initiation, together with a small amount of instruction in the
code used. Moving hence to the Cadet Wing at Long Branch, wireless
formed a definite part of the routine of the day’s work. The cadet
was required to successfully send and receive six words per minute,
and for purposes of instruction telephones were connected to the
buzzer circuits. In the tuition of sending, Morse recorders operated
by means of a silenced key were installed, and picture targets,
constructed with miniature lamps shining haphazardly through small
holes, were operated from a switchboard. These represented shell
bursts which the cadet was required instantly to locate and report.
With six weeks’ of wireless at the Cadet Wing, the pupil proceeded to
the School of Aeronautics for further instruction, and heard lectures
on picture target work and artillery coöperation from experienced
observers. Requirements now demanded eight words per minute. After
examination, his next step was to the elementary training wing at
either Deseronto or Borden, where he not only carried on ground work,
but also put into actual practice in the air the instruction already
received.
Moving on to North Toronto he reached the stage of final tuition in
this section of his course. At varying distances from this station,
puff targets were provided to simulate shell bursts, and the embryo
pilot conducted himself as though on active service by locating the
shoot and reporting it with necessary adjustments to the battery
receiving station. Such was the value attached to this phase of
training, that eighty per cent. of the observations sent down were
required to be correct before the pupil was considered passed. The
tests included reading ground messages, bomb dropping, etc., the
latter being checked by a camera obscura hut which was used as the
target. In this process it was necessary that the cadet adjust his
bomb sights both for the speed and altitude of his machine. This
being done, his wireless key was depressed and the actual position
of his machine recorded in the camera obscura hut at the moment of
signalling, which moment, it was understood, was the instant at which
the bomb would have been dropped were the machine in actual service.
The result recorded infallibly the amount of judgment which had
been used. Some idea of the extent of this School may be gathered
from the fact that a tour around the batteries involved a 60 mile
trip. Bomb-dropping, though having no connection with artillery
observation, was here practised as a matter of convenience.
[Illustration: POPHAM PANNEAU.
POPHAM PANNEAU.]
[Illustration: “A PUFF.”
GROUND STRIPS.]
If it be asked why the pilot does not receive as well as send
wireless messages while in the air, it may be stated that up to the
present the difficulties of receiving on a trailing aerial have been
such that what might be termed a graphic ground method has proved
preferable. Large ground strips are, on active service, an invitation
for bombardment by the enemy and are being aided by the Popham
Panneau, a method of signalling consisting of the rapid forming up
of small, symmetrical, rectangular figures, by arrangements of white
bands capable of rapid variation. In general they are the combination
of the letter “T” with short, symmetrical additions.
The Aldis lamp, also used, is an improvement on the heliograph, and
reflects the rays of an electric globe instead of sunlight, but it
will be understood that recent advances in wireless telephoning have
revolutionized the above methods.
A word is in place with regard to the Artillery Coöperation School
at Leaside through which all pilots of necessity must pass. The
equipment is the result of very brilliant work by an R.A.F. officer.
The maps themselves represent two sections of the Western front, and
are reproduced with vivid accuracy from aerial photographs. Each is
40 feet × 20 feet, and contains some eighty targets so arranged as
to allow switching from one gun pit to another, thus following the
actual work of destruction by imaginary batteries. Zone calls are
arranged for all targets, these representing every possible point
for bombardment, such as hostile battery positions, trench points,
railroads, cross roads and fortified positions in enemy towns.
British and German trenches are shown on a scale of approximately
five inches to one hundred yards.
The total number of electric globes used to simulate bursts is 1,360,
and the two balconies where the observing pilots sit are so equipped
that every operation which must be carried out in doing wireless
tests must be completed before signals can be received by the
operator seated below at the imaginary battery. Space does not permit
of a detailed description of the intricate, electrical work required
to complete this admirable installation. It suffices to say that
those best qualified to judge deem it a very considerable achievement.
Rotary targets are also used, as by turning them practically the same
condition is created as that which confronts the pilot when turning
his machine in the air. These, too, represent a reproduction of
well-known sections of the Western front.
A special map was devised for contact patrol work, presenting three
distinct lines of trenches together with an equal number of groups
of headquarters, as well as machine gun pits, tanks, etc., while
wireless sending was coupled up with Aldis lamp work--the latter
requiring to be read at four words per minute.
At the conclusion of instruction of every course it was demanded
that every cadet both receive and send at a speed of eight words per
minute before being allowed to proceed with aerial tests.
[Illustration: WIRELESS IN THE FIELD.]
[Illustration: MOSAIC OF CAMP BORDEN R.A.F. AND PART OF C.E.F. AREA.
1. CANVAS MATS AND MACHINES.
2. HANGARS.
3. LANDING SQUARES.
4. MACHINE GUN SHELTER.
5. CADET CAMP.
6. SAND PATCH.
7. WOODED GROUND.
8. OFFICERS’ QUARTERS.
9. RAILWAY.
10. EARTH ROAD.
11. BARRACK BLOCKS.
12. BORDEN STATION.
13. PATH.
14. GOLF COURSE.
15. QUARTERMASTER STORES.
[_Examine this photo with a glass._]
]
PHOTOGRAPHY.
The Air Force is the eye of the army, and the camera the recording
eye of the airman. It is therefore, of prime importance that aerial
photography in all its phases be mastered by the would-be pilot.
Failure cannot be risked. Too much is involved in sending machines
on long photographic reconnaissance. Their results should indicate
everything from a narrow path through enemy wire to a camouflaged
German aerodrome.
In order to secure the best type of instruction, the R.A.F. has
availed itself of the services of officers of experience on all
points. Training begins at the School of Aeronautics. Here ground
tuition is given, including everything from camera mechanism to
colour filters and panchromatic plates, from map making to mosaics,
the relative size of objects and the value of shadows in estimating
heights.
Leaving the School, the cadet takes to the air to be tested by
photographing given points, his ground instruction still proceeding.
In the case of the observer, the course is the same, and all such
work forms part of a general mapping scheme which aimed at the
compiling of a complete reproduction of the areas around the several
aerodromes.
Bad weather, usually considered a bugbear, is not allowed to
interfere. By the use of a wide shutter slit and the very best
lenses, tests are made in all weathers, and active service conditions
thus paralleled. That photographic instruction has been faithfully
given and intelligently received, may be seen from the excellent
reproductions of aerial work presented in this volume.
From the foregoing it might be assumed that the art is simply
acquired, but such is not in any way the case. To use his lens with
complete facility, the pupil must correctly establish his height,
his relative position with the objects to be photographed, and,
generally speaking, be sufficiently at home in the air to do his
flying instinctively and devote his chief attention to the camera.
[Illustration: ATTACHING CAMERA TO FUSELAGE.
BUILDING UP A MOSAIC.]
[Illustration: RECEIVING.
ARTILLERY OBSERVATION HUT.]
[Illustration: PHOTOGRAPHY.
AERIAL NAVIGATION.]
[Illustration: AERIAL AMBULANCE.]
ARMOUR HEIGHTS SYSTEM.
Training development in England had now reached a point at which
elements already recognized but not hitherto fully appreciated
were proved to be invaluable. Their use was aimed primarily at the
attaining of instinctive flying by the pupil. The means by which
this was achieved, the consequent effect on the instructor, and the
reduced fatalities during instruction are sufficiently notable to
call for mention.
The product has been the active-service pilot as distinguished from
the peace pilot--two vastly different individuals.
The actions and reactions of this system are in general
psychological. They begin with the assumption that since fear is
almost invariably of the unknown, once the latter is eliminated
fear should be non-existent. The approach is, therefore, by way of
wiping out ignorance concerning the air and the machine in which the
pupil and instructor ascend, and illustrating, while in flight, the
simplicity of those laws which are fundamental to all good pilots and
machines.
This, while seemingly simple enough, involves an ultimate strain
on the instructor. His pupils are, it is true, limited to six, but
into each of these he is expected to pour the sum of his knowledge
and skill. He is personally responsible for their crashes. At first
blush apparently unjust, this resolves itself into an absolutely
fair deduction from the principles of the system. A crash by a
pupil--engine failure and aeroplane failure being too infrequent
to alter the premise--is considered as due to an imperfection of
training. At some stage in the course some indispensable point must
have been slighted or overlooked. Hence the pupil’s inability to meet
the emergency.
Character--that subtle union of temperament and disposition, the
increasing air sense, the delicacy of control, the spontaneous
response, the nameless faculty by which the pupil becomes, as it
were, welded to the machine which in turn replies to the subconscious
movement of hand and foot--the study of all these are found in the
Armour Heights system, which itself is based on an admirable method
originated at Gosport, in England. The pupil is expected to do the
flying, and even in an emergency the instructor does not assume
control until it is demonstrated that the pupil is literally out of
his depth.
And always by telephone or tube sounds back from the front seat the
guiding voice, encouraging, reproving, suggesting and probing the
mental process of the pupil at the moment. Take, for instance, the
spin, that plunge easy to commence and equally easy to terminate.
The machine slows, stalls, dips and dives earthward. At the second
spin comes steadily in the word of experience--“stick a little
forward--not too much--right rudder--hold her there--that’s
right--easy isn’t it?--feel all right?--let’s do it again--put her
in yourself this time.” With such an “entente cordiale” as this, it
is clear why the words “danger” and “nerves” are barred from the
instructor’s vocabulary, and the terms “safe” and “dangerous” give
place to “right” and “wrong.” The pupil has obtained the sense of
relationship between himself and his machine.
It is admitted that the art, of instruction is difficult from the
lecture platform, but how much more arduous when weaving circles at
5,000 feet, with an invisible tyro in control. Confidence is born
quickly in these high altitudes, but since the system looks to the
instructor, rather than to the pupil, the strain on the former is
commensurate with the added advantages extended to the latter.
[Illustration: “A CENTAUR OF THE AIR.”]
[Illustration: 88TH SQUADRON--CAMP BORDEN.]
Herewith a few excerpts from an admirable syllabus issued by the Air
Ministry in this connection. They are curt, valuable and saturated
with experience:--
“Put the pupil in the pilot’s seat from the very beginning.
“Control your pupils in the air entirely by word of mouth through the
speaking tube.
“When a pupil makes a mistake in the air let him first exhaust his
own ideas of how to put things right if height permits.
“Make it a point of honour to allow pupils full control, except, of
course, in cases of emergency.
“Your greatest duty is to inspire your pupils with confidence in
themselves, in their machines and in you.
“If the weather is too bad for instruction, you should fly yourself
for the sake of the spirit it produces.
“Every time a pupil does something in the air he has never done
before he increases his confidence.
“Instructors are responsible for the crashes of their own pupils, and
the saving of a crash compensates for any amount of additional dual
control.
“Have all your machines rigged properly, and fly them frequently
yourself to see that none get into a bad condition.
“The time available during training is ample for a pupil to be made a
real pilot, provided he makes up his mind never to waste time in the
air and is taught, not left, to teach himself.”
The progress of instruction is roughly indicated below, this
sequence of manoeuvres having been developed in Canada to suit local
conditions and the general type of pupil available:--
Demonstrate effect of the controls.
Flying straight, level and climbing.
Turns.
Misuse of controls in turns.
Difference in control with the engine off.
Glide.
Stalling.
Slow flying.
Gliding turns.
Taking-off into wind.
Landing into wind.
Approach.
Spinning, etc.
The pupil now goes solo.
Steeper turns, with and without engine.
Climbing turns.
Flatter glide.
Side-slipping.
Taking-off and landing across wind.
Landing on a mark.
Forced landings.
Higher manoeuvring.
From the moment of introduction of the Armour Heights system, a
modification of the training of instructors became necessary. The
psychological phase of the new method demanded recognition, and steps
were taken forthwith to analyze and increase the personnel of aerial
tuition at all units. The School of Special Flying resolved itself
into a station of five products, as indicated by the graph given
herewith. The value of each class to the Royal Air Force, Can., has
been inestimable.
The crashes resulting in fatalities showed, under the new Armour
Heights system, a notable decrease as evidenced by the chart on page
218. To realize the full significance of this chart, it is necessary
to remember that the pilot who is an “Armour Heights graduate” has
performed in the air every manoeuvre of which his machine is capable.
He has solved all aerial problems. Whatever protective agencies human
skill and experience could formulate were put into operation, and the
record in respect of fatalities is so low as to be a tribute to the
ceaseless care exercised.
[Illustration: “PEGASUS.”
ACROBATICS.]
[Illustration: R.A.F. CAN.--CRASH COMPARISON SHOWING EFFECT OF
INTRODUCTION OF THE ARMOUR HEIGHTS SYSTEM]
And if it should be asked why those phases of the system which may
be termed its humanities are of so recent development, the answer
lies in the fact that what is termed “air sense” called for an
investigation of personal phenomena in respect of which science had
not a single landmark. Men watched the bird curving its wings to
invisible gales, and hazarded numberless theories. Early machines
were tricky compared to their successors. They lacked present
efficiency, reliability and simplicity. The sum total of the powers
of the pilot were busy meeting mechanical difficulties, and there
was little opportunity for excursions into the psychology of the new
art. The honour of service is equal, but the pilots sent overseas by
the R.A.F., Can., in 1918, have in comparison with the pilots of 1914
a vastly superior technical and mental training. They have advanced
step by step with the world’s knowledge of the air.
To reduce it to a sentence, the system of to-day turns out a pilot
who is subdivided, so to speak, into two sections. One is subjective
and does the flying. The other is objective, free for retreat or
pursuit, defence or attack or any of the countless situations of
aerial warfare which call for swift and fearless action.
SCHOOL OF SPECIAL FLYING.
The Armour Heights special course for instructors commenced on or
about April 1st, 1918, with one squadron detailed for duty. As will
be inferred, this was the direct outcome of the adoption and further
development by the R.A.F., Canada, of the method of tuition known as
the Gosport system, then in use in Great Britain.
It might be well to explain that the Armour Heights course differs
in important respects from the instruction given in England. Up till
the present, it was not considered that the JN4 machine, as used,
was capable of performing all higher manoeuvres, such as rolling,
looping, etc. It had therefore been, so to speak, set aside by the
British authorities for what might be called lower training. The
higher and more difficult evolutions had been reserved until the
pilot went overseas and was trained in the use of fast, service
machines. With the Canadian JN4, however, all the higher manoeuvres
were now performed by speed and not by engine power. This naturally
necessitated considerable dexterity of manipulation.
By the first of July, ninety-five instructors were passed out of the
School. On this date a second squadron was absorbed for the purpose
of tuition and the School of Special Flying came into existence, with
thirty-six machines and an average of twelve instructors.
At the beginning of October an output of sixty for the month was
counted on. This was lowered to forty-two, owing to the severe
epidemic of influenza then prevalent, which considerably reduced the
number of serviceable instructors.
[Illustration: OFFICERS AND STAFF--SCHOOL OF SPECIAL FLYING.]
[Illustration: R.A.F. CAN.--SCHOOL OF SPECIAL FLYING--OUTPUT OF PUPILS
GRAND TOTAL 257]
The primary aim of the tuition has been to obtain smooth and correct
work and a light-handed method of flying, as it was found that when
pilots used perforce only JN4 machines they were apt to develop a
somewhat heavy touch, unless extreme care was exercised. Stunting
and contour chasing were particularly encouraged amongst instructors
and others with sufficient air experience, and since the duty of the
School was to instruct instructors, the personality of the latter was
always considered a determining factor entirely apart from ability as
a pilot.
An important duty performed by the School, was the calling in of
most of the instructors then in the brigade, in order to thoroughly
acquaint them with the new methods involved in tuition as given in
the Armour Heights course. This proved entirely justified.
It was found, also, that even in the case of most experienced pilots,
who had been flying fast machines overseas, great advantage was
secured by taking the course, since it was required that they depend
to a much greater extent upon correct flying, far more skill being
required to do higher manoeuvres on a low-powered machine.
The dual time put in by instructors who passed out for wing duty was
reduced from fourteen hours to eight hours in the course of four or
five months, as a result of better instruction at the wings, this
being indirectly due to the fact that the instructors under whom they
had flown in each squadron had themselves been through the Armour
Heights course. It was found that three hours’ solo to one hour of
dual instruction was most advantageous.
The above notes give very baldly an outline of the purpose of the
School, and it will be found necessary to take them in conjunction
with the chapter on the Armour Heights system in order that the
essential elements of this tuition may be fully realized.
FLYING ACCIDENTS.
The “crash” diagram is, after all, the most definite and conclusive
record of the success or failure of any system of flying instruction.
Its facts are incontrovertible.
During the earlier period of the history of the Corps in Canada,
there was, of course, in use a constantly broadening system whereby
the details of all aerial accidents were instantly forwarded to
headquarters. It was not, however, until the Armour Heights method
had been in definite operation for some months that it became
possible to re-analyse the then existing procedure in the light
of new knowledge, and evolve a form of records which completely
reflected all the various instrumentalities which required diagnosis.
This statement carries no reflection on either the instructors or
the methods of instruction pertaining to the first year’s operation
of the unit. As in all its other activities, out of experience
came knowledge, the application of which was instantly undertaken.
We find, then, that during the summer of 1918 not only were the
salient features of the crash carefully investigated, but also all
those possibly contributory causes in some one of which will almost
certainly be found some vitally important feature.
The first procedure was to classify the crash. The method adopted
will be seen in the index of the graph on page 229. Prior, however,
to this classification, which of course is only established by means
of close technical examination of the damaged machine, the unit to
which the machine belonged sent to headquarters by telegraph or
telephone, whichever was the faster, the following information:--
(1) Regimental number, rank and name of personnel concerned,
stating which is pilot and which is passenger.
(2) Injuries sustained and by whom.
(3) Précis of accident.
(4) Time and date.
(5) Type and number of machine.
(6) Number of hours solo and dual flown by casualty.
(7) Whether next-of-kin has been notified.
(8) Whether Canadian press (if necessary) has been notified.
(9) Whether court of enquiry is being held.
The next procedure was to further analyze the accident by
establishing as quickly as possible all facts which might tend to
elucidate information. Under the nine succeeding headings come also
certain crashes from one or more contributory causes--the latter to
be further classified in relative proportion, whether primary or
secondary.
i. Aeroplane defect--
(a) Breakage.
(b) Engine failure.
(c) Faulty rigging.
ii. Error of judgment--
(a) Not due to poor instruction.
(b) Probably due to poor instruction.
iii. Loss of head.
iv. Brain fatigue.
v. Fear.
vi. Physical illness.
vii. Unavoidable.
viii. Disobeying--
(a) Rules of the air.
(b) Instructions for that flight.
(c) Standing orders.
ix. Weather (wing visibility, temperature effects).
As some accidents will have one or more contributory causes, they
will be shown under two headings:--
Primary cause.
Secondary or contributory cause.
It will be seen at a glance that the bringing forth of this
information involved reference to records already in existence, and
which had been maintained with particular care in order they might
be fully available when thus crucially needed. There was sent,
furthermore, specified information with regard to certain possible
contributory causes, such as “loss of head,” “brain fatigue” or
“fear.” Under “loss of head,” for instance, it is pointed out that
the pupil in his new occupation of flying, especially for the first
time, has every mental faculty on the alert at extremely high
tension, and that the sense of danger, although not asserting itself,
is also subconsciously present. It follows, therefore, that under the
strain of an emergency the power of synchronized decision and act may
lapse--this lapse resulting in what is known as “loss of head.” When
there is added to this the fact that in flying, not only seconds, but
parts of a second count enormously, it will be clear that after an
actual loss of head there is seldom time to correct an error.