1890-1893
Extension of command--Efficiency of the Native Army
--Concessions to the Native Army--Officering of the Native Army
--The Hunza-Naga campaign--Visit to Nepal--A Nepalese entertainment
--Proposed mission to the Amir--A last tour--Farewell entertainments
--Last days in India
New Year's Day, 1890, found me in Calcutta, where I went to meet
Prince Albert Victor on his arrival in India. On my way thither I
received a letter from Mr. Edward Stanhope, Secretary of State for
War, telling me that he had heard from Lord Cross, the Secretary of
State for India, that there was a proposal to ask me to retain my
appointment of Commander-in-Chief in India for some time after the
expiration of the usual term of office; but that, while such an
arrangement would have his hearty approval, he thought the question
should be considered from another point of view, and that it would be
extremely agreeable to himself, and he felt to the Duke of Cambridge
also, if he could secure me for the post of Adjutant-General in
succession to Lord Wolseley. Mr. Stanhope went on to say he would
like to know whether I would be willing to accept the appointment, or
whatever position Lord Wolseley's successor would fill, should the
report of Lord Hartington's Commission cause a change to be made in
the staff at the Horse Guards.
I was pleased, though somewhat surprised, at this communication, and I
replied to the Right Honourable gentleman that I would gladly accept
the offer, and that I could arrange to join on the 1st October, when
the appointment would become vacant, but that, as Lord Lansdowne had
expressed a wish that I should remain in India over the next cold
season, I hoped, if it were possible, some arrangement might be made
to admit of my doing so. The idea of employment in England, now that I
allowed myself to dwell upon it, was very attractive, for dearly as
I loved my Indian command, and bitterly as I knew I should grieve at
leaving the country, the peoples, and the grand army, which were all
sources of such intense interest to me, I felt that the evil day at
longest could only be postponed for a few years, and that there is a
limit to the time that even the strongest European can with impunity
live in an eastern climate, while I was glad to think I should still
be in a position to work for my country and for the benefit of the
army.
From Calcutta I travelled north to Muridki, where a large force of
Horse Artillery and Cavalry was assembled for practice, and where we
had a standing camp, at which Prince Albert Victor did us the honour
of being our guest for the final manoeuvres. I think His Royal
Highness enjoyed the novelty of camp life, and was greatly attracted
by the picturesque and soldier-like appearance of the Native troops.
The Native officers were very proud at being presented to the grandson
of their Empress, and at His Royal Highness being appointed Honorary
Colonel of the 1st Punjab Cavalry.
Towards the end of April I returned to Simla for what I thought was to
be our last season in that place; and shortly after I got up there, a
telegram from Mr. Stanhope informed me that my appointment had been
accepted by the Cabinet, and that my presence in England was strongly
desired in the autumn. It was therefore with very great surprise that
I received a second telegram three weeks later from the Secretary
of State, telling me that, as it was then found to be impossible to
choose my successor, and as the exigencies of the public service
urgently required my presence in India, the Cabinet, with the approval
of Her Majesty and the concurrence of the Duke of Cambridge, had
decided to ask me to retain my command for two more years.
I felt it my duty to obey the wishes of the Queen, Her Majesty's
Government, and the Commander-in-Chief; but I fully realized that in
doing so I was forfeiting my chance of employment in England, and that
a long and irksome term of enforced idleness would in all probability
follow on my return home, and I did not attempt to conceal from Mr.
Stanhope that I was disappointed.
At the latter end of this year, and in the early part of 1891, it was
found necessary to undertake three small expeditions: one to Zhob,
under the leadership of Sir George White, for the protection of our
newly-acquired subjects in that valley; one on the Kohat border,
commanded by Sir William Lockhart, to punish the people of the
Miranzai valley for repeated acts of hostility; and the third, under
Major-General Elles,[1] against the Black Mountain tribes, who, quite
unsubdued by the fruitless expedition of 1888, had given trouble
almost immediately afterwards. All these were as completely successful
in their political results as in their military conduct. The columns
were not withdrawn until the tribesmen had become convinced that they
were powerless to sustain a hostile attitude towards us, and that it
was their interest, as it was our wish, that they should henceforth be
on amicable terms with us.
[Illustration: FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS ON HIS ARAB CHARGER
'VONOLEL.'
_From an oil-painting by Charles Furse._]
While a considerable number of troops were thus employed, a fourth
expedition had to be hurriedly equipped and despatched in quite the
opposite direction to punish the Raja of Manipur, a petty State on
the confines of Assam, for the treacherous murder of Mr. Quinton, the
Chief Commissioner of Assam, and four other British officers.
Notwithstanding its inaccessibility, two columns, one from Burma, the
other from Cachar, quickly and simultaneously reached Manipur, our
countrymen were avenged, and the administration of the State was taken
over for a time by the Government of India.[2]
Towards the end of January the Cesarewitch came to Calcutta, where
I had the honour of being introduced to our august visitor, who
expressed himself as pleased with what he had seen of the country and
the arrangements made for His Imperial Highness's somewhat hurried
journey through India.
In April my military colleague in the Viceroy's Council for five
years, and my personal friend, General Sir George Chesney, left India,
to my great regret. We had worked together most harmoniously, and, as
he wrote in his farewell letter, there was scarcely a point in regard
to the Army in India about which he and I did not agree.
Sir George was succeeded by Lieutenant-General Brackenbury, who had
been Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office. I was
relieved to find that, although in some particulars my new coadjutor's
views differed from mine, we were in accord upon all essential points,
particularly as to the value of the Indian Army and the necessity for
its being maintained in a state of preparedness for war.
From the time I became Commander-in-Chief in Madras until I left India
the question of how to render the army in that country as perfect a
fighting machine as it was possible to make it, was the one which
caused me the most anxious thought, and to its solution my most
earnest efforts had been at all times directed.
The first step to be taken towards this end was, it seemed to me, to
substitute men of the more warlike and hardy races for the Hindustani
sepoys of Bengal, the Tamils and Telagus of Madras, and the so-called
Mahrattas of Bombay; but I found it difficult to get my views
accepted, because of the theory which prevailed that it was
necessary to maintain an equilibrium between the armies of the three
Presidencies, and because of the ignorance that was only too universal
with respect to the characteristics of the different races, which
encouraged the erroneous belief that one Native was as good as another
for purposes of war.
In former days, when the Native Army in India was so much stronger in
point of numbers than the British Army, and there existed no means
of rapid communication, it was only prudent to guard against a
predominance of soldiers of any one creed or nationality; but with
British troops nearly doubled and the Native Army reduced by more than
one-third, with all the forts and arsenals protected, and nearly the
whole of the Artillery manned by British soldiers, with railway and
telegraph communication from one end of India to the other, with the
risk of internal trouble greatly diminished, and the possibility of
external complications becoming daily more apparent, circumstances and
our requirements were completely altered, and it had become essential
to have in the ranks of our Native Army men who might confidently be
trusted to take their share of fighting against a European foe.
In the British Army the superiority of one regiment over another is
mainly a matter of training; the same courage and military instinct
are inherent in English, Scotch, and Irish alike, but no comparison
can be made between the martial value of a regiment recruited amongst
the Gurkhas of Nepal or the warlike races of northern India, and of
one recruited from the effeminate peoples of the south.
How little this was understood, even by those who had spent a great
part of their service in India, was a marvel to me; but, then, I
had had peculiar opportunities of judging of the relative fighting
qualities of Natives, and I was in despair at not being able to get
people to see the matter with my eyes, for I knew that nothing was
more sure to lead to disaster than to imagine that the whole Indian
Army, as it was then constituted, could be relied on in time of war.
General Chesney fortunately shared my opinions, and as Lords Dufferin
and Lansdowne trusted us, we were able to do a great deal towards
increasing the efficiency of the Native Army and improving the status
and prospects of the Native soldier. Several companies and regiments
composed of doubtful material were disbanded, and men of well-known
fighting castes entertained instead. Class regiments were formed,
as being more congenial to the men and more conducive to _esprit
de corps_; recruiting was made the business of carefully selected
officers who understood Native character, and whose duty it was to
become acquainted with the various tribes inhabiting the districts
from which the recruits for their own regiments were drawn; and
special arrangements were made with the Nepalese Government by which a
sufficient number of the best class of men could be obtained for our
thirteen Gurkha regiments.
The pay of Cavalry soldiers was improved, and it was pointed out to
the Government that an increase to the Infantry soldiers' pay
could not be long deferred;[3] the issue of good-conduct pay was
accelerated; _jagirs_[4] were sanctioned annually for a limited number
of specially distinguished Native officers; full pay was authorized
for recruits from date of enlistment instead of from the date of
joining their regiments; field _batta_[5] was sanctioned whenever
troops should be employed beyond sea or on service; pensions were
granted after a shorter period of service than heretofore; medals for
meritorious service and good conduct were given in commemoration of
Her Majesty's Jubilee; bronze war medals were sanctioned for all
authorized Government followers; a reserve, which it was arranged
should undergo an annual course of training, was formed for the
Artillery and Infantry; and a system of linked battalions was
organized, three battalions being grouped together, and the men being
interchangeable during war-time.
While the tendency of these alterations and concessions was to make
all ranks happy and contented, their training was carefully attended
to, and, as I have before mentioned, musketry particularly reached a
very high standard.
The one thing left undone, and which I should like to have been able
to accomplish before leaving India, was to induce the Government to
arrange for more British officers to be given to the Native regiments
in time of war. Nine to a Cavalry and eight to an Infantry corps may
be sufficient in time of peace, but that number is quite too small
to stand the strain of war. Indian soldiers, like soldiers of every
nationality, require to be led; and history and experience teach us
that eastern races (fortunately for us), however brave and accustomed
to war, do not possess the qualities that go to make leaders of men,
and that Native officers in this respect can never take the place
of British officers. I have known many Natives whose gallantry and
devotion could not be surpassed, but I have never known one who would
not have looked to the youngest British officer for support in time
of difficulty and danger. It is therefore most unwise to allow Native
regiments to enter upon a war with so much smaller a proportion of
British officers than is considered necessary for European regiments.
I have no doubt whatever of the fighting powers of our best Indian
troops; I have a thorough belief in, and admiration for, Gurkhas,
Sikhs, Dogras, Rajputs, Jats, and selected Mahomedans; I thoroughly
appreciate their soldierly qualities; brigaded with British troops, I
would be proud to lead them against any European enemy; but we cannot
expect them to do with less leading than our own soldiers require, and
it is, I maintain, trying them too highly to send them into action
with the present establishment of British officers.[6]
In the late autumn of 1891 our latest acquisition, the Zhob Valley,
was included in my frontier tour, which I had the pleasure of
making, for the greater part of the way, in the company of General
Brackenbury. He was prevented from getting as far as Quetta by an
accident which laid him up for some time, but not, as he told me,
before he had seen enough of the frontier to satisfy him that the
tribes were a factor in our system of defence which could not be
ignored, and that I had not exaggerated the importance of having them
on our side.
During this winter the brilliant little Hunza-Naga campaign took
place, which has been so graphically described in Mr. Knight's 'Where
Three Empires Meet.' It was brought about by Russia's intrigues with
the Rulers of the petty States on the northern boundary of Kashmir;
and our attention was first roused to the necessity for action by two
British officers, who were journeying to India by way of the Pamirs
and Gilgit, being forced by Russian soldiers to leave what the leader
of the party called 'newly-acquired Russian territory '[7]--territory
to which Russia had not the shadow of a claim.
In addition to this unjustifiable treatment of Captain Younghusband
and Lieutenant Davison, Colonel Yanoff crossed the Hindu Kush with his
Cossacks by the Korabhut Pass, and, after reconnoitring the country on
the borders of Kashmir, re-crossed the range by the Baroghil Pass.
As this was a distinct breach of the promises made by the Russian
Government, and an infringement of the boundary line as agreed to
between England and Russia in 1873, it was necessary to take steps to
prevent any recurrence of such interference, and a small force was
accordingly sent against the Chief of Hunza, who had openly declared
himself in favour of Russia. He made a desperate stand, but was
eventually driven from his almost inaccessible position by the
determined gallantry of our Indian troops, assisted by a Contingent
from Kashmir. Three Victoria Crosses were given for this business, and
many more were earned, but of necessity there must be a limit to the
disposal of decorations; and in an affair of this kind, in which all
proved themselves heroes, each individual must have felt himself
honoured by the small force being awarded such a large number of the
coveted reward, in proportion to its size.
We reaped the benefit of having taken this district under our own
control when Chitral required to be relieved, and the Hunza-Naga
people afforded Colonel Kelly such valuable help.
On the 1st January, 1892, I received an intimation that Her Majesty
had been graciously pleased to bestow a peerage upon me, and the same
day the Secretary of State for India offered me a further extension
of my appointment as Commander-in-Chief--an offer I would gladly have
accepted, as I knew it had been made with the concurrence of the
Viceroy, if I could have taken even a few months' leave to England.
But during a quarter of a century I had only been able to spend
eighteen months out of India, and I felt the need of change of climate
and a little rest after so many years of continued hard work. Under
the existing regulations a Commander-in-Chief could have no leave.
Lord Cross had tried to remedy this hard rule by bringing in the
'Officers' Leave Bill'; but as he informed Lord Lansdowne it was
impossible to get it through the House of Commons that session, I was
obliged very reluctantly to beg to be allowed to resign my command in
the spring of 1893.
Before returning to Simla for really the last time, my wife and I made
another trip to Burma as far as Mandalay, and after this was over
we paid a most interesting visit to Nepal, having received the very
unusual honour of an invitation to Khatmandu from Maharaja Bir
Shumsher Jung Rana Bahadur.
Khatmandu is about a hundred miles from our frontier station of
Segowli, by a very rough road over a succession of steep, high hills
and along deep, narrow valleys, which would have been quite impossible
for a lady to travel by but for the excellent arrangements made by
the Nepalese officials; the last descent was the worst of all; we
literally dropped from one rock to the next in some places. But on
reaching the base of the mountain all was changed. A beautifully
cultivated valley spread itself out before us; comfortable tents were
prepared for our reception, where we were met by some of the State
officials; and a perfectly appointed carriage-and-four was waiting
to carry us on to Khatmandu, where we were received by the Resident,
Lieutenant-Colonel Wylie, and his wife, old friends of ours. That
afternoon the Maharaja paid me a private visit.
The next morning the official call was made, which I returned soon
afterwards; and in the evening the Maharaja, accompanied by his eldest
son and eight of his brothers, all high officers of state, were
present at Mrs. Wylie's reception, wearing military frock-coats and
forage-caps. They all spoke English fluently; their manners were those
of well-bred gentlemen, easy and quiet, as free from awkwardness as
from forwardness; each, coming up in turn, talked very pleasantly
to Lady Roberts for a time, and then made way for someone else. The
Maharaja is extremely musical, and has several well-trained bands,
taught by an English bandmaster; three of them were in attendance, and
were directed to play selections from our favourite operas, and then a
number of the beautiful plaintive Nepalese airs. Altogether, we passed
a most agreeable evening.
The following day a review of all the troops (18,000 men and 78
guns)[8] was held on a ground one mile in length by half a mile in
breadth, perfectly level and well turfed. It would be considered a
fine parade-ground for the plains of India, and must have entailed a
considerable expenditure of time, labour, and money to make in such a
hilly place as Khatmandu.
On reaching the ground, I was received by the Maharaja and Deb
Shamsher Jung, the eldest of his many brothers, and the nominal
Commander-in-Chief of the army; we rode along the line together,
and the march past then began. Everything was done with the utmost
precision; there was no fuss or talking, and from first to last not a
single bugle sound was heard, showing how carefully officers and men
had been drilled. I was told that the executive Commander-in-Chief,
the third brother, by name Chandra Shamsher, had almost lived on the
parade-ground for weeks before my arrival. The Maharaja's sons
and brothers, who all knew their work, and were evidently fond of
soldiering, commanded the several divisions and brigades.
The troops were not, perhaps, turned out quite so smartly as those
in our service, and several of the officers were old and feeble; but
these were the only faults perceptible, and I came to the conclusion
that the great majority of the 18,000 men were quite as good as the
Gurkhas we enlist; and I could not help thinking that they would be a
valuable addition to our strength in the event of war.
General Chandra Shamsher is a very red-hot soldier. He said to my
wife: 'Lady Roberts, when are the Russians coming? I wish they would
make haste. We have 40,000 soldiers in Nepal ready for war, and there
is no one to fight!'
The next day a grand durbar was held, at which the King (the Maharaja
Dhiraj, as he is called) presided; he was an unusually handsome lad
of about eighteen years of age, fairer than most Nepalese, and very
refined looking. As on all previous occasions, everyone wore uniform
except the King, who had on a perfectly plain dress of spotless white.
Great deference is outwardly paid to the Dhiraj, but he has no power,
and is never consulted in matters of State, being considered too
sacred to be troubled with mundane affairs. Although a mere boy, he
had four wives, two of them daughters of the Maharaja Bir Shamsher
Jung.
After the durbar, I was shown over the principal school and hospital;
both appeared to be well conducted, and evidently no expense was
spared upon them. I was then taken to a magazine, in which were a
number of guns of various calibre and any amount of ammunition. I was
told there were several other magazines, which I had not time to see,
and a few miles from Khatmandu extensive workshops, where all kinds of
munitions of war were manufactured.
That evening, accompanied by Colonel and Mrs. Wylie, we attended a
reception at the Maharaja's palace. The durbar hall, which was filled
with men in uniform, was of beautiful proportions, and very handsomely
decorated and furnished. After the usual introductions and some
conversation with the chief officers, we were invited to visit the
Maharani in her own apartments, and having ascended a flight of steps
and passed through numerous corridors and luxuriously furnished rooms,
we were shown into a spacious apartment, the prevailing colour of
which was rose, lighted by lamps of the same colour. The Maharani
was sitting on a sofa at the further end of the room, gorgeously
apparelled in rose-coloured gauze dotted over with golden spangles;
her skirts were very voluminous, and she wore magnificent jewels on
her head and about her person. Two Maids of Honour stood behind her,
holding fans, and dressed in the same colour as their mistress, but
without jewels. On each side of her, forming a semicircle, were
grouped the ladies of the Court, all arrayed in artistically
contrasting colours; they were more or less pretty and refined
looking, and the Maharani herself was extremely handsome. My wife was
placed by her side on the sofa, and carried on a long conversation
with her through one of the ladies who spoke Hindustani and acted as
Interpreter. The Maharani presented Lady Roberts with a beautiful
little Chinese pug-dog, and the Maharaja gave me a gold-mounted
_kookri_ (Gurkha knife). After this little ceremony there was a grand
display of fireworks, and we took our leave.
Nothing could exceed the kindness we met with during our stay in
Nepal. The Maharaja endeavoured in every way to make our visit
enjoyable, and his brothers vied with each other in their efforts to
do us honour. It was impressed upon me that the Nepalese army was at
the disposal of the Queen-Empress, and hopes were repeatedly expressed
that we would make use of it in the event of war.
Notwithstanding the occasional differences which have occurred between
our Government and the Nepal Durbar, I believe that, ever since 1817,
when the Nepal war was brought to a successful conclusion by Sir David
Ochterlony, the Gurkhas have had a great respect and liking for us:
but they are in perpetual dread of our taking their country, and they
think the only way to prevent this is not to allow anyone to enter
it except by invitation, and to insist upon the few thus favoured
travelling by the difficult route that we traversed. Nepal can never
be required by us for defensive purposes, and as we get our best class
of Native soldiers thence, everything should, I think, be done to show
our confidence in the Nepalese alliance, and convince them that we
have no ulterior designs on the independence of their kingdom.
On leaving Nepal we made a short tour in the Punjab, and then went to
Simla for the season.
One of the subjects which chiefly occupied the attention of the
Government at this time was the unfriendly attitude of the Ruler of
Afghanistan towards us. Abdur Rahman Khan appeared to have entirely
forgotten that he owed everything to us, and that, but for our support
and lavish aid in money and munitions of war, he could neither have
gained nor held the throne of Kabul. We refused to Sher Ali much that
we could have gracefully granted and that would have made him a firm
friend, but in our dealings with Abdur Rahman we rushed into the other
extreme, and showered favours upon him; in fact, we made too much
of him, and allowed him to get out of hand. The result was that he
mistook the patience and forbearance with which we bore his fits
of temper for weakness, and was encouraged in an overweening and
altogether unjustifiable idea of his own importance; he considered
that he ought to be treated as the equal of the Shah of Persia, and
keenly resented not being allowed to communicate direct with Her
Majesty's Ministers.
In the hope of being able to establish more satisfactory relations
with the Amir, Lord Lansdowne invited him to come to India, and,
on His Highness pleading that his country was in too disturbed a
condition to admit of his leaving it, the Viceroy expressed his
willingness to meet him on the frontier, but Abdur Rahman evaded this
arrangement also under one pretext or another. It was at last proposed
to send me with a Mission as far as Jalalabad, a proposal I gladly
accepted, for I was sanguine enough to hope that, by personal
explanation, I should be able to remove the suspicions which the
Amir evidently entertained as to the motives for our action on the
frontier, and to convince him that our help in the time of his need
must depend upon our mutually agreeing in what manner that help should
be given, and on arrangements being completed beforehand to enable our
troops to be rapidly transported to the threatened points.
Abdur Rahman agreed to receive me in the autumn, and expressed
pleasure at the prospect of meeting me, but eventually he apparently
became alarmed at the size of the escort by which the Government
thought it necessary that I, as Commander-in-Chief, should be
accompanied; and, as the time approached for the Mission to start,
he informed Lord Lansdowne that his health would not permit of his
undertaking the journey to Jalalabad.
Thus the opportunity was lost to which I had looked forward as a
chance for settling many vexed questions, and I am afraid that there
has been very little improvement in our relations with Abdur Rahman
since then, and that we are no nearer the completion of our plans for
the defence of his kingdom than we were four years ago[9]--a defence
which (and this cannot be too strongly impressed upon the Amir) it
would be impossible for us to aid him to carry through unless Kabul
and Kandahar are brought into connexion with the railway system of
India.
In the autumn, just before we left Simla, our friends bestowed upon my
wife a farewell gift in the shape of a very beautiful diamond bracelet
and a sum of money for her fund for 'Homes in the Hills, and Officers'
Hospitals,' made doubly acceptable by the kind words with which Lord
Lansdowne, on behalf of the donors, presented it. Shortly afterwards
we bade a regretful adieu to our happy home of so many years, and made
our way to the Punjab for a final visit.
We spent a few days at Peshawar, and then went to Rawal Pindi to
be present at a Camp of Exercise, and see how the works under
construction for the protection of the arsenal were progressing.
These works had been put in hand in 1890, when, according to my
recommendation, it had been decided not to fortify Multan. No place in
the Punjab appeared to my mind to possess the same military value as
Rawal Pindi, its strategical importance with regard to the right
flank of the frontier line being hardly inferior to that of Quetta in
relation to the left flank; but of late the advisability of completing
the works had been questioned by my colleagues in Council, greatly
to my concern, for I felt that it would be unwise to leave the
elaboration of the defences of such a position until war should be
imminent.[10]
In January, 1893, a series of farewell entertainments were organized
for me at Lahore by the people of the Punjab, as touching as they
were highly appreciated, and intensely gratifying. Amongst the crowds
assembled in the Town Hall to bid me good-bye, I was greatly pleased
to see, besides the Maharaja of Kashmir, Chiefs and men from beyond
our frontier, from Kuram, from the confines of Baluchistan, even from
the wilds of Waziristan; for their presence on this occasion I felt to
be, not only a proof of their kindly feeling towards me personally,
and of their approval of the measures for their safety and welfare
that I had always advocated, but a very distinct sign of the much
to be desired change that was taking place in the sentiments of the
border tribes towards us as a nation.
Four addresses were presented to me, from the Sikh*, Hindu*, Mahomedan*,
and European* communities of the Punjab, respectively, which I will
venture to give in the Appendix, as I feel sure that the spirit of
loyalty which pervades them will be a revelation to many, and a source
of satisfaction to all who are interested in the country to which we
owe so much of our present greatness, and which I conceive to be the
brightest jewel in England's crown.
(See Appendices XII, XIII, XIV, AND XV.)
It was a wonderful and moving scene upon which we looked from the
platform of the Town Hall on this memorable occasion, made up as
it was of such different elements, each race and creed easily
recognizable from their different costumes and characteristics, but
all united by the same kindly desire to do honour to their departing
friend, or comrade, for there were a great number of old soldiers
present.
At each place that we visited on our way to Calcutta there was the
same display of kindly regret at our departure; friends assembled to
see us off at the railway-stations, bands played 'Auld lang syne,' and
hearty cheers speeded us on our way.
In February we went to Lucknow for a few days, when the Talukdars of
Oudh gave my wife and me an entertainment on a very splendid scale in
the Wingfield Park, and presented me with an address[11] and a sword
of honour.
On our return to Calcutta, just before we left for England, the
European community entertained me at a dinner, at which more than two
hundred were present, presided over by Sir James Mackay, K.C.I.E.,
Chairman of the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce. Sir James was far
too kind and eulogistic in speaking of my services, but for his
appreciative allusion to my wife I could only feel deeply gratified
and thankful. After dinner a reception was given to Lady Roberts and
myself, at which the Viceroy and Lady Lansdowne and all the principal
Native and European residents of Calcutta were assembled. An
address[12] was presented to me on this never-to be-forgotten
occasion, in which, to my supreme satisfaction, the Native noblemen
and gentlemen expressed their hearty approval of what had been done
during my tenure of office as Commander-in-Chief to strengthen the
defences of the frontier and render the army in India efficient,
and declared that 'we cheerfully bear our share of the cost, as in
possession of these protections against aggressions from without we
believe all who dwell within the borders of the land will find their
best guarantee for peace, and in peace the best safeguard they and
their children can possess to enable them to pass their lives in
happiness and prosperity, and escape the misery and ruin which follow
war and invasion.'
We travelled to Bombay _viâ_ Jeypur and Jodhpur. At both places we
were royally entertained by the Rulers of those states, and my staff
and I were given excellent sport amongst the wild boar, which was much
enjoyed by all, particularly by my son, who, having joined the King's
Royal Rifles at Rawal Pindi, was attached to me as A.D.C. during my
last six months in India, and had not before had an opportunity of
tasting the joys of pig-sticking.
At Jodhpur my friend the Maharaja Sir Pertap Sing gave us a signal
proof that the ancient valour of the Rajputs had not deteriorated in
the present day. I had wounded a fine boar, and on his making for some
rocky ground, where I could hardly have followed him on horseback, I
shouted to Sir Pertap to get between him and the rocks, and turn him
in my direction. The Maharaja promptly responded, but just as he came
face-to-face with the boar, his horse put his foot into a hole and
fell; the infuriated animal rushed on the fallen rider, and, before
the latter could extricate himself, gave him a severe wound in the leg
with his formidable tushes. On going to his assistance, I found Sir
Pertap bleeding profusely, but standing erect, facing the boar and
holding the creature (who was upright on his hind-legs) at arms'
length by his mouth. The spear without the impetus given by the horse
at full speed is not a very effective weapon against the tough hide
of a boar's back, and on realizing that mine did not make much
impression, Pertap Sing, letting go his hold of the boar's mouth,
quickly seized his hind-legs, and turned him over on his back, crying:
'_Maro, sahib, maro!_' ('Strike, sir, strike!') which I instantly did,
and killed him. Anyone who is able to realize the strength and weight
of a wild boar will appreciate the pluck and presence of mind of Sir
Pertap Sing in this performance. Fortunately, my wife and daughter,
who had been following the pig-stickers in a light cart, were close at
hand, and we were able to drive my friend home at once. The wound was
found to be rather a bad one, but it did not prevent Sir Pertap from
attending some tent-pegging and other amusements in the afternoon,
though he had to be carried to the scene.
A few months after my return to England the boar's head arrived,
set up, and with a silver plate attached to it, on which was an
inscription commemorating the adventure.
At Ahmedabad, where the train stopped while we lunched, I was
presented with an address by the President and members of the
Municipality, who, 'with loyal devotion to Her Imperial Majesty the
Queen and Empress of India, to whose glorious reign we sincerely wish
a continuance of brilliant prosperity,' expressed their hope that Lady
Roberts and I would have 'a happy voyage home and enjoyment of perfect
health and prosperity in future.'
The day before we left Bombay for England, the members of the Byculla
Club gave me a parting dinner. It was with great difficulty I could
get through my speech in response to the toast of my health on that
occasion, for, pleased and grateful as I was at this last mark of
friendship and approval from my countrymen, I could not help feeling
inexpressibly sad and deeply depressed at the thought uppermost in
my mind, that the time had come to separate myself from India and my
gallant comrades and friends, British and Native.
In dwelling on the long list of farewell addresses and entertainments
with which I was honoured on leaving India, I feel that I may be
laying myself open to the charge of egotism; but in writing of one's
own experiences it is difficult to avoid being egotistical, and
distasteful as it is to me to think that I may be considered so,
I would rather that, than that those who treated me so kindly and
generously should deem me unmindful or ungrateful.
Thus ended forty-one years in India. No one can, I think, wonder that
I left the country with heartfelt regret. The greater number of my
most valued friendships had been formed there; from almost everyone
with whom I had been associated, whether European or Native, civilian
or soldier, I had experienced unfailing kindness, sympathy, and
support; and to the discipline, bravery, and devotion to duty of the
Army in India, in peace and war, I felt that I owed whatever success
it was my good fortune to achieve.
[Footnote 1: The late Lieutenant-General Sir W.K. Elles, K.C.B.]
[Footnote 2: A detachment of the Calcutta Volunteer Rifles, at the
particular request of the regiment, took part in the expedition, and
did good service.]
[Footnote 3: The pay of the Native Infantry has been suitably
increased since I left India.]
[Footnote 4: _Jagirs_ are grants of land.]
[Footnote 5: _Batta_, extra allowances given to Native soldiers when
proceeding on field service.]
[Footnote 6: During the Mutiny the casualties amongst the British
officers with the six Punjab regiments which saw the most fighting
amounted to 60 per cent.! Luckily, these were able to be replaced by
officers belonging to corps which had mutinied. This supply, however,
has long since been used up, and it behoves the Government either
to provide an adequate reserve of officers, or to arrange for a
sufficient number being sent out from England whenever India is likely
to be engaged in a serious war.
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
| | Number of | CASUALTIES |
| | Officers +------------------------------------------+
| CORPS. | who did |Killed | Died | | | |
| | Duty with | in | of |Died of | | In- |
| | each Corps.|Action.|Wounds.|Disease.|Wounded.|valided.|
+-------------+------------+-------+-------+--------+--------+--------+
| 1st Punjab | | | | | | |
| Cavalry (1 | | | | | | |
| squadron) | 12 | 1 | ... | ... | 6 | 7 |
| 2nd Punjab | | | | | |
| Cavalry | 20 | 1 | ... | ... | 5 | 4 |
| 5th Punjab | | | | | | |
| Cavalry (1 | | | | | | |
| squadron) | 7 | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... |
| 1st Punjab | | | | | | |
| Infantry | 15 | 3 | ... | ... | 6 | ... |
| 2nd Punjab | | | | | | |
| Infantry | 22 | 3 | ... | ... | 4 | 3 |
| 4th Punjab | | | | | | |
| Infantry | 24 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 8 | ... |
+-------------+------------+-------+-------+--------+--------+--------+
| Total | 100 | 11 | 4 | 2 | 29 | 14 |
+-------------+------------+-------+-------+--------+--------+--------+]
[Footnote 7: Captain Younghushand was at Bozai-Gumbaz, and Lieutenant
Davison on the Alichur Pamirs, both places being south of the Aksu
branch of the Oxus, flowing from the Little Pamir Lake.]
[Footnote 8: The Infantry comprised twenty-four battalions drawn up in
line of quarter columns. The Artillery consisted of one battery (six
7-pounders) carried on elephants, six batteries (six guns each,
5-pounders and 7-pounders) dragged by soldiers, and six batteries (six
guns each, 3-pounders and 5-pounders) carried by Bhutia coolies.]
[Footnote 9: I am not unmindful of the visit which Sir Mortimer Durand
paid to Kabul after I had left India, but on that occasion, I believe,
the question of the defence of Afghanistan was not discussed.]
[Footnote 10: The works were stopped after I left India, but not, I
was glad to think, before the redoubts had been finished, with the
communications thereto. The reasons given were that a change of
plans was necessary for economy's sake, and that the construction of
fortifications might induce the Natives to think we were doubtful of
the continuance of our supremacy. As regarded the first, I explained
that the total outlay for works and armaments was estimated at only
£332,274--considerably less than one half the cost of a British
line-of-battle ship; and as to the second, I urged that an argument
of this sort against frontier defences would hardly bear examination;
that the possibility of external attack was freely discussed in every
newspaper; that Russian movements and frontier difficulties were
known and commented on in every bazaar; that the construction of
fortifications in support of the Ruling Power had been an Oriental
practice from time immemorial; that our action in this respect was at
least as likely to instil the idea that we meant to retain our eastern
possessions at any cost, as to give an impression of weakness; that
the progressive re-organization and mobilization of our army were well
known to have reference to service beyond the frontier; and that we
had extended our confidence in this respect to Native Princes by
encouraging them to train their own troops and fit them to take their
place in line with ours.]
[Footnote 11: Given in the Appendix. (Appendix XVI.)]
[Footnote 12: _Ibid._ (Appendix XVII.)]
* * * * *
APPENDIX
APPENDIX I.
(See Chapter XIV, Footnote 4.)
The 9th Native Infantry, to which Captain Donald Stewart belonged, was
divided between Aligarh, Mainpuri, Bulandshahr, and Etawa, Stewart
being with the Head-Quarters of the regiment at Aligarh.
The news from Meerut and Delhi had caused a certain amount of alarm
amongst the residents at Aligarh, and arrangements had been made for
sending away the ladies and children, but, owing to the confidence
placed in the men of the 9th, none of them had left the station.
Happen what might in other regiments, the officers were certain that
the 9th could never be faithless to their salt! The Native officers
and men were profuse in their expressions of loyalty, and as a proof
of their sincerity they arrested and disarmed several rebel sepoys,
who were making for their homes in Oudh and the adjoining districts.
As a further proof, they gave up the regimental pandit for
endeavouring to persuade them to mutiny. He was tried by a
Court-Martial composed of European and Native officers, found guilty,
and sentenced to be hanged. The sentence was carried out that same
afternoon. It was intended that the regiment should witness the
execution, but it did not reach the gaol in time; the men were
therefore marched back to their lines, and Stewart, in his capacity of
Interpreter, was ordered to explain to them the purpose for which
they had been paraded. While he was speaking a man of his own company
shouted out something. Stewart did not hear the words, and no one
would repeat them. The parade was then dismissed, when the same man,
tearing off his uniform, called upon his comrades not to serve a
Government which had hanged a Brahmin. A general uproar ensued. The
Commanding Officer ordered the few Sikhs in the regiment to seize the
ringleader; they did so, but not being supported by the rest they
released him. The Subadar Major was then told to arrest the mutineer,
but he took no notice whatever of the order. This Native officer had
been upwards of forty years in the regiment and was entitled to his
full pension. He had been a member of the Court-Martial which tried
the pandit, and, though a Brahmin himself, had given his vote in
favour of the prisoner being hanged; moreover he was a personal friend
of all the officers. Stewart, who had been for many years Adjutant,
knew him intimately, and believed implicitly in his loyalty. The man
had constantly discussed the situation with Stewart and others, and
had been mainly instrumental in disarming the sepoys who had passed
through Aligarh; and yet when the hour of trial came he failed as
completely as the last-joined recruit.
The British officers went amongst their men and tried to keep order,
but the excitement rapidly spread; some of the young soldiers began to
load, and the older ones warned the officers that it was time for them
to be off. The sepoys then plundered the treasury, broke open the gaol
doors, released the prisoners, and marched in a body towards Delhi.[1]
Stewart, being thus left without a regiment, attached himself to
the magistrate of the district, and took command of a small body of
volunteers sent from Agra by the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West
Provinces, to aid the civil authorities in restoring order. Not caring
for this work, and thinking he might be more usefully employed,
Stewart made up his mind to find his way to Delhi; his idea was to try
and get there _viâ_ Meerut, but before deciding on the route, he went
to Agra, where he had been invited by the Lieutenant-Governor. At the
interview, Mr. Colvin advised Stewart to travel _viâ_ Muttra, as
the safer of the two routes, and told him that despatches had been
received from the Government in Calcutta for the Commander-in-Chief,
then understood to be with the army before Delhi. At the same time the
Lieutenant-Governor impressed upon Stewart that he was not giving him
any order to go, and that if he undertook to carry the despatches it
must be a voluntary act on his part, entailing no responsibility on
the Government of the North-West Provinces.
Stewart accepted the duty, and took his leave of Mr. Colvin as the sun
was setting on the 18th June, delighted at the chance of being able
to join the army before Delhi. He reached Muttra, thirty-five miles
distant, without mishap. The streets of this city were crowded
with men, all carrying arms of some sort; they showed no signs of
hostility, however, and even pointed out to Stewart the house of which
he was in search. The owner of this house, to whose care he had been
commended by the Agra authorities, was a Brahmin holding an official
position in the town. This Native gentleman behaved with civility,
but did not attempt to conceal his embarrassment at the presence of a
British officer, or his relief when Stewart announced his intention of
resuming his journey an hour or so before daybreak.
The Brahmin provided him with two sowars belonging to the Raja of
Bhartpur with orders to accompany him as far as Kosi. They were
cut-throat-looking individuals, and Stewart felt rather inclined to
dispense with their services, but, thinking it unwise to show any
signs of distrust, he accepted them with the best grace he could.
After riding fifteen or sixteen miles, Stewart's horse fell from
exhaustion, on which his so-called escort laughed uproariously, and
galloped off, leaving our poor traveller to his own devices.
Believing the horse could not recover, Stewart took off the saddle and
bridle and tramped to the nearest village, where he hoped to be
able to buy or hire an animal of some kind on which to continue his
journey. No one, however, would help him, and he was forced to seize
a donkey which he found grazing in a field hard by. About sunset he
reached Kosi, thirty-seven miles from Muttra. The _tehsildar_[2]
received him courteously, and gave him some bread and milk, but would
not hear of his staying for the night. He told him that his appearance
in the town was causing considerable excitement, and that he could not
be responsible for his safety. Stewart was much exhausted after his
hot ride, but as the _tehsildar_ stood firm there was nothing for him
to do but to continue his journey, and he consented to start if he
were provided with a horse. The _tehsildar_ promptly offered his own
pony, and as soon as it was dark Stewart set out for the Jaipur camp.
His progress during the night was slow, and it was not until eight
o'clock the next morning that he reached his destination, where he was
hospitably received by the Political Agent, Major Eden, who introduced
him to the Maharaja's Wazir. This official at first promised to give
Stewart a small escort as far as Delhi, but on various pretexts he put
him off from day to day. At the end of a week Stewart saw that the
Wazir either could not or would not give him an escort, and thinking
it useless to delay any longer, he made up his mind to start without
one.
There were several refugees in the camp, and one of them, Mr. Ford,
collector and magistrate of Gurgaon, offered to join Stewart in his
venture.
Stewart and his companion left the Jaipur camp on the afternoon of
the 27th June, and reached Palwal soon after dark. Ford sent for the
_kotwal_,[3] who was one of his own district officials, and asked him
for food. This was produced, but the _kotwal_ besought the _sahibs_ to
move on without delay, telling them that their lives were in imminent
danger, as there was a rebel regiment in the town, and he was quite
unable to protect them. So they continued their journey, and, escaping
from one or two threatened attacks by robbers, reached Badshahpur in
the morning. Here they rested during the heat of the day, being kindly
treated by the villagers, who were mostly Hindus.
The travellers were now not far from Delhi, but could hardly proceed
further without a guide, and the people of Badshahpur declined to
provide one. They pleaded that they were men of peace, and could not
possibly leave their village in such evil times. Suddenly a man from
the crowd, offered his services. His appearance was against him, and
the villagers declared that he was a notorious cattle-lifter, who was
strongly suspected of having set fire to the collector's (Mr. Ford's)
office at Gurgaon, in order that the evidences of his offences might
be destroyed. Not a pleasant _compagnon de voyage_, but there was
nothing for it but to accept his offer.
As soon as it was dark a start was made, and at daybreak on the
29th the minarets of Delhi rose out of the morning mist, while an
occasional shell might be seen bursting near the city.
On reaching the Hansi road, the guide, by name Jumna Das, who, in
spite of appearances, had proved true to his word, stopped and said he
could go no further. He would not take any reward that it was then in
the power of Stewart or Ford to offer him, but he expressed a hope
that, when the country became settled, the slight service he had
performed would not be forgotten. They gratefully assured him on this
point, and thanked him cordially, giving him at the same time a letter
testifying to his valuable service. Stewart then went to the nearest
village, and for a small reward found a man who undertook to conduct
them safely to one of our piquets.
One curious circumstance remarked by Stewart throughout the ride was
that the peasants and villagers, though not generally hostile to him,
had evidently made up their minds that the British _raj_ was at an
end, and were busily engaged in rendering their villages defensible,
to meet the troubles and disturbances which they considered would
surely follow on the resumption of Native rule.
It is difficult to over-estimate the pluck and enterprise displayed
by Stewart during this most adventurous ride. It was a marvel that he
ever reached Delhi. His coming there turned out to be the best thing
that ever happened to him, for the qualities which prompted him to
undertake and carried him through his dangerous journey, marked him as
a man worthy of advancement and likely to do well.
[Footnote 1: While the regiment was in the act of mutinying one of the
sepoys left the parade-ground, and running round to all the civilians'
houses, told the occupants what had happened, and warned them to make
their escape. He asked for no reward, and was never seen again.]
[Footnote 2: Native magistrate.]
[Footnote 3: City magistrate.]
* * * * *
APPENDIX II.
(These two memoranda are referred to in the note in Chapter XXV,
Footnote 6.)
_Memorandum by Lieutenant McLeod Innes._
'1. Sir H. Lawrence joined at Lucknow about the end of March, 1857,
succeeding Mr. Coverley Jackson in the Chief Commissionership.
'2. On his arrival he found himself in the midst of troubles, of which
the most important were these:
I. A general agitation of the empire, from the discontent of the
soldiery.
II. A weak European force at Oudh, with all the military
arrangements defective.
III. Grievous discontent among several classes of the population
of Oudh, viz., the nobility of Lucknow and the members and
retainers of the Royal Family, the official classes, the old
soldiery, and the entire country population, noble and peasant
alike.
'3. This third was due to disobedience of, or departure from, the
instructions laid down by Government at the annexation, as very
clearly shown in Lord Stanley's letter of October 13, 1858. The
promised pensions had either been entirely withheld or very sparingly
doled out; the old officials were entirely without employment;
three-quarters of the army the same; while the country Barons had, by
forced interpretation of rules, been deprived of the mass of their
estates, which had been parcelled out among their followers, who, for
clannish reasons, were more indignant at the spoliation and loss of
power and place of their Chiefs than they were glad for their own
individual acquisitions.
'4. The weakness of the European force could not be helped; it was
deemed politic to show the country that the annexation did not require
force.
'5. But the inefficiency of the military arrangements arose from mere
want of skill, and was serious, under the threatening aspect of the
political horizon.
'6. The discontent of the province, and the coming general storm, had
already found vent in the brigandage of Fuzl Ali, and the seditions of
the Fyzabad Moulvie.
'7. And with all these Sir H. Lawrence had to grapple immediately on
his arrival.
'8. But I may safely say that ten days saw the mass of them disappear.
The Fyzabad Moulvie had been seized and imprisoned. Fuzl Ali had been
surrounded and slain. The promised pensions had been paid, by Sir H.
Lawrence's peremptory orders, to the members and retainers of the
Royal Family. A recognition had been published of the fair rights of
the old Oudh officials to employment in preference to immigrants from
our old provinces, and instructions had been issued for giving it
effect. The disbanded soldiers of the Royal Army of Oudh were promised
preference in enlistment in the local corps and the police, and
a reorganization and increase to the latter, which were almost
immediately sanctioned, gave instant opportunities for the fulfilment
of the first instalment of these promises. While last, but not least,
durbars were held, in which Sir Henry Lawrence was able to proclaim
his views and policy, by which the landholders should be reinstated in
the possessions which they held at the annexation, the basis on which
the instructions had been originally issued, which had been hitherto
practically ignored, but to which he pledged himself to give effect.
'9. To strengthen his military position, he placed Artillery with the
European Infantry; he distributed his Irregular Cavalry; he examined
the city, decided on taking possession of the Muchee Bawn and
garrisoning it as a fort; and summoned in Colonel Fisher and Captain
George Hardinge; and with them, Brigadier Handscombe and Major
Anderson, consulted and arranged for future plans against the storms
which he saw to be impending.
'10. Much of this, and his policy for remaining in Oudh, and the
conduct of the defence of Lucknow, I know from recollections of what
he occasionally let drop to me in his confidential conversations while
inspecting the Muchee Bawn. He told me that nearly the whole army
would go; that he did not think the Sikhs would go; that in every
regiment there were men that, with proper management, would remain
entirely on our side; and that, therefore, he meant to segregate from
the rest of the troops the Sikhs and selected men, and to do his
best to keep them faithful allies when the rest should go; that, if
Cawnpore should hold out, we would not be attacked; but that if it
should fall, we would be invested, and more or less closely besieged;
that no troops could come to our relief before the middle of August;
that the besieging forces would, he thought, be confined to the
sepoys, for the people of the country had always liked our European
officers, whom they had frequently had to bless for the safety of
their lives and the honour of their families; and the whole Hindu
population had a lively recollection of our friendly line of conduct
in the late quarrel with the Mussulmans regarding the Hunnooman
Gurhee; that to hold out where we were was necessary, for the
slightest appearance of yielding, or of not showing a bold front,
would result in annihilation; that to hold out we must get provisions;
that to got provisions and prepare for an efficient defence we must
keep open our communication with the country, and keep the city quiet;
that to the former end the retention of the cantonment was necessary,
and of the Muchee Bawn to the latter, while the site of the permanent
defences, in case of the need of concentration, should be the
Residency.
'11. All this I know, as before said, from Sir Henry Lawrence's own
casual and hurried remarks to me. Whether they are officially recorded
anywhere I do not know; but they must have been written in letters
to various persons, and repeated to others of his subordinates at
Lucknow. I mention these matters thus early, as although the facts on
which they bear did not immediately occur, still, Sir Henry Lawrence
had prescience of them, and had decided on his line of policy.
'12. I understand, further, but not on authentic grounds, that Sir
Henry wrote at a very early stage to Sir H. Wheeler, urging him to
construct entrenchments at the magazine at Cawnpore, and to ensure his
command of the boats, whatever might happen; that he wrote early
to the Government, entreating them to divert one of the European
regiments in the course of relief, and divide it between Cawnpore and
Allahabad; and that subsequently he urged on Government to employ the
troops of the Persian expedition in Bengal, and to stop the Chinese
force for the same end, and to subsidize some of the Nepal troops for
the protection of our older provinces east of Oudh.
'13. To revert to the narrative, the measures already mentioned
so entirely pacified the province, that, in spite of the previous
discontent, the previous troubles, the proverbial turbulence of its
inhabitants, and the increasing agitation throughout the empire, there
was no difficulty experienced in collecting the revenue by the close
of April. And the subsequent disturbances were, as will be shown,
entirely due to the soldiery, and, till long after Sir Henry's death,
participated in only by them, by the city ruffians, and by a few of
the Mussulman families of the country population. The mass of the city
people and the entire Hindu population held aloof, and would have
nothing to say to the outbreak; and, with one single exception, every
Talookdar, to whom the chance offered itself, aided, more or less
actively, in the protection of European fugitives. This phase in the
character of the disturbances in Oudh is not generally known; but it
is nevertheless true, and is due emphatically and solely, under Divine
Providence, to the benignant personal character and the popular policy
of Sir Henry Lawrence.
'14. The 1st of May saw our disturbances commence with the mutiny of
the 7th Oudh Irregular Infantry. This, its suppression, and the durbar
in which he distributed rewards and delivered a speech on the aspect
of affairs, have been fully described elsewhere, and need not be
repeated by me.
'15. The durbar was held on the twelfth. I am not aware whether he had
any intelligence at that time of the Meerut outbreak. The telegrams,
when they did arrive, were vague; but he indubitably kept on his guard
immediately on receiving them. The Cavalry were piqueted between the
cantonments and the Residency, and the Infantry and Artillery were
kept prepared for movement. His plans were evidently already decided;
but they were to be effected simultaneously and not successively,
and the movements of the Europeans were somewhat dependent on the
arrangements of the Quarter-master-General's Department. It was not
until the sixteenth that the tents required for the 32nd were ready;
and the morning of the 17th May saw an entirely new and effective
disposition of the troops. Half the Europeans were at the Residency,
commanding the Iron Bridge; half, with the Artillery, were at the
south end of the cantonments; the bridge of boats was moved and under
control, while the Muchee Bawn, not yet sufficiently cleansed from
its old conglomeration of filth, was garrisoned by a selected body of
Native troops. The whole of these dispositions could not have been
effected at an earlier date, and Sir Henry would not do them piecemeal
or successively. Simultaneous, they were effective, and tended to
paralyze any seditious plots that may have been hatching. Successive
and piecemeal, they would have incited the sepoys to mutiny and the
turbulent to insurrection.'
_Memorandum, 18th May, inserted in Sir Henry's own hand in his ledger
book._
'Time is everything just now. Time, firmness, promptness,
conciliation, and prudence; every officer, each individual European,
high and low, may at this crisis prove most useful, or even dangerous.
A firm and cheerful aspect must be maintained--there must be no
bustle, no appearance of alarm, still less of panic; but, at the same
time, there must be the utmost watchfulness and promptness; everywhere
the first germ of insurrection must be put down instantly. Ten men may
in an hour quell a row which, after a day's delay, may take weeks
to put down. I wish this point to be well understood. In preserving
internal tranquillity, the Chiefs and people of substance may be most
usefully employed at this juncture; many of them have as much to lose
as we have. Their property, at least, is at stake. Many of them have
armed retainers--some few are good shots and have double-barrelled
guns. For instance [name illegible], can hit a bottle at 100 yards. He
is with the ordinary soldiers. I want a dozen such men, European or
Native, to arm their own people and to make _thannahs_ of their own
houses, or some near position, and preserve tranquillity within a
circuit around them.'
* * * * *
APPENDIX III.
(Referred to in Chapter XLVI, Footnote 1.)
The column was composed as follows:
_Men._ _Guns._
F Battery, A Brigade, R.H.A.,
commanded by Colonel W. Sterling 135 6
One squadron 10th Hussars,
commanded by Major Bulkeley 102
G Battery, 3rd Brigade, R.A.,
commanded by Major Sydney Parry 83 3
2nd Battalion 8th Foot,
commanded by Colonel Barry Drew 620
Wing 72nd Highlanders, commanded
by Lieutenant-Colonel F. Brownlow 405
----- --
Total British troops 1,345 9
12th Bengal Cavalry, commanded
by Colonel Hugh Gough, V.C. 337
No. 1 Mountain Battery,
commanded by Captain Kelso 136 4
7th Company Bengal Sappers and Miners 113
2nd (Punjab Frontier Force) Infantry,
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Tyndall 647
5th (Punjab Frontier Force) Infantry,
commanded by Major McQueen 502
5th (Punjab Frontier Force) Gurkhas,
commanded by Major Fitz-Hugh 438
21st Punjab Infantry,
commanded by Major Collis 496
23rd Pioneers,
commanded by Colonel Currie 650
29th Punjab Infantry,
commanded by Colonel J.J. Gordon 671
----- --
Total Natives 3,990 4
----- --
Grand total 5,335 13
Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Lindsay commanded the Artillery, Colonel
Æneas Perkins was Commanding Royal Engineer. Colonel Hugh Gough
commanded the Cavalry, Brigadier-Generals Cobbe (17th Foot) and
Thelwall (21st Punjab Infantry) the two Infantry brigades. Major
W. Galbraith (85th Foot) was Assistant-Adjutant-General; Major
H. Collett, Assistant, and Captains 'Dick' Kennedy and F. Carr,
Deputy-Assistant-Quartermasters-General. Captains G. de C. Morton and
A. Scott, V.C., Brigade-Majors. Captain A. Badcock, Chief Commissariat
officer; Captain J. Colquhoun, R.A., Commissary of Ordnance; Major
Moriarty, Captain Goad, and Lieutenant F. Maisey, Transport officers;
Captain A. Wynne (51st Foot), Superintendent of Field Telegraphs;
Captain R. Woodthorpe, R.E., Superintendent of Surveys;
Deputy-Surgeon-General F. Allen, Principal Medical officer; Rev. J. W.
Adams, Chaplain.
* * * * *
APPENDIX IV.
(Referred to in Chapter XLIX, Footnote 15.)
_Translation of a letter from_ MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS _to
His Highness_ THE AMIR OF KABUL.
ALIKHEL, _18th September_, 1879.
(After the usual compliments.) Your Highness's letter of the 28th
Ramazan, with the enclosures from Herat and Turkestan, reached me
last night. I have acquainted myself with the contents. I am glad
to find your Highness is in good health, but sorry to hear of
the unfortunate disturbances in your Highness's dominions. Your
Highness's letter, in original, has been sent with enclosures to
His Excellency the Viceroy. I have already informed your Highness
of the wishes of His Excellency the Viceroy, and the reasons for
the movements of the British troops, and I have requested your
Highness to send a confidential representative to my camp. I
am awaiting a reply to that letter, and the arrival of your
Highness's confidential representative.
In the meantime I have sent a Proclamation to the tribes, and
letters to some of the Logar _maliks_, your Highness's subjects,
to assure those not concerned in the hateful massacre, and asking
them for assistance in carriage and supplies on payment. As it
appears to me proper I should inform your Highness of what I have
done, I enclose copies of the Proclamation to the tribes and of my
letter to the Logar _maliks_, and hope that your Highness may also
issue necessary orders for the furtherance of our plans. Rest
assured of the support of the Government of India.
* * * * *
APPENDIX V.
(Referred to in Chapter XLIV, Note *.)
_Notes of an interview between GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS and
the AMIR'S AGENTS, MUSTAUFI HABIBULLA KHAN and WAZIR SHAH MAHOMED
KHAN. Dated ALIKHEL, 23rd September, 1879._
After compliments, General Roberts intimated to the Agents that at
their desire he had granted them a second interview. He now requested
them to be good enough to speak freely all that they wished him to
know.
The MUSTAUFI then spoke in the following sense: The interests of
England and Afghanistan are the same, and the Amir and his officials
are deeply grieved at the late occurrences in Kabul. Moreover, the
Amir is anxious to do whatever the British Government wishes, and
most desirous that the dignity of the British Government should be
maintained by any means which may seem proper to the Viceroy. But His
Highness cannot conceal from himself that the mutinous troops and
his people in general, ryots as well as soldiers, are in fear of
an indiscriminate revenge, which will fall alike upon innocent and
guilty. He hopes, therefore, that measures will be taken to guard
against the possibility of a general rising consequent on fear.
The Mustaufi was here reminded of the tenor of General Roberts's
Proclamation on 15th September. He answered that the people were too
ignorant to be acted upon by a Proclamation, and then went on as
follows:
Of course, it is possible that no such combination may take place. The
Afghans are selfish, and divided against themselves. Still, lest he
should be blamed if it should occur, the Amir thinks it right
to express his opinion, and give the British Government all the
information in his power. On the whole, his advice, as an earnest
friend, is that the advance of a British force on Kabul should be
delayed for a short time ('_Panjroz_'). In the interval he will
endeavour to disarm the Regular troops, raise new levies, and, by
the aid of the latter, punish all concerned in the late abominable
outrage. His idea is to get rid of Sher Ali's soldiery--always a
source of danger--and keep only 15,000 men for the future. It would
be very desirable to delay the advance until he could establish his
power. The Amir does not mean to imply that any Afghan army, were it
50,000 strong, could resist the British. The mutinous troops have
neither organization nor leaders. But the mutinous troops are of all
tribes; and if the British army destroys them, as it would undoubtedly
do in case of resistance, the whole country may combine against the
British and the Amir. It is for this reason that he advises delay, and
that the punishment of the guilty be left to him. The Viceroy may rest
assured that he will show no mercy. He will make an example which will
be conspicuous in the eyes of the world as the sun at noonday. Already
everyone in Kabul regards the Amir as an infidel, because of the
way in which he and his have thrown in their lot with the British
Government.
Notwithstanding all that has been said, however, things might go right
if the mutinous troops would keep together and attempt a stand. But
the Amir fears they will not do so. They are more likely to scatter
here and there, and raise the country. In that case there will be
constant attacks on the communications of the force, and the gathering
of supplies will be difficult. They would come chiefly from the
direction of Ghazni, partly also from Logar. If the tribes rise it
would be hard to collect them. Only one month remains before the
setting in of winter. Of course, it is impossible to say what may
happen. There may be no opposition, and the Amir is in any case ready
to do what the British Government desires. But he feels it is his duty
to express his strong opinion that the present season is unsuited for
a forward movement.
General Roberts replied that on behalf of the Viceroy he thanked the
Amir for his kind advice, which he was confident was the advice of
a friend. He said the matter was important, and required careful
consideration, and asked whether the Agents had anything more to bring
forward.
The Mustaufi then spoke as follows: The Amir's advice to delay the
advance is that of a sincere friend, and it is the best he can give.
But if the British Army is to march on Kabul, there is one thing more
which I am desired to say: let it march in such strength as to crush
all hopes of mischief, and put down all rebellion throughout the
country. You cannot wait for reinforcements. If you come, you must
come in full strength--in sufficient strength to put down all
opposition. There may be no opposition, but you cannot count on this.
General Roberts replied: The Amir's advice is of great importance,
and must be carefully considered. When His Highness first wrote,
announcing the outbreak at Kabul and asking for help, the first desire
of the Viceroy was to send British forces without delay. I was ordered
to Kuram at once to lead the force here. Simultaneously the Kandahar
force was ordered by telegram to return to Kandahar, which it was then
leaving, and to advance towards Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and instructions were
issued to collect a third force at Peshawar; all this was to help the
Amir. The Viceroy from the first contemplated the possibility of such
a general rising as the Amir now fears, and the several armies were,
therefore, by His Excellency's order, made up to such strength that
all Afghanistan combined could not stand against them for a moment.
The Kandahar troops were ready in a very short time, and are now
beyond Kandahar, on the road to Kabul.[1] The Peshawar force was
rapidly collected and pushed on; and the Amir may rest assured that
the British army is advancing in ample strength. I will think over the
Amir's advice, nevertheless, for it is important. But His Highness
must remember that the late occurrences at Kabul do not affect only
the English officers and the fifty or sixty men who were treacherously
killed--the honour of the English Government is concerned; and so long
as the bodies of these officers and men remain unburied or uncared for
in Kabul, I do not believe the English people will ever be satisfied.
They will require the advance of a British force, and the adequate
punishment of the crime. Still, the Amir's advice, which I am
convinced is that of a friend, must be carefully considered, and I
will think over it and give an answer later.
The MUSTAUFI then said: We quite understand what has been said about
the strength of the British army. Doubtless it is sufficient, and
all Afghanistan could not stand against it. But the Amir asked us to
mention, what I have hitherto forgotten, that there are in Turkestan
24 regiments of Infantry, 6 of Cavalry, and 56 guns. These troops were
the first to show a disaffected spirit at Mazar-i-Sharif; and putting
aside external enemies, there are Abdur Rahman and the sons of Azim
Khan waiting their chance. Herat again is doubtful; when the troops
there hear what has occurred at Kabul, there is no saying what they
may do. If Abdur Rahman ingratiates himself with these people, Herat
and Turkestan will be permanently severed from the Afghan dominions.
This is another reason why the advance of the British force should be
delayed, in order that the Amir may have time to gain over the Herat
and Turkestan troops.
GENERAL ROBERTS replied: All these reasons will have full
consideration. The Viceroy's first order was to push on at once to
help the Amir; but I am sure His Highness's advice is friendly, and
that in any case he will do his utmost to co-operate with the British
Government. Therefore every consideration will be given to what His
Highness has desired you to say.
The MUSTAUFI: The Viceroy may be sure the Amir will do what he
pleases.
The WAZIR: When the Amir learnt from General Roberts's letter that the
Viceroy had given General Roberts power to deal with the whole matter,
he was very pleased, knowing General Roberts's character as a soldier
and his kindness of heart.
GENERAL ROBERTS replied that he would carefully consider the proposals
brought forward, and give an answer later on. Meanwhile, he must
request the Agents to stay a day or two in camp until he should
have thoroughly weighed the Amir's advice, which was of the utmost
importance to both the British and Afghan Governments.
The interview then came to an end.
(Signed) H. M. DURAND,
Political Secretary to General Roberts, K.C.B., V.C.,
Commanding Kabul Field Force.
[Footnote 1: The Agents here seemed surprised and anxious.--H.M.D.]
* * * * *
APPENDIX VI.
(Referred to in Chapter LIII, Footnote 3.)
_From LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding
Kabul Field Force, to A.C. LYALL, ESQ., C.B., Secretary to the
Government of India, Foreign Department._
KABUL, _22nd November,_ 1879.
1. I Have the honour to submit a brief account of an interview
which took place between the Amir Yakub Khan and myself on the
22nd October. The interview was a private and informal one; but
recent events have lent some interest to what passed on the
occasion, and I have, therefore, thought it desirable that
a report should be prepared for the information of the
Governor-General in Council.
2. After some conversation upon matters of no special importance,
the Amir introduced his father's name, and thus gave me the
opportunity I had often wished to have of leading him on to speak
naturally and unconstrainedly about Sher Ali Khan's feelings and
policy during the last ten years. I was most careful to avoid any
expression of my own views upon the subject in order that I might,
if possible, obtain from the Amir a perfectly spontaneous and
truthful account of the circumstances which led, in his opinion,
to Sher Ali's estrangement from ourselves and _rapprochement_ to
Russia. In this I think I succeeded. Yakub Khan spoke readily
and freely of all that had passed, and needed no question or
suggestion from me to declare his conviction regarding the cause
of his father's unfriendly attitude towards us during the past few
years.
3. The substance of the Amir's statement was as follows:
'In 1869 my father was fully prepared to throw in his lot with
you. He had suffered many reverses before making himself secure on
the throne of Afghanistan; and he had come to the conclusion that
his best chance of holding what he had won lay in an alliance with
the British Government. He did not receive from Lord Mayo as
large a supply of arms and ammunition as he had hoped, but,
nevertheless, he returned to Kabul fairly satisfied, and so he
remained until the visit of Saiyad Nur Muhammud to India in 1873.
This visit brought matters to a head. The diaries received from
Saiyad Nur Mahomed during his stay in India, and the report which
he brought back on his return, convinced my father that he could
no longer hope to obtain from the British Government all the aid
that he wanted; and from that time he began to turn his attention
to the thoughts of a Russian alliance. You know how this ended.
'When my father received from the Government of India the letter
informing him that a British Mission was about to proceed to
Kabul, he read it out in durbar. The members of the Russian
Embassy were present. After the reading was finished, Colonel
Stolietoff rose, saluted the Amir and asked permission to leave
Kabul. If permitted, he would, he said, travel without delay to
Tashkent, and report the state of affairs to General Kauffmann,
who would inform the Czar, and thus bring pressure to bear on
England. He promised to return in six weeks or two months, and
urged the Amir to do everything in his power meanwhile to prevent
the British Mission from reaching Kabul.
'Colonel Stolietoff never returned to Kabul. He lost no time in
reaching Tashkent, where he remained for a few weeks, and he then
started for Russia.
'The Afghan official, Mirza Mahomed Hassan Khan, generally known
as the "Dabir-ul-Mulk," who had travelled with Colonel Stolietoff
from the Oxus to Kabul, accompanied him on his return journey to
Tashkent. Here the Mirza was detained under pretence that orders
would shortly be received from the Emperor, until the news of my
father's flight from Kabul reached General Kauffmann. He was then
permitted to leave. Two Aides-de-Camp were sent with him, one a
European, the other a Native of Bokhara.
'My father was strongly urged by General Kauffmann not to leave
Kabul. At the same time the members of the Embassy were ordered to
return to Tashkent, the Doctor being permitted to remain with my
father if his services were required.
'Throughout, the Russian Embassy was treated with great honour,'
and at all stations between Mazar-i-Shariff and Kabul, orders were
given for the troops to turn out, and for a salute to be fired on
their arrival and departure.'
4. I cannot, of course, vouch for the exact words used by Yakub
Khan, but I am confident that the foregoing paragraph, which is
written from notes taken at the time, contains a substantially
accurate record of the conversation.
5. It would be superfluous for me to advance any proof of the fact
that for one reason or another Sher Ali did during the latter part
of his reign fall away from us and incline towards an alliance
with Russia. But I think the closeness of the connection between
Russia and Kabul, and the extent of the Amir's hostility towards
ourselves, has not hitherto been fully recognized. Yakub Khan's
statements throw some light upon this question, and they are
confirmed by various circumstances which have lately come to my
knowledge. The prevalence of Russian coin and wares in Kabul,
and the extensive military preparations made by Sher Ali of late
years, appear to me to afford an instructive comment upon Yakub
Khan's assertions. Our recent rupture with Sher Ali has, in fact,
been the means of unmasking and checking a very serious conspiracy
against the peace and security of our Indian Empire.
6. The magnitude of Sher Ali's military preparations is, in my
opinion, a fact of peculiar significance. I have already touched
upon this point in a former letter, but I shall perhaps be excused
for noticing it again. Before the outbreak of hostilities last
year the Amir had raised and equipped with arms of precision 68
regiments of Infantry and 16 of Cavalry. The Afghan Artillery
amounted to nearly 300 guns. Numbers of skilled artizans were
constantly employed in the manufacture of rifled cannon and
breach-loading small arms. More than a million pounds of powder,
and I believe several million rounds of home-made Snider
ammunition, were in the Bala Hissar at the time of the late
explosion. Swords, helmets, uniforms, and other articles of
military equipment were stored in proportionate quantities.
Finally, Sher Ali had expended upon the construction of the
Sherpur cantonments an astonishing amount of labour and money. The
extent and cost of this work may be judged of from the fact that
the whole of the troops under my command will find cover during
the winter within the cantonment, and the bulk of them in the main
line of rampart itself, which extends to a length of nearly two
miles under the southern and western slopes of the Bimaru hills.
Sher Ali's original design was apparently to carry the wall
entirely round the hills, a distance of nearly five miles, and the
foundations were already laid for a considerable portion of this
length. All these military preparations were quite unnecessary
except as a provision for contemplated hostilities with ourselves,
and it is difficult to understand how their entire cost could
have been met from the Afghan treasury, the gross revenue of the
country amounting only to about eighty lakhs of rupees per annum.
7. I have referred to the prevalence of Russian coin and wares
in Kabul as evidence of the growing connexion between Russia and
Afghanistan. I am unable to find proof that the Czar's coin was
introduced in any other way than by the usual channels of trade.
It is quite possible that the bulk of it, if not the whole, came
in gradually by this means, the accumulation of foreign gold in
particular being considerable in this country, where little gold
is coined. Nevertheless, it seems to me a curious fact that the
amount of Russian money in circulation should be so large. No
less than 13,000 gold pieces were found among the Amir's treasure
alone; similar coins are exceedingly common in the city bazaar;
and great numbers of them are known to be in possession of the
Sirdars. Of course English goods of all kinds are plentiful
here--that is inevitable, particularly with a considerable body
of Hindu merchants settled in the city, but Russian goods also
abound. Glass, crockery, silks, tea, and many other things which
would seem to be far more easily procurable from India than from
Russian territory, are to be found in great quantities. A habit,
too, seems to have been growing up among the Sirdars and others of
wearing uniforms of Russian cut, Russian buttons, Russian boots,
and the like. Russian goods and Russian ways seem, in fact, to
have become the fashion in Afghanistan.
* * * * *
APPENDIX VII.
(Referred to in Chapter LIII, Footnote 3.)
_Translations of letters from _GENERAL-ADJUTANT VON KAUFFMANN,
_Governor-General of Turkestan, to the address of the_ AMIR OF
AFGHANISTAN, _received on 10th, Shaban, 1295, through_ GENERAL
STOLIETOFF, _9th August, 1878._
Be it known to you that in these days the relations between the
British Government and ours with regard to your kingdom require
deep consideration. As I am unable to communicate my opinion
verbally to you, I have deputed my agent, Major-General
Stolietoff. This gentleman is a near friend of mine, and performed
excellent services in the Russo-Turkish war, by which he earned
favour of the Emperor. The Emperor has always had a regard for
him. He will inform you of all that is hidden in my mind. I hope
you will pay great attention to what he says, and believe him as
you would myself, and, after due consideration, you will give him
your reply. Meanwhile, be it known to you that your union and
friendship with the Russian Government will be beneficial to
the latter, and still more so to you. The advantages of a close
alliance with the Russian Government will be permanently evident.
This friendly letter is written by the Governor-General of
Turkestan and Adjutant-General to the Emperor, Von Kauffmann,
Tashkent, Jamadial Akbar, 1295 ( = June, 1878).
_To the_ AMIR _of the whole of Afghanistan_, SHER ALI KHAN.
(After compliments.) Be it known to you that our relations with
the British Government are of great importance to Afghanistan and
its dependencies. As I am unable to see you, I have deputed my
trustworthy (official) General Stolietoff to you. The General
is an old friend of mine, and during the late Russo-Turkish war
earned the favour of the Emperor by his spirit and bravery. He has
become well known to the Emperor. This trustworthy person will
communicate to you what he thinks best. I hope you will pay
attention to what he says, and repose as much confidence in his
words as if they were my own; and that you will give your answer
in this matter through him. In the meantime, be it known to you
that if a friendly treaty will be of benefit to us, it will be of
far greater benefit to yourself.
GENERAL STOLIETOFF _sent the following letter, on his return to
Tashkent from Kabul, to the address of the Foreign Minister, _WAZIR
SHAH MAHOMED KHAN, _dated 23rd of the holy month of Ramazan, 1295 ( =
21st September, 1878)._
Thank God, I reached Tashkent safely, and at an auspicious moment
paid my respects to the Viceroy (Yaroni Padishah means 'half
king'). I am trying day and night to gain our objects, and hope I
shall be successful. I am starting to see the Emperor to-day, in
order to inform His Majesty personally of our affairs. If God
pleases, everything that is necessary will be done and affirmed.
_I hope that those who want to enter the gate of Kabul from the
east will see that the door is closed; then, please God, they will
tremble._ I hope you will give my respects to His Highness the
Amir. May God make his life long and increase his wealth! May you
remain in good health, and know that the protection of God will
arrange our affairs!
(Signed) GENERAL STOLIETOFF.
_From_ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR, _dated Tashkent, 8th Zekada,
1295 ( = 22nd October, 1878)._
(After compliments.) Be it known to you that your letter, dated
12th Shawal, reached me at Tashkent on the 16th October, _i.e._,
3rd Zekada, and I understood its contents. I have telegraphed an
abstract of your letter to the address of the Emperor, and
have sent the letter itself, as also that addressed to General
Stolietoff, by post to Livadia, where the Emperor now is. I am
informed on good authority that the English want to come to terms
with you; and, as a friend, I advise you to make peace with them
if they offer it.
_From_ GENERAL STOLIETOFF _to_ WAZIR SHAH MAHOMED KHAN, _dated 8th
October 1878._
First of all, I hope you will be kind enough to give my respects
to the Amir. May God make his life long and increase his wealth!
I shall always remember his royal hospitality. I am busy day and
night in his affairs, and, thank God, my labours have not been
without result. The great Emperor is a true friend of the Amir's
and of Afghanistan, and His Majesty will do whatever he may think
necessary. Of course, you have not forgotten what I told you,
that the affairs of kingdoms are like a country which has many
mountains, valleys, and rivers. One who sits on a high mountain
can see things well. By the power and order of God, there is no
empire equal to that of our great Emperor. May God make his life
long! Therefore, whatever our Government advises you, you should
give ear to it. I tell you the truth that our Government is wise
as a serpent and harmless as a dove. There are many things which
you cannot understand, but our Government understands them well.
It often happens that a thing which is unpleasant at first is
regarded as a blessing afterwards. Now, my kind friend, I inform
you that the enemy of your famous religion wants to make peace
with you through the Kaisar (Sultan) of Turkey. Therefore you
should look to your brothers who live on the other side of the
river. If God stirs them up, and gives the sword of fight into
their hands, then go on, in the name of God (Bismilla), otherwise
you should be as a serpent; make peace openly, and in secret
prepare for war, and when God reveals His order to you, declare
yourself. It will be well, when the Envoy of your enemy wants to
enter the country, if you send an able emissary, possessing the
tongue of a serpent and full of deceit, to the enemy's country, so
that he may with sweet words perplex the enemy's mind, and induce
him to give up the intention of fighting with you.
My kind friend, I entrust you to the protection of God. May God be
the protector of the Amir's kingdom, and may trembling fall upon
the limbs of your enemies! Amen.
Write to me soon, and send the letter to the capital. Please write
in Arabic characters, so that I may be able to read your letter.
_From_, GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, _dated 30th
Zekada (=26th November,_ 1878).
(After compliments.) I was much pleased to receive your letter,
dated 24th Zekada, 1295 (=18th November, 1878), and to hear of
your good health. I have also received a copy of the letter which
you sent to the Governor-General. May God be pleased with you. The
British Ministers have given a pledge to our Ambassador in London
that they will not interfere with the independence of Afghanistan.
I am directed by His Majesty the Emperor to communicate this news
to you, and then, after forming friendship, to go to His Majesty.
I intend to go to the Russian capital after I have arranged the
affairs of this country (Turkestan). As I do not consider it
advisable to keep your trusted officials, whom you are in want
of, here any more, I send Mahomed Hassan Khan, Kamuah
(Deputy-Governor), and Gholam Haidar Khan, with two officers, back
to you. I hope you will consider me a well-wisher of your kingdom,
and write to me now and then. I have given instructions that,
until my return, every letter of yours which they receive at
Turkestan should be forwarded to the capital. Your good fortune is
a cause of happiness to me, and if any troubles come upon you, I
also shall be grieved. Some presents have been sent by me through
Mirza Mahomed Hassan, Kamuah; perhaps they may be accepted.
_Translation of a letter from,_ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to_ GENERAL
VOZGONOFF, _dated Zel Hijja,_ 1295 _(=December,_ 1878).
The Amir knows perfectly well that it is impossible for me to
assist him with troops in winter. Therefore it is necessary that
war should not be commenced at this unseasonable time. If the
English, in spite of the Amir's exertions to avoid the war,
commence it, you must then take leave of the Amir and start for
Tashkent, because your presence in Afghanistan in winter is
useless. Moreover, at such a juncture as the commencement of war
in Afghanistan, you ought to come here and explain the whole thing
to me, so that I may communicate it to the Emperor. This will be
of great benefit to Afghanistan and to Russia.
_From_ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, dated _25th
December,_ 1878 _(Russian, 13th Muharram,_ 1296).
Your letter, dated 27th Zel Hijja (=20th November), 1878, has
reached me. I was pleased to hear tidings of your good health.
The Emperor has caused the British Government to agree to the
continuance of Afghan independence. The English Ministers have
promised this. I earnestly request you not to leave your kingdom.
As far as possible, consider your own interests, and do not lose
your independence. For the present come to terms with the British
Government. If you do not want to go back to Kabul for this
purpose, you can write to your son, Mahomed Yakub Khan, to make
peace with the English as you may direct him. Do not leave the
soil of Afghanistan at this time, because it will be of benefit
to you. My words are not without truth, because your arrival in
Russian territory will make things worse.
* * * * *
APPENDIX VII (cont.)
_From_ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, _received at
Mazir-i-Sharif on the 17th January, 1879_.
I have received your friendly letter, dated 13th Zel Hijja (=8th
December, 1878). In that letter you asked me to send you as many
troops as could be got ready. I have written to you a letter to
the effect that the Emperor, on account of your troubles, had
communicated with the British Government, and that the Russian
Ambassador at London had obtained a promise from the British
Ministers to the effect that they would not injure the
independence of Afghanistan. Perhaps you sent your letter before
you got mine. Now, I have heard that you have appointed your son,
Mahomed Yakub, as your Regent, and have come out of Kabul with
some troops. I have received an order from the Emperor to the
effect that it is impossible to assist you with troops now. I
hope you will be fortunate. It all depends on the decree of God.
Believe me, that the friendship which I made with you will be
perpetual. It is necessary to send back General Vozgonoff and his
companions. You can keep Dr. Yuralski with you if you please. No
doubt the doctor will be of use to you and to your dependents. I
hope our friendship will continue to be strengthened, and that
intercourse will be carried on between us.
_From_ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR SHER ALI, _dated 29th December,
1878 (=17th Muharram, 1296)_.
(After compliments.) The Foreign Minister, General Gortchakoff,
has informed me by telegraph that the Emperor has directed me
to trouble you to come to Tashkent for the present. I therefore
communicate this news to you with great pleasure; at the same
time, I may mention that I have received no instructions about
your journey to St. Petersburg. My personal interview with you
will increase our friendship greatly.
_Translation of a letter from_ MAJOR-GENERAL IVANOFF, _Governor of
Zarafshan, to the Heir-Apparent, _MAHOMED MUSA KHAN, _and others_.
On the 26th of Rabi-ul-Awul, at an auspicious moment, I received
your letter which you sent me, and understood its contents. I
was very much pleased, and at once communicated it to General
Kauffmann, the Governor-General. With regard to what you wrote
about the friendly relations between the Russian and Afghan
Governments, and your own desire for friendship, I have the
honour to state that we are also desirous of being friends. The
friendship between the two Governments existed in the time of the
late Amir, and I hope that it will be increased and strengthened
by Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan.
May God change the wars in your country to happiness; may peace
reign in it; and may your Government be strengthened! I have been
forwarding all your letters to the Governor-General, General
Kauffmann. May God keep you safe!
The Zarafshan Province Governor, MAJOR-GENERAL IVANOFF.
Written and sealed by the General. Written on 29th Mart (March),
1879 (=5th Rabi-ul-Saui, 1296).
_Treaty between the RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT and AMIR SHER ALI KHAN;
_written from memory by MIRZA MAHOMED NABBI._
1. The Russian Government engages that the friendship of the Russian
Government with the Government of Amir Sher Ali Khan, Amir of all
Afghanistan, will be a permanent and perpetual one.
2. The Russian Government engages that, as Sirdar Abdulla Khan, son of
the Amir, is dead, the friendship of the Russian Government with
any person whom the Amir may appoint Heir-Apparent to the throne of
Afghanistan, and with the heir of the Heir-Apparent, will remain firm
and perpetual.
3. The Russian Government engages that if any foreign enemy attacks
Afghanistan, and the Amir is unable to drive him out, and asks the
assistance of the Russian Government, the Russian Government will
repel the enemy, either by means of advice, or by such other means as
it may consider proper.
4. The Amir of Afghanistan will not wage war with any foreign power
without consulting the Russian Government, and without its permission.
5. The Amir of Afghanistan engages that he will always report in a
friendly manner to the Russian Government what goes on in his kingdom.
6. The Amir of Afghanistan will communicate every wish and important
affair of his to General Kauffmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, and
the Governor-General will be authorized by the Russian Government to
fulfil the wishes of the Amir.
7. The Russian Government engages that the Afghan merchants who may
trade and sojourn in Russian territory will be safe from wrong, and
that they will be allowed to carry away their profits.
8. The Amir of Afghanistan will have the power to send his servants to
Russia to learn arts and trades, and the Russian officers will treat
them with consideration and respect as men of rank.
9. (Does not remember.)
10. I, Major-General Stolietoff Nicholas, being a trusted Agent of the
Russian Government, have made the above-mentioned Articles between the
Russian Government and the Government of Amir Sher Ali Khan, and have
put my seal to them.
* * * * *
APPENDIX VIII.
(Referred to in Chapter LVIII, Footnote 5.)
_Letter from SIRDAR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN to LEPEL GRIFFIN, ESQ.,
dated 15th April, 1880._
Whereas at this happy time I have received your kind letter. In
a spirit of justice and friendship you wrote to inquire what I
wished in Afghanistan. My honoured friend, the servants of the
great [British] Government know well that, throughout these twelve
years of exile in the territories of the Emperor of Russia, night
and day I have cherished the hope of revisiting my native land.
When the late Amir Sher Ali Khan died, and there was no one to
rule our tribes, I proposed to return to Afghanistan, but it
was not fated [that I should do so]; then I went to Tashkent.
Consequently, Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan, having come to terms and
made peace with the British Government, was appointed Amir of
Afghanistan; but since, after he had left you, he listened to the
advice of every interested [dishonest] person, and raised fools to
power, until the ignorant men directed the affairs of Afghanistan,
which during the reign of my grandfather, who had eighteen able
sons, was so managed that night was bright like day, Afghanistan
was, in consequence, disgraced before all States, and ruined. Now,
therefore, that you seek to learn my hopes and wishes, they are
these: that as long as your Empire and that of Russia exist, my
countrymen, the tribes of Afghanistan, should live quietly in ease
and peace; that these two States should find us true and faithful,
and that we should rest at peace between them [England and
Russia], for my tribesmen are unable to struggle with Empires, and
are ruined by want of commerce; and we hope of your friendship
that, sympathizing with and assisting the people of Afghanistan,
you will place them under the honourable protection of the two
Powers. This would redound to the credit of both, would give peace
to Afghanistan, and quiet and comfort to God's people. This is my
wish; for the rest, it is yours to decide.
* * * * *
APPENDIX IX.
(Referred to in Chapter LVIII, Footnote 6.)
_Letter from A. C. LYALL, ESQ., C.B., Secretary to the Government of
India, Foreign Department, to LEPEL H. GRIFFIN, Esq., C.S.I., Chief
Political Officer, Kabul, dated Simla, April, 1880._
I have the honour to inform you that the Governor-General has
received and considered in council your telegrams of the 22nd and
23rd instant, forwarding the translation of a letter received by
you from Sirdar Abdur Rahman on the 21st instant, together with
a summary of certain oral explanations which accompanied that
letter, and a statement of the recommendations suggested by it to
Lieutenaut-General Sir Frederick Roberts and yourself.
In conveying to you its instructions on the subject of this
important communication, the Government of India considers it
expedient to recapitulate the principles on which it has hitherto
been acting in northern Afghanistan, and clearly to define the
point of view from which it contemplates the present situation of
affairs in that country. The single object to which, as you are
well aware, the Afghan policy of this Government has at all times
been directed and limited, is the security of the North-West
frontier of India. The Government of India has, however, no less
invariably held and acted on the conviction that the security of
this frontier is incompatible with the intrusion of any foreign
influence into the great border State of Afghanistan. To exclude
or eject such influence the Government of India has frequently
subsidized and otherwise assisted the Amirs of Kabul. It has also,
more than once, taken up arms against them. But it has never
interfered, for any other purpose, in the affairs of their
kingdom. Regulating on this principle and limiting to this object
the conduct of our relations with the rulers of Kabul, it was our
long-continued endeavour to find in their friendship and their
strength the requisite guarantees for the security of our own
frontier. Failing in that endeavour, we were compelled to seek the
attainment of the object to which our Afghan policy was, and is
still, exclusively directed, by rendering the permanent security
of our frontier as much as possible independent of such
conditions.
This obligation was not accepted without reluctance. Not even when
forced into hostilities by the late Amir Sher Ali Khan's espousal
of a Russian alliance, proposed by Russia in contemplation of a
rupture with the British Government, did we relinquish our desire
for the renewal of relations with a strong and friendly Afghan
Power, and, when the son of Sher Ali subsequently sought our
alliance and protection, they were at once accorded to him, on
conditions of which His Highness professed to appreciate the
generosity. The crime, however, which dissolved the Treaty of
Gandamak, and the disclosures which followed that event, finally
convinced the Government of India that the interests committed to
its care could not but be gravely imperilled by further adhesion
to a policy dependent for its fruition on the gratitude, the good
faith, the assumed self-interest, or the personal character of any
Afghan Prince.
When, therefore, Her Majesty's troops re-entered Afghanistan in
September last, it was with two well-defined and plainly-avowed
objects. The first was to avenge the treacherous massacre of
the British Mission at Kabul; the second was to maintain the
safeguards sought through the Treaty of Gandamak, by providing
for their maintenance guarantees of a more substantial and less
precarious character.
These two objects have been maintained: the first by the capture
of Kabul and the punishment of the crime committed there, the
second by the severance of Kandahar from the Kabul power.
Satisfied with their attainment, the Government of India has no
longer any motive or desire to enter into fresh treaty engagements
with the Rulers of Kabul. The arrangements and exchange of
friendly assurances with the Amir Sher Ali, though supplemented on
the part of the Government of India by subsidies and favours of
various kinds, wholly failed to secure the object of them,
which was, nevertheless, a thoroughly friendly one, and no less
conducive to the security and advantage of the Afghan than to
those of the British Power. The treaty with Yakub Khan, which
secured to him our friendship and material support, was equally
ineffectual. Moreover, recent events and arrangements have
fundamentally changed the situation to which our correspondence
and engagements with the Amir of Afghanistan formally applied. Our
advance frontier positions at Kandahar and Kuram have materially
diminished the political importance of Kabul in relation to India,
and although we shall always appreciate the friendship of its
Ruler, our relations with him are now of so little importance to
the paramount objects of our policy that we no longer require to
maintain British agents in any part of his dominions.
Our only reasons, therefore, for not immediately withdrawing our
forces from northern Afghanistan have hitherto been--_first_, the
excited and unsettled condition of the country round Kabul,
with the attitude of hostility assumed by some leaders of armed
gatherings near Ghazni; and, _secondly_, the inability of the
Kabul Sirdars to agree among themselves on the selection of a
Ruler strong enough to maintain order after our evacuation of the
country.
The first-named of these reasons has now ceased to exist. In a
minute dated the 30th ultimo the Viceroy and Governor-General
stated that 'the Government is anxious to withdraw as soon as
possible the troops from Kabul and from all points beyond those
to be occupied under the Treaty of Gandamak, except Kandahar. In
order that this may be done, it is desirable to find a Ruler for
Kabul, which will be separated from Kandahar. Steps,' continued
His Excellency, 'are being taken for this purpose. Meanwhile, it
is essential that we should make such a display of strength in
Afghanistan as will show that we are masters of the situation,
and will overawe disaffection.'... 'All that is necessary, from a
political point of view, is for General Stewart to march to
Ghazni, break up any opposition he may find there or in the
neighbourhood, and open up direct communication with General Sir
Frederick Roberts at Kabul.' The military operations thus defined
have been accomplished by General Stewart's successful action
before Ghazni.
With regard to the second reason mentioned for the retention of
our troops in northern Afghanistan, the appearance of Abdur
Rahman as a candidate for the throne of Kabul, whose claims the
Government of India has no cause to oppose, and who seems to be
approved, and likely to be supported, by at least a majority of
the population, affords fair ground for anticipating that our
wishes in regard to the restoration, before our departure, of
order in that part of the country will now be fulfilled.
The Governor-General in Council has consequently decided that the
evacuation of Kabul shall be effected not later than October next,
and it is with special reference to this decision that the letter
and message addressed to you by Sirdar Abdur Rahman have been
carefully considered by His Excellency in Council.
What first claims notice in the consideration of that letter is
the desire that it expresses for the permanent establishment of
Afghanistan with our assistance and sympathy under the joint
protection of the British and Russian Empires. This suggestion,
which is more fully developed in the Sirdar's unwritten message,
cannot be entertained or discussed.
As already stated, the primary object and declared determination
of the Government of India have been the exclusion of foreign
influence or interference from Afghanistan. This cardinal
condition of amicable relations with Afghanistan has, at all times
and in all circumstances, been deemed essential for the permanent
security of Her Majesty's Indian Empire. As such, it has hitherto
been firmly maintained by successive Governors-General of India
under the explicit instructions of Her Majesty's Government. Nor
has it ever been ignored, or officially contested, by the Russian
Government. That Government, on the contrary, has repeatedly, and
under every recent change of circumstances in Afghanistan, renewed
the assurances solemnly given to the British Government that
'Russia considers Afghanistan as entirely beyond the sphere of her
influence.'
It is true that negotiations at one time passed between the two
Governments with a view to the mutual recognition of certain
territories as constituting a neutral zone between their
respective spheres of legitimate influence and action, and that at
one time it was proposed by Russia to treat Afghanistan itself as
a neutral territory. Those negotiations, however, having proved
fruitless, the northern frontier of Afghanistan was finally
determined by mutual agreement, and in 1876 the Russian Government
formally reiterated its adherence to the conclusion that, 'while
maintaining on either side the arrangement come to as regards the
limits of Afghanistan, which is to remain outside the sphere of
Russian action, the two Cabinets should regard as terminated the
discussions relative to the intermediate zone, which promised no
practical result.'
The position of Afghanistan as defined and settled by these
engagements was again distinctly affirmed on behalf of the Queen's
Government by the Marquis of Salisbury in 1879, and the Government
of India unreservedly maintains it in the fullest conviction
of its essential necessity for the peaceable protection of Her
Majesty's Indian dominions. It is therefore desirable that you
should take occasion to inform Abdur Rahman that the relations of
Afghanistan to the British and Russian Empires are matters which
the Government of India must decline to bring into discussion with
the Sirdar. The Afghan states and tribes are too contiguous
with India, whose North-Western frontier they surround, for the
Government of India ever willingly to accept partnership with
any other Power in the exercise of its legitimate and recognized
influence over those tribes and States.
The Governor-General in Council is, nevertheless, most anxious
that the Sirdar should not misunderstand the light in which his
personal sentiments and obligations towards Russia are regarded
by the Government of India. So long as the Rulers of Kabul were
amenable to its advice, this Government has never ceased to
impress on them the international duty of scrupulously respecting
all the recognized rights and interests of their Russian
neighbour, refraining from every act calculated to afford the
Russian authorities in Central Asia any just cause of umbrage or
complaint. The intelligence and good sense which are conspicuous
in the Sirdar's letter and messages to you will enable him to
appreciate the difference between conduct regulated on these
principles and that which cost Sher Ali the loss of his throne.
This Government does not desire, nor has it ever desired, to
impose on any Ruler of Kabul conditions incompatible with that
behaviour which Russia, as a powerful and neighbouring Empire, is
entitled to expect from him; least of all can we desire to impose
such conditions on a Prince who has received hospitality and
protection in Russian territory. I am therefore to observe that,
in the natural repugnance expressed by Abdur Rahman to conditions
which 'might make him appear ungrateful' to those 'whose salt he
has eaten,' the Governor-General in Council recognizes a sentiment
altogether honourable to the Sirdar, and perfectly consistent with
the sincerity of his professed goodwill towards ourselves.
These observations will furnish you with a sufficient answer to
the question asked by Abdur Rahman as to the 'nature of our
friendship' and 'its conditions.'
The frankness with which he has explained his position entitles
him to receive from us a no less unreserved statement of our own.
The Government of India cordially shares the wish expressed by
Abdur Rahman that, between the British and Russian Empires, his
'tribes and countrymen may live quietly in ease and peace.' We do
not desire to place them in a position of unfriendliness towards a
Power which is pledged to us to regard their country as 'entirely
beyond the sphere of its action.' The injury to Afghan commerce
caused by the present condition of Afghanistan, to which the
Sirdar has alluded, is fully appreciated by the Government of
India, and on the restoration of peace between the two countries
the revival and development of trade intercourse need present no
difficulty. As regards our own friendship, it will, if sincerely
sought, be freely given, and fully continued so long as it is
loyally reciprocated. But we attach to it no other condition. We
have no concessions to ask or make, and the Sirdar will therefore
perceive that there is really no matter for negotiation or bargain
between him and us.
On this point your reply to Abdur Rahman cannot be too explicit.
Previous to the Sirdar's arrival in Turkestan, the hostility and
treachery of those whose misconduct he admits and deplores had
compelled the Government of India to make territorial arrangements
of a material and permanent character for the better protection of
our frontier. The maintenance of these arrangements is in no wise
dependent on the assent or dissent, on the good will or ill-will,
of any Chief at Kabul. The character of them has been so fully
explained by you to all the other Kabul Sirdars that it is
probably well known to Abdur Rahman. But in order that our present
intercourse and future relations with the Sirdar may be perfectly
clear of doubt on a point affecting the position he aspires
to fill, the Governor-General in Council authorizes you, if
necessary, to make him plainly understand that neither the
district assigned to us by the Treaty of Gandamak, nor any part
of the province of Kandahar, will ever be restored to the Kabul
Power.
As regards this last-mentioned province, the Government of India
has been authorized by that of Her Majesty to give to Sher Ali
Khan, the present Wali of Kandahar, a distinct assurance that
he will be not only recognized, but maintained, by the British
Government as the Ruler of that province. Sher Ali Khan is one of
the Native nobles of Kandahar. He is administering the province
with ability, good sense, and complete loyalty to the British
Government, which has promised him the support of a British
garrison so long as he requires such support. The Governor-General
in Council cannot doubt that Sirdar Abdur Rahman will readily
recognize the obligation incumbent on the honour of the British
Government to keep faith with all who, whether at Kandahar or
elsewhere, have proved themselves true and loyal adherents.
Yakub Khan forfeited our alliance, and with it his throne, by
mistrusting the assurances we gave him, and falsifying those
which he had given to us. If, misled by his example, Yakub Khan's
successor attempts to injure or oppress the friends of the British
Government, its power will again be put forth to protect or avenge
them. Similarly, if the next Kabul Ruler reintroduces into his
Court or country foreign influences adverse to our own, the
Government of India will again take such steps as it may deem
expedient to deal with such a case. These contingencies, however,
cannot occur if the sentiments of Abdur Rahman are such as
he represents them to be. Meanwhile, the territorial and
administrative arrangements already completed by us for the
permanent protection of our own interests are not susceptible of
negotiation or discussion with Abdur Rahman or any other claimant
to the throne of Kabul.
To the settlement of Herat, which is not included in these
completed arrangements, the Governor-General in Council cannot
authorize you to make or invite any reference in your reply to
Abdur Rahman. The settlement of the future administration of
Herat has been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government; with those
present views in regard to this important question, the Government
of India is not yet acquainted.
Nor can our evacuation of Kabul constitute any subject for
proposals in your correspondence with the Sirdar. This measure
was determined on by the Government of India long before the
appearance of Abdur Rahman as a candidate for the government of
the country we are about to evacuate. It has not been caused by
the hostility, and is not, therefore, conditional on the goodwill,
of any Afghan Power.
The Government of India is, however, very willing to carry out the
evacuation of Kabul in the manner most conducive to the personal
advantage of Abdur Rahman, whose interests we believe to be, more
than those of any other Sirdar, in accordance with the general
interests of the Afghan people. For this reason it is desirable
that you should inform Abdur Rahman of our intention to evacuate
Kabul, and our desire to take that opportunity of unconditionally
transferring to his authority the whole of the country from which
our troops will be withdrawn. You are authorized to add that our
military and political officers at Kabul will be empowered to
facilitate any practical arrangement suggested by the Sirdar for
promptly and peaceably effecting, in co-operation with him, the
transfer thus contemplated on his behalf. Such arrangement must,
however, be consistent with our obligations towards those who have
served and aided the British Government during our occupation of
those territories.
For this purpose, it appears to the Governor-General in Council
desirable that the Sirdar should lose no time in proceeding to
Kabul, and there settling, in conference with General Stewart and
yourself, such preliminary arrangements as may best promote the
undisturbed establishment of his future government.
The Governor-General in Council has, however, no desire to press
this suggestion, should it appear to the Sirdar that his presence
at Kabul, previous to the withdrawal of our troops for the purpose
of personal conference with the British authorities, might have
the effect of weakening his popularity, or compromising his
position in the eyes of his future subjects.
The point is one which must be left entirely to the Sirdar's own
judgment and inclination.
But Abdur Rahman is doubtless aware that there are at present,
in and around Kabul, personages not destitute of influence, who
themselves aspire to the sovereignty he seeks, and that the family
of Yakub has still numerous personal adherents, who may possibly
take advantage of the withdrawal of our troops to oppose the
Sirdar's authority if he is not personally present to assert it.
It should on both sides he remembered and understood that it is
not the policy of this Government to impose upon the Afghan people
an unpopular Ruler or to interfere uninvited in the administration
of a friendly one. If Abdur Rahman proves able and disposed to
conciliate the confidence of his countrymen, without forfeiting
the good understanding which he seeks with us, he will assuredly
find his best support in our political appreciation of that fact.
Our reason for unconditionally transferring to him the government
of the country, from which our forces will in any case be
withdrawn a few months hence, is that, on the whole, he appears to
be the Chief best able to restore order in that country, and also
best entitled to undertake such a task. In his performance of it
he will receive, if he requires it, our assistance. But we neither
need nor wish to hamper, by preliminary stipulations or provisoes,
his independent exercise of a sovereignty which he declares
himself anxious to maintain on a footing of peace and friendship
with the British Government.
The present statement of the views and intentions of His
Excellency the Governor-General in Council respecting Abdur Rahman
will enable you to represent them with adequate accuracy in your
reply to the Sirdar's friendly overtures, and it will now be your
duty to convey to Abdur Rahman, without any avoidable delay,
the answer of the Government of India to the letter and message
received from him. His Excellency feels assured that you will give
full expression to the spirit of candour and goodwill in which
these communications have been received and are reciprocated.
But I am to impress on your attention the importance of avoiding
any expression which might appear to suggest or admit matter for
negotiation or discussion in reference to the relative positions
of the Sirdar and the Government of India.
In conclusion, I am to request that on receipt of this letter you
will be so good as to lose no time in submitting its contents to
General Sir Donald Stewart, should he then have reached Kabul.
In any case, you will, of course, communicate them to General
Roberts, and act upon them in consultation with the chief military
authority on the spot.
* * * * *
APPENDIX X.
(Referred to in Chapter LIX, Footnote 2.)
_Extract from a Report by LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS,
V.C., K.C.B., to the QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL IN INDIA, dated Kabul,
17th April, 1880._
25. I think I have now dealt with all the points of military
importance connected with the military position in northern
Afghanistan, but there are a few questions of more general interest
which I desire to bring to the notice of His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief and the Government of India.
26. First with regard to rations. The daily scale of issue to Native
troops is given in the margin.
[Sidenote: _Daily ration of Native soldiers_:
Atta[1] 12 chittacks [2]
Dall[3] 2 chittacks
Ghi[4] 1 chittack
Salt 1/3 chittack
Meat 1 lb. bi-weekly
Rum 1 dram " ]
It has been found throughout the campaign, even when the men were
employed upon hard work, that '12 chittacks' of 'atta' daily are amply
sufficient for the Native troops, supplemented, as of late, through
the liberality of Government, by a bi-weekly issue of 1 lb. of
meat. In a climate like Afghanistan, where the inhabitants are all
meat-eaters, this liberality has been most wise. Every endeavour was
made, before this sanction was granted, to supply the Native portion
of the force with meat on payment, and I attribute to this in great
measure the sound health and excellent stamina which they now exhibit.