
distinct trade interest extremely difficult. How to overcome these grave
difficulties which stand in the way of effective combination among
unskilled workers is a consideration of the first importance. The rapid
and momentarily successful action of organized dock labourers must not
be taken as conclusive evidence that combination in all other branches
of low-class labour can proceed at the same pace. The public and
localized character of the competition for casual dock labour rendered
effective combination here possible, in spite of the low intellectual
and moral calibre of the average labourer. It is the absence of such
public and localized competition which is the kernel of the difficulty
in most "sweating" trades. It may be safely said that the measure of
progress in organization of low class labour will be the comparative
size and localization of the industrial unit. Where "sweating" exists in
large factories or large shops, effective combination even among workers
of low education may be tolerably rapid; among workers engaged by some
large firm whose work brings them only into occasional contact, the
progress will be not so fast; among workers in small unrelated workshops
who have no opportunities of direct intercourse with one another, the
progress will be extremely slow. The most urgent need of organization is
precisely in those industries where it is most difficult to organize. It
is, on the whole, not reasonable to expect that this remedy, unless
aided by other forces working against the small workshops, will enable
the "hands" in the small sweater's den to materially improve their
condition.
§ 4. Trade Union Methods of limiting Competition.--So far we have
regarded the value of combination as dependent on the ability of workers
to combine. There is another side which cannot be neglected. Two
societies of workmen equally strong in the moral qualities of successful
union may differ widely in the influence they can exert to secure and
improve their position. We saw that the real value of organization to a
body of workmen lay in the power it gave them to make it inconvenient
for an employer to dispense with their services in favour of outsiders.
Now the degree of this inconvenience will obviously depend in great
measure upon the number of outsiders qualified by strength and skill to
take their place without delay. The whole force of Unionism hangs on
"the unemployed." The strongest and most effective Unions are in trades
where there are the smallest number of unemployed competitors; the
weakest Unions are in trades which are beset by crowds of outsiders able
and willing to undertake the work, and if necessary to underbid those
who are employed.
Close attention to the composition and working of our Trade Unions
discloses the fact that their chief object is to limit the competition
for work in their respective trades. Since their methods are sometimes
indirect, this is sometimes denied, but the following statement of Trade
Union methods makes it clear. The minimum or standard rate of wages
plays a prominent part in Unionism. It is arbitrarily fixed by the
Union, which in its estimate takes into account, [Greek: a]. prices paid
for articles produced; [Greek: b]. a reasonable standard of comfort;
[Greek: g]. and remuneration for time spent in acquiring necessary
skill.[30] This is an estimate, it must be remembered, of a "fair wage,"
based upon calculations as to what is just and reasonable, and does not
necessarily correspond to the economic wage obtainable in a
neighbourhood by the free competition of labour and capital. Now this
standard wage, which may or may not be the wage actually paid, plays a
very prominent part in Unionism. The point of importance here is its
bearing on the admission of new members. The candidate for membership
has, as his principal qualification, to show that he is capable of
earning the standard rate of wages. It is evident, however, that the
effect of any large new accession to the ranks of any trade must, unless
there is a corresponding growth of employment, bring down the rate of
wages, whether these be fixed by a Trade Union standard or not. Hence it
is evident that any Trade Union would be bound to refuse admission to
new applicants who, though they might be in other respects competent
workmen, could not find work without under-bidding those who were at
present occupied. This they would do by reason of their standard wage
qualification, for they would be able to show that the new applicants
would not be competent to earn standard wages under the circumstances.
How far Trade Unions actually have conscious recourse to this method of
limiting their numbers, may be doubted; but no one acquainted with the
spirit of Trades Unions would believe that if a sudden growth of
technical schools enabled large numbers of duly qualified youths to
apply for admission into the various Unions so as to compete for the
same quantity of work with the body of existing members, the Unions of
the latter would freely and cheerfully admit them. To do so would be
suicidal, for no standard rate of wages could stand against the pressure
of an increased supply of labour upon a fixed demand. But it is not
necessary to suppose that any considerable number of actually qualified
workmen are refused admission to Trade Unions of skilled workers. For
the possession of the requisite skill, implying as it does a certain
natural capacity, and an expenditure of time and money not within the
power of the poorest classes, forms a practical limit to the number of
applicants. Moreover, in many trades, though by no means in all,
restrictions are placed by the Unions upon the number of apprentices,
with the object of limiting the number of those who should from year to
year be qualified to compete for work. In other trades where no rigid
rule to this effect exists, there is an understanding which is equally
effective. Certain trades, such as the engineers, boiler-makers, and
other branches of iron trade, place no restrictions, and in certain
other trades the restrictions are not closely applied. But most of the
strong Trades Unions protect themselves in another way against the
competition of unemployed. By a System of "out of work" pay, they bribe
those of their body, who from time to time are thrown out of work, not
to underbid those in work, so as to bring down the rate of wages.
Several of the most important Unions pay large sums every year to "out
of work" members. By these three means, the "minimum wage" qualification
for membership, the limitation of the number of apprentices, and the
"out of work" fund, the Trade Unions strengthen the power of organized
labour in skilled industries by restricting the competition of
unemployed outsiders.
It is true that some of the leading exponents of Trade Unionism deny
that the chief object of the Unions is to limit competition. Mr. Howell
considers that the "standard wage" qualification for membership is
designed in order to ensure a high standard of workmanship, and regards
the "out of work" fund merely as belonging to the insurance or
prudential side of Trade Unionism. But though it may readily be admitted
that one effect of these measures may be to maintain good workmanship
and to relieve distress, it is reasonable to regard the most important
result actually attained as being the object chiefly sought. It is fair
to suppose, therefore, that while Unionists may not be indifferent to
the honour of their craft, their principal object is to strengthen their
economic position. At any rate, whatever the intention of Trade Unions
may be, the principal effect of their regulations is to limit the
effective supply of competing labour in their respective branches of
industry.
§ 5. Can Low-skilled Workers successfully combine?--Now the question
which concerns our inquiry may be stated thus. Supposing that the
workers in "sweating" industries were able to combine, would they be
able to secure themselves against outside competition as the skilled
worker does? Will their combination practically increase the difficulty
in replacing them by outsiders? Now it will be evident that the
unskilled or low-skilled workers cannot depend upon the methods which
are adopted by Unions of skilled workers, to limit the number of
competitors for work. A test of physical fitness, such as was recently
proposed as a qualification for admission to the Dock-labourers Union,
will not, unless raised far above the average fitness of present
members, limit the number of applicants to anything like the same extent
as the test of workmanship in skilled industries. Neither could rules of
apprenticeship act where the special skill required was very small. Nor
again is it easy to see how funds raised by the contribution of the
poorest classes of workers, could suffice to support unemployed members
when temporarily "out of work," or to buy off the active competition of
outsiders, or "black-legs," to use the term in vogue. The constant
influx of unskilled labour from the rural districts and from abroad,
swollen by the numbers of skilled workmen whose skill has been robbed of
its value by machinery, keeps a large continual margin of unemployed,
able and willing to undertake any kind of unskilled or low-skilled
labour, which will provide a minimum subsistence wage. The very success
which attends the efforts of skilled workers to limit the effective
supply of their labour by making it more difficult for unskilled workers
to enter their ranks, increases the competition for low-skilled work,
and makes effective combination among low-skilled workers more
difficult. Though we may not be inclined to agree with Prof. Jevons,
that "it is quite impossible for Trade Unions in general to effect any
permanent increase of wages," there is much force in his conclusion,
that "every rise of wages which one body secures by mere exclusive
combination, represents a certain extent, sometimes a large extent, of
injury to the other bodies of workmen."[31] In so far as Unions of
skilled workers limit their numbers, they increase the number of
competitors for unskilled work; and since wages cannot rise when the
supply of labour obtainable at the present rate exceeds the demand,
their action helps to maintain that "bare subsistence wage," which forms
a leading feature in "sweating."
Are we then to regard Unions of low-skilled workers as quite impotent so
long as they are beset by the competition of innumerable outsiders? Can
combination contribute nothing to a solution of the sweating problem?
There are two ways in which close combination might seem to avail low-
skilled workers in their endeavours to secure better industrial
conditions.
In the first place, close united action of a large body of men engaged
in any employment gives them, as we saw, a certain power dependent on
the inconvenience and expense they can cause to their employers by a
sudden withdrawal. This power is, of course, in part measured by the
number of unemployed easily procurable to take their place. But granted
the largest possible margin of unemployed, there will always be a
certain difficulty and loss in replacing a united body of employés by a
body of outsiders, though the working capacity of each new-comer may be
equal to that of each member of the former gang. This power belonging
inherently to those in possession, and largely dependent for its
practical utility on close unity of action, may always be worked by a
trade organization to push the interests of its members independently of
the supply of free outside labour, and used by slow degrees may be made
a means of gaining piece by piece a considerable industrial gain. Care
must, however, be taken, never to press for a larger gain than is
covered by the difficulty of replacing the body of present employés by
outside labour. Miscalculations of the amount of this inherent power of
Union are the chief causes of "lock-outs" and failures in strikes.
Another weapon in the hands of unskilled combination, less calculable in
its effectiveness, is the force of public opinion aided by "picketing,"
and the other machinery of persuasion or coercion used to prevent the
effective competition of "free" labour. In certain crises, as for
example in the Dock strike of 1889, these forces may operate so
powerfully as to strictly limit the supply of labour, and to shut out
the competition of unemployed. There can be no reason to doubt that if
public authority had not winked at illegal coercion of outside labour,
and public opinion touched by sentiment condoned the winking, the Dock
strike would have failed as other movements of low-skilled labour have
generally failed. The success of the Dockers is no measure of the power
of combination among low-skilled labourers. It is possible, however,
that a growing sense of comradeship, aided by a general recognition of
the justice of a claim, may be generally relied upon to furnish a
certain force which shall restrict the competition of free labour in
critical junctures of the labour movement. If public opinion, especially
among workmen, becomes strongly set in favour of letting capital and
labour "fight it out" in cases of trade disputes, and vigorously resents
all interference of outsiders offering to replace the contending
labourers, it seems likely that this practical elimination of outside
competition may enable combinations of unskilled workmen to materially
improve their condition in spite of the existence of a large supply of
outside labour able to replace them.
§ 6. Can Trade Unionism crush out "Sweating"?--But here again it must be
recognized that each movement of public opinion in this direction is
really making for the establishment of new trade monopolies, which tend
to aggravate the condition of free unemployed labour. Unions of low-
skilled labour can only be successful at the expanse of outsiders, who
will find it increasingly difficult to get employment. The success of
combinations of low-skilled workers will close one by one every avenue
of regular employment to the unemployed, who will tend to become even
more nomadic and predatory in their habits, and more irregular and
miserable in their lives, affording continually a larger field of
operation for the small "sweater," and other forms of "arrested
development" in commerce. It must always be an absorbing interest to a
Trades Union to maintain the industrial welfare of its members by
preventing what it must regard as an "over-supply" of labour. No
organization of labour can effect very much unless it takes measures to
restrict the competition of "free labour"; each Union, by limiting the
number of competitors for its work, increases the competition in trades
not similarly protected. So with every growth of Trade Unionism the
pressure on unprotected bodies of workmen grows greater. Thus it would
seem that while organization of labour may become a real remedy for
"sweating" in any industry to which it is vigorously applied, it cannot
be relied upon ever entirely to crash out the evil. It can only drive it
into a smaller compass, where its intenser character may secure for it
that close and vigorous public attention which, in spite of recent
revelations, has not been yet secured, and compel society to clearly
face the problem of a residue of labour-power which is rotting in the
miserable and degraded bodies of its owners, because all the material on
which it might be productively employed is otherwise engaged.
§ 7. Public Workshops.--Those who are most active in the spread of
Unionism among the low-skilled branches of industry, are quite aware
that their action, by fencing off section after section of labour from
the fierce competition of outsiders, is rendering the struggle more
intense for the unprotected residuum. So far as they indulge any wider
view than the interest of their special trades, it may be taken that
they design to force the public to provide in some way for the
unemployed or casually employed workers, against whom the gates of each
Union have been successively closed. There can be little doubt that if
Unionism is able to establish itself firmly among the low-skilled
industries, we shall find this margin of unemployed low-skilled labour
growing larger and more desperate, in proportion to the growing
difficulty of finding occupation. Trade Union leaders have boldly avowed
that they will thus compel the State to recognize the "right to
employment," and to provide that employment by means of national or
municipal workshops. With questions of abstract "right" we are not here
concerned, but it may be well to indicate certain economic difficulties
involved in the establishment of public works as a solution of the
"unemployed" problem. Since the "unemployed" will, under the closer
restrictions of growing Trade Unionism, consist more and more of low-
skilled labourers, the public works on which they must be employed must
be branches of low-skilled labour. But the Unions of low-skilled workers
will have been organized with the view of monopolizing all the low-
skilled work which the present needs of the community require to be
done. How then will the public provide low-skilled work for the
unemployed? One of two courses seems inevitable. Either the public must
employ them in work similar to that which is being done by Union men for
private firms, in which case they will enter into competition with the
latter, and either undersell them in the market and take their trade, or
by increasing the aggregate supply of the produce, bring down the price,
and with it the wage of the Union men. Or else if they are not to
compete with the labour of Union men, they must be employed in relief
works, undertaken not to satisfy a public need or to produce a commodity
with a market value, but in order that those employed may, by a wholly
or partially idle expenditure of effort, appear to be contributing to
their own support, whereas they are really just as much recipients of
public charity as if they were kept in actual idleness. This is the
dilemma which has to be faced by advocates of public workshops. Nor can
it be eluded by supposing that the public may use the unemployed labour
either in producing some new utility for the public use, such as
improved street-paving, or a municipal hot-water supply. For if such
undertakings are of a character which a private company would regard as
commercially sound, they ought to be, and will be, undertaken by wise
public bodies independently of the consideration of providing work for
unemployed. If they are not such as would be considered commercially
sound, then in so far as they fall short of commercial soundness, they
will be "charity" pure and simple, given as relief is now given to able-
bodied paupers, on condition of an expenditure of mere effort which is
not a commercial _quid pro quo_.
If the State or municipality were permitted to conduct business on
ordinary commercial principles, it might indeed be expected to seize the
opportunity afforded by a large supply of unemployed labour, to
undertake new public works at a lower cost than usual. But to take this
advantage of the cheapness of labour is held to be "sweating." Public
bodies are called upon to disregard the rise and fall of market wages,
and to pay "a fair wage," which practically means a wage which is the
same whether labour is plentiful or scarce. This refusal to permit the
ordinary commercial inducement to operate in the case of public bodies,
cuts off what might be regarded as a natural check to the accumulation
of unemployed labour. If public bodies are to employ more labour, when
labour is excessive, and pay a wage which shall be above the market
price, it must be clearly understood that the portion of the wages which
represents the "uncommercial" aspect of the contract is just as much
public charity as the half-crown paid as out-door relief under the
present Poor Law. Lastly, the establishment of State or municipal
workshops for the "unemployed" has no economic connection with the
"socialist" policy, by which the State or municipality should assume
control and management of railways, mines, gas-works, tramways, and
other works into which the element of monopoly enters. Such a
"socialist" policy, if carried out, would not directly afford any relief
to the unemployed. For, in the first place, the labour employed in these
new public departments would be chiefly skilled, and not unskilled.
Moreover, so far as the condition of the "workers" was concerned, the
nationalization, or municipalization of these works would not imply any
increased demand for labour, but merely the transfer of a number of
employés from private to the public service. The public control of
departments of industry, which are now in private hands, would not, so
long as it was conducted on a commercial footing in the public interest,
furnish either direct, or indirect, relief to "the unemployed." A
reduction of hours of labour in the case of workers transferred to the
public service, might afford employment to an increased number of
skilled labourers, and might indirectly operate in reducing the number
of unemployed. But such reduction of hours of labour, like the payment
of wages above the market rate, forms no essential part of a "socialist"
policy, but is rather a charitable appendage.
§ 8. State Business on uncommercial terms.--It cannot be too clearly
recognized that the payment by a public body of wages which are above
the market price, the payment of pensions, the reduction of hours of
labour, and any other advantages freely conferred, which place public
servants in a better position than private servants, stand on precisely
the same economic footing with the establishment of public workshops for
the relief of the unemployed, in which wages are paid for work which is
deficient in commercial value. In each case the work done has some
value, unless the unemployed are used to dig holes in the ground and
fill them up again; in each case the wages paid for that work are in
excess of the market rate.
If it were established as a general rule, that public bodies should
always add a "bonus" to the market wage of their employés to bring it up
to "fairness," and take off a portion of the usual "working-day" to
bring it down to "fairness," it would follow quite consistently that a
wage equal to, or exceeding, the minimum market rate might be paid to
"unemployed" for work, the value of which would be somewhat less than
that produced by the lowest class of "employed" workers. The policy
throughout is one and the same, and is based upon a repudiation of
competition as a test of the value of labour, and the substitution of
some other standard derived from moral or prudential considerations.
So far as the State or Municipality chooses to regulate by an
"uncommercial" or moral standard the conditions of labour for the
limited number of employés required for the services which are a public
monopoly, it is able to do so, provided the public is willing to pay the
price. There is much to be said in favour of such a course, for the
public example might lend invaluable aid in forming a strong public
opinion which should successfully demand decent conditions of life and
work, for the whole body of workers. But if the State or Municipality
were to undertake to provide work and wages for an indefinite number of
men who failed to obtain work in the competition market, the effect
would be to offer a premium upon "unemployment." Thus, it would appear
that as fast as the public works drew off the unemployed, so fast would
men leave the low-paid, irregular occupations, and by placing themselves
in a state of "unemployment" qualify for public service. There would of
course be a natural check to this flow. As the State drained off all
surplus labour, the market value of labour would rise, greater
regularity of employment would be secured, and the general improvement
of industrial conditions would check the tendency of workers to flow
towards the public workshops. This consideration has led many of the
leaders of labour movements to favour a scheme of public workshops,
which would practically mean that the State or Municipality undertook to
limit the supply of labour in the open market, by providing for any
surplus which might exist, at the public expense. The effect of such a
policy would be of course to enormously strengthen the effective power
of labour-organizations. But while the advocates of public workshops are
fully alive to these economic effects, they have not worked out with
equal clearness the question relating to the disposal of the labour in
public workshops. How can the "protected" labour of the public workshops
be so occupied, that its produce may not, by direct or indirect
competition with the produce of outside labour, outweigh the advantage
conferred upon the latter by the removal of the "unemployed" from the
field of competition, in digging holes and filling them up again, or
other useless work, the problem is a simple one. In that case the State
provides maintenance for the weaker members in order that their presence
as competitors for work may not injure the stronger members. But if the
public workmen produce anything of value, by what means can it be kept
from competing with and underselling the goods produced under ordinary
commercial conditions? Without alleging that the difficulties involved
in these questions are necessarily fatal to all schemes of public works,
we maintain that they require to be clearly faced.
Even if it be held that public workshops can furnish no economic remedy
for poverty, this judgment would of course be by no means conclusive
against public emergency works undertaken on charitable grounds to tide
over a crisis. Every form of charity, public or private, discriminate or
indiscriminate, entails some evil consequences. But this consideration
is not final. A charitable palliative is defensible and useful when the
net advantages outweigh the net disadvantages. This might seem self-
evident, but it requires to be stated, because there are not wanting
individuals and societies which imagine they have disposed of the claim
of charitable remedies by pointing out the evil consequences they
entail. It is evident that circumstances might arise which would compel
the wisest and steadiest Government to adopt public relief works as a
temporary expedient for meeting exceptional distress.
§ 9. Restriction of Foreign Emigration.--Two further proposals for
keeping down the supply of low-skilled labour deserve notice, and the
more so because they are forcing their way rapidly toward the arena of
practical politics.
The first is the question of an Alien law limiting or prohibiting the
migration of foreign labourers into England. The power of the German,
Polish, or Russian Jew, accustomed to a lower standard of life, to
undersell the English worker in the English labour market, has already
been admitted as a cause of "sweating" in several city industries. The
importance of this factor in the problem of poverty is, however, a much
disputed point. To some extent these foreign labourers are said to make
new industries, and not to enter into direct and disastrous competition
with native workers. In most cases, however, direct competition between
foreign and native workers does exist, and, as we see, the comparatively
small number of the foreign immigrants compared with the aggregate of
native workers, is no true criterion of the harm their competition does
to low-waged workers. Whether this country will find it wise to reverse
its national policy of free admission to outside labour, it is not easy
to predict. The point should not be misunderstood. Free admission of
cheap foreign labour must be admitted _primâ facie_ to be conducive to
the greatest production of wealth in this country. Those who seek to
restrict or prohibit this admission, do so on the ground that the damage
inflicted upon that class of workers, brought directly or indirectly
into competition for employment with these foreigners, overbalances the
net gain in the aggregate of national wealth. It is this consideration
which has chiefly operated in inducing the United States, Canada, and
Australia to prohibit the admission of Chinese or Coolie labour, and to
place close restrictions upon cheap European labour. Sir Charles Dilke,
in a general summary of colonial policy on this matter, writes,
"Colonial labour seeks protection by legislative means, not only against
the cheap labour of the dark-skinned or of the yellow man, but also
against white paupers, and against the artificial supply of labour by
State-aided white immigration. Most of the countries of the world,
indeed, have laws against the admission of destitute aliens, and the
United Kingdom is in practice almost the only exception."[32]
The greater contrast between the customary standard of living of the
immigrants and that of the native workers with whom they would compete,
has naturally made the question seem a more vital one for our colonies,
and for the United States than for us. There can, however, be little
doubt that if a few shiploads of Chinese labourers were emptied into the
wharves of East London, whatever Government chanced to be in power would
be compelled to adopt immediate measures of restraint on immigration, so
terrible would the effect be upon the low class European labourers in
our midst. Whether any such Alien legislation will be adopted to meet
the inroad of continental labour depends in large measure on the course
of continental history. It is, however, not improbable that if the
organization of the workers proceeds along the present lines, when they
come to realize their ability to use political power for securing their
industrial position, they may decide that it will be advisable to limit
the supply of labour by excluding foreigners. Those, however, who are
already prepared to adopt such a step, do not always realize as clearly
as they should, that the exclusion of cheap foreigners from our labour-
market will be in all probability accompanied by an exclusion from our
markets of the cheap goods made by these foreigners in their own
country, the admission of which, while it increases the aggregate wealth
of England, inflicts a direct injury on those particular workers, the
demand for whose labour is diminished by the introduction of foreign
goods which can undersell them. If an Alien law is passed, it will bring
both logically and historically in its wake such protective measures as
will constitute a reversal of our present Free Trade policy. Whether
such new and hazardous changes in our national policy are likely to be
made, depends in large measure upon the success of other schemes for
treating the condition of over-supply of low-skilled labour. If no
relief is found from these, it seems not unlikely that a democratic
government will some day decide that such artificial prohibition of
foreign labour, and the foreign goods which compete with the goods
produced by low-skilled English labour, will benefit the low-skilled
workers in their capacity as wage-earners, more than the consequent rise
of prices will injure them in their capacity as consumers.
§ 10. The "Eight Hours Day" Argument.--The last proposal which deserves
attention, is that which seeks to shorten the average working-day. The
attempt to secure by legislation or by combination an eight hours day,
or its equivalent, might seem to affect the "sweating system" most
directly, as a restriction on excessive hours of labour. But so far as
it claims to strike a blow at the industrial oppression of low-skilled
labour, its importance will depend upon its effect on the demand and
supply of that low-skilled labour. The result which the advocates of an
eight hours day claim for their measure, may be stated as follows--
Assuming that low-skilled workers now work on an average twelve hours a
day, a compulsory reduction to eight hours would mean that one-third
more men were required to perform the same amount of work, leaving out
for convenience the question whether an eight hours day would be more
productive than the first eight hours of a twelve hours day. Since the
same quantity of low-skilled work would require to be done, employment
would now be provided for a large number of those who would otherwise
have been unemployed. In fact, if the shorter day is accompanied by an
absolute prohibition of over-time, it seems possible that work would
thus be found for the whole army of "unemployed." Nor is this all. The
existence of a constant standing "pool" of unemployed was, as we saw,
responsible for keeping the wages of low-skilled labour down to a bare
subsistence wage. Let this "pool" be once drained off, wages will
rapidly rise, since the combined action of workers will no longer be
able to be defeated by the eagerness of "outsiders" to take their work
and wages. Thus an eight hours day would at once solve the problem of
the "work-less," and raise the wages of low-skilled labour. The effect
would be precisely the same as if the number of competitors for work
were suddenly reduced. For the price of labour, as of all else, depends
on the relation between the demand for it and the supply, and the price
will rise if the demand is increased while the supply remains the same,
or if the supply is decreased while the demand remains the same. A
compulsory eight hours day would practically mean a shrinkage in the
supply of labour offered in the market, and the first effect would
indisputably be a rise in the price of labour. To reduce by one-third at
a single blow the amount of labour put forth in a day by any class of
workers, is precisely equivalent to a sudden removal of one-third of
these workers from the field of labour. We know from history that the
result of a disastrous epidemic, like the Black Plague, has been to
raise the wages and improve the general condition of the labourer even
in the teeth of legal attempts to keep down wages. The advocates of an
Eight Hours Act assert that the same effect would follow from that
measure.
Setting aside as foreign to our discussion all consideration of the
difficulties in passing and enforcing an Eight Hours Act, or in applying
it to certain industries, the following economic objection is raised by
opponents to the eight hours movement--
The larger aggregate of wages, which must be paid under an eight hours
day, will increase the expanses of production in each industry. For the
increased wage cannot in general be obtained by reducing profits, for
any such reduction will drive freshly-accumulated capital more and more
to seek foreign investments, and managing ability will in some measure
tend to follow it. The higher aggregate of wages must therefore be
represented in a general rise of prices. This rise of prices will have
two effects. In the first place it will tend to largely negative the
higher aggregate of money wages. Or if organized labour, free from the
competition of unemployed, is able to maintain a higher rate of real
wages, the general rise in prices will enable foreign producers to
undersell us in our own market (unless we adopted a Protective Tariff),
and will disable us from competing in foreign markets. This constitutes
the pith of the economic objection raised against an eight hours day.
The eight hours advocates meet the objection in the following ways--
First, they deny that prices will rise in consequence of the increased
aggregate of wages. A reduction in interest and in wages of
superintendence will take place in many branches of industry, without
any appreciable tendency to diminish the application of capital, or to
drive it out of the country.
Secondly, the result of an increased expenditure in wages will be to
crush the small factories and workshops, which are the backbone of the
sweating System, and to assist the industrial evolution which makes in
favour of large well-organized factories working with the newest
machinery.
Thirdly, it is claimed that we shall not be ousted either from our own
or from foreign markets by foreign competition, because the eight hours
movement in England must be regarded as part of a larger industrial
movement which is proceeding _pari passu_ among the competing nations.
If the wages of German, French, and American workers are advancing at
the same rate as English wages, or if other industrial restrictions in
those countries are otherwise increasing the expenses of production at a
corresponding rate, the argument of foreign competition falls to the
ground.
These leading arguments of the advocates of an eight hours day are of
very unequal value. The first argument is really based upon the
supposition that the increased aggregate of wages can be "got out of
capital" by lowering interest and profits. The general validity of this
argument may be questioned. In its application a distinction must be
drawn between those businesses which by means of the possession of some
monopoly, patent, or other trade advantage are screened from the full
force of competition, and are thus enabled to earn profits above the
average, and those businesses where the constant stress of close
competition keeps interest and profits down to the lowest point which
suffices to induce the continued application of capital and organizing
ability. In the former cases the "cost" of an Eight Hours Day might be
got out of capital, assuming an effective organization of labour, in the
latter cases it could not.
As to the second argument, it is probable enough that the legal eight
hours day would accelerate the industrial evolution, which is enabling
the large well-equipped factory to crush out the smaller factory. As we
have seen that the worst evils of "sweating" are associated with a lower
order of industrial organization, any cause which assisted to destroy
the small workshop and the out-work system, would be a benefit. But as
the economic motive of such improved organization with increased use of
machinery, would be to save human labour, it is doubtful whether a
quickening of this process would not act as a continual feeder to the
band of unemployed, by enabling employers to dispense with the services
of even this or that body of workers whose work is taken over by brute
machinery.
The net value of these two eight hours arguments is doubtful. The real
weight of the discussion seems to rest on the third.
If the movement for improving the industrial condition of the working
classes does proceed as rapidly in other industrial countries as in our
own, we shall have nothing to fear from foreign competition, since
expenses of production and prices will be rising equally among our own.
If there is no such equal progress in other nations, then the industrial
gain sought for the working classes of this country by a shorter day
cannot be obtained, though any special class or classes of workers may
be relieved of excessive toil at the expense of the community as a
whole. Government employés, and that large number of workers who cannot
be brought into direct competition with foreign labour, can receive the
same wages for shorter hours, provided the public is willing to pay a
higher price for their protected labour.
In conclusion, it may be well to add that the economic difficulties
which beset this question cannot be lightly set aside by an assertion
that the same difficulties were raised by economists against earlier
factory legislation, and that experience has shown that they may be
safely disregarded. It is impossible to say how far the introduction of
humane restrictions upon the exploitation of cheap human labour has
affected the aggregate production of wealth in England. It has not
prevented the growth of our trade, but very possibly it has checked the
rate of growth. If the mere accumulation of material wealth, regardless
alike of the mode of production or of the distribution, be regarded as
the industrial goal, it is quite conceivable that a policy of utter
_laissez faire_ might be the best means of securing that end. Although
healthy and happy workers are more efficient than the half-starved and
wholly degraded beings who slaved in the uninspected factories and mines
during the earlier period of the factory system, and still slave in the
sweater's den, it may still be to the interest of employers to pay
starvation wages for relatively inefficient work, rather than pay high
wages for a shorter day's work to more efficient workers. It is to the
capitalist a mere sum in arithmetic; and we cannot predict that the
result will always turn in favour of humanity and justice.
At the same time, even if it is uncertain whether a shorter working day
could be secured without a fall of wages, it is still open to advocates
of a shorter working day to urge that it is worth while to purchase
leisure at such a price. If a shorter working day could cure or abate
the evil of "the unemployed," and help to raise the industrial condition
of the low-skilled workers, the community might well afford to pay the
cost.