THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE DEFENCE OF ARRAS, 1918
On the 11th March 1918 the 1/4th Londons took over the Oppy Trenches
from the Kensingtons.
There was no room for doubt now that the Germans intended sooner or
later to launch a big attack in this area, and the only thing was to
ensure that the troops holding the line should be ready whenever the
storm might burst. The dispositions now taken up were, therefore, those
which had been finally decided on for the scheme of defence, and it
was arranged that companies should henceforth always occupy the same
positions in order the better to know their ground. These positions
will be stated in detail later.
So far as the infantry in the line were concerned the period of
suspense was mainly characterised by very hard work on the defences and
by particularly active patrolling. Each front line post nightly pushed
forward to the enemy wire a listening patrol to give early warning of
signs of the enemy's assembly for attack. On the evening of the 12th
March 2/Lieut. G. G. Lewis took a patrol into the German trenches near
Crucifix Corner, but found them unoccupied. The tour of duty passed
quietly, with the exception of a very severe bombardment with mustard
gas shells, which began at about 7 p.m. on the 15th March and continued
till about 8 a.m. the following morning. At the time this caused
little damage, but the heat of the sun later in the day accentuated
the effects of the gas, and Lieuts. A. Bath and O. D. Garratt, M.C.,
2/Lieuts. G. W. Fisher, E. A. Ratcliffe and 109 other ranks became
casualties.
Intelligence reports pointed to the probability of the attack
developing on the 12th March; but although nothing occurred, from this
date onwards the whole Division daily stood to arms from one hour
before dawn till 8.30 a.m., while the Divisional and Corps artillery
put a slow barrage on the enemy lines at daybreak. The "stand-to"
order was strictly enforced as far back as the transport lines and the
Quartermaster.
On the 18th the 1/4th Londons were relieved by the Kensingtons and
withdrew in Brigade reserve to Roclincourt, leaving two platoons in
support attached to the Kensingtons, and one in front trenches attached
to the London Scottish. A rearrangement of the method of holding the
line was now ordered by Corps, and the necessary changes which were
effected on the night of 21st/22nd March resulted in each division
holding its sector with two brigades in line and one in reserve. Each
front line brigade had two battalions in trenches and one in support.
The effect of this in the 56th Division was to leave the 169th and
168th Brigades in the line, while the 167th was withdrawn to the
support area.
The 21st March saw the opening of the great German offensive on the
Fifth Army front, but no attack developed opposite the 56th Division.
The day was marked by very greatly increased artillery activity on the
enemy's part, gas shell being freely used on the Bailleul-Willerval
line. This indication of the imminence of active operations caused the
cancellation of the relief of the 56th Division by the 62nd. The next
day warning was received that the 2nd Canadian Division would take over
the line, but this order was also subsequently cancelled.
No definite news of the offensive was received during the 21st March,
though it was reported that the enemy had gained the high ground
near Wancourt Tower, and was likely by his assault on Monchy to lay
the Corps right flank open to attack. Arras was heavily shelled, and
all the civilians were cleared out. St Pol also was bombarded by a
long-range gun, while low-flying Bosche aeroplanes were over the lines
and at night dropped bombs on Thélus.
On the evening of the 24th the 1/4th Londons returned to the front
line. Aerial reports of great activity behind the German lines now
made it clear that the attack was imminent, and final preparations for
the struggle were completed. All spare Lewis guns and magazines were
brought up from the transport lines. The men were in splendid fettle,
and the high probability that the long weeks of suspense would shortly
be over increased their good humour. All were absolutely confident in
themselves and each other, and their only anxiety was as to whether
they would have the good fortune to be in front trenches to meet the
enemy.
At this time Gen. Loch and Lieut.-Col. Marchment made strong
representations that the three front line posts ought to be much more
lightly held, and that the Company Headquarters in Beatty should be
withdrawn to the Marquis line, on the grounds that it was useless to
pack men into posts only 100 yards from the enemy, where they were
certain to suffer severely from the hostile bombardment and where
they had no room to fight. These representations were not received
favourably by Corps though the event showed they were well founded. As
it was Lieut.-Col. Marchment moved one platoon from Oppy Post, but even
with this alteration the Marquis line was too lightly held.
News from the area of battle in the south was still vague, though it
was known that the Fifth Army had been forced to give a great deal of
ground, and that the Third Army on its left had also retreated, though
to a less degree, and to conform to the movements of its neighbour.
As the day wore on, however, the enemy's pressure on the Third
Army south of the Scarpe increased and by the 27th he had captured
Monchy-le-Preux. It became evident that he was aiming at a movement
to envelop Arras from the south. A reasonable deduction from this
situation was that the blow at Arras would shortly develop also on the
north of the Scarpe, by means of an assault on the Vimy Ridge.
In the early hours of the 25th March, shortly after the 1/4th Londons
had taken over the line, 2/Lieut. C. H. Board and Coy. Sergt.-Major
Matthews of B Company were visiting the sentry groups in Beatty Post
when two of the enemy, who had entered the trench by stealth, tried to
drag the Coy. Sergt.-Major out of it. A scuffle ensued in which another
officer and an N.C.O. joined. The two Germans unfortunately got away
after slightly wounding both Board and Matthews.
During the day the artillery on both sides became more active, though
no infantry action occurred, and the men were kept busy in constructing
trench blocks and improving firesteps. The right flank of the 1/4th
Londons' sector had always been regarded as a rather weak spot in the
defence, and in view of the expectation that the enemy would assault
the Vimy Ridge from the south, it was desirable to provide for the
formation by the Battalion of a defensive flank facing south should
this area become threatened. To this end work was pushed forward in
constructing and improving firesteps in Ouse Alley for its possible use
as a "switch line." This precaution, as will be seen, was justified by
events.
During the evening a report was received of the examination of a
prisoner of the 471st Infantry Regiment, who had been taken near
Mill Post on the previous evening. This was to the effect that the
attack was to be made on the morning of the 26th, and that the 219th
and 23rd Reserve Divisions had been brought forward for the purpose.
These troops were accommodated in the Drocourt-Quéant line. They
had just arrived from Riga and would attack in conjunction with the
240th and 5th Bavarian Reserve Divisions. They would assemble in
the front line system and would advance to a depth of four miles
with their right flank on Oppy, then swing round towards Vimy. Three
special divisions would capture the Vimy Ridge the next day. The 471st
Regiment had already 60 trench mortars in position, and 8 more trench
mortar companies were to arrive on the night of the 25th; most of the
ammunition was already in the line.
This message, bringing as it did a hope that the wearisome suspense was
at last at an end, was received with satisfaction, and instructions to
prepare for battle were issued. All night our artillery maintained a
heavy fire on the enemy's supposed assembly positions, while No Man's
Land was occupied by our listening patrols. At 4 a.m. these came in and
the heavy artillery placed a slow barrage on the German front lines.
At 4.45 a.m. the Battalion stood to arms, blocks were lowered in the
communication trenches and all made ready. No attack developed, and
at 7.30 a.m. the order to stand down was received from Brigade, the
remainder of the day passing comparatively quietly.
In the evening, in response to urgent appeals from Corps for an
identification, all battalions in the line sent patrols to the enemy
trenches to try to get prisoners. From the 1/4th Londons two parties
went forward at 10.30 p.m. after wire-cutting preparations by the field
artillery. 2/Lieut. G. G. Lewis with a platoon of A Company entered the
enemy line opposite Oppy Post, but the sentry group was heard running
away and no bag was obtained. From C Company 2/Lieut. R. E. Campkin
took two men to the German trenches near Crucifix Corner, and had a
lively little scrap in the dark with the sentry group. In this case
also the Bosche took to their heels, and, in spite of a good set to
with fists, managed to get away pursued by Campkin. After remaining
two hours in the enemy line both patrols returned bringing some trench
notice boards.
The 27th March passed remarkably quietly, nothing of interest occurring
beyond the movements of a low-flying Bosche 'plane which appeared to
be particularly interested in our trenches. A relief of the German
division opposite the Battalion was suspected, but the report was
incorrect.
On the night 27th/28th March orders were received that the XIII Corps
boundary was to be extended northwards as far as the Souchez River, and
that the 56th Division would "side-step" northwards. The side-step was
effected by transferring the Kensingtons from the right flank of the
1/4th Londons to the left flank, the Kensingtons taking over two new
posts north of the 1/4th Londons from the 8th Canadian Brigade. The gap
thus created on the right flank of the Battalion was filled by the
169th Brigade, which extended its left flank. Why this redistribution
was effected at the eleventh hour we do not know: obviously it must
have been for some very important reason. But whatever the cause,
the result was distinctly weakening to the defence. We have already
alluded to the well-recognised risk of the 1/4th Londons' right flank
being laid open, and now at the last moment the area was occupied by a
Battalion entirely strange to the ground. The relief in fact was not
completed before the battle opened, for when the Bosche barrage fell on
the morning of the 28th March the L.R.B. had not taken over Bailleul
East Post, while a company of the 1st Canadian Rifles in the Brown line
was still awaiting relief. By the courtesy of the Canadian Brigadier
this company was placed under the orders of Brig.-Gen. Loch.
In addition to this eleventh hour change of dispositions a certain
difficulty appears to have beset the High Command in reconciling the
rôles of the three divisions composing the Corps, and this resulted in
a stream of orders each of which altered its predecessor. The Corps
order, under which the extension of the 56th Division's line was
carried out, laid down that the Bailleul-Willerval line (Red line) was
to be the line of resistance, and that the front line system would be
regarded as outposts. Later in the evening the front line system was
ordered to be held at all costs to conform with the 4th Division on our
right; but still later a modification of this was made on the left of
the line in order to conform to the defensive line of the 3rd Canadian
Division on our left, and the garrison of Arleux Post was ordered, if
heavily attacked, to withdraw to the Arleux Loop.
The final dispositions therefore provided five lines of defence,
each to be defended at all costs in default of a Divisional order to
withdraw. There were:
1. Front line system.
2. Red line (Bailleul-Willerval).
3. Brown line (Farbus-Vimy).
4. Green line (Thélus).
5. La Targette line.
The order of battle of Brigade was as follows:
169TH BRIGADE (RIGHT):
Front line system: Queen's Westminsters in Towy Post on the right.
London Rifle Brigade in Mill,
Bradford and Bird Posts on the left.
Red line: 1/2nd Londons.
Brown line: 1 coy. 1/5th Cheshire Pioneers.
Reserve: 2 coys. 1st Londons (attd. from 167th Brigade).
168TH BRIGADE (LEFT):
Front line system: 1/4th Londons in Beatty, Wood and Oppy Posts
on the right.
Kensingtons in Tommy and Arleux Posts
on the left.
Red line: London Scottish.
Brown line: 2 platoons 1/5th Cheshire Pioneers.
Green line: 2 coys. 1st Londons, 1½ coys.
1/5th Cheshire Pioneers.
DIVISIONAL RESERVE:
167th Brigade (less 1st Londons) and 3 field coys. R.E.
The companies of the 1/4th Londons were disposed as follows:
Right: B Company (Spicer) H.Q. and 2 platoons in Beatty
Post. 1 platoon in Marquis and Earl line.
Centre: C Company (Duthie) 1 platoon in Wood Post. 1
platoon in Marquis line. H.Q. and 1 platoon in
South Duke St.
Left: A Company (H. N. Williams) 1 platoon in Oppy Post.
1 platoon between Oppy Post and Marquis line.
H.Q. and 1 platoon in Marquis line.
Advanced Battalion H.Q.: (Major F. A. Phillips) in South Duke
St. (with C Coy.)
Support: D Company (Cooper) in Bow Trench.
Battalion H.Q.: (Lieut.-Col. Marchment) in Ouse Alley west of
Bow Trench.
During the night 2/Lieut. R. E. Campkin with two men of C Company again
crossed No Man's Land and returned shortly before 3 a.m. on the 28th
March reporting that he had seen long lines of men carrying up to the
enemy front line what appeared to be large biscuit tins--doubtless the
trench mortar ammunition coming in. Evidently this was The Day!
At 3 a.m. on the 28th March the enemy opened an intense high explosive
shell fire on Bow Trench, Ouse Alley and Rear Battalion Headquarters,
as well as on all the rearward defensive posts. This bombardment, which
continued throughout the day, was at first mingled with mustard gas.
The forward area was hardly affected by this shelling except for the
fact that the wind carried the gas eastward over the front line posts,
the garrisons of which had to wear masks for over an hour.
At 5.40 a.m. a terrific trench mortar fire fell on the forward posts
doing very severe damage, and causing many casualties. Ouse Alley and
the Earl-Marquis line at first escaped this, though later the area of
bombardment was extended and they received a full share of it.
A strictly chronological account of an action such as this, in which
different parts of the Battalion became involved in the fight at
varying hours, is almost an impossibility if the reader is to glean
anything but the most confused impression of what occurred. We propose,
therefore, to deal first of all with the fight for the front line posts
gradually working our narrative westward.
The S.O.S. signal was received in Battalion Headquarters from Oppy
Post by wire at 7.15 a.m., and a few moments later flares were sent
up from Wood and Beatty. The signal was repeated backwards to Brigade
by Battalion Headquarters. "We stood on top," writes Lieut.-Col.
Marchment, "to have a look round but could see very little as it was
not fully light. We could, however, hear a pleasant noise--very heavy
rifle fire!"
Oppy Post on the left had been very badly knocked about by the
trench mortaring and the garrison seriously reduced before the enemy
came over. A gallant attempt at resistance was put up and rifle and
Lewis gun fire were opened as soon as the attacking lines made their
appearance. One Lewis gun team was seen from the rear to have climbed
on to the parapet, and the gun was being fired from the hip. But it was
hopeless from the first. The enemy lines were very close, and by sheer
weight of numbers the Post was quickly swamped. Of a garrison of 2
officers and 48 other ranks but 1 officer (2/Lieut. Athey) and 5 other
ranks were able to make their way back to the Marquis line which they
did by way of Boyne Trench.
On the right Beatty Post had suffered from the trench mortar fire more
severely than any, and by the time the Germans appeared its trenches
were practically effaced. The attackers appeared in fairly close
formation, and in considerable depth, some of the leading wave firing
rifle grenades from the hip. Apparently the enemy's trench mortar
preparation, severe as it had been, had not dealt effectively with
our wire, for the leading wave of attackers was delayed in getting
through it, causing those following to bunch up to it. The rapid rifle
and Lewis gun fire opened by the garrison of the post was thus able
to inflict very severe loss. For about fifteen minutes the garrison
stoutly held its own, but at the end of that time it was found that the
enemy had already swept over the posts to the right held by the L.R.B.,
and was working into Marine Trench and Ouse Alley in great numbers.
Again sheer weight of numbers made further resistance impossible, and
2/Lieut. G. R. Pitman brought the six surviving men back to the Marquis
line over the open, leaving 2 officers (Capt. E. E. Spicer and 2/Lieut.
Coombes) and 78 other ranks fallen at their posts.
In the centre a magnificent stand was made by the garrison of Wood
Post under Lieut. H. F. Dade and 2/Lieut. H. O. Morris. The night
position of the post had been changed a few days before the battle,
and the German trench mortar preparation therefore fell harmlessly on
the former position. When the trench mortar fire ceased the enemy was
seen advancing in an extended line over the open ground left of the
Wood and coming through the Wood in groups of about 10 men 50 yards
apart. This line was followed by groups of about 30 men some 200 yards
in rear. The whole garrison (2 officers, 45 other ranks and 2 Lewis
guns) at once opened a heavy fire which undoubtedly caused very severe
loss to the enemy. A party of Germans tried to force the block in the
trench leading from the new post to the old, but they were effectively
disposed of with rifle grenades. For a full hour this gallant garrison
held their own, completely checking the enemy in the wood. On the
right, however, the enemy had, as already recounted, swept over Beatty
Post and was now working his way round Wood Post from the south.
Ammunition and bombs were beginning to run short. After a consultation
Dade and Morris decided that the position was no longer tenable, and
they withdrew their men along Bedford Row and Boyne Trench to the
Marquis line. This withdrawal was skilfully executed, the move of the
riflemen down Boyne Trench being covered by Lewis guns in Bedford Row.
That the garrison held their own to the last is evidenced by the fact
that before the post was finally evacuated the Headquarters dugout was
in the hands of the enemy, while our own artillery was already shelling
the post. The defence of Wood Post cost 25 casualties in other ranks.
[Illustration: THE DEFENCE OF ARRAS, MARCH 1918]
The value of the defence of Wood Post can hardly be overestimated.
Apart from the heavy losses which the fire of its garrison undoubtedly
inflicted on the enemy, it is certain that its prolonged resistance
saved the Marquis line from being overrun in the vicinity of Advanced
Battalion Headquarters.
As soon as Williams reported the men back from Oppy Post Lieut.-Col.
Marchment had a 6-inch howitzer battery turned on to Oppy Wood.
The forward posts having fallen, the Marquis line became almost
immediately engaged, and Capt. H. N. Williams (A Company) displayed
great qualities of leadership in his defence of the position. We cannot
do better than to relate this phase of the battle in the words of the
official account of the action submitted by Lieut.-Col. Marchment:
The Marquis line easily held up the advancing enemy after the posts
had gone. On the right the enemy was strongly established in the
Earl line and Viscount Street about fifteen minutes after zero.
Major F. A. Phillips at once gave orders to 2/Lieut. O. C. Hudson,
whose platoon was in the Marquis line astride Ouse Alley, to form
the defensive flank at once. This had been rehearsed previously and
consisted not only in manning the block in Ouse Alley to the front,
but also in Earl to the right, and manning firesteps facing to the
right along Ouse Alley. 2/Lieut. Hudson maintained this position
with great gallantry and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy,
whom he caught in enfilade as they broke through over Earl to
Viscount Street. The defensive flank was prolonged by Headquarter
details who continued on the firestep in Ouse Alley and held a
block near the Aid Post in South Duke Street.
At about 9.30 a.m. a strong party was seen working up Ouse Alley
from Viscount Street towards Forward Battalion Headquarters.
Major F. A. Phillips at once attacked over the open with about
20 Headquarter details, the men following most gallantly under
heavy fire. The enemy were ejected and a block established in Ouse
Alley towards Viscount Street. A block was established here and
successfully defended with grenades by a party under Sergt. Udall.
In the centre of the Marquis line the attack was not pressed
until the Wood Post Garrison had withdrawn. After this the enemy
gradually built up a large volume of rifle fire from Oppy Wood, but
was prevented from debouching by well-directed rifle and Lewis gun
fire from the Marquis line. Rifle grenades were also used on New
Cut and Baker Street where the enemy had established himself.
On the left of the Marquis line excellent targets were presented on
the left of the Wood, the Lewis gun in the bank (near the junction
of Clarence Trench and Kent Road) doing most excellent work.
During the next three hours the enemy twice broke into the line
near Boyne, but was thrown out, leaving a good many dead in the
trench. Rifle and Lewis gun fire was opened whenever a good target
presented itself, and a large number of dead were seen between Wood
and Beale Trenches.
Later on the enemy broke in on the left from Clarence Trench. The
Lewis gun on the left had finished its ammunition, but reinforced
by a few men, the team ejected the enemy with rifle fire and
grenades.
Thus, at about 11 a.m., the forward troops were holding the Marquis
line beating off attacks to the front and holding a block on the
left. On the right, although the enemy pressure was considerable,
he was held up splendidly in Earl and South Duke Street and in
front and behind in Ouse Alley; the enemy holding Viscount Street
on the right and pushing on towards the Red line.
During the whole of this fight information as to the situation came
in to Rear Battalion Headquarters rapidly, thanks to a buried cable,
and throughout the battle communication was maintained with the troops
in front and with Brigade Headquarters and the artillery in rear.
Advantage of this was taken when definite news of the fall of the post
line was received, and the artillery barrage was dropped to conform to
the situation, Earl Trench being shelled with good effect.
We must now turn for a moment to the course of events in the rearward
area. The enemy's preparatory bombardment had fallen heavily on Bow
Trench, but the garrison (D Company, Cooper) was kept in dugouts,
sentries being changed each half-hour, and few casualties were
sustained. At 5 a.m. the blocks in Ouse Alley were lowered, and rum and
extra S.A.A. issued to the men. On the S.O.S. signal being received
the trench was manned; and at the same time Lieut.-Col. Marchment sent
the Headquarter Company round to join D Company, retaining with him
only a few signallers to work the line, two clerks and a few scouts, in
addition to Boutall (Adjutant), Lorden (Works Officer) and Padre Green
"to create a calm atmosphere." Lorden was hit here at about 7.45 a.m.
From about 8 a.m. the Headquarters area was quite in the air. The front
line system in the adjoining sector on the right (169th Brigade) had
gone, with the exception of Towy Post held by the Queen's Westminsters;
and the Bosche had worked up the valley on the left and was also for a
time in Ouse Alley, and attacking Bailleul East Post in the Red line
(held by the London Scottish).
For a time trouble was caused by low-flying enemy aeroplanes, but these
went back as soon as our own R.E. 8's appeared. Good contact work was
done throughout the day with these machines which called at intervals
for flares. Luckily all flares were carried on the men, and they were
thus available to show our positions to the aeroplanes. At one time
the Battalion code and position call, Q.J.B., was sent to the contact
aeroplane by Lucas Lamp worked by Sergt. Hurst, and satisfactorily
received.
At about 9 a.m. the enemy was in Viscount Trench, and as stragglers
from the L.R.B. reported that he was also working down Ouse Alley, D
Company was ordered to despatch one platoon to man Ouse Alley forward
of Bow Trench. This was quickly done, and the men, taking up positions
on the firesteps facing south-east, were able to engage small parties
of the enemy who appeared over the crest in front of Bailleul East Post.
Later in the morning when news was received of the severe odds against
which the gallant Marquis line garrison was struggling, the remainder
of D Company was ordered to bomb up Ouse Alley to try to join hands
with Major Phillips and thus complete the defensive flank. At the same
time a carrying party was detailed from Headquarters to carry S.A.A.
to the front line should D Company succeed. The place of D Company in
Bow Trench was taken by two platoons of the London Scottish placed at
Lieut.-Col. Marchment's disposal.
The bombing attack was pushed forward for some 400 yards. Enemy
opposition was not very severe and about a dozen were killed. The
Germans were, however, continuing to press forward over the open from
the right and it seemed likely that D Company would get cut off. A
block was therefore made in Ouse Alley which was held by a few men,
while another small party manned the firesteps to the right to engage
the advancing enemy. The remainder of D Company moved over the open in
the valley north of Ouse Alley towards Boyne Dump to carry S.A.A. to
the Marquis line, taking full advantage of the ground.
By 11.30 a.m. the situation of the Marquis line troops had become
precarious in the extreme. The Germans in Oppy Wood were being
reinforced and were developing a considerable volume of fire from
that direction. The right and right rear of the position were almost
enveloped and an attack was being launched against the left flank.
Bombs and ammunition were giving out. It seemed clear that further
resistance could only lead to useless loss of life. Influenced by
these weighty considerations Major Phillips, after a consultation
with his senior officers, decided to try to save the remnants of the
garrison by a withdrawal to the Red line. The only available trench
for withdrawal, Ouse Alley, was, however, already occupied by the
enemy in rear of the position, and the valley from Boyne Dump on the
left offered the only loophole of escape from the closing pincers.
Lieut.-Col. Marchment writes of this withdrawal:
The withdrawal was witnessed by myself from my headquarters. I
watched it through my glasses. It was carried out in a very steady
and orderly way, the men leaving in groups of about a dozen.
Although exposed to heavy fire from the front and flanks, they made
excellent use of the ground and had few casualties.
The men of D Company, who were meanwhile carrying S.A.A. up to the
Marquis line, met the survivors returning and covered their withdrawal.
It is hard to find adequate words in praise of this gallant defence and
skilful and well-timed withdrawal. All ranks alike behaved with the
greatest spirit under very trying circumstances.
A great loss was suffered in this defence in the capture by the enemy
of the Regimental Aid Post. Capt. Maloney, the M.O. was a most popular
man in the Battalion, and Sergt. Rossington and the two orderlies,
Palmer and Simpson, had all done excellent work. By an irony of fate
2/Lieut. Morris, who had done such good work in the defence of Wood
Post earlier in the morning, was hit later, and was having his wounds
dressed in the Aid Post when it was captured.
Major F. A. Phillips who, at Forward Headquarters, was in charge of
the whole defence of the forward system, did excellent work. He was
continually up and down the lines encouraging the men, and was able to
keep Rear Battalion Headquarters constantly in touch with the rapid
changes in the situation.
The enemy was now in great force in Viscount Street and was beginning
to bomb heavily down Ouse Alley, while he showed increasing signs of
strength on the ridge to the right of that trench. The party of D
Company in Ouse Alley was therefore withdrawn as soon as the survivors
of the Marquis line garrison had reached Bow Trench, to avoid the risk
of being cut off. Later the enemy appeared in great strength against
the block in Ouse Alley forward of Bow Trench. This block was defended
by a "slit" cut in the side of Ouse Alley which was covered by a Lewis
gun post in Bow Trench and seven of the enemy were killed by Lewis gun
fire.
As soon as the Battalion was concentrated in Bow Trench and the Red
line, the artillery barrage was dropped to a line about 400 yards in
front of Bow Trench, and arrangements were made to increase it to
intense should the S.O.S. signal be sent up from Battalion Headquarters.
The enemy skirmishers having been definitely checked the situation now
became quieter, and for the next hour there was a distinct lull in the
battle.
The Kensingtons on the left had not been attacked but had withdrawn to
the Red line to conform to the 1/4th Londons' new position.
In Towy Post, the extreme right of the Divisional front, the Queen's
Westminsters had put up a most gallant fight, but the remainder of
the 169th Brigade front had rapidly been swamped by weight of enemy
numbers, and in this sector the 169th Brigade troops were thrown back
to the Red line while the Wood Post garrison was still holding its
ground.
The development of this great German attack was a remarkable
confirmation of the statement which had been made by the prisoner
captured on the 24th March. All the troops mentioned by him were
identified in the course of the fighting. On the 1/4th Londons' front
two German regiments were identified: the 249th I. Regt. at Oppy Post,
and the 10th R.I. Regt. in the shape of a gentleman who broke into
Sergt. Plumbley's canteen in Ouse Alley. But having armed himself with
a tin of pineapple this luckless marauder fell into the arms of D
Company bombing up the trench!
Eleven German divisions took part in this great battle, but they
were all checked by the divisions holding the line, the 56th and 4th
north of the Scarpe and the 3rd and 15th south of it. That the almost
complete failure of the enemy on the 28th March was a severe blow to
the German High Command there can be no doubt, and Ludendorff says,
"It was an established fact that the enemy's resistance was beyond our
strength."
The regiment has every reason to be proud of its defence this day. For
over four hours it retained the front line system under the weight
of heavy shell fire and repeated attacks by vastly superior numbers,
and, when finally it was forced to give ground to avoid extinction,
it withdrew fighting. The casualties were heavy, but considering the
enormous service rendered the price paid was not unduly great.
At about 4 p.m. the enemy began to shell the Red line rather heavily,
but no infantry attack matured. Shortly afterwards the 1/4th Londons
were withdrawn, and by 6 p.m. were under cover of the Railway
Embankment north-east of Bailleul, reorganised in two companies (Cooper
and Williams), S.A.A. was replenished and arrangements made to man the
Brown line and posts south of the Bailleul Road should the enemy break
through the Red line. Bow Trench had been handed over to the London
Scottish.
The experience of this battle showed the need for holding front line
posts lightly, and purely for observation purposes. The uselessness
of locking up large garrisons in them--unless they can be effectively
concealed as in the case of Wood Post--was clearly demonstrated. The
system of trench blocks to which much thought had previously been
devoted fully proved its value, while the advantage of rehearsing
companies in the rôles they may be expected to play, and especially of
acquainting all ranks with the "overland" routes within the area was
much in evidence.
The casualties sustained by the 1/4th Londons in this action were:
Officers: Capt. E. E. Spicer, 2/Lieuts. R. E. Campkin, H. T.
Hannay and H. V. Coombes, killed; Capt. A. M. Duthie,
D.S.O., and Lieut. H. M. Lorden, wounded; Capt.
Maloney, 2/Lieuts. C. W. Denning (attached to 168th
L.T.M. Battery), H. O. Morris and C. S. Richards,
captured.
N.C.O.'s and men: 15 killed, 43 wounded and 168 missing.
Decorations were awarded to the following:
Lieut.-Col. A. F. Marchment, M.C., and Major F. A. Phillips, the
D.S.O.; Capts. A. M. Duthie, D.S.O., T. B. Cooper, M.M., and
H. N. Williams, the M.C.; C.S.M. T. Lock, M.M., the D.C.M.;
L.-Corpl. W. J. Hutchin, M.M., Bar to M.M.; Sergts. F. G.
Udall, H. V. R. Randall and C. J. Gibbs, Corpls. G. Hayes
and A. Parker, L.-Corpls. S. G. Coates, C. L. Husk and A. J.
Deadman, and Ptes. W. A. G. Battershall, P. C. Swinchatt, A. J.
Sellars and J. R. Phillips, the M.M.
During the 29th March the 1/4th Londons remained in Brigade support.
Much movement was observed in the enemy's lines during the morning, and
our artillery was active in anticipation of a renewal of the attack,
but as the day wore on it became evident that the enemy was engaged in
relieving the attacking divisions. That evening at 7 p.m. the Battalion
handed over its trenches to the 87th Canadian Battalion (4th Canadian
Division) and marched out to billets at Mont St Eloy, arriving there at
2 a.m. on the 30th March.