"But what, after all, is this appeal that we make to posterity? The
human imagination is such that it forms a more exalted conception of
posterity than of the men of past or present times, simply because we
are totally ignorant of the people who are yet to be. But, reasonably,
and not imaginatively, do we really think our successors will be better
than ourselves? I am of a contrary opinion, and for my part put faith
in the proverb that says 'the world grows worse as it ages,' It were
better for men of genius if they could appeal to their wise ancestors,
who, according to Cicero, were not inferior in point of numbers, and
far superior in excellence to their successors. But, though such appeal
would be sure of a truer judgment, it is certain that the greatest men
of our day would be held in little esteem by the ancients.
"It may be allowed that the men of the future, being free from
any spirit of rivalry, envy, love, or hatred, not indeed amongst
themselves, but towards us, ought to be better qualified than ourselves
to pass impartial judgment on our writings. For other reasons, too,
they may be better judges. Posterity will perhaps have fewer excellent
writers, noble poets, and subtle philosophers. In which case the few
followers of these sublime influences will honour us the more. It is
also probable that their control over the minds of the people will
be still less than that exercised by us. Again, will the affections,
imagination, and intellect of men be, as a rule, more powerful than
they are at present? If not, we shall gain by the comparison.
"Literature is peculiarly exposed to the influence of custom. In times
of debased literature, we see how firmly this or that barbarism is
retained and upheld, as though it alone were reasonable and natural. At
such times the best and greatest writers are forgotten or ridiculed.
Where, then, is the certainty that posterity will always esteem the
kind of writing that we praise? Besides, it is a question whether or
not we ourselves esteem what is really praiseworthy. For men have
different opinions about what constitutes good writing, and these vary
according to the times, the nature of places and people, customs,
usages, and individuals. Yet it is to this variety and variability of
influences that the glory of writers is subjected.
"Philosophy is even more diverse and changeable than other sciences.[1]
At first sight the contrary of this would seem to be true; for whereas
the 'belles lettres' are concerned with the study of the beautiful,
which is chiefly a matter of custom and opinion, sciences seek the
truth, which is fixed and unchangeable. But this truth is hid from
mortals, though, as centuries go by, some little of it is revealed.
Consequently, on the one hand, in their endeavours to discover it,
and their conjectures as to its nature, men are led to embrace this
or that resemblance of truth; thereupon opinions and sects multiply.
And, on the other hand, it is due to the ever-increasing number of
fresh discoveries, and new aspects of truth obtained daily, that even
these divisions become subdivided; and opinions which at one time were
regarded almost as certainties change shape and substance momentarily.
It is owing to the changeability of sciences and philosophy that they
are so unproductive of glory, either at the hands of contemporaries
or posterity. For when new discoveries, or new ideas and conjectures,
greatly alter the condition of this or that science from its present
state, how will the writings and thoughts of men now celebrated in
these sciences be regarded? Who, for instance, now reads Galileo's
works? Yet in his time they were most wonderful; nor could better and
nobler books, full of greater discoveries and grander conceptions,
be then written on such subjects. But now every tyro in physics or
mathematics surpasses Galileo in his knowledge. Again, how many people
in the present day read the writings of Francis Bacon? Who troubles
himself about Malebranche? And how much time will soon be bestowed on
the works of Locke, if the science almost founded by him progresses in
future as rapidly as it gives promise of doing?
"Truly the very intellectual force, industry, and labour, which
philosophers and scientists expend in the pursuit of their glory, are
in time the cause of its extinction or obscurÈment. For by their own
great exertions they open out a path for the still further advancement
of the science, which in time progresses so rapidly that their writings
and names fall gradually into oblivion. And it is certainly difficult
for most men to esteem others for a knowledge greatly inferior to their
own. Who can doubt that the twentieth century will discover error in
what the wisest of us regard as unquestionable truths, and will surpass
us greatly in their knowledge of the truth?"
[Footnote 1: Compare the following from H. Rogers' _Essay on Leibnitz_:
"The condition of great philosophers is far less enviable than that of
great poets. The former can never possess so large a circle of readers
under any circumstances; but that number is still further abridged by
the fact that even the truths the philosopher has taught or discovered
form but stepping-stones in the progress of science, and are afterwards
digested, systematised, and better expounded in other works composed by
inferior men."]