UNION STRATEGY 1864

To accomplish the conquest of the Confederacy, the Northern plan called

for a huge two-pronged attack. Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, in command

of the southern prong, was assigned the task of destroying Gen. Joseph

E. Johnston’s Confederate Army of Tennessee, capturing Atlanta, marching

to the sea, and then turning north to effect a junction with Grant.

It was the upper arm of the movement which was directly concerned with

Richmond and Petersburg. This was composed of two armies: the Army of

the Potomac and the Army of the James. It was the task of these armies

to capture Richmond, crush the Army of Northern Virginia, and march

south toward Sherman.

The story of the Army of the James in the early phase of the offensive

can be briefly told. Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler was ordered to advance

upon Richmond from the southeast and threaten communications between the

Confederate capital and the Southern States. With some 40,000 Union

troops, the advance was begun. City Point, located at the junction of

the James and Appomattox Rivers and soon to be the supply center for the

attack on Petersburg, was captured on May 4, 1864. Within 2 weeks,

however, a numerically inferior Confederate force shut up the Army of

the James, “as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked,” in Bermuda

Hundred, a loop formed by the winding James and Appomattox Rivers. Here

Butler waited, while north of him the Army of the Potomac and the Army

of Northern Virginia engaged in a series of bloody battles.

The Battle of the Wilderness, May 5-7, 1864, began what proved to be the

start of the final campaign against the Army of Northern Virginia. Here

Meade’s Army of the Potomac, numbering approximately 118,000 troops,

fought the Confederate defenders of Richmond. Lee had about 62,000 men

with him, while an additional 30,000 under Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard held

the Richmond-Petersburg area. The battle resulted in a fearful loss of

men on both sides, although the armies remained intact. This was

followed by a series of fierce engagements around Spotsylvania Court

House from May 8 to 21.

Failing to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia in these battles, Grant

moved the Army of the Potomac to the east of Richmond. It was his hope

that he would outflank the Confederate defenders by persistent night

marches. Lee was not to be so easily outguessed, however. After minor

battles at the North Anna River (May 23) and Totopotomoy Creek (May 29),

Grant arrived at Cold Harbor, about 8 miles northeast of Richmond, but

Lee’s army still stood between him and that city. On June 3, 2 days

after he arrived at Cold Harbor, Grant ordered a direct frontal assault

against the Confederate lines. He was repulsed with heavy losses—about

7,000 men. “I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor

was ever made,” Grant would write many years later. By the end of the

first month of Grant’s campaign, both sides had suffered heavy

casualties, but the North’s ability to refill its depleted ranks was

greater than the South’s. Lee’s offensive strength had been sapped. From

the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House until the end of the war, except

for counterattacks and the lunge at Fort Stedman during the siege of

Petersburg, the Army of Northern Virginia was a defensive weapon only.

After Cold Harbor, Grant decided to turn quickly to the south of

Richmond and isolate the city and the defending troops by attacking

Petersburg and cutting the railroads that supplied them. Lee knew he

could not allow this to happen. “We must destroy this army of Grant’s

before he gets to James River,” he told one of his generals. “If he gets

there, it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere question of

time.”

Campaign for Petersburg · 第 6 / 20 题