1878
Effect of the Berlin Treaty at Kabul
--Sher Ali decides against England--A meeting of portentous moment
--Preparations for war--Letter from Sher Ali
In 1877 Russia declared war with Turkey; for more than a year fighting
had been going on between the two countries, and as it seemed possible
to the British Government that England might in the end be drawn into
the contest, it was deemed expedient to obtain help from India, and
a force of about 5,000 Native soldiers was despatched from Bombay to
Malta in response to the demand from home.
Russia answered this move on our part by increased activity in
Central Asia; and in June, 1878, it was reported by Major Cavagnari,
Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawar, that a Russian Envoy of the same rank
as the Governor-General of Tashkent was about to visit Kabul, and
that General Kauffmann had written to the Amir that the Envoy must
be received as an Ambassador deputed by the Czar himself. A few days
later further reports were received of Russian troops being mobilized,
and of the intention of Russia to establish cantonments on the ferries
of Kilif and Kerki on the Oxus.
The Amir, it was said, summoned a council of the leading Chiefs,
to discuss the question whether it would be most advantageous for
Afghanistan at this juncture to side with Russia or with England; it
was decided apparently in favour of the former, for from the moment
General Stolietoff's Mission set foot on Afghan territory it met with
an enthusiastic reception. Five miles from the capital Stolietoff and
his companions were welcomed by the Foreign Secretary. They were then
mounted on richly-caparisoned elephants, and escorted by a large body
of troops to the Bala Hissar, where the following morning they were
received in state by Sher Ali, and the nobles of highest degree in his
kingdom.[1]
On the eve of the day that the Mission entered Kabul, Stolietoff
received a despatch from General Kauffmann giving him the heads of the
Berlin Treaty, with the following commentary in the handwriting of
the Governor-General himself: 'If the news be true, it is indeed
melancholy;' adding, however, that the Congress had finished its
sittings, and that, therefore, the Envoy in his negotiations with
the Amir had better refrain from arranging any distinct measures, or
making any positive promises, and '_not go generally as far as would
have been advisable if war with England had been threatened_.'
Evidently these instructions greatly modified the basis of
Stolietoff's negotiations with Sher Ali; for, although the Russians
deny that an offensive and defensive alliance with the Afghan Ruler
was contemplated, it seems probable, from the tone of Kauffmann's
despatch, that the Envoy's instructions were elastic enough to admit
of such an arrangement had the circumstances of the case made it
desirable--_e.g._, had the Berlin Congress failed to establish peace
in Europe.
In telegraphing to the Secretary of State an account of these
proceedings at Kabul, the Viceroy requested explicit instructions from
Her Majesty's Government as to whether this conduct on the part of
Russia and Afghanistan was to be left to the Government of India to
deal with as a matter between it and the Amir, or whether, having
regard to Russia's formal promises, it would be treated as an Imperial
question. 'In the former case,' he concluded, 'I shall propose, with
your approval, to insist on an immediate suitable reception of a
British Mission.'
Lord Lytton's proposition was approved of by Her Majesty's Ministers,
and a letter[2] was at once written by the Viceroy to the Amir,
announcing that a Mission would shortly be despatched to Kabul with
General Sir Neville Chamberlain, at that time Commander-in-Chief in
Madras, as its responsible head.
Major Cavagnari was at the same time directed to inform the
authorities at Kabul that the object of the Mission was altogether
friendly, and that a refusal to grant it a free passage and safe
conduct, such as had been accorded to the Russian Envoy, would be
considered as an act of open hostility. Intimation of the Viceroy's
intentions reached Kabul on the 17th August, the day on which the
Amir's favourite son, Abdulla Jan, died. This untoward event was taken
advantage of to delay answering the Viceroy's letter, but it was not
allowed in any way to interfere with the progress of the negotiations
with Russia. When these were completed, Stolietoff inquired from Sher
Ali whether he meant to receive the English Mission, whereupon the
Amir asked for the General's advice in the matter. Stolietoff, while
replying somewhat evasively, gave Sher Ali to understand that the
simultaneous presence of Embassies from two countries in almost
hostile relations with each other would not be quite convenient, upon
which His Highness decided not to allow the British Mission to enter
Afghanistan. This decision, however, was not communicated to the
Viceroy, and on the 21st September the Mission[3] marched out of
Peshawar and encamped at Jamrud, three miles short of the Kyber Pass.
In consequence of the extremely hostile attitude of the Amir, and the
very unsatisfactory reply received from General Faiz Mahomed Khan,
commanding the Afghan troops in the Kyber Pass, to a letter[4] he had
written a few days before, Sir Neville Chamberlain suspected that the
advance of the Mission would be opposed, and, in order 'to reduce to
a minimum any indignity that might be offered to our Government,' he
deputed Major Cavagnari to ride on with a few sowars to Ali Masjid, a
fort ten miles beyond the mouth of the Pass, and demand leave for the
Mission to proceed.
When within a mile of the fort, Cavagnari was met by a body of
Afridis, who warned him that the road ahead was blocked by Afghans,
and that if he ventured further he would be fired upon. On this
Cavagnari halted, and while in the act of writing a letter to Faiz
Mahomed, complaining of the treatment he had met with, and informing
him that he and his companions intended to proceed until fired upon,
an act the responsibility for which would rest with the Amir's
representatives, a message was brought him from Faiz Mahomed to the
effect that he was coming to meet him, and would hear anything he had
to communicate.
The interview took place near a water-mill on the right bank of the
stream which flows under Ali Masjid. I have several times since ridden
past the spot and pictured to myself the meeting between the British
political officer and the Afghan General. It was a meeting of most
portentous moment, for its result would mean peace or war.
Faiz Mahomed's bearing was perfectly courteous, but he made it clear
that he did not intend to permit the Mission to pass, explaining that
he was only acting as a sentry under instructions from Kabul, and
that he was bound to resist the entrance of the Mission into
Afghan territory with all the force at his disposal. He spoke with
considerable warmth, and told Cavagnari that but for their personal
friendship he would, in obedience to the Amir's orders, have shot down
him and his escort.
Faiz Mahomed's followers were not so respectful in their bearing as
their Chief, and their manner warned Cavagnari that it was unadvisable
to prolong the conversation; he, therefore, took leave of the Afghan
General, and returned to Jamrud. The Mission was dissolved,[5] our
Agent at Kabul was ordered to return to India, and Cavagnari was
instructed to remain at Peshawar and arrange for alienating the
Afridis in the Khyber from the Amir's interests.
In reporting these circumstances to the Secretary of State, the
Government of India expressed their regret that this final endeavour
on their part to arrive at some definite understanding with the Amir
of Kabul should have been thus met with repudiation and affront, and
concluded their despatch in the following words: 'The repulse of Sir
Neville Chamberlain by Sher Ali at his frontier while the Russian
emissaries are still at his capital has proved the inutility of
diplomatic expedients, and has deprived the Amir of all claim upon our
further forbearance.'
It had been arranged that, if it were unfortunately found to be
necessary to support political efforts by military measures, two
columns should be mobilized, one at Sukkur on the Indus, for an
advance in the direction of Kandahar, the other at Kohat for
operations in the Kuram valley, and that I was to have command of the
latter. As soon, therefore, as the tidings of Sir Neville's repulse
was received, I started from Simla to be on the spot in case the
proposal to employ force should be sanctioned by the authorities in
England.
Between the time of my leaving Simla and my arrival at Kohat on
the 9th October, it was decided to employ a third column to make
a demonstration in the direction of the Khyber for the purpose of
clearing the Amir's troops out of the pass.[6]
The formation of this column was no doubt a wise move, as the Afghans
were holding Ali Masjid, the spot on which the insult had been offered
to our Envoy, and the presence of a force on this line would tend to
relieve the pressure against my column; but looked at from my point of
view, this third column was not quite so desirable, as it involved the
withdrawal of three of my most efficient regiments, and the transfer
of a large number of my transport animals to the Khyber for its use.
There was some consolation, however, in the fact that my old friend
Major-General Sir Samuel Browne, who had been named for the command in
the Khyber, was to be the gainer by my loss.
Major-General Donald Stewart, who was in England, was telegraphed for
to command the Kandahar column, the advanced portion of which, it was
intended, should push on under Major-General Biddulph to strengthen
Quetta.
The long-expected reply[7] from the Amir to the Viceroy's letter of
the 14th August was received at Simla on the 19th October. Its tone
was considered extremely discourteous; it contained no apology for the
public affront offered to the British Government, and indicated no
desire for improved relations.
The reply was at once communicated to the Secretary of State, who was
further informed that the Government of India proposed the following
measures:--
The immediate issue of a manifesto which should define the cause
of offence, declare a friendly disposition towards the Afghan
people and reluctance to interfere in their internal affairs, and
should fix the whole responsibility of what might happen upon the
Amir.
An advance into the Kuram valley as soon as the force at Kohat was
ready to move.
The expulsion of the Afghan troops holding the Khyber Pass.
An advance from Quetta into Pishin, or, if necessary, to Kandahar.
Lord Cranbrook (who had succeeded the Marquis of Salisbury as
Secretary of State for India) replied[8] that he did not consider
matters to be at present ripe for taking the extreme measures
recommended by the Government of India, and that, before crossing the
frontiers of Afghanistan, a letter should be addressed to the Amir
demanding, in temperate language, an apology, and the acceptance of a
permanent Mission within Afghan limits; that sufficient time should be
given for the receipt of a reply to this letter (the text of which was
to be telegraphed to Lord Cranbrook for approval before despatch), and
that meanwhile the massing of troops should be continued, and adequate
forces assembled at the various points where the frontier would be
crossed if war were declared. The Secretary of State went on to say:
'There must be no mistake as to our show of power to enforce what we
require; this _locus penitentiæ _should be allowed before hostile acts
are committed against the Amir.'
These instructions were carried out, and on the 30th October the
ultimatum was despatched to Sher Ali, informing him that, unless his
acceptance of the conditions were received by the Viceroy not later
than the 20th November, he would be treated by the British Government
as a declared enemy.
[Footnote 1: On the 13th June, the day on which the Berlin Congress
held its first sitting, the news of the approach of General
Stolietoff's Mission reached Kabul. The Russians hoped that the
Mission might influence the decision of the Berlin Congress, and
although its despatch was repudiated by the Imperial Government at St.
Petersburg, it was subsequently ascertained on excellent authority
that the project of sending a Mission to Kabul was discussed three
times at the Council of Ministers, and, according to a statement in
the _Journal de St. Petersbourg_, orders were sent in April, 1878, to
General Kauffmann regarding its despatch. About the same time, the
Russian Minister of War proposed that the Army of the Caucasus should
be transferred bodily across the Caspian to Astrabad, whence the
troops would march in two columns on Herat; while three columns,
amounting in the aggregate to 14,000 men, were to move direct upon the
Oxus from Turkestan. The main part of this scheme was never carried
into effect, probably from its being found too great an undertaking at
a time when Russia had scarcely obtained a footing beyond the Caspian,
but the minor movement was partially carried out. The largest of the
three columns, under Kauffmann's own command, moved from Tashkent,
through Samarkand, to Jam, the most southern point of the Russian
possessions at that time, and within ten marches of Kilif, the main
ferry over the Oxus. There it remained for some weeks, when it
returned to Tashkent, the Afghan expedition being abandoned in
consequence of the Treaty of Berlin having been signed.]
[Footnote 2:
'SIMLA,
'14_th August,_ 1878.
'The authentic intelligence which I have lately received of the
course of recent events at Kabul and in the countries bordering on
Afghanistan has rendered it necessary that I should communicate
fully and without reserve with your Highness upon matters
of importance which concern the interests of India and of
Afghanistan. For this reason, I have considered it expedient to
depute a special and confidential British Envoy of high rank, who
is known to your Highness--his Excellency General Sir Neville
Bowles Chamberlain, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable
Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Commander of the Most Exalted
Order of the Star of India, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras
Army--to visit your Highness immediately at Kabul, in order that
he may converse personally with your Highness regarding these
urgent affairs. It appears certain that they can best be arranged
for the welfare and tranquillity of both States, and for the
preservation of friendship between the two Governments, by a
full and frank statement of the present position. This letter is
therefore sent in advance to your Highness by the hand of Nawab
Gholam Hussein Khan, C.S.I., a faithful and honoured Sirdar of my
Government, who will explain all necessary details as to the time
and manner of the Envoy's visit. It is asked that your Highness
may be pleased to issue commands to your Sirdars, and to all other
authorities in Afghanistan, upon the route between Peshawar
and Kabul, that they shall make, without any delay, whatever
arrangements are necessary and proper for effectively securing to
my Envoy, the representative of a friendly Power, due safe conduct
and suitable accommodation according to his dignity, while passing
with his retinue through the dominions of your Highness.
'I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your
Highness, and to subscribe myself.']
[Footnote 3: The Mission was composed of General Sir Neville
Chamberlain, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.; Major Cavagnari, C.S.I.; Surgeon-Major
Bellew, C.S.I.; Major O. St. John, R.E.; Captain St. V. Hammick,
43rd Foot; Captain F. Onslow, Madras Cavalry; Lieutenant Neville
Chamberlain, Central India Horse; Maharaj Pertap Sing of Jodhpur; and
Sirdar Obed Ulla Khan, of Tonk. Lieutenant-Colonel F. Jenkins and
Captain W. Battye were with the escort.]
[Footnote 4:
'PESHAWAR,
'15_th September_, 1878.
(After compliments.) 'I write to inform you that, by command
of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, a
friendly Mission of British officers, with a suitable escort, is
about to proceed to Kabul through the Khyber Pass, and intimation
of the despatch of this Mission has been duly communicated to His
Highness the Amir by the hand of the Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan.
'I hear that an official from Kabul has recently visited you at
Ali Masjid, and he has doubtless instructed you in accordance with
His Highness the Amir's commands. As, however, information has
now been received that you have summoned from Peshawar the Khyber
headmen with whom we were making arrangements for the safe conduct
of the British Mission through the Khyber Pass, I therefore write
to inquire from you whether, in accordance with the instructions
you have received, you are prepared to guarantee the safety of the
British Mission to Daka or not; and I request that a clear reply
to this inquiry may be speedily communicated by the hand of
the bearer of this letter, as I cannot delay my departure from
Peshawar. It is well known that the Khyber tribes are in receipt
of allowances from the Kabul Government, and also, like other
independent tribes on this frontier, have relations with the
British Government. It may be well to let you know that when the
present negotiations were opened with the Khyber tribes, it was
solely with the object of arranging with them for the safe conduct
of the British Mission through the Khyber Pass, in the same manner
as was done in regard to the despatch of our Agent, the Nawab
Ghulam Hussein Khan; and the tribes were given clearly to
understand that these negotiations were in no way intended to
prejudice their relations with His Highness the Amir, as it was
well known that the object of the British Mission was altogether
of a friendly character to His Highness the Amir and the people of
Afghanistan.
'I trust that, in accordance with the instructions you have
received from His Highness the Amir, your reply to this letter
will be satisfactory, and that it will contain the required
assurances that the Mission will be safely conducted to Daka. I
shall expect to receive your reply to this letter not later than
the 18th instant, so please understand that the matter is most
urgent.
'But at the same time, it is my duty to inform you, in a frank and
friendly manner, that if your answer is not what I trust it will
be, or if you delay to send an early reply, I shall have no
alternative but to make whatever arrangements may seem to me best
for carrying out the instructions I have received from my own
Government.']
[Footnote 5: In a letter to Lord Lytton reporting the rebuff the
Mission had encountered, General Chamberlain wrote: 'No man was ever
more anxious than I to preserve peace and secure friendly solution,
and it was only when I plainly saw the Amir's fixed intention to drive
us into a corner that I told you we must either sink into a position
of merely obeying his behests on all points or stand on our rights
and risk rupture. Nothing could have been more distinct, nothing more
humiliating to the dignity of the British Crown and nation; and I
believe that but for the decision and tact of Cavagnari at one period
of the interview, the lives of the British officers and the Native
following were in considerable danger.']
[Footnote 6: The approximate strength of the three columns was as
follows:
_Officers._ _Men._ _Guns._
I. The Kandahar Field Force 265 12,599 78
II. The Kuram Field Force 116 6,549 18
III. The Peshawar Valley Field Force 325 15,854 48
----- ------ ---
706 35,002 144]
[Footnote 7:
'KABUL,
'_6th October, 1878._
(After compliments.) 'Your Excellency's despatch regarding the
sending of a friendly Mission has been received through Nawab
Gholam Hussein Khan; I understand its purport, but the Nawab had
not yet an audience, nor had your Excellency's letters been seen
by me when a communication was received to the address of my
servant, Mirza Habibulla Khan, from the Commissioner of Peshawar,
and was read. I am astonished and dismayed by this letter,
written threateningly to a well-intentioned friend, replete with
contentions, and yet nominally regarding a friendly Mission.
Coming thus by force, what result, or profit, or fruit, could come
of it? Following this, three other letters from above-mentioned
source, in the very same strain, addressed to my officials, have
been perused by me. Thus, during a period of a few days several
letters from that quarter have all been before me, and none
of them have been free from harsh expressions and hard words,
repugnant to courtesy and politeness, and in tone contrary to the
ways of friendship and intercourse. Looking to the fact that I
am at this time assaulted by affliction and grief at the hand of
fate, and that great trouble has possessed my soul, in the
officials of the British Government patience and silence would
have been specially becoming. Let your Excellency take into
consideration this harsh and breathless haste with which the
desired object and place of conference have been seized upon, and
how the officials of the Government have been led into discussion
and subjection to reproach. There is some difference between this
and the pure road of friendship and goodwill. In alluding to those
writings of the officials of the opposite Government which have
emanated from them, and are at this time in the possession of
my own officials, the latter have in no respect desired to show
enmity or opposition towards the British Government, nor, indeed,
do they with any other Power desire enmity or strife; but when any
other Power, without cause or reason, shows animosity towards this
Government, the matter is left in the hands of God, and to His
will. The esteemed Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, the bearer of this
despatch, has, in accordance with written instructions received
from the British Government, asked for permission to retire, and
it has been granted.']
[Footnote 8: 25th October.]
* * * * *