THE PLOTS OF FIESCHI.
The political ideas of the sixteenth century--The advice of Donato
Gianotto to the Italians--Generous aims of Gianluigi Fieschi--His
reported plots with Cesare Fregoso disproved--The conspiracy with
Pietro Strozzi a fable--Fieschi has secret conferences with Barnaba
Adorno, lord of Silvano--Pier Luca Fieschi and his part in the
conspiracy of Gianluigi--The Count sends Cagnino Gonzaga to treat with
France--The purchase of the Farnesian galleys--Francesco Burlamacchi.
ACCORDING to our belief, a single idea directed the movements of the
Peninsula in the first part of the sixteenth century--the thought
common to all the people of emancipating the country from that foreign
power which was corrupting the national character, literature, and
art. Classic and courtly history has found in these stormy years only
local and isolated conspiracies; few writers, we might almost say none,
have heard, in these risings of peoples crushed under the ambitions of
the great, the mighty groan of a dying nation not yet resigned to her
terrible fate.
The national Guelph tradition refused to yield place to the new
imperial system which was slowly destroying the old charters of the
communes. There were generous throbs which showed that the old body
politic, though sore wounded, still contained the breath of life; every
city of Italy on the verge of the grave rose up with the last strength
of an expiring man, protested with blood, and died.
Palermo protested in her hero Giovanni Squarcialupo whose death
consecrated her cause; she renewed her life in the patriotism of the
Abbattelli, who could not turn back her destiny. Naples was lit up
with insurrection. Milan, always foremost in magnanimous enterprises,
raised her head, when Morone incited the marquis of Pescara against the
emperor, and that nobleman first promised to lead the revolution and
then betrayed it to the tyrant. Perugia in vain set up the banner of
the Republic; Florence fought, Siena renewed the memory of Saguntum,
and Lucca burned audacious fires of civil and religious liberty.
There was scarcely a city or village which did not recall its Latin
traditions, and combat the monarchical power which was descending like
a tempest on the whole nation.
The blood which was poured out like water did not profit our cause.
Some died in battle, some lost their heads on the block, and others
preferred banishment to being witnesses of the national degradation.
Hospitable Venice, who alone was clean from the Spanish leprosy, opened
her doors to the fugitive patriots, and they, having broken their
swords, continued to protest with their pens. Italian statesmen had
good reason to struggle against the growing importance of the house of
Hapsburgh, whose only enemy was France then barely escaped out of her
contests with feudalism and with the English.
Donato Gianotti, the successor of Machiavelli, as secretary of the
Florentine Republic, wrote a wonderful address to Paul III., in which
he urged that Genoa should be redeemed from the hands of the Dorias and
Spaniards, and the republic and principalities bound in alliance with
France, as necessary measures for the defence of national liberty. The
object of this discourse, so rich in political wisdom, was to warn the
Italians of the danger of neglecting their own interests.
“They cannot,” he says, “secure their safety except by making
preparations to take up arms against that power _which can only secure
itself in its possessions by enslaving all Italy_.”[31] Gianotti urged
the importance of tempting the confederates of the emperor, and, if
possible, enlisting them in the national cause, and adds: “The State
of Genoa under the authority of Andrea Doria, ought to be reconciled
to the King of France; and I do not believe the Genoese would be
disinclined to it, for their sympathies are for France, and they know
the advantages to a Republic of independence and the free use of
their political power. It was useful to the Genoese, at the moment,
to follow the influence of Doria and, ceasing to be French, to become
imperialists, as a step towards liberty; but at present it would not be
less useful to them to unite, without altering the form of their state,
with the other governments of the Peninsula.”
Gianotti expressed the hope that the Pope’s authority might induce
Doria to risk his fortunes with those of Italy, and he thinks there
could not be obstacles on the part of the French monarch, because
political prudence would counsel him to ally himself with Genoa,
without seeking to govern her as a subject province: “rather,” he
adds, “the French king should refuse to govern Genoa, as such power
would involve most embarrassments for himself. The French king should
make allies of the Genoese, solely in order to detach them from his
enemies.” He makes a similar suggestion to all the Italian states,
especially Siena and Florence, “who for common interests ought to make
common cause.” He argues that such a policy would free these states
from that dependence on the empire, which some believed necessary
to their existence, and would give them the repute of being able to
live without leaning on foreign support. He advocates the policy
which adjusts itself to the conveniences and changes of the times,
and enforces this reasoning by the conduct and aims of the Emperor
which left the Italians no hope but in war. He advises that arms and
munitions both of offence and defence be acquired with as much haste as
possible; that friendship be cultivated with foreign powers. “_Peace_,”
he concludes, “_may be more fatal than war_, for the former must in
the end subject us to despotism, while war may fortify our present
liberties and restore those of which we have been defrauded.”[32]
This apparent digression upon the discourse of the Florentine
statesman is very much to our purpose, and that his counsels were
warmly welcomed by the Count Lavagna is manifest, for his scheme is
moulded upon Gianotti’s plan. The Florentine laid down three rules
of policy,--That our provinces, especially Genoa, break with the
Emperor; that they form alliance with France--not to put themselves
in her power, but to keep her from becoming their enemy,--and that,
without seeking material aid from France, all the Republics should make
vigorous preparation for war against the empire.
On these principles Fieschi constructed his too-much calumniated plot.
Those who have written about it, without studying the character of the
times, rather as romancers than historians, have transmitted us a fable
that he sought the supreme control of the Republic; but he sought no
other end than to bring back the government to its ancient principles.
Revolution in Genoa never aimed at enslaving the people. In those
centuries we had foreign generals and ministers among us, but never
absolute rulers; and if these ministers attempted tyranny, they paid
for their audacity with their blood, like Opizzino d’Alzate, or were
expelled, like Trivulzio and others.
Gianluigi was not so short-sighted as not to know the temper of the
Genoese, or to forget the lesson of then recent examples. He sought not
to usurp the government and become the oppressor of the people, but to
confer on his native land the blessings of its ancient order.
Though writers in the pay of Spain accused him of corrupt ambition,
lust of gold and thirst for blood, it is time to render him the tardy
justice of saying that no document can be quoted which proves that he
cherished such infamous projects--projects alien to his gentle and
humane character, to the traditions of his family, and to the spirit
of the Guelph party then supported by the most sound and cultivated
intellects of Italy.
Sismondi alone, of all historians, seems to us to have comprehended the
real object of Fieschi. “Andrea Doria,” he writes, “had restored the
name of Republic to his country, but not liberty nor independence. He
called to the government a strict aristocracy, of whom Gianettino was
the master. He bound the fate of his country to that of Austria, by
bonds which humiliated the best part of the Genoese. Fieschi planned
his conspiracy in order to deliver the country from the yoke of Spain
and the Dorias.”[33]
The events we proceed to describe set the seal of truth upon the words
of this illustrious historian.
Some tell us that Gianluigi plotted, so early as 1537, with Cesare
Fregoso, to place the Republic in the hands of the French king; for
which, Bonfadio adds,[34] he would have lost his head, if Andrea
Doria had not saved him from the rigours of the law. This report was
set on foot by the marquis Vasto, governor of Milan, who, after the
assassination of Cesare Fregoso and Antonio Rancone, the messengers
of King Francis to Soliman, endeavoured to justify his treachery by
declaring, among other things, that he had found in commentaries of
Fregoso, (which he never had in his hands) proofs that Fieschi took
part in that plot. But these pretended conspiracies with the King of
France are now destroyed by very authoritative testimony. If Bonfadio
had remembered that, in 1537, Fieschi was still a lad, he would have
hesitated to adopt that slander. It is known, too, that personal
enmity existed between the families Fregoso and Fieschi of so bitter a
character as to forbid all possibility of common political views and
intimate secret negotiations. The memory of the day, when Doge Giano
Fregoso and his brother Fregosino, encountering Gerolamo Fieschi,
killed him with many blows, was not effaced; nor was it forgotten that
the Fieschi retired to their castles to plan their revenge, collected
three thousand soldiers and besieged the city from the valley of
Bisagno, where the Fregosi were entrenched. A battle was fought, in
which the Doge was defeated. The Fieschi entered the city as victors,
killed Zaccaria Fregoso, dragged his corpse through the populous
streets, and elevated Antoniotto Adorno to the office of Doge. From
that day a mortal hatred had divided the two families. This fact alone
renders the story of a plot with Fregoso highly improbable.
Bonfadio also accuses Fieschi of having attempted to betray the city to
Pietro Strozzi, which, he says, would have been done, if Bernardino di
Mendozza had not arrived with a strong body of _Bisogni_, in good time
to overthrow the conspiracy. Some add that the count sent one Sacco,
to Strozzi to instigate him to attack Genoa and to act as a guide. The
circumstance deserves investigation.
In August, 1544, when the emperor had marched into France, Pietro
Strozzi collected an army at Mirandola, with the design of attacking
the territories of Milan in concert with Enghein. Aided by Pierluigi
Farnese, he had already crossed the Po, and entered the province
of Piacenza, where he lay encamped on the slopes of the Ligurian
mountains, when, being assailed by Ridolfo Baglione and imperial troops
sent from Naples, he was forced to fall back to Serravalle, on the
banks of the Scrivia. Here he was overtaken by the prince of Salerno,
and forced to accept battle. The fight was at first favourable to
Strozzi, but in the end he suffered defeat. There were few killed,
because the Italians recognized their brotherhood on the field of
battle, threw down their arms and embraced each other. Strozzi took
shelter with the remnant of his army in the territory of the Republic.
The Fieschi, fearing the rage of a conquered Strozzi, and perhaps an
assault upon Montobbio, fled into the city, and remained there until
Strozzi evacuated his camp in the Apennines. This shows how completely
Bonfadio was in error.[35]
Though, however, the count of Lavagna (then lord of thirty-three
castles) had no secret correspondence with Fregoso nor Strozzi, he
certainly had political relations with other persons; and this is what
remains after eliminating the falsehoods spread abroad by Spain.
Having formed the purpose of deposing the old nobility and restoring
the popular government, Fieschi saw that his best policy was to follow
the fortunes of the Adorni, whose party his ancestors, and especially
his father, had zealously supported. The views of Gianluigi found an
echo in the breast of Barnaba Adorno, count of Silvano, of whom we must
briefly speak.
Silvano is situated in the Val d’Orba in Monferrato, two miles beyond
the Giovi. On the east and west lie the villages of St. Cristoforo,
then a feud of the Dorias, of Montaldeo--honored as the birth-place,
at a later period, of cardinal Mazzarino--and Mornese, a feud of the
Serras; on the south lay Cremolino, possessed by the Dorias; and on
the north the castles of Carpineto, and Montaldo, and the city of
Alessandria. Nearer and almost contiguous to Silvano stood the castles
of Lerma, Tagliolo, Ovada, Rocca Grimaldi, Capriata, and Castelletto
Val d’Orba, also feuds of Barnaba Adorno.
Silvano was fortified by two large and strong towers, and was the usual
residence of Adorno, who had strong friends and political allies in
all the castles and villages around him. He devoted his early years
to arms, and, rising to the rank of colonel under Cæsar, he acquired
distinction in Provence and in the kingdom of Naples. In the latter he
obtained the feud of Caprarica. Weary of the tumults of war, he retired
to his home and married Maddalena, daughter of the Doge Antoniotto
Adorno. In beauty, this woman was excelled by few persons of her time.
The quiet of Adorno was disturbed by serious quarrels, especially by
one with count Paolo Pico of Mirandola, who attacked his lands and put
Castelletto to fire and sword. This strife, so bloody in the civil war
which it inflamed, was not less spirited before the tribunals of the
empire; but it is not our province to enlarge on its many vicissitudes.
Adorno cherished the design of cultivating the popular party, and so
raising the declining fortunes of his house, and he soon began to
attempt plots against the new order in Genoa.
In this purpose he turned to the count of Lavagna, through the
mediation of a Fra Badaracco, and, after many debates, it was resolved
to unite their forces for the overthrow of the Dorias. Barnaba was to
be elevated to the Dogate, and the count to govern the eastern Riviera
as his father had done before him. They further agreed to place the
Republic under the protection of France, without prejudice, however,
to its liberties, and solely to secure it from the vengeance of Cæsar.
Fra Badaracco, in order to find partisans, held conversations with some
gentlemen whom he supposed to be dissatisfied with the government of
the Dorias. But these persons exposed the matter in the senate: the
friar was arrested, and some letters of Barnaba Adorno were found on
his person. After having been tortured, Bardaracco was decapitated,
having confessed that, besides Adorno, Gianluigi Fieschi and Pietra
Paolo Lasagna were concerned in the conspiracy. The senators, not being
able to obtain proofs of their guilt, decided not to prosecute the
conspirators.
Having thus failed in his first effort, the count sought new paths
to his end. He saw that it was necessary to have an understanding
with the king of France, as a means of restraining the army which the
emperor had in the territories of Milan, and to secure the capture of
the fleet of Doria, which was the chief prop of the imperial power. It
was plain that these naval and military forces would easily quell any
insurrection, unless the troops of France in Piedmont were directed to
hold the army of Cæsar in check. Gianluigi was induced to enter into an
understanding with France by one of his relatives by blood, of whom we
ought briefly to speak, because his name has been almost forgotten in
our domestic histories.
A branch of the Fieschi family, expelled from Genoa in 1339, had taken
up its residence in Piedmont and acquired there both possessions and
honours. A certain Giovanni Fieschi--made bishop of Vercelli by Clement
VI., in 1348--gave a share of the temporal government of his diocese to
his brother Nicolò, and conferred upon him some lands and castles.
We find in the archives of the court at Turin that the Fieschi ruled
in Masserano until 1381, and that Nicolò, Giovanni, and Antonio formed
an alliance with count Verde. Some few years later, or in 1394,
Lodovico Fieschi, also bishop of Vercelli and cardinal, petitioned
Boniface IX. for the repayment of a large sum of money spent by him in
maintaining the rights of his church, and he obtained permission to
alienate from the jurisdiction of the church the castles of Masserano
and Moncrivello, and to confer the feud upon his brother Antonio. This
investiture was confirmed by subsequent popes, especially by Julius
II.; and Alexander VI. added, in 1498, the feuds of Curino, Brusnengo,
Flecchia, and Riva, assigning them to the brothers Innocenzo and Pier
Luca.
The first of these had a son named Lodovico, and this Lodovico a
daughter named Beatrice, whose hand her father gave to Filiberto
Ferrero, a citizen of Biella, adopting him as a son.
The Fieschi possessions in this way passed into the family of Ferrero;
and he, having obtained for his son Besso the hand of Camilla, niece
of Paul III., secured the investiture of Masserano, then created a
Marquisate. Whoever is desirous of learning how these feuds came into
the possession of the Ferreri to the exclusion of the male line, and
particularly of Gregory and Pier Luca Fieschi, may consult _Curzio
Giuniore_.
This Pier Luca II., lord of Crevacuore, where he had an excellent
mint, of whose coinage some specimens are preserved to us, constantly
revolved revolutionary projects, as a means of recovering his lost
dominions, and urged Count Gianluigi to proclaim himself a partisan
of France. It is certain that by the advice of Pier Luca, Gianluigi
bought the Farnesian galleys, of which we shall presently speak.
The count received Pier Luca at his house in Vialata with every mark
of affection, and lent a willing ear to his suggestions; but fearing
that France would wish to reduce Genoa to the condition of a French
province, he resolved to ascertain the views of the ministers of that
power, and to obtain pledges for the security of popular liberty.
He entrusted this negotiation to Gian Francesco, (called Gagnino)
Gonzaga of the family of the dukes of Sabbione, a brave soldier,
hostile to the empire. With his uncle Frederick he had fought against
Cæsar at Parma, and later as a colonel of the Florentines in the
celebrated siege of Florence. Being an open partisan of the French, he
was banished from his native land.
Gonzaga presented himself before the French council of state, and
reminded the ministers of the many services which the Fieschi family
had rendered to the French crown; he showed clearly that the only
means of driving the Spaniards from Lombardy, was to destroy the
communication with their other Italian states: and the first step to
this end would be to remove from power in Genoa the faction of the
Dorias. Fieschi, he added, could accomplish this more easily than any
other person, and he would attempt the enterprise if France would
encourage his efforts, and promise not to lay violent hands on the
Republic.
Doria had many enemies in Paris. Though the Chancellor Du Prat was
dead and the constable Montmorency was fallen, yet the animosities
awakened by Doria in that court were not buried. Delfino still
remembered that Doria had taken Genoa from the dominion of France and
he meditated vengeance.
The count of San Polo had not forgotten that Andrea caused his defeat
and captivity at the battle of Landriano, by informing the Spaniards of
the difficulties he was encountering in his retreat. Cardinal Tournon
was unable to pardon Doria for throwing many obstacles in his way when
he went to Rome to attend the conclave assembled to elect a successor
to Clement VIII. Admiral Annebaut hoped to command the army to be sent
for the conquest of Lombardy as soon as the revolution should break out
in Genoa.
Thus all the ministers, actuated at once by personal and political
motives, favoured the plans of Fieschi. Gonzaga was welcomed with
delight and obtained a solemn promise that the crown of France would
renounce all pretensions to the government of Genoa. He was also
empowered to make use of the French troops in Piedmont in garrison
at Turin, Moncalieri, Savigliano and Pinerolo; and to select in the
port of Toulon such ships as might be adapted to serve the purposes of
Fieschi.
This negotiation, securing the coöperation of France without
compromising the independence of the country, is highly creditable to
Gianluigi and shows the keenness of his political vision which forecast
all the dangers and complications of foreign assistance. Perhaps he
listened too hopefully to these promises of foreign succour; but if
French diplomatists then deceived him, he afterwards showed that he
lacked neither courage nor will to undertake his revolution without
their coöperation.
France was at that time prodigal of flattery to Italy. She drew from
us her luxury, her arts and the embellishments of her life; perhaps
also her vices which she repaid to us with usury. She had apparently
no schemes for the overthrow of the Italians, and sincerely, though
not disinterestedly, sought our emancipation from the Spanish power.
We are indebted to her for restraining Cæsar from destroying among us
even the name of liberty; and this explains why our Republics, our
people and our first intellects were so friendly to France. Whatever
secret designs she may have cherished, she promoted popular franchises
in Italy. She encouraged agriculture and commerce, and in war for
the most part abstained from pillage and carnage, so that the people
butchered by the Spaniards cried out, “Would that the French were here
to liberate us from these miscreants!”
Some tell us that the Count, besides the aid promised, received an
annual sum from France and that he was also salaried by Cæsar. But we
have never found any credible testimony for such statements, and the
authors seem to have spun them out of their own fancies or received
them upon the faith of partisan writers. They should be consigned to
that mass of idle rumours or malevolent slanders which we have set
aside. Of similar cloth is the fable of the journey of Ottobuono,
brother of Gianluigi, to Paris, and also to Rome to ask justice for a
grave injury inflicted upon him by Gianettino.
In the mean while, Gianluigi lost no opportunity of making partisans.
The times were propitious. The Duke of Piacenza, wishing to restrain
the license of the nobles published a proclamation requiring them
to reside in the city. This command offended not a few who were
feudatories, but not subjects, of the duke. Among these were the
Borromeo of Milan, who possessed Guardasone in the province of Parma,
and the Fieschi who held Calestano. Gianluigi sent a message to the
duke asking that the order might be revoked in his favour. His request
was granted, and he went in person, ostensibly to thank the duke and
render him homage as his feudatory, but in reality to treat for the
purchase of the Farnesian galleys, a measure recommended by Pier Luca
as necessary to the contemplated revolution.
To conceal his true intent he wrote to the Senate, on the 28th of
September, 1545, that he was in Piacenza to pay homage to the duke, and
that he found nuncios coming there from all the Italian provinces. He
therefore advised that the Republic should also send a representative.
The Senate followed his advice, and charged him with the honourable
office.
Although the galleys of which we have spoken had already been asked
for by Pietro Strozzi, by Prince Adamo Centurione, and by Cardinal
Sauli, for a nephew who had already paid a part of the price, yet the
duke, knowing the use Gianluigi intended to make of them, gave him the
preference. The purchase was effected on the 23rd of November, 1545.
The galleys were named the _Capitana_, _Vittoria_, _Santa Caterina_ and
_Padrona_, and had on board, in addition to arms and equipments, three
hundred persons condemned for life, one hundred and eighty-five for
various terms of years, and one hundred and eighty Turkish and other
slaves.
The price amounted to thirty-four thousand gold crowns, to be paid in
several instalments; one third on delivery of the vessels, another on
Lady day, 1546, and the last one year later. The deferred payments were
secured upon the feud of Calestano, with the consent of Gianluigi’s
brother Gerolamo, who was lord of that property.[36] The contracting
parties were, on one side, Paolo Pietro Guidi, president of the ducal
chamber, and Giovanni Battista Liberati, the duke’s treasurer; and the
Count of Lavagna on the other. We must not omit, among the conditions
of the sale, that three of the galleys were to remain for two years
longer in the service of the Apostolic See, Count Fieschi receiving the
Papal bonds held by Orazio Farnese.
The low price of the galleys is explained by this condition, in virtue
of which they were bound to remain in the port of Civita Vecchia, and
the count was obliged to provide for the maintenance and pay of the
officers and crews without deriving any advantage from the ownership.
Gianluigi assigned the command to Giulio Pojano, who had also commanded
them under Orazio Farnese when the emperor undertook the war of Algiers.
We are not able to decide with certainty whether, after this purchase,
the count went to Rome, as some affirm. We find however that Duke
Pierluigi, having proclaimed a tournament in Piacenza to take place
on the 21st of February, 1546, and requested that the ladies of his
feudatories should also attend, the countess Eleanora, as well as many
others, complied with the invitation and was presented by her husband
to the duke, who now treated Gianluigi as his equal.
Duke Farnese announced another tournament for the autumn of the same
year, to celebrate the marriage of Faustina Sforza with Muzio Visconti
Sforza, marquis of Caravaggio. At this festival the flower of the
Italian nobility was gathered together; and in the tournament of the
20th of October, 1546, Nicolò Pusterla and Count Fieschi obtained the
highest honours.
It is not known what means the duke intended to employ for carrying
out the contemplated revolution. Perhaps both Fieschi and Farnese were
yet undecided. It is not impossible (we have strong testimony for the
theory) that they waited, with the hope of enlisting on their side one
who had even more audacity and strength than themselves, and who would
have brought no mean forces into the alliance.
One of those reformers who makes centuries glorious was maturing a
scheme of greater scope than that of Fieschi. Francesco Burlamacchi,
born of a noble house in Lucca, had conceived the lofty design of
revolutionizing, under popular auspices, the Tuscan cities oppressed
by Cosimo; allying them to the still surviving republics of Lucca
and Siena; embracing in the new nation Perugia, which since 1540 had
maintained itself under popular government against the Papacy; taking
away from the Apostolic See the temporal power, and restoring the
church to the consecrated poverty of the Gospel.
He confided in the popular discontent at domestic and foreign tyranny,
and not less in the reformed doctrines which were advocated by the
most distinguished Italians, especially by those of Lucca. He proposed
his scheme to his friends and sought partisans among the Florentine
exiles, the faction of the Strozzi, and even among the German Lutherans
who had at their head Phillip Landgrave of Hesse, and Frederick, duke
of Saxony. Impatient of delay, he went in person to Venice, then
the asylum of the Tuscan and Genoese exiles, and solicited their
coöperation. He made an arrangement with Leone Strozzi, prior of Capua,
by which the latter agreed to support the enterprize; but Strozzi
thought it wiser to procrastinate until the result of the Germanic war
should be known.
Burlamacchi, having been created commissary of ordnance at Montagna,
resolved to undertake his daring enterprize without waiting longer for
foreign aid. He intended to rouse the people to arms, march rapidly
upon Pisa--whose fortress, commanded by Vincenzo del Poggio, would be
opened to him without bloodshed--to capture Florence, and thence spread
the generous fire of liberty over the Peninsula.
The revolution was planned with great prudence and all contingencies
were amply provided for. Unfortunately, however, he was obliged in
the exercise of his office as Confaloniere of justice to issue a
proclamation against one Andrea Pezzini who was cognisant of the
conspiracy. This person in order to gratify his malice, revealed the
whole scheme to Duke Cosimo. The government of Luca, mortally terrified
by the Pope and the emperor, arrested Burlamacchi, in August 1546, and
obtained from him by torture a confession of his revolutionary designs.
Luca consigned him to the imperial ministers by whom he was beheaded in
Milan.
Some confused and scattered papers which we have seen imply that there
were messages and interviews between Gianluigi and Burlamacchi, and
this corresponds with that which Adriani has written of the Lucchese
revolutionist, viz: that he had formed friendship and made allies in
every part of Europe. It is then very probable that he sounded Count
Fieschi, whose enmity to the Spaniards was well known, as one whose
great wealth and numerous dependents would greatly reinforce the
revolution. Fieschi was often at his castle in Pontremoli and it would
have been easy for the two to hold secret interviews without awakening
the least suspicion. It is possible that Fieschi though satisfied of
the good faith of France, believed that nothing could be attempted
in Italy without her active coöperation or, being a Guelph, disdained
to embark in a scheme for the overthrow of the temporal power of the
Papacy.
These first plots of Fieschi confute the charge, disproved by other
and more direct evidence, made by sacred college of Padua, that he
conspired against the government of the Dorias with the sole object of
destroying Gianettino who was paying court to the countess of Lavagna.