In the seven years that elapsed between Solferino and the second battle
of Custozza the political unification of Italy had proceeded rapidly,
although the price of the union of Italy had been the cession of Savoy
and Nice to Napoleon III. Garibaldi's irregulars had in 1860 overrun
Sicily, and regular battles, inspired by the same great leader, had
destroyed the kingdom of Naples on the mainland (Volturno, 1st-2nd
October 1860). At Castelfidardo near Ancona on the 18th of September in
the same year Cialdini won another victory over the Papal troops
commanded by Lamoriciere. In 1866, then, Italy was no longer a
"geographical expression," but a recognized kingdom. Only Rome and
Venetia remained of the numerous, disunited and reactionary states set
up by the congress of Vienna. The former, still held by a French
garrison, was for the moment an unattainable aim of the liberators, but
the moment for reclaiming Venetia, the last relic of the Austrian
dominions in Italy, came when Austria and Prussia in the spring of 1866
prepared to fight for the hegemony of the future united Germany (see
SEVEN WEEKS' WAR).
The new Italian army, formed on the nucleus of the Sardinian army and
led by veterans of Novara and Solferino, was as strong as the whole
allied army of 1859, but in absorbing so many recruits it had
temporarily lost much of its efficiency. It was organized in four corps,
of which one, under Cialdini, was detached from the main body.
Garibaldi, as before, commanded a semi-regular corps in the Alpine
valleys, but being steadily and skilfully opposed by Kuhn, Gyulai's
former chief of staff, he made little or no progress during the brief
campaign, on which indeed his operations had no influence. The main
Austrian army, still the best-trained part of the emperor's forces, had
been, up to the verge of the war, commanded by Benedek, but Benedek was
induced to give up his place to the archduke Albert, and to take up the
far harder task of commanding against the Prussians in Bohemia. It was
in fact a practically foregone conclusion that in Italy the Austrians
would win, whereas in Bohemia it was more than feared that the Prussians
would carry all before them. But Prussia and Italy were allied, and
whatever the result of a battle in Venetia, that province would have to
be ceded in the negotiations for peace with a victorious Prussia. Thus
on the Austrian side the war of 1866 in Italy was, even more than the
former war, simply an armed protest against the march of events.
Second Battle of Custozza.
The part of Hess in the campaign of Solferino was played with more
success in that of Custozza by Major-General Franz, Freiherr von John
(1815-1876). On this officer's advice the Austrian army, instead of
remaining behind the Adige, crossed that river on the 23rd of June and
took up a position on the hills around Pastrengo on the flank of the
presumed advance of Victor Emmanuel's army. The latter, crossing the
Mincio the same day, headed by Villafranca for Verona, part of it in the
hills about Custozza, Somma-Campagna and Castelnuovo, partly on the
plain. The object of the king and of La Marmora, who was his adviser,
was by advancing on Verona to occupy the Austrian army (which was only
about 80,000 strong as against the king's 120,000), while Cialdini's
corps from the Ferrara region crossed the lower Po and operated against
the Austrian rear. The archduke's staff, believing that the enemy was
making for the lower Adige in order to co-operate directly with
Cialdini's detachment, issued orders for the advance on the 24th so as
to reach the southern edge of the hilly country, preparatory to
descending upon the flank of the Italians next day. However, the latter
were nearer than was supposed, and an encounter-battle promptly began
for the possession of Somma-Campagna and Custozza. The king's army was
unable to use its superior numbers and, brigade for brigade, was much
inferior to its opponents. The columns on the right, attempting in
succession to debouch from Villafranca in the direction of Verona, were
checked by two improvised cavalry brigades under Colonel Pulz, which
charged repeatedly, with the old-fashioned cavalry spirit that Europe
had almost forgotten, and broke up one battalion after another. In the
centre the leading brigades fought in vain for the possession of
Custozza and the edge of the plateau, and on the left the divisions that
had turned northward from Valeggio into the hills were also met and
defeated. About 5 P.M. the Italians, checked and in great disorder,
retreated over the Mincio. The losses were--Austrians, 4600 killed and
wounded and 1000 missing; Italians, 3800 killed and wounded and 4300
missing. The archduke was too weak in numbers to pursue, his losses had
been considerable, and a resolute offensive, in the existing political
conditions, would have been a mere waste of force. The battle necessary
to save the honour of Austria had been handsomely won. Ere long the bulk
of the army that had fought at Custozza was transported by rail to take
part in defending Vienna itself against the victorious Prussians. One
month later Cialdini with the re-organized Italian army, 140,000 strong,
took the field again, and the 30,000 Austrians left in Venetia retreated
to the Isonzo without engaging.
In spite of Custozza and of the great defeat sustained by the Italian
navy at the hands of Tegetthof near Lissa on the 20th of July, Venetia
was now liberated and incorporated in the kingdom of Italy, and the
struggle for unity, that had been for seventeen years a passionate and
absorbing drama, and had had amongst its incidents Novara, Magenta,
Solferino and the Garibaldian conquest of the Two Sicilies, ended in an
anti-climax.
Three years later the cards were shuffled, and Austria, France and Italy
were projecting an offensive alliance against Prussia. This scheme came
to grief on the Roman question, and the French chassepot was used for
the first time in battle against Garibaldi at Mentana, but in 1870
France was compelled to withdraw her Roman garrison, and with the assent
of their late enemy Austria, the Italians under Cialdini fought their
way into Rome and there established the capital of united Italy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.--The war of 1848-49 has been somewhat neglected by
modern military historians, but the following are useful: _Der Feldzug
der osterr. Armee in Italien 1848-49_ (Vienna, 1852); Gavenda,
_Sammlung aller Armeebefehle u.s.w. mit Bezug auf die Hauptmomente des
Krieges_ 1848-49; Major H. Kunz, _Feldzuge des F. M. Radetzki in
Oberitalien_ (Berlin, 1900), and Major Adams, _Great Campaigns_. Both
the French and the Austrian governments issued official accounts
(_Campagne de Napoleon III en Italie 1859_, _Der Krieg in Italien
1859_) of the war of 1859. The standard critical work is _Der
italienische Feldzug 1859_ by the German general staff (practically
dictated by Moltke). Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, who had
many friends in the Austrian army, deals with the Magenta campaign in
vol. i. of his _Letters on Strategy_. General Silvestre's _Etude sur
la campagne de 1859_ was published in 1909. In English, Col. H. C.
Wylly, _Magenta and Solferino_ (1906), and in German General Cammerer,
_Magenta_, and Major Kunz, _Von Montebello bis Solferino_ should be
consulted.
For the Italian campaign of 1866 see the Austrian official history,
_Osterreichs Kampfe 1866_ (French translation), and the Italian
official account, _La Campagna del 1866_, of which the volume dealing
with Custozza was published in 1909. A short account is given in Sir
H. Hozier's _Seven Weeks' War_, and tactical studies in v. Verdy's
_Custozza_ (tr. Henderson), and Sir Evelyn Wood, _Achievements of
Cavalry_. (C. F. A.)