It will be seen that no attention is paid to my question, as there is
no connection between it and the intended answer. This may signify
something or it may not. My letter may have been mislaid and contents
forgotten. The time has been when the reception of this letter would
have greatly gratified me, but since I have made a study of the records
and other authorities I have become convinced that, with one exception,
there was not a brigade in Trimble’s or Pettigrew’s divisions which
did not only equal but really surpass any of General Pickett’s in all
soldierly qualities on that occasion.
And now for a few of the figures you some time ago expressed the
wish to see. For the whole battle the fifteen Virginia regiments on
the right had in killed and wounded 1,360. Amongst those on the left
were the five North Carolina and three Mississippi regiments, which
constituted Pettigrew’s and Davis’ brigades, and their loss in killed
and wounded was 2,002.
What part of this latter loss was incurred on the third day will never
be accurately known; but we know from the Federals that the artillery
fire was largely concentrated upon these two brigades, and we also
know from the testimony of Federal officers, one of whom was Colonel
Morgan, General Hancock’s chief of staff, that the dead lay thicker
on the ground over which these troops had passed than upon any other
part of the field, and if we did not know these two facts the case of
one regiment furnishes a key to the per centage of killed and wounded
in its own brigade and that of the one immediately on its right. This
regiment, the Eleventh Mississippi, did no fighting on the first day,
as it was on detached service and consequently met with all its loss
in the fight of the third. We know how many it carried in, and Dr.
Guild’s report informs us of the loss, and, knowing these numbers, we
know that its per centage of killed and wounded was more than sixty--a
per centage so high that not one Virginia regiment ever made it, and
not a great many others. This and its companion regiment--the Second
Mississippi--were old troops--veterans in fact as well as in name--had
fought often and always well. By referring to the Sharpsburg Campaign
Series 1, Vol. xix. of the records, a comparison can be readily drawn
between the conduct of these two regiments in this campaign and that of
several which were afterwards at Gettysburg with Pickett. A comparison
that were it not so pitiful would be amusing.
If Pickett’s troops carried in no more than claimed their per centage
of killed and wounded was twenty-eight. But in order that their per
centage might appear as high as possible, it is probable their numbers
were always represented as smaller than they were. Their fifteen
regiments probably averaged 400. If they did not, they should have done
so, for they did not often have anybody hurt--that is, compared with
the troops in the army from the other States. In the period from the
close of the Richmond fighting to Gettysburg--one year--twelve battles
were fought by the whole or part of the army, and in these battles
Archer’s Tennessee, Lane’s North Carolina and Scales’ North Carolina
had 3,610 killed and wounded. Kemper’s Virginia, Armistead’s Virginia
and Garnett’s Virginia had 772. We can understand why these people were
handled so tenderly, for were they not made of better clay than the
fighters of the army? Fine porcelain from the province of Quang Tong
were they--things of beauty, but fragile.
In the assault Davis’ brigade had about sixty per cent. killed and
wounded. It is probable that Pettigrew’s brigade had even a higher per
centage, as they were somewhat longer under fire. It is possible that
Pickett’s was twenty-five. But whatever it was, after all, their pretty
wheelings and lovely drum major’s airs, that the enemy should have been
so ungrateful as to shoot at them, so wounded their feelings that they
had to be sent out of the army and they did not re-join it for nearly a
year afterwards.
If a line of good soldiers can be formed in rushing distance, almost
anything can be carried. But if a wide and open field has to be passed
and there is to be a loss from twenty-five to seventy per cent. and
the consequent disorganization, nothing but useless bloodshed can be
expected. This would appear to be a truth so self-evident that the
merest tyro could comprehend it. But yet Burnside and Hancock (’till
too late) do not appear to have done so at Fredericksburg. General Lee
did not at Malvern Hill and Gettysburg, and, in ignorance of this law,
the gallant Schobelef sacrificed the best division of the Russian army
at Plevna.
Bodies in motion, by their momentum, advance in the direction of least
resistance. A body of soldiers making an attack forms no exception
to this law of physics. When the Philadelphia brigade of Gibbon’s
division, which had been roughly handled the day before, gave way as
our men got in charging distance, this point of least resistance was
filled by Confederates--a disorganized mob of about 1,000--in which
several brigades had representatives, and this is very foolishly called
the “high water mark of the Confederacy.” Why, there was not a fresh
regiment in the Federal army which could not have defeated this body,
and there was a whole corps of fresh regiments at hand. The Sixth,
which by many was considered the best in the army had hardly fired
a shot. If there was any high water mark connected with this battle
it was reached the afternoon before, while McLaws, Hood and Anderson
were doing their fighting--and the precise time was when Wright’s
brigade, of the last named division, having driven the enemy before
them, had carried a battery of twenty guns. Shortly afterwards one of
McLaws’ brigades gave way, and with its defeat went our fortunes. Every
shot fired by us the next day was one more nail in the coffin of the
Confederacy.--Scotland Neck Commonwealth.