According to the United States census of 1860, Petersburg was a city of
18,266 people. It was situated on the southern bank of the Appomattox
River about 8 miles from City Point, where the Appomattox joins the
James, and 23 miles south of Richmond. As the war progressed and the
territory to the north and east was shut off, Richmond became
increasingly dependent on Petersburg for supplies. Through it passed a
constant stream of war materials and necessities of life from the South
to sustain the straining war effort. In short, Petersburg was a road and
rail center of vital importance to the Confederacy, and its capture
would almost certainly lead to the abandonment of Richmond.
The transportation vehicles of the 1860’s did not require the wide,
straight highways of the present. However, several good roads came into
the city from the east, south, and west where they joined with the
Richmond Turnpike. Along these roads passed supply wagons, couriers,
and, on occasion, troops on their way to repel the foe. Several were
built of logs laid across the road to form a hard surface. Because of
this they were called “plank roads.” Two of the most important arteries
of traffic into Petersburg were the Jerusalem Plank Road, connecting
Petersburg with Jerusalem (now Courtland), Va., and the Boydton Plank
Road which led south through Dinwiddie Court House. Among others of
importance were the City Point, Prince George Court House, Baxter,
Halifax, Jordon Point, Squirrel Level, and Cox Roads.
[Illustration: Railroads and important roads serving Petersburg in
1864. The dashed line indicates the original Confederate Defense
line built in 1862-63.]
[Illustration: Map showing the network of railroads and the
strategic location of Petersburg to Richmond. The shaded area is the
approximate line of Union control in early 1864. The three arrows
indicate the major drives planned by the Union army for 1864.
(Railroads serving Rich. and Petersburg are in heavy lines.)]
It was the railroads more than the highways, however, which gave to
Petersburg a significance out of all proportion to its size. Tracks
radiated from the city in all directions. The Richmond and Petersburg
Railroad left the city to the north; the Southside Railroad ran west to
Lynchburg; the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad led south to North
Carolina; the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad passed through a ravine
east of the city before turning southeast toward Norfolk; and the
Petersburg and City Point Railroad struck out for the hamlet of City
Point, situated at the junction of the James and Appomattox Rivers about
8 miles away.
Because of its proximity, Petersburg became a part of the transportation
system of the Confederate capital, serving as a major point of transfer
to the larger metropolis for products and materials from the vast
regions to the south and southwest. By June 1864, all but one railroad
from the south and west into Richmond—the Richmond and Danville
Railroad—passed through Petersburg. As other lines of supply were cut
off or threatened, the dependence of Richmond upon Petersburg increased
and made the security of that city a matter of vital concern.
In the spring of 1862, McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign had threatened
Richmond from the east and southeast, making that city’s defenders
acutely aware of the need for a system of fortifications around
Petersburg. In August a defense line was begun, and work continued until
its completion about a year later. Capt. Charles H. Dimmock, a
Northerner by birth, was in charge of it under the direction of the
Engineer Bureau, Confederate States Army, and the line so constructed
became unofficially known as the “Dimmock Line.”
When finished, the chain of breastworks and artillery emplacements
around Petersburg was 10 miles long, beginning and ending on the
Appomattox River and protecting all but the northern approaches to the
city. The 55 artillery batteries were consecutively numbered from east
to west. Although natural terrain features were utilized whenever
possible, some glaring weaknesses existed, such as the deep ravine
between Batteries 7 and 8, which could provide a means of penetration by
an attacking force. The very length and size of the fortifications
proved to be a disadvantage. It meant that a larger number of troops
would be necessary to defend the line than General Beauregard, charged
with this heavy responsibility, had present for duty. Col. Alfred Roman,
an aide-de-camp to Beauregard, estimated that the long “Dimmock Line”
would require more than 10 times as many men to defend it as were
available.
On several occasions raids were made on the railroads south and west of
Petersburg. The most serious of these occurred on June 9, 1864, when
3,000 infantry and 1,300 cavalry appeared in force along the eastern and
southeastern sector of the Dimmock Line. The infantry contented itself
with a menacing demonstration, but the cavalry attacked up the Jerusalem
Plank Road. After breaking through the defenses, the horse soldiers were
checked by regular Southern army units assisted by a hastily summoned
home guard of old men and youths. The damage done by such raids was
quickly patched up, but they were a constant nuisance to the city’s
transportation lines. To shut off permanently the supplies that streamed
along the railroads, the Union forces would have to take permanent
physical possession of them.