The campaign of Magenta and Solferino took place ten years later.
Napoleon III., himself an ex-_carbonaro_, and the apostle of the theory
of "nationalities," had had his attention and his ambitions drawn
towards the Italian problem by the attempt upon his life by Orsini. The
general political horizon was by no means clear at the end of 1858, and
on the 1st of January 1859 the emperor of the French publicly expressed
to the Austrian ambassador his regret that "our relations are not so
good as heretofore." This was regarded by all concerned as a prelude to
war, and within a short time a treaty and a marriage-contract allied
Sardinia with the leading European power. In the smaller Italian states,
as before, the governments were on the side of Austria and the
"settlement of 1815," and the peoples on that of United Italy. The
French still maintained a garrison in Rome to support the pope. The
thorny question of the temporal power _versus_ the national movement was
not yet in the foreground, and though Napoleon's support of the former
was later to prove his undoing, in 1859 the main enemy was Austria and
the paramount factor was the assistance of 200,000 French regulars in
solving the immediate problem.
The Sardinian army, reconstituted by La Marmora with the definite object
of a war for union and rehabilitated by its conduct in the Crimea, was
eager and willing. The French army, proud of its reputation as the
premier army in the world, and composed, three-fourths of it, of
professional soldiers whose gospel was the "Legend," welcomed a return
to the first Napoleon's battle-grounds, while the emperor's ambitions
coincided with his sentiments. Austria, on the other hand, did not
desire war. Her only motive of resistance was that it was impossible to
cede her Italian possessions in face of a mere threat. To her, even more
than to France and infinitely more than to Italy, the war was a
political war, a "war with a limited aim" or "stronger form of
diplomatic note"; it entirely lacked the national and personal spirit of
resistance which makes even a passive defence so powerful.
Events during the period of tension that preceded the actual declaration
of war were practically governed by these moral conditions. Such
advantages as Austria possessed at the outset could only be turned to
account, as will presently appear, by prompt action. But her army system
was a combination of conscription and the "nation in arms," which for
the diplomatic war on hand proved to be quite inadequate. Whereas the
French army was permanently on a two-thirds war footing (400,000 peace,
600,000 war), that of Austria required to be more than doubled on
mobilization by calling in reservists. Now, the value of reservists is
always conditioned by the temper of the population from which they come,
and it is more than probable that the indecision of the Austrian
government between January and April 1859 was due not only to its desire
on general grounds to avoid war, but also, and perhaps still more, to
its hopes of averting it by firmness, without having recourse to the
possibly dangerous expedient of a real mobilization. A few years before
the method of "bluffing" had been completely successful against Prussia.
But the Prussian reservist of 1850 did not want to fight, whereas the
French soldier of 1859 desired nothing more ardently.
Mobilization.
In these conditions the Austrian preparations were made sparingly, but
with ostentation. The three corps constituting the Army of Italy
(commanded since Radetzky's death in 1858 by Feldzeugmeister Count Franz
Gyulai (1798-1863)), were maintained at war efficiency, but not at war
strength (corps averaging 15,000). Instead, however, of mobilizing them,
the Vienna government sent an army corps (III.) from Vienna at peace
strength in January. This was followed by the II. corps, also at peace
strength, in February, and the available field force, from that point,
could have invaded Piedmont at once.[4] The initial military situation
was indeed all in favour of Austria. Her mobilization was calculated to
take ten weeks, it is true, but her concentration by rail could be much
more speedily effected than that of the French, who had either to cross
the Alps on foot or to proceed to Genoa by sea and thence by one line of
railway to the interior. Further, the demands of Algeria, Rome and other
garrisons, the complicated political situation and the consequent
necessity of protecting the French coasts against an English attack,[5]
and still more the Rhine frontier against Prussia and other German
states (a task to which the greatest general in the French army,
Pelissier, was assigned), materially reduced the size of the army to be
sent to Italy. But the Austrian government held its hand, and the
Austrian commander, apparently nonplussed by the alternation of
quiescence and boldness at Vienna, asked for full mobilization and
turned his thoughts to the Quadrilateral that had served Radetzky so
well in gaining time for the reserves to come up. March passed away
without an advance, and it was not until the 5th of April that the
long-deferred order was issued from Vienna to the reservists to join the
II., III., V., VII. and VIII. corps in Italy. And, after all, Gyulai
took the field, at the end of April, with most of his units at
three-quarters of their war strength.[6] On the side of the allies the
Sardinians mobilized 5 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions, totalling
64,000, by the third week in April. A few days later Austria sent an
ultimatum to Turin. This was rejected on the 26th, war being thereupon
declared. As for the French, the emperor's policy was considerably in
advance of his war minister's preparations. The total of about 130,000
men (all that could be spared out of 500,000) for the Italian army was
not reached until operations were in progress; and the first troops only
entered Savoy or disembarked in Genoa on the 25th and 26th of April.
Austrian movements.
Thus, long as the opening had been delayed, there was still a period
after both sides had resolved on and prepared for war, during which the
Austrians were free to take the offensive. Had the Austrians crossed the
frontier instead of writing an ultimatum on the 19th of April, they
would have had from a week to a fortnight to deal with the Sardinians.
But even the three or four days that elapsed between the declaration and
the arrival of the first French soldiers were wasted. Vienna ordered
Gyulai to take the offensive on the 27th, but it was not until the 30th
that the Austrian general crossed the Ticino. His movements were
unopposed, the whole of the Sardinian army having concentrated (by
arrangement between La Marmora and Marshal Canrobert) in a flank
position between Casale and Alessandria, where it covered Turin
indirectly and Genoa, the French disembarkation port, directly.
Gyulai's left was on the 2nd of May opposite the allied centre, and his
right stretched as far as Vercelli.[7] On the 3rd he planned a
concentric attack on King Victor Emmanuel's position, and parts of his
scheme were actually put into execution, but he suspended it owing to
news of the approach of the French from Genoa, supply difficulties
(Radetzky, the inheritor of the 18th-century traditions, had laid it
down that the soldier must be well fed and that the civilian must not be
plundered, conditions which were unfavourable to mobility) and the heavy
weather and the dangerous state of the rivers.
[Illustration: Map.]
Austrians grouped at Mortara.
Gyulai then turned his attention to the Sardinian capital. Three more
days were spent in a careful flank march to the right, and on the 8th of
May the army (III., V. and VII.) was grouped about Vercelli, with
outposts 10-14 m. beyond the Sesia towards Turin, reserves (II. and
VIII.) round Mortara, and a flank-guard detached from Benedek's VIII.
corps watching the Po. The extreme right of the main body skirmished
with Garibaldi's volunteers on the edge of the Alpine country. The Turin
scheme was, however, soon given up. Bivouacs, cancelled orders and
crossings of marching columns all contributed to exhaust the troops
needlessly. On the 9th one corps (the V.) had its direction and
disposition altered four times, without any change in the general
situation to justify this. In fact, the Austrian headquarters were full
of able soldiers, each of whom had his own views on the measures to be
taken and a certain measure of support from Vienna--Gyulai, Colonel Kuhn
his chief of staff, and Feldzeugmeister Hess, who had formerly played
Gneisenau to Radetzky's Blucher. But what emerges most clearly from the
movements of these days is that Gyulai himself distrusted the offensive
projects he had been ordered to execute, and catching apparently at some
expression of approval given by the emperor, had determined to imitate
Radetzky in "a defensive based on the Quadrilateral." His immediate
intention, on abandoning the advance on Turin was to group his army
around Mortara and to strike out as opportunity offered against the
heads of the allied columns wherever they appeared. Meantime, the IX.
corps had been sent to Italy, and the I. and XI. were mobilizing. These
were to form the I. Army, Gyulai's the II. The latter was by the 13th of
May grouped in the Lomellina, one third (chiefly VII. corps) spread by
brigades fanwise from Vercelli along the Sesia and Po to Vaccarizza, two
thirds massed in a central position about Mortara. There was still no
information of the enemy's distribution, except what was forwarded from
Vienna or gathered by the indefatigable Urban's division, which moved
from Milan to Biella, thence to Brescia and Parma, and back to Lombardy
in search of revolutionary bands, and the latter's doings in the nature
of things could not afford any certain inferences as to the enemy's
regular armies.
On the side of the allies, the Piedmontese were grouped on the 1st of
May in the fortified positions selected for them by Canrobert about
Valenza-Casale-Alessandria. The French III. corps arrived on the 2nd and
3rd and the IV. corps on the 7th at Alessandria from Genoa. Unhampered
by Gyulai's offensive, though at times and places disquieted by his
minor reconnaissances, the allies assembled until on the 16th the French
were stationed as follows: I. corps, Voghera and Pontecurone, II., Sale
and Bassignana, III., Tortona, IV., Valenza, Guard, Alessandria, and the
king's army between Valenza and Casale. The V. French corps under Prince
Napoleon had a political mission in the duchies of middle Italy; one
division of this corps, however, followed the main army. On the eve of
the first collision the emperor Napoleon, commanding in chief, had in
hand about 100,000 French and about 60,000 Sardinian troops (not
including Garibaldi's enlisted volunteers or the national guard).
Gyulai's II. Army was nominally of nearly equal force to that of the
allies, but in reality it was only about 106,000 strong in combatants.
Montebello.
The first battle had no relation to the strategy contemplated by the
emperor, and was still less a part of the defence scheme framed by
Gyulai. The latter, still pivoting on Mortara, had between the 14th and
19th drawn his army somewhat to the left, in proportion as more and more
of the French came up from Genoa. He had further ordered a
reconnaissance in force in the direction of Voghera by a mixed corps
drawn from the V., Urban's division and the IX. (the last belonging to
the I. Army). The saying that "he who does not know what he wants, yet
feels that he must do something, appeases his conscience by a
reconnaissance in force," applies to no episode more forcibly than to
the action of Montebello (20th May) where Count Stadion, the commander
of the V. corps, not knowing what to reconnoitre, engaged disconnected
fractions of his available 24,000 against the French division of Forey
(I. corps), 8000 strong, and was boldly attacked and beaten, with a loss
of 1400 men against Forey's 700.
Flank march of the Allies.
Montebello had, however, one singular result: both sides fell back and
took defensive measures. The French headquarters were already
meditating, if they had not actually resolved upon, a transfer of all
their forces from right to left, to be followed by a march on Milan (a
scheme inspired by Jomini). But the opening of the movement was
suspended until it became quite certain that Stadion's advance meant
nothing, while Gyulai (impressed by Forey's aggressive tactics)
continued to stand fast, and thus it was not until the 28th that the
French offensive really began.[8] The infantry of the French III. corps
was sent by rail from Pontecurone to Casale, followed by the rest of the
army, which marched by road. To cover the movement D'Autemarre's
division of Prince Napoleon's corps (V.) was posted at Voghera and one
division of the king's army remained at Valenza. The rest of the
Piedmontese were pushed northward to join Cialdini's division which was
already at Vercelli. The emperor's orders were for Victor Emmanuel to
push across the Sesia and to take post at Palestro on the 30th to cover
the crossing of the French at Vercelli. This the king carried out,
driving back outlying bodies of the enemy in spite of a stubborn
resistance and the close and difficult character of the country. Hearing
of the fighting, Gyulai ordered the recapture of Palestro by the II.
corps, but the Sardinians during the night strengthened their positions
and the attack (31st) was repulsed with heavy loss. These two initial
successes of the allies, the failures in Austrian tactics and leadership
which they revealed, and the fatigues and privation to which indifferent
staff work had exposed his troops, combined to confirm Gyulai in his now
openly expressed intention of "basing his defensive on the
Quadrilateral." And indeed his only alternatives were now to fall back
or to concentrate on the heads of the French columns as soon as they had
passed the Sesia about Vercelli. Faithful to his view of the situation
he adopted the former course (1st June). The retreat began on the 2nd,
while the French were still busied in closing up. Equally with the
Austrians, the French were the victims of a system of marching and
camping that, by requiring the tail of the columns to close up on the
head every evening, reduced the day's net progress to 6 or 7 m.,
although the troops were often under arms for fourteen or fifteen hours.
The difference between the supreme commands of the rival armies lay not
in the superior generalship of one or the other, but in the fact that
Napoleon III. as sovereign knew what he wanted and as general pursued
this object with much energy, whereas Gyulai neither knew how far his
government would go nor was entire "master in his own house."
Austrian retreat.
French advance to the Ticino.
The latter became very evident in his retreat. Kuhn, the chief of staff,
who was understood to represent the views of the general staff in
Vienna, had already protested against Gyulai's retrograde movement, and
on the 3rd Hess appeared from Vienna as the emperor's direct
representative and stopped the movement. It was destined to be resumed
after a short interval, but meanwhile the troops suffered from the
orders and counter-orders that had marked every stage in the Austrian
movements and were now intensified instead of being removed by higher
intervention. Meanwhile (June 1-2) the allies had regrouped themselves
east of the Sesia for the movement on Milan. The IV. corps, driving out
an Austrian detachment at Novara, established itself there, and was
joined by the II. and Guard. The king's army, supported by the I. and
III. corps, was about Vercelli, with cavalry far out to the front
towards Vespolate. From Novara, the emperor, who desired to give his
troops a rest-day on the 2nd, pushed out first a mixed reconnaissance
and then in the afternoon two divisions to seize the crossing of the
Ticino, Camou's of the Guard on Turbigo, Espinasse's of the II. corps on
San Martino. Further the whole of the Vercelli group was ordered to
advance on the 3rd to Novara and Galliate, where Napoleon would on the
4th have all his forces, except one division, beyond Gyulai's right and
in hand for the move on Milan. The division sent to Turbigo bridged the
river and crossed in the night of the 2nd/3rd, that at San Martino (on
the main road) occupied the bridge-head and also the river bridge
itself, though the latter was damaged. Espinasse's division here was
during the night replaced by a Guard division and went to join a growing
assembly of troops under General MacMahon, which established itself at
Turbigo and Robecchetto on the morning of the 3rd. Lastly, in order to
make sure that no attack was impending from the direction of Mortara,
Napoleon sent General Niel with a mixed reconnoitring force thither,
which returned without meeting any Austrian forces--fortunately for
itself, if the fate of the "reconnaissance in force" at Montebello
proves anything.
The centre of gravity was now at Buffalora, a village on the main
Milan road at the point where it crosses the Naviglio Grande. Here, on
the night of the 1st, Count Clam-Gallas, commanding the Austrian I.
corps (which had just arrived in Italy and was to form part of the
future I. Army) had posted a division, with a view to occupying the
bridge-head of San Martino. On inspecting the latter Clam-Gallas
concluded that it was indefensible, and, ordering the San Martino road
and railway bridges to be destroyed (an order which was only
partially executed), he called on Gyulai for support, sent out
detachments to the right against the French troops reported at
Turbigo, and prepared to hold his ground at Buffalora. On receipt of
Clam-Gallas's report at the Austrian headquarters, Hess ordered the
resumption of the retreat that he had countermanded, but it was
already late and many of the troops did not halt for the night till
midnight, June 3rd/4th. Gyulai promised them the 4th as a rest-day,
but fortune ordered it otherwise. This much at least was in favour of
the Austrians, that when the troops at last reached their assigned
positions four-fifths of them were within 12 m. of the battlefield.
But, as before, the greater part of the army was destined to be
chained to "supporting positions" well back from the battlefield.
Battle of Magenta.
When day broke on the 4th, the emperor of the French was still
uncertain as to Gyulai's whereabouts, and his intention was therefore
no more than to secure the passage of the Ticino and to place his army
on both sides of the river, in sufficient strength to make head
against Gyulai, whether the latter advanced from Mortara and Vigevano
or from Abbiategrasso. He therefore kept back part of the French army
and the whole of the Sardinian. But during the morning it became known
that Gyulai had passed the Ticino on the evening of the 3rd; and
Napoleon then ordered up all his forces to San Martino and Turbigo.
The battlefield of Magenta is easily described. It consists of two
level plateaux, wholly covered with vineyards, and between them the
broad and low-lying valley of the Ticino. This, sharply defined by the
bluffs of the adjoining plateaux, is made up of backwaters, channels,
water meadows and swampy woods. At Turbigo the band of low ground is
1(1/2) m. wide, at Buffalora 2(1/2). Along the foot of the eastern or
Austrian bluffs between Turbigo and Buffalora runs the Grand Canal
(Naviglio Grande); this, however, cuts into the plateau itself at the
latter place and trending gradually inwards leaves a tongue of high
ground separate from the main plateau. The Novara-Milan road and
railway, crossing the Ticino by the bridge of San Martino, pass the
second obstacle presented by the canal by the New Bridges of Magenta,
the Old Bridge being 1000 yards south of these. The canal is bridged
at several points between Turbigo and Buffalora, and also at Robecco,
1(1/2) m. to the (Austrian) left of the Old Bridge. Clam-Gallas's main
line of defence was the canal between Turbigo and the Old Bridge,
skirmishers being posted on the tongue of high ground in front of the
New Bridges, which were kept open for their retreat. He had been
joined by the II. corps and disposed of 40,000 men, 27,000 more being
at Abbiategrasso (2(1/2) m. S. of Robecco). Of his immediate command,
he disposed about 12,000 for the defence of the New Bridges, 12,000
for that of Buffalora, 8000 at Magenta and 8000 at Robecco; all
bridges, except the New Bridges, were broken. Cavalry played no part
whatever, and artillery was only used in small force to fire along
roads and paths.
Napoleon, as has been mentioned, spent the morning of the 4th in
ascertaining that Gyulai had repassed the Ticino. Being desirous
merely of securing the passage and having only a small force available
for the moment at San Martino, he kept this back in the hope that
MacMahon's advance from Turbigo on Magenta and Buffalora would
dislodge the Austrians. MacMahon advanced in two columns, 2 divisions
through Cuggiono and 1 through Inveruno. The former drove back the
Austrian outposts with ease, but on approaching Buffalora found so
serious a resistance that MacMahon broke off the fight in order to
close up and deploy his full force. Meantime, however, on hearing the
cannonade Napoleon had ordered forward Mellinet's division of the
Guard on the New Bridges and Buffalora. The bold advance of this
_corps d'elite_ carried both points at once, but the masses of the
allies who had been retained to meet a possible attack from Mortara
and Vigevano were still far distant and Mellinet was practically
unsupported. Thus the French, turning towards the Old Bridge, found
themselves (3.30 P.M.) involved in a close fight with some 18,000
Austrians, and meantime Gyulai had begun to bring up his III. and VII.
corps towards Robecco and (with Hess) had arrived on the field
himself. The VII. corps, on its arrival, drove Mellinet back to and
over the New Bridges, but the French, now broken up into dense swarms
of individual fighters, held on to the tongue of high ground and
prevented the Austrians from destroying the bridges, while the
occupants of Buffalora similarly held their own, and beyond them
MacMahon, advancing through orchards and vineyards in a line of battle
2 m. long, slowly gained ground towards Magenta. The III. Austrian
corps, meanwhile, arriving at Robecco spread out on both sides of the
canal and advanced to take the defenders of the New Bridges in rear,
but were checked by fresh French troops which arrived from San Martino
(4 P.M.). The struggle for the New and Old Bridges continued till 6
P.M., more and more troops being drawn into the vortex, but at last
the Austrians, stubbornly defending each vineyard, fell back on
Magenta. But while nearly all the Austrian reinforcements from the
lower Ticino had successively been directed on the bridges, MacMahon
had only had to deal with the 8000 men who had originally formed the
garrison of Magenta. The small part of the reinforcing troops that had
been directed thither by Gyulai before he was aware of the situation,
had in consequence no active role defined in their orders and
(initiative being then regarded as a vice) they stood fast while
their comrades were beaten. But it was not until after sunset that the
thronging French troops at last broke into Magenta and the victory was
won. The splendid Austrian cavalry (always at a disadvantage in Italy)
found no opportunity to redress the balance, and their slow-moving and
over-loaded infantry, in spite of its devotion, was no match in broken
country for the swift and eager French. The forces engaged were 54,000
French (one-third of the allied army) to 58,000 Austrians (about half
of Gyulai's total force). Thus the fears of Napoleon as regards an
Austrian attack from Mortara-Vigevano neutralized the bad distribution
of his opponent's force, and Magenta was a fair contest of equal
numbers. The victory of the French was palpably the consequence not of
luck or generalship but of specific superiority in the soldier. The
great result of the battle was therefore a conviction, shared by both
sides, that in future encounters nothing but exceptional good fortune
or skilful generalship could give the Austrians victory. The
respective losses were: French 4000 killed and wounded and 600
missing, Austrians 5700 killed and wounded, 4500 missing.
Melegnano.
While the fighting was prolonged to nightfall, the various corps of the
Austrian army had approached, and it was Gyulai's intention to resume
the battle next day with 100,000 men. But Clam-Gallas reported that the
I. and II. corps were fought out, and thereupon Gyulai resolved to
retreat on Cremona and Mantua, leaving the great road Milan-Brescia
unused, for the townsmen's patriotism was sharpened by the remembrance
of Haynau, "the Hyena of Brescia." Milan and Pavia were evacuated on the
5th, Hess departed to meet the emperor Francis Joseph (who was coming to
take command of the united I. and II. Armies), and although Kuhn was
still in favour of the offensive Gyulai decided that the best service he
could render was to deliver up the army intact to his sovereign on the
Mincio. On the 8th of June Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel made their
triumphal entry into Milan, while their corps followed up rather than
pursued the retreating enemy along the Lodi and Cremona roads. On the
same day, the 8th of June, the I. and II. French corps, under the
general command of Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers, attacked an Austrian
rearguard (part of VIII. corps, Benedek) at the village of Melegnano.
MacMahon with the II. corps was to turn the right flank, the IV. the
left of the defenders, while Baraguay attacked in front. But MacMahon,
as at Magenta, deployed into a formal line of battle before closing on
the village, and his progress through the vineyards was correspondingly
slow. The IV. corps was similarly involved in intricate country, but
Baraguay, whose corps had not been present at Magenta, was burning to
attack, and being a man _aussi dur a ses soldats qu'a lui-meme_, he
delivered the frontal attack about 6 P.M. without waiting for the
others. This attack, as straightforward, as brusque, and as destitute of
tactical refinements as that of the Swiss on that very ground in 1515
(Marignan), was carried out, without "preparation," by Bazaine's
division _a la baionnette_. Benedek was dislodged, but retreated safely,
having inflicted a loss of over 1000 men on the French, as against 360
in his own command.
After Melegnano, as after Magenta, contact with the retiring enemy was
lost, and for a fortnight the story of the war is simply that of a
triumphal advance of the allies and a quiet retirement and
reorganization of the Austrians. Up to Magenta Napoleon had a
well-defined scheme and executed it with vigour. But the fierceness of
the battle itself had not a little effect on his strange dreamy
character, and although it was proved beyond doubt that under reasonable
conditions the French must win in every encounter, their emperor turned
his attention to dislodging rather than to destroying the enemy. War
clouds were gathering elsewhere--on the Rhine above all. The simple
brave promise to free Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic" became
complicated by many minor issues, and the emperor was well content to
let his enemy retire and to accelerate that retirement by manoeuvre as
far as might be necessary. He therefore kept on the left of his
adversary's routes as before, and about the 20th of June the whole
allied army (less Cialdini's Sardinian division, detached to operate on
the fringe of the mountain country) was closely grouped around
Montechiaro on the Chiese. It now consisted of 107,000 French and 48,000
Sardinians (combatants only).
Austrians on the Mincio.
The Austrians had disappeared into the Quadrilateral, where the emperor
Francis Joseph assumed personal command, with Hess as his chief of
staff. Gyulai had resigned the command of the II. Army to Count Schlick,
a cavalry general of 70 years of age. The I. Army was under Count
Wimpffen. But this partition produced nothing but evil. The imperial
headquarters still issued voluminous detailed orders for each corps, and
the intervening army staff was a cause not of initiative or of
simplification, but of unnecessary delay. The direction of several
armies, in fact, is only feasible when general directions (_directives_
as they are technically called) take the place of orders. All the
necessary conditions for working such a system--uniformity of training,
methods and doctrine in the recipients, abstention from interference in
details by the supreme command--were wanting in the Austrian army of
1859. The I. Army consisted of the III., IX. and XI. corps with one
cavalry division and details, 67,000 in all; the II. Army of the I., V.,
VII. and VIII. corps, one cavalry division and details or 90,000
combatants--total 160,000, or practically the same force as the allies.
The emperor had made several salutary changes in the administration,
notably an order to the infantry to send their heavy equipment and
parade full-dress into the fortresses, which enormously lightened the
hitherto overburdened infantryman. At this moment the political omens
were favourable, and gathering the impression from his outpost reports
that the French were in two halves, separated by the river Chiese, the
young emperor at last accepted Hess's advice to resume the offensive, in
view of which Gyulai had left strong outposts west of the Mincio, when
the main armies retired over that river, and had maintained and
supplemented the available bridges.
[Illustration: Map of Solferino.]
The possibility of such a finale to the campaign had been considered but
dismissed at the allied headquarters, where it was thought that if the
Austrians took the offensive it would be on their own side, not the
enemy's, of the Mincio and in the midst of the Quadrilateral. Thus the
advance of the French army on the 24th was simply to be a general move
to the line of the Mincio, preparatory to forcing the crossings, coupled
with the destruction of the strong outpost bodies that had been left by
the Austrians at Solferino, Guidizzolo, &c. The Austrians, who advanced
over the Mincio on the 23rd, also thought that the decisive battle would
take place on the third or fourth day of their advance. Thus, although
both armies moved with all precautions as if a battle was the immediate
object, neither expected a collision, and Solferino was consequently a
pure encounter-battle.
Battle of Solferino.
Speaking generally, the battlefield falls into two distinct halves,
the hilly undulating country, of which the edge (almost everywhere
cliff-like) is defined by Lonato, Castiglione, Cavriana and Volta, and
the plain of Medole and Guidizzolo. The village of Solferino is within
the elevated ground, but close to the edge. Almost in the centre of
the plateau is Pozzolengo, and from Solferino and Pozzolengo roads
lead to crossing places of the Mincio above Volta (Monzambano-Salionze
and Valeggio). These routes were assigned to the Piedmontese (44,000)
and the French left wing (I., II. and Guard, 57,000), the plain to the
III. and IV. corps and 2 cavalry divisions (50,000). On the other side
the Austrians, trusting to the defensive facilities of the plateau,
had directed the II. Army and part of the I. (86,000) into the plain,
2 corps of the I. Army (V. and I.) on Solferino-Cavriana (40,000), and
only the VIII. corps (Benedek), 25,000 strong, into the heart of the
undulating ground. One division was sent from Mantua towards Marcaria.
Thus both armies, though disposed in parallel lines, were grouped in
very unequal density at different points in these lines.
The French orders for the 24th were--Sardinian army on Pozzolengo, I.
corps Esenta to Solferino, II. Castiglione to Cavriana, IV. with two
cavalry divisions, Carpenedolo to Guidizzolo, III. Mezzane to Medole
by Castel Goffredo; Imperial Guard in reserve at Castiglione. On the
other side the VIII. corps from Monzambano was to reach Lonato, the
remainder of the II. Army from Cavriana, Solferino and Guidizzolo to
Esenta and Castiglione, and the I. Army from Medole, Robecco and
Castel Grimaldo towards Carpenedolo. At 8 A.M. the head of the French
I. corps encountered several brigades of the I. Army in advance of
Solferino. The fighting was severe, but the French made no progress.
MacMahon advancing on Guidizzolo came upon a force of the Austrians at
Casa Morino and (as on former occasions) immediately set about
deploying his whole corps in line of battle. Meanwhile masses of
Austrian infantry became visible on the edge of the heights near
Cavriana and the firing in the hills grew in intensity. Marshal
MacMahon therefore called upon General Niel on his right rear to
hasten his march. The latter had already expelled a small body of the
Austrians from Medole and had moved forward to Robecco, but there more
Austrian masses were found, and Niel, like MacMahon, held his hand
until Canrobert (III. corps) should come up on his right. But the
latter, after seizing Castel Goffredo, judged it prudent to collect
his corps there before actively intervening. Meantime, however,
MacMahon had completed his preparations, and capturing Casa Morino
with ease, he drove forward to a large open field called the Campo di
Medole; this, aided by a heavy cross fire from his artillery and part
of Niel's, he carried without great loss, Niel meantime attacking Casa
Nuova and Robecco. But the Austrians had not yet developed their full
strength, and the initial successes of the French, won against
isolated brigades and battalions, were a mere prelude to the real
struggle. Meanwhile the stern Baraguay d'Hilliers had made ceaseless
attacks on the V. corps at Solferino, where, on a steep hill
surmounted by a tower, the Austrian guns fired with great effect on
the attacking masses. It was not until after midday, and then only
because it attacked at the moment when, in accordance with an often
fatal practice of those days, the Austrian V. corps was being relieved
and replaced by the I., that Forey's division of the I. corps,
assisted by part of the Imperial Guard, succeeded in reaching the
hill, whereupon Baraguay stormed the village and cemetery of Solferino
with the masses of infantry that had gradually gathered opposite this
point. By 2 P.M. Solferino was definitively lost to the Austrians.
During this time MacMahon had taken, as ordered, the direction of
Cavriana, and was by degrees drawn into the fighting on the heights.
Pending the arrival of Canrobert--who had been alarmed by the reported
movement of an Austrian force on his rear (the division from Mantua
above mentioned) and having given up his cavalry to Niel was unable to
explore for himself--Niel alone was left to face the I. Army. But
Count Wimpffen, having been ordered at 11 to change direction towards
Castiglione, employed the morning in redistributing his intact troops
in various "mutually supporting positions," and thus the forces
opposing Niel at Robecco never outnumbered him by more than 3 to 2.
Niel, therefore, attacking again and again and from time to time
supported by a brigade or a regiment sent by Canrobert, not only held
his own but actually captured Robecco. About the same time MacMahon
gained a foothold on the heights between Solferino and Cavriana, and
as above mentioned, Baraguay had stormed Solferino and the tower hill.
The greater part of the II. Austrian Army was beaten and in retreat on
Valeggio before 3 P.M. But the Austrian emperor had not lost hope, and
it was only a despairing message from Wimpffen, who had suffered least
in the battle, that finally induced him to order the retreat over the
Mincio. On the extreme right Benedek and the VIII. corps had fought
successfully all day against the Sardinians, this engagement being
often known by the separate name of the battle of San Martino. On the
left Wimpffen, after sending his despondent message, plucked up heart
afresh and, for a moment, took the offensive against Niel, who at
last, supported by the most part of Canrobert's corps, had reached
Guidizzolo. In the centre the Austrian rearguard held out for two
hours in several successive positions against the attacks of MacMahon
and the Guard. But the battle was decided. A violent storm, the
exhaustion of the assailants, and the firm countenance of Benedek,
who, retiring from San Martino, covered the retreat of the rest of the
II. Army over the Mincio, precluded an effective pursuit.
The losses on either side had been: Allies, 14,415 killed and wounded
and 2776 missing, total 17,191; Austrians, 13,317 killed and wounded,
9220 missing, total 22,537. The heaviest losses in the French army
were in Niel's corps (IV.), which lost 4483, and in Baraguay
d'Hilliers' (I.), which lost 4431. Of the total of 17,191, 5521 was
the share of the Sardinian army, which in the battle of San Martino
had had as resolute an enemy, and as formidable a position to attack,
as had Baraguay at Solferino. On the Austrian side the IX. corps,
which bore the brunt of the fighting on the plain, lost 4349 and the
V. corps, that had defended Solferino, 4442. Solferino, in the first
instance an encounter-battle in which each corps fought whatever enemy
it found in its path, became after a time a decisive trial of
strength. In the true sense of the word, it was a soldier's battle,
and the now doubly-proved superiority of the French soldier being
reinforced by the conviction that the Austrian leaders were incapable
of neutralizing it by superior strategy, the war ended without further
fighting. The peace of Villafranca was signed on the 11th of July.