The coming of better weather heralded the opportunity for the final
blows against the city. Grant, who was now passing some of the most
anxious moments of his life, planned that this effort should be
concentrated on the extreme right of the long Confederate line which
protected Richmond and Petersburg. This meant that hostilities would
soon commence somewhere west of Hatcher’s Run, perhaps in the
neighborhood of Dinwiddie Court House or a road junction called Five
Forks which lay 17 miles southwest of Petersburg. On March 24, Grant
ordered the II and IX Corps and three divisions of the Army of the James
to the extreme left of the Union lines facing Lee. This resulted in a
strong concentration northeast of Hatcher’s Run. Two days later Sheridan
arrived at City Point, fresh from his victorious campaign in the
Shenandoah Valley, and was ordered to join his troops to those
concentrated on the left. Finally, it began to appear that the Army of
Northern Virginia was to be encircled.
Meanwhile, Lee was waiting only until he collected supplies and rations
to last his men for a week and until the roads were passable before
leaving to join Johnston. He hoped to leave on or about April 10. The
information he received about the rapid accumulation of Union forces
opposite his lightly held right was very disturbing, for, if it was
true, the Federals not only threatened to cut off his retreat to the
west and south, but they also posed a serious danger to the Southside
Railroad—the last remaining communication link between Petersburg and
the South, which continued to deliver a trickle of supplies to the city.
On March 29 the Union troops moved out. Sheridan’s cavalry crossed the
Rowanty Creek and occupied Dinwiddie Court House, while the II and V
Corps crossed Hatcher’s Run. In moving into position on the left of the
II Corps, Warren’s V Corps soldiers encountered heavy resistance north
of Gravelly Run. While Sheridan was marshaling his troops around
Dinwiddie, Lee issued orders on March 29 which sent Maj. Gens. George E.
Pickett and Fitzhugh Lee to the Confederate right near Five Forks, far
beyond Petersburg.
Sheridan was prepared to move against the Confederates with his cavalry
on March 30, but heavy rains lasting from the evening of March 29 until
the morning of the 31st made a large-scale movement impracticable over
the muddy roads. On the last day of the month, part of Sheridan’s forces
which has pushed northwest toward Five Forks was attacked by Southern
forces which succeeded in driving them back to Dinwiddie Court House,
where Sheridan had a fresh division. Pickett then found his men badly
outnumbered and withdrew them to Five Forks without pressing the
advantage he had gained. This incident, called the Battle of Dinwiddie
Court House, was a minor Confederate victory, although Sheridan’s men
were neither demoralized nor disorganized by the attack, and Robert E.
Lee could find small comfort in the situation.
[Illustration: Map, Five Forks.]
Meanwhile, there had been a savage clash on White Oak Road between
Warren’s V Corps and Maj. Gen. Bushrod Johnson’s Confederate division.
The Confederates at first swept all before them, but in the end numbers
told and they were compelled to withdraw behind their breastworks.
The Confederates had been able to concentrate on their extreme right in
the vicinity of Five Forks only about 10,000 cold and hungry soldiers to
meet the expected Union drive to turn their right flank. Massed against
this force commanded by Pickett were about 10,000 Northern cavalry and
12,000 infantry. The desperate urgency of General Lee’s fears was
indicated in the dispatch he sent to Pickett early on April 1, the day
of the struggle for Five Forks: “_Hold Five Forks at all hazards._
Protect road to Ford’s Depot and prevent Union forces from striking the
south-side railroad. Regret exceedingly your forced withdrawal, and your
inability to hold the advantage you had gained.”
Throughout April 1, Pickett’s troops worked unceasingly, erecting
barricades of logs and earth around Five Forks. About 4 p.m., with only
2 hours of daylight remaining, Sheridan’s cavalry and Warren’s infantry
attacked. While the cavalry occupied the attention of the Confederate
defenders along White Oak Road, divisions of infantrymen from the V
Corps moved to the left of Pickett’s troops and, after crossing the
White Oak Road which connected Five Forks with Petersburg, hit them on
the weakly held left flank. Lacking sufficient artillery support,
infantry reserves, and the presence of their commander, the Southerners
were quickly overcome. Realizing that their position was no longer
tenable, portions of the Confederate troops tried to retreat to
Petersburg, but the avenue of escape had been cut by the Union advance
across the White Oak Road.
By dusk, the Battle of Five Forks had ended. Union troops were in
possession of the disputed area. They had cut off and captured more than
3,200 prisoners, while suffering a loss of probably less than 1,000.
Now the besieging forces were in position for the first time to
accomplish Grant’s objective of cutting Lee’s supply lines and breaking
through his fortifications. The western end of Lee’s mobile defenses had
crumbled.
[Illustration: _When Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan (above) sent
cavalry and infantry crashing into the Confederate right flank at
Five Forks on April 1, 1865, the Southern commander, Maj. Gen.
George E. Pickett (below), was at a shad bake in the rear. By the
time Pickett returned to his command, both it and the defense line
had crumbled. Suddenly, Petersburg was no longer tenable. “It has
happened as I told them in Richmond it would happen,” said Lee. “The
line has been stretched until it is broken.”_]
[Illustration: Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett.]
Those Confederates who had survived the Battle of Five Forks had fallen
back to the Southside Railroad where they rallied for a stand, but
darkness had prevented a Union pursuit. Grant’s troops were within
striking distance of the rail line, located less than 3 miles from Five
Forks. Lee now knew that Petersburg and Richmond must be evacuated
without delay or the Army of Northern Virginia would be completely cut
off from outside help and all possible escape routes would be gone.
The problem of assigning a proper significance to Five Forks is a
difficult one. It is now known that Lee and the Confederate government
officials were on the verge of abandoning their capital. In June of the
previous year the Southside Railroad had been a most important objective
of the invading army, but the plight of Lee’s army had grown so
desperate during the intervening months that whether the railroad
remained open or not mattered little. Grant, of course, did not know
this as a positive fact, although the uncomfortable situation of his
opponents was something of which he was doubtless aware. The real
importance of Five Forks lay in the probability that, by making it more
difficult for Lee to escape, it brought the inevitable a little closer.
Lt. Col. Horace Porter, of Grant’s staff, was positive more than 30
years later that news of Sheridan’s success prompted the Union commander
in chief to issue the orders for the attack that carried the city.