By mid-March 1865 the climax of the campaign, and of the war, was close
at hand. Lee’s forces in both Richmond and Petersburg had dwindled to
about 55,000. Grant, on the other hand, had available, or within easy
march, at least 150,000. Moreover, Sheridan, having destroyed the
remnants of Early’s forces at Waynesboro, Va., on March 2, had cleared
the Shenandoah Valley of Confederates and was now free to rejoin Grant
before Petersburg.
Everywhere Lee turned, the military situation was black. Union forces
under Sherman, driving the Confederates before them, had turned north
from Savannah and were now hammering Johnston’s forces in North
Carolina. With President Jefferson Davis’ consent, Lee sent a letter to
General Grant on March 2 suggesting an interview. In the early morning
hours of the second day following the dispatch of the letter, Lee and
Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon discussed the three possible solutions to the
problem which perplexed them: (1) Try to negotiate satisfactory peace
terms. (This had already been acted upon in Lee’s note to Grant.) (2)
Retreat from Richmond and Petersburg and unite with Johnston for a final
stand. (3) Attack Grant in order to facilitate retreat.
There followed a series of interviews with Confederate government
officials in Richmond. Each of the plans was analyzed. The first was
quickly dropped when Grant made it clear that he was not empowered to
negotiate. Nor was the second proposal, that of retreat, deemed
advisable by President Davis who wished to strike one more blow before
surrendering his capital. This left only the third alternative—to
attack.
Before settling on a definite course of action, however, Lee ordered
General Gordon to make a reconnaissance of the Federal lines around
Petersburg to see if they could be broken anywhere. Gordon soon reported
that the best place for an attack was at Fort Stedman, a Union work
located near the City Point and Petersburg Railroad and only 150 yards
to the east of a strongly fortified Confederate position named
Colquitt’s Salient. Lee agreed with Gordon’s assessment and, on the
night of March 23, told Gordon to make preparations for an attack on the
fort.
[Illustration: _In Petersburg, sometime in the autumn of 1864, Lee
was photographed on his horse Traveller for the first time. Although
determined to fight on until all hope was gone, already Lee knew the
war was going badly and that his tired, hungry, dirty, and cold
soldiers could not hold out for long against Grant’s growing
might._]
About one-half of the besieged army would be used to charge the Union
line in the vicinity of Fort Stedman. It was hoped that this would cause
Grant to shorten his front by withdrawing his left flank to protect his
endangered right. Then Lee could detach a portion of the Confederate
army to send to the aid of Johnston as, with shorter lines, he would not
need as many men in Petersburg. Should the attack fail, he would attempt
to retreat with all his forces for a final stand with Johnston. This
would be the last desperate gamble of the Army of Northern Virginia.
The details for the attack were worked out by Gordon. During the night
preceding the assault, the obstructions before the Confederate lines
were to be removed and the Union pickets overcome as quietly as
possible. A group of 50 men were to remove the chevaux-de-frise and
abatis protecting Fort Stedman; then three companies of 100 men each
were to charge and capture the fort. When Stedman was safely in
Confederate hands, these men were to pretend they were Union troops and,
forming into three columns, were to rush to the rear to capture other
positions.
The next step was to send a division of infantry to gain possession of
the siege lines north and south of the fallen bastion. When the breach
had been sufficiently widened, Southern cavalry were to rush through and
destroy telegraphic communication with Grant’s headquarters at City
Point. They were also ordered to cut the military railroad. Additional
reserves were to follow the cavalry.
The attack was scheduled for the morning of March 25. The 50 axmen and
the 300 soldiers who were to make up the advance columns were given
strips of white cloth to wear across their chests to tell friend from
foe. The officers in charge were given the names of Union officers known
to be in the vicinity and were told to shout their assumed names if
challenged. Beginning about 3 a.m., Confederates professing to be
deserters crossed to the Union pickets offering to surrender. Their
purpose: to be near at hand to overwhelm the unsuspecting pickets when
the attack began.
At 4 a.m. Gordon gave the signal, and the Confederates sprang forward.
At first the attack went as planned. Blue-clad pickets were silenced so
effectively that not a shot was fired. Union obstructions were quickly
hewn down by the axmen, and the small vanguard of 300 swept through
Battery No. X which stood immediately north of Fort Stedman. They then
rushed into the fort; the occupants were completely surprised and many
surrendered without a fight. Battery XI to the south of Fort Stedman was
also soon in Confederate hands. Union resistance in this early stage was
ineffective, although Battery XI was recaptured for a short time.
[Illustration: _Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon planned and led the March
25 attack on Fort Stedman, one of the most advanced works on the
Union line._]
More Confederates pressed into the torn line. While three columns set
out in the general direction of City Point and along the Prince George
Court House Road behind Stedman, other infantry units moved north and
south along the Federal emplacements. To the north, they captured the
fortifications as far as Battery IX where they were stopped by the Union
defenders; to the south, they progressed as far as the ramparts of Fort
Haskell. A desperate struggle ensued, but here, too, the Northerners
refused to yield. Despite these checks, the Confederates were now in
possession of almost 1 mile of the Union line.
In the center of the Confederate attack, the three small columns quickly
advanced as far as Harrison’s Creek—a small stream which winds its way
north to the Appomattox River 650 yards behind Fort Stedman. One of the
columns succeeded in crossing the stream and continuing toward a small
Union artillery post on the site of what had been Confederate Battery 8
(renamed Fort Friend by the Federals), but canister from the post forced
the column back to the creek. Confusion took hold of the Confederates
who were unable to locate the positions they had been ordered to capture
behind the Union line. Artillery fire from Northern guns on a ridge to
the east held them on the banks of Harrison’s Creek. By 6 a.m. their
forward momentum had been checked.
[Illustration: _Advancing from Colquitt’s Salient (above), Gordon’s
men captured Fort Stedman (below) but were driven out by a murderous
crossfire from Federal artillery. In the assault, some 4,000
Confederates were killed, wounded, or captured._]
[Illustration: Fort Stedman.]
Union infantry then charged from the ridge to attack the Southerners.
The forces joined battle along Harrison’s Creek and the Confederates
were soon forced back to Fort Stedman. For a brief time they held their
newly captured positions. At 7:30 a.m. Brig. Gen. John F. Hartranft
advanced on them with a division of Northern troops. Heavy small-arms
and artillery fire on Gordon’s men threatened them with annihilation
unless they retired to their own lines. About 8 a.m., Gordon received an
order from Lee to withdraw his men. The order was quickly dispatched
across the open fields to the soldiers in the captured Union works. By
now, however, the line of retreat was raked by a vicious crossfire and
many Confederates preferred surrender to withdrawal. About the same time
Gordon was starting back, Hartranft ordered his division of Pennsylvania
troops to recapture Fort Stedman. Within a few moments the Union line
was completely restored and the forlorn Southern hope of a successful
disruption of Northern communications, followed by secret withdrawal
from the city, was lost. Equally bad, if not worse, to the Confederates
was the loss of more than 4,000 killed, wounded, and captured as
compared to the Union casualties of less than 1,500.
Of the three Confederate plans of action before the Battle of Fort
Stedman, now only the second—retreat—was possible. The situation
demanded immediate action, for, even as Gordon had been preparing on
March 24 to launch his attack, Grant had been engaged in planning more
difficulties for the harassed defenders of Petersburg.