1878
Shortcomings of my column--Attitude of the Border tribes
It was a proud, albeit a most anxious, moment for me when I assumed
command of the Kuram Field Force; though a local Major-General, I was
only a Major in my regiment, and save for a short experience on one
occasion in Lushai, I had never had an opportunity of commanding
troops in the field. Earnestly longing for success, I was intensely
interested in ascertaining the qualities of those who were to aid me
in achieving it. To this end I lost no time in taking stock of the
several officers and corps who were to be associated with me, some of
whom were personally known to me, while others I had never met before;
and in endeavouring to satisfy myself as to their qualifications and
fitness for their several posts, I could not help feeling that they
must be equally anxious as to my capability for command, and that the
inspection must be of nearly as great moment to them as to me.
The results of a very close investigation were tolerably satisfactory,
but there were weak points in my armour which gave me grave cause for
anxiety.
I came to the conclusion that the force was not numerically strong
enough for the very difficult task before it--in the first instance,
the occupation of the Kuram valley and the expulsion of all Afghan
garrisons south of the Shutargardan Pass, and in the second, as
opportunity might offer, the pushing my reconnaissances into the Khost
valley, and, if military considerations would admit, the dislodging
the Amir's administration from that tract of country, so as to prevent
the Kabul Government drawing supplies from it. Finally, I was directed
to explore the roads leading to the unknown region beyond Khost.
The Shutargardan was not less than 180 miles from Kohat, the garrison
of which station would, on my departure, be reduced to a minimum, and
Rawal Pindi, the nearest place from which aid could be procured, was
130 miles still further off, separated from Kohat by an execrable road
and the swiftly-flowing river Indus, crossed by a precarious bridge of
boats. It had to be taken into account also that the various Afridi
tribes were watching their opportunity, and at the first favourable
moment, in common with the tribesmen nearer Kuram, they might be
expected to take advantage of our weakness and attack our convoys and
the small posts which had necessarily to be established along our line
of communication.
The attitude of the Mahomedan sepoys, of whom there were large numbers
in four out of my six Native Infantry regiments, was also a cause of
considerable anxiety; for I was aware that they were not altogether
happy at the prospect of taking part in a war against their
co-religionist, the Ruler of Afghanistan, and that the mullas were
already urging them to desert our cause.
Furthermore, I discovered that my only British Infantry Regiment, the
2nd Battalion of the 8th Foot, was sickly to a degree, and therefore
in an unserviceable condition. It was largely composed of quite
young, unacclimatized soldiers, peculiarly susceptible to fever--that
terrible scourge which fills the hospitals of our Punjab stations in
the autumn of each year. I rode out to meet the battalion on its way
into Kohat, and was horrified to see the long line of doolies and
ambulance-carts by which it was accompanied.
The inefficient state of the transport added to my anxieties.
Notwithstanding the difficulties experienced in former campaigns from
the same cause, the Government had neglected to take any steps for the
organization of a proper transport service while we were at peace;
consequently, when everything should have been ready for a start,
confusion reigned supreme in this all-important department. Large
numbers of camels, mules, and bullocks arrived daily, picked up at
exorbitant prices from anyone who would supply them; but most of these
animals were quite unfit to enter upon the hard work of a campaign,
and with a totally inexperienced and quite insufficient staff of
officers to supervise them, it was evident that the majority must
succumb at an early date.
Hardly had I realized these shortcomings in the constitution and
equipment of my column than I received intelligence which led me to
believe that the Afghans would hold the Peiwar Kotal (the pass leading
into Afghanistan over the range of mountains bounding the Kuram
valley) in great strength, and were determined to oppose our advance
at this point. Under these circumstances I felt myself justified in
representing to the powers at Simla that I considered the number of
troops at my disposal inadequate for the task they were expected to
perform, which representation resulted in the 23rd Pioneers, whose
transfer to the Khyber column had been under consideration, being left
with me, and the 72nd Highlanders, a battery of Field Artillery, and
the 28th Punjab Infantry, being sent to Kohat. Of these, however, I
was allowed to take on with me only one wing of the 72nd, half the
battery, and the 28th Punjab Infantry; and the last-named regiment I
could hardly consider as part of my force, for when we should arrive
at Thal, our furthest frontier post, it would have to be dropped,
with a wing of the 5th Punjab Cavalry and No. 2 Mountain Battery, to
garrison that place.
This small reinforcement was not given to me without considerable
demur on the part of the military authorities, who had made up
their minds that the Kuram column would meet with slight, if any,
opposition, and that the chief stand would be made in the Khyber. Lord
Lytton, however, supported my appeal, as did Sir Neville Chamberlain,
who was then acting as Military Member of Council, and who had
personal knowledge of the great natural strength of the Peiwar Kotal
position.
I next turned my attention to the transport, and endeavoured by all
the means I could think of to render it more efficient. A certain
portion of it I placed in regimental charge; I had the men instructed
in loading and unloading, and I took great care that the animals were
not overladen.
Happily, I had a very able staff. Major Galbraith, the
Assistant-Adjutant-General, though new to the work, proved
exceptionally good, and Captain Badcock, the chief Commissariat
officer, and Major Collett and Captain 'Dick' Kennedy, officers of
the Quartermaster-General's department, whom I had myself selected, I
could thoroughly depend upon.
As regards my own personal staff I was equally lucky, Captain Pretyman
of the R.A. being my A.D.C., and Lieutenant Neville Chamberlain, of
the Central India Horse, and Lieutenant-Colonel George Villiers, of
the Grenadier Guards, my Orderly officers.
As political adviser I had with me an old friend and schoolfellow,
Colonel Garrow Waterfield, Commissioner of Peshawar, who brought with
him a large following of Native gentlemen connected with the frontier,
by whom he thought our intercourse with the tribesmen would be
assisted. With scarcely an exception they proved loyal, and throughout
the campaign helped me materially.
Knowing how important it was to secure the interest of the Chiefs and
Khans of the border on our side, especially those who had influence in
the Kuram valley, we lost no opportunity of becoming acquainted with
them while we were at Kohat. They were friendly and full of promises,
but it was clear that the amount of assistance to be given by
them depended on whether or not our occupation of Kuram was to
be permanent, and on this important point I solicited definite
instructions. I reported to the Commander-in-Chief that, from all I
had learnt, the advent of a British force would be welcomed by the
people, provided they understood that it was the forerunner of
annexation; that in this case we should be regarded as deliverers, and
all the resources of the country would be placed at our disposal; but
if the people were led to believe that the force would be withdrawn
when our work was finished, and that they would be again handed over
to the tender mercies of the Kabul Government, we must expect no aid
from them, as they would naturally dread the resentment of their
Afghan rulers.
In reply, I was informed that I could assure the people of Kuram that
our occupation would be permanent; and my being enabled to make this
promise was undoubtedly the explanation of the friendly reception we
met with on entering the valley, and the cause of my receiving at the
same time a letter from the Chief of the Turis (the inhabitants of
the Kuram valley), inquiring when we might be expected, as they were
suffering greatly from the tyranny of the Afghan Government, and were
anxiously waiting the arrival of the British.
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