"The admixture of the relative element not only does not take away
the absolute character of the remainder, but does not even (if our
author is right) prevent us from recognising it. The confusion,
according to him, is not inextricable. It is for us to 'analyse and
distinguish what elements' in an 'act of knowledge' are contributed
by the object, and what by our organs, or by the mind. We may
neglect to do this, and as far as the mind's share is concerned, we
can only do it by the help of philosophy; but it is a task to
which, in his opinion, philosophy is equal. By thus stripping off
such of the elements in our apparent cognitions of things as are
but cognitions of something in us, and consequently relative, we
may succeed in uncovering the pure nucleus, the direct intuitions
of things in themselves; as we correct the observed positions of
the heavenly bodies by allowing for the error due to the refracting
influence of the atmospheric medium, an influence which does not
alter the facts, but only our perception of them."
Surely Mr. Mill here demands much more of philosophy than Sir W. Hamilton
deems it capable of accomplishing. Why may not Hamilton, like Kant,
distinguish between the permanent and necessary, and the variable and
contingent--in other words, between the subjective and the objective
elements of consciousness, without therefore obtaining a "direct
intuition of things in themselves?" Why may he not distinguish between
space and time as the forms of our sensitive cognitions, and the things
perceived in space and time, which constitute the matter of the same
cognitions, without thereby having an intuition, on the one hand, of pure
space and time with nothing in them, or on the other, of things in
themselves out of space and time? If certain elements are always present
in perception, while certain others change with every act, I may surely
infer that the one is due to the permanent subject, the other to the
variable object, without thereby knowing what each would be if it could
be discerned apart from the other. "A direct intuition of things in
themselves," according to Kant and Hamilton, is an intuition of things
out of space and time. Does Mr. Mill suppose that any natural Realist
professes to have such an intuition?
The same error of supposing that a doctrine of relativity is necessarily
a doctrine of Idealism, that "matter known only in relation to us" can
mean nothing more than "matter known only through the mental impressions
of which it is the unknown cause,"[AC] runs through the whole of Mr.
Mill's argument against this portion of Sir W. Hamilton's teaching. That
argument, though repeated in various forms, may be briefly summed up in
one thesis; namely, that the doctrine that our knowledge of matter is
wholly relative is incompatible with the distinction, which Hamilton
expressly makes, between the primary and secondary qualities of body.
[AC] The assumption that these two expressions are or ought
to be synonymous is tacitly made by Mr. Mill at the
opening of this chapter. He opens it with a passage from
the _Discussions_, in which Hamilton says that the
existence of _things in themselves_ is only indirectly
revealed to us "through certain qualities _related to
our faculties of knowledge_;" and then proceeds to show
that the author did not hold the doctrine which these
phrases "seem to convey in the only substantial meaning
capable of being attached to them;" namely, "that we
know nothing of _objects_ except their existence, and
the impressions produced by them upon the human mind."
Having thus quietly assumed that "things in themselves"
are identical with "objects," and "relations" with
"impressions on the human mind," Mr. Mill bases his
whole criticism on this tacit _petitio principii_. He is
not aware that though Reid sometimes uses the term
_relative_ in this inaccurate sense, Hamilton expressly
points out the inaccuracy and explains the proper
sense.--(See _Reid's Works_, pp. 313, 322.)
The most curious circumstance about this criticism is, that, if not
directly borrowed from, it has at least been carefully anticipated by,
Hamilton himself. Of the distinction between primary and secondary
qualities, as acknowledged by Descartes and Locke, whose theory of
external perception is identical with that which Mr. Mill would force on
Hamilton himself, Hamilton says: "On the general doctrine, however, of
these philosophers, both classes of qualities, as known, are confessedly
only states of our own minds; and while we have no right from a
subjective affection to infer the existence, far less the corresponding
character of the existence, of any objective reality, it is evident that
their doctrine, if fairly evolved, would result in a dogmatic or in a
sceptical negation of the primary no less than of the secondary qualities
of body, as more than appearances in and for us."[AD] It is astonishing
that Mr. Mill, who pounces eagerly on every imaginable instance of
Hamilton's inconsistency, should have neglected to notice this, which, if
his criticism be true, is the most glaring inconsistency of all.
[AD] _Reid's Works_, p. 840.
But Hamilton continues: "It is therefore manifest that the fundamental
position of a consistent theory of dualistic realism is--that our
cognitions of Extension and its modes are not wholly ideal--that although
Space be a native, necessary, _à priori_ form of imagination, and so
far, therefore, a mere subjective state, that there is, at the same time,
competent to us, in an _immediate_ perception of external things, the
_consciousness_ of a really existent, of a really objective, _extended_
world." Here we have enunciated in one breath, first the subjectivity of
space, which is the logical basis of the relative theory of perception;
and secondly, the objectivity of the extended world, which is the logical
basis of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It is
manifest, therefore, that Hamilton had not, as Mr. Mill supposes, ceased
to hold the one theory when he adopted the other.[AE]
[AE] See _Examination_, p. 28.
The key to all this is not difficult to find. It is simply that
_objective existence_ does not mean existence _per se_; and that a
_phenomenon_ does not mean a mere mode of mind. Objective existence is
existence _as an object_, in perception, and therefore in relation; and a
phenomenon may be material, as well as mental. The thing _per se_ may be
only the unknown cause of what we directly know; but what we directly
know is something more than our own sensations. In other words, the
phenomenal effect is material as well as the cause, and is, indeed, that
from which our primary conceptions of matter are derived. Matter does not
cease to be matter when modified by its contact with mind, as iron does
not cease to be iron when smelted and forged. A horseshoe is something
very different from a piece of iron ore; and a man may be acquainted with
the former without ever having seen the latter, or knowing what it is
like. But would Mr. Mill therefore say that the horseshoe is merely a
subjective affection of the skill of the smith--that it is not iron
modified by the workman, but the workman or his art impressed by iron?
If, indeed, Hamilton had said with Locke, that the primary qualities are
in the bodies themselves, whether we perceive them or no,[AF] he would
have laid himself open to Mr. Mill's criticism. But he expressly rejects
this statement, and contrasts it with the more cautions language of
Descartes, "ut sunt, vel saltem esse possunt."[AG] The secondary
qualities are mere affections of consciousness, which, cannot be
conceived as existing except in a conscious subject. The primary
qualities are qualities of body, as perceived in relation to the
percipient mind, _i.e._, of the phenomenal body perceived as in space.
How far they exist in the real body out of relation to us, Hamilton does
not attempt to decide.[AH] They are inseparable from our conception of
body, which, is derived exclusively from the phenomenon; they may or may
not be separable from the thing as it is in itself.
[AF] _Essay_, ii 8, § 23.
[AG] _Reid's Works_, p. 839.
[AH] We have been content to argue this question, as Mr.
Mill himself argues it, on the supposition that Sir W.
Hamilton held that we are directly percipient of primary
qualities in external bodies. Strictly speaking, however,
Hamilton held that the primary qualities are immediately
perceived only in our organism as extended, and
inferred to exist in extra-organic bodies. The external
world is immediately apprehended only in its
secundo-primary character, as resisting our locomotive
energy. But as the organism, in this theory, is a
material _non-ego_ equally with the rest of matter, and as
to press this distinction would only affect the verbal
accuracy, not the substantial justice, of Mr. Mill's
criticisms, we have preferred to meet him on the ground
he has himself chosen. The same error, of supposing that
"presentationism" is identical with "noumenalism," and
"phenomenalism" with "representationism," runs through
the whole of Mr. Stirling's recent criticism of Hamilton's
theory of perception. It is curious, however, that the
very passage (_Lectures_, i., p. 146) which Mr. Mill cites
as proving that Hamilton, in spite of his professed
phenomenalism, was an unconscious noumenalist, is
employed by Mr. Stirling to prove that, in spite of his
professed presentationism, he was an unconscious
representationist. The two critics tilt at Hamilton
from opposite quarters: he has only to stand aside and let
them run against each other.
Under this explanation, it is manifest that the doctrine, that matter as
a subject or substratum of attributes is unknown and unknowable, is
totally different from that of cosmothetic idealism, with which Mr Mill
confounds it;[AI] and that a philosopher may without inconsistency
accept the former and reject the latter. The former, while it holds the
material substance to be unknown, does not deny that some of the
attributes of matter are perceived immediately as material, though, it
may be, modified by contact with mind. The latter maintains that the
attributes, as well as the substance, are not perceived immediately as
material, but mediately through the intervention of immaterial
representatives. It is also manifest that, in answer to Mr. Mill's
question, which of Hamilton's two "cardinal doctrines," Relativity or
Natural Realism, "is to be taken in a non-natural sense,"[AJ] we must
say, neither. The two doctrines are quite compatible with each other, and
neither requires a non-natural interpretation to reconcile it to its
companion.
[AI] _Examination_, p. 23.
[AJ] _Examination_, p. 20.
The doctrine of relativity derives its chief practical value from its
connection with the next great doctrine of Hamilton's philosophy, the
incognisability of the Absolute and the Infinite. For this doctrine
brings Ontology into contact with Theology; and it is only in relation to
theology that ontology acquires a practical importance. With respect to
the other two "ideas of the pure reason," as Kant calls them, the human
soul and the world, the question, whether we know them as realities or as
phenomena, may assist us in dealing with certain metaphysical
difficulties, but need not affect our practical conduct. For we have an
immediate intuition of the attributes of mind and matter, at least as
phenomenal objects, and by these intuitions may be tested the accuracy of
the conceptions derived from them, sufficiently for all practical
purposes. A man will equally avoid walking over a precipice, and is
logically as consistent in avoiding it, whether he regard the precipice
as a real thing, or as a mere phenomenon. But in the province of theology
this is not the case. We have no immediate intuition of the Divine
attributes, even as phenomena; we only infer their existence and nature
from certain similar attributes of which we are immediately conscious in
ourselves. And hence arises the question, How far does the similarity
extend, and to what extent is the accuracy of our conceptions guaranteed
by the intuition, not of the object to be conceived, but of something
more or less nearly resembling it? But this is not all. Our knowledge of
God, originally derived from personal consciousness, receives accession
from two other sources--from the external world, as His work; and from
revelation, as His word; and the conclusions derived from each have to be
compared together. Should any discrepancy arise between them, are we at
once warranted in rejecting one class of conclusions in favour of the
other two, or two in favour of the third? or are we at liberty to say
that our knowledge in respect of all alike is of such an imperfect and
indirect character that we are warranted in believing that some
reconciliation may exist, though our ignorance prevents us from
discovering what it is? Here at least is a practical question of the very
highest importance. In the early part of our previous remarks, we have
endeavoured to show how this question has been answered by orthodox
theologians of various ages, and how Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy
supports that answer. We have now to consider Mr Mill's chapter of
criticisms.
It is always unfortunate to make a stumble on the threshold; and Mr.
Mill's opening paragraph makes two. "The name of God," he says, "is
veiled under two extremely abstract phrases, 'the Infinite and the
Absolute.'... But it is one of the most unquestionable of all logical
maxims, that the meaning of the abstract must be sought in the concrete,
and not conversely."[AK]--Now, in the first place, "the Infinite" and
"the Absolute," even in the sense in which they are both predicable of
God, are no more names of God than "the creature" and "the finite" are
names of man. They are the names of certain attributes, which further
inquiry may, perhaps, show to belong to God and to no other being, but
which do not in their signification express this, and do not constitute
our primary idea of God, which is that of a Person. Men may believe in an
absolute and infinite, without in any proper sense believing in God; and
thousands upon thousands of pious men have prayed to a personal God, who
have never heard of the absolute and the infinite, and who would not
understand the expressions if they heard them. But, in the second place,
"the absolute" and "the infinite," in Sir W. Hamilton's sense of the
terms, cannot both be names of God, for the simple reason that they are
contradictory of each other, and are proposed as alternatives which
cannot both be accepted as predicates of the same subject. For Hamilton,
whatever Mr. Mill may do, did not fall into the absurdity of maintaining
that God in some of His attributes is absolute without being infinite,
and in others is infinite without being absolute.[AL]
[AK] _Examination_, p. 32.
[AL] See _Examination_, p. 35.
But we have not yet done with this single paragraph. After thus making
two errors in his exposition of his opponent's doctrine, Mr. Mill
immediately proceeds to a third, in his criticism of it. By following his
"most unquestionable of all logical maxims," and substituting the name of
God in the place of "the Infinite" and "the Absolute," he exactly
reverses Sir W. Hamilton's argument, and makes his own attempted
refutation of it a glaring _ignoratio elenchi_.
One of the purposes of Hamilton's argument is to show that we have no
positive conception of an Infinite Being; that when we attempt to form
such a conception, we do but produce a distorted representation of the
finite; and hence, that our so-called conception of the infinite is not
the true infinite. Hence it is not to be wondered at--nay, it is a
natural consequence of this doctrine,--that our positive conception of
God as a Person cannot be included under this pseudo-concept of the
Infinite. Whereas Mr. Mill, by laying down the maxim that the meaning of
the abstract must be sought in the concrete, quietly assumes that this
pseudo-infinite is a proper predicate of God, to be tested by its
applicability to the subject, and that what Hamilton says of _this_
infinite cannot be true unless it is also true of God. Of this
refutation, Hamilton, were he living, might truly say, as he said of a
former criticism on another part of his writings,--"This elaborate parade
of argument is literally answered in two words--_Quis dubitavit?_"
But if the substitution of God for the Infinite be thus a perversion of
Hamilton's argument, what shall we say to a similar substitution in the
case of the Absolute? Hamilton distinctly tells us that there is one
sense of the term _absolute_ in which it is contradictory of the
infinite, and therefore is not predicable of God at all. Mr. Mill admits
that Hamilton, throughout the greater part of his arguments, employs the
term in this sense; and he then actually proceeds to "test" these
arguments "by substituting the concrete, God, for the abstract,
Absolute;" _i.e._, by substituting God for something which Hamilton
defines as contradictory to the nature of God. Can the force of confusion
go further? Is it possible for perverse criticism more utterly, we do not
say to misrepresent, but literally to invert an author's meaning?
The source of all these errors, and of a great many more, is simply this.
Mr. Mill is aware, from Hamilton's express assertion, that the word
_absolute_ may be used in two distinct and even contradictory senses; but
he is wholly unable to see what those senses are, or when Hamilton is
using the term in the one sense, and when in the other. Let us endeavour
to clear up some of this confusion.
Hamilton's article on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned is a criticism,
partly of Schelling, partly of Cousin; and Schelling and Cousin only
attempted in a new form, under the influence of the Kantian philosophy,
to solve the problem with which philosophy in all ages has attempted to
grapple,--the problem of the Unconditioned.
"The unconditioned" is a term which, while retaining the same general
meaning, admits of various applications, particular or universal. It may
be the unconditioned as regards some special relation, or the
unconditioned as regards all relations whatever. Thus there may be the
unconditioned in Psychology--the human soul considered as a substance;
the unconditioned in Cosmology--the world considered as a single whole;
the unconditioned in Theology--God in His own nature, as distinguished
from His manifestations to us; or, finally, the unconditioned _par
excellence_--the unconditioned in Ontology--the being on which all other
being depends. It is of course possible to identify any one of the three
first with the last. It is possible to adopt a system of Egoism, and to
maintain that all phenomena are modes of my mind, and that the substance
of my mind is the only real existence. It is possible to adopt a system
of Materialism, and to maintain that all phenomena are modes of matter,
and that the material substance of the world is the only real existence.
Or it is possible to adopt a system of Pantheism, and to maintain that
all phenomena are modes of the Divine existence, and that God is the only
reality. But the several notions are in themselves distinct, though one
may ultimately be predicated of another.
The general notion of the Unconditioned is the same in all these cases,
and all must finally culminate in the last, the Unconditioned _par
excellence_. The general notion is that of the One as distinguished from
the Many, the substance from its accidents, the permanent reality from
its variable modifications. Thought, will, sensation, are modes of my
existence. What is the _I_ that is one and the same in all? Extension,
figure, resistance, are attributes of matter. What is the one substance
to which these attributes belong? But the generalisation cannot stop
here. If matter differs from mind, the _non-ego_ from the _ego_, as one
thing from another, there must be some special point of difference,
which, is the condition of the existence of each in this or that
particular manner. Unconditioned existence, therefore, in the highest
sense of the term, cannot be the existence of _this_ as distinguished
from _that_; it must be existence _per se_, the ground and principle of
all conditioned or special existence. This is the Unconditioned, properly
so called: the unconditioned in Schelling's sense, as the indifference of
subject and object: and it is against this that Hamilton's arguments are
directed.
The question is this. Is this Unconditioned a mere abstraction, the
product of our own minds; or can it be conceived as having a real
existence _per se_, and, as such, can it be identified with God as the
source of all existence? Hamilton maintains that it is a mere
abstraction, and cannot be so identified; that, far from being "a name of
God," it is a name of nothing at all. "By abstraction," he says, "we
annihilate the object, and by abstraction we annihilate the subject of
consciousness. But what remains? _Nothing._" When we attempt to conceive
it as a reality, we "hypostatise the zero."[AM]
[AM] _Discussions_, p. 21.
In order to conceive the Unconditioned existing as a thing, we must
conceive it as existing out of relation to everything else. For if
nothing beyond itself is necessary as a condition of its existence, it
can exist separate from everything else; and its pure existence as the
unconditioned is so separate. It must therefore be conceivable as the
sole existence, having no plurality beyond itself; and as simple, having
no plurality within itself. For if we cannot conceive it as existing
apart from other things, we cannot conceive it as independent of them;
and if we conceive it as a compound of parts, we have further to ask as
before, what is the principle of unity which binds these parts into one
whole? If there is such a principle, this is the true unconditioned; if
there is no such principle, there is no unconditioned; for that which
cannot exist except as a compound is dependent for its existence on that
of its several constituents. The unconditioned must therefore be
conceived as one, as simple, and as universal.
Is such a conception possible, whether in ordinary consciousness, as
Cousin says, or in an extraordinary intuition, as Schelling says? Let us
try the former. Consciousness is subject to the law of Time. A phenomenon
is presented to us in time, as dependent on some previous phenomenon or
thing. I wish to pursue the chain in thought till I arrive at something
independent. If I could reach in thought a beginning of time, and
discover some first fact with nothing preceding it, I should conceive
time as absolute--as completed,--and the unconditioned as the first thing
in time, and therefore as completed also, for it may be considered by
itself, apart from what depends upon it. Or if time be considered as
having no beginning, thought would still be able to represent to itself
that infinity, could it follow out the series of antecedents for ever.
But is either of these alternatives possible to thought? If not, we must
confess that the unconditioned is inconceivable by ordinary
consciousness; and we must found philosophy, with Schelling, on the
annihilation of consciousness.
But though Hamilton himself distinguishes between the _unconditioned_ and
the _absolute_, using the former term generally, for that which is out of
all relation, and the latter specially, for that which is out of all
relation as complete and finished, his opponent Cousin uses the latter
term in a wider sense, as synonymous with the former, and the _infinite_
as coextensive with both. This, however, does not affect the validity of
Hamilton's argument. For if it can be shown that the absolute and the
infinite (in Hamilton's sense) are both inconceivable, the unconditioned
(or absolute in Cousin's sense), which must be conceived as one or the
other, is inconceivable also. Or, conversely, if it can be shown that the
unconditioned, the unrelated in general, is inconceivable, it follows
that the absolute and the infinite, as both involving the unrelated, are
inconceivable also.