THE 2/4TH BATTALION IN THE SECOND BATTLE OF THE SOMME, 1918
I. _Preparations for the German Offensive_
The southward move of Gough's Fifth Army was for the purpose of
extending the British lines into an area hitherto occupied by
the French. Between the 10th January and the 3rd February 1918 a
considerable sector, extending from the River Omignon north of St
Quentin to Barisis, in the Forêt de St Gobain south of La Fère, was
taken over from the French. The responsibility for the whole of this
line, some thirty miles long, in addition to about twelve miles from
Gouzeaucourt to the Omignon, hitherto held by Byng's Third Army, fell
upon Gough.
The 58th Division was at first in reserve and was billeted in the
Amiens area, the 2/4th Londons being quartered on the evening of the
22nd January at Thézy-Glimont, a pleasant village near the confluence
of the Avre with the Noye, about eight miles south-east of Amiens,
where French pre-war civilisation was still almost untouched. It is
needless to remark how delightful to all ranks were these peaceful
surroundings after the ghastly shell-torn swamps of Poelcapelle. About
a fortnight passed at Thézy-Glimont in the usual routine of training,
during which one or two small drafts joined the Battalion. Lieut. B.
Rivers Smith left the Battalion on the 1st February for six months'
duty in England.
The most important feature of the rest period was the reorganisation of
Divisions on a ten-battalion basis,[6] of which a note has been given
in the preceding chapter. In the 58th Division, as in the 56th, the 4th
London Battalion was selected for continued existence, and at the end
of January the 2/4th Battalion was strengthened by the transference
from the disbanded 2/1st Londons of 10 officers and 221 other ranks.
The officers who joined from the 2/1st Londons were Capt. W. D. Ramsey;
Lieuts. W. C. Morton, G. J. L. Menges, W. B. Evans; 2/Lieuts. R. H. J.
Mendl, A. Woodington, C. J. C. Wildman, W. H. Parslow, S. H. E. Crane
and H. W. Durlacher. After the reorganisation the infantry of the
Division comprised the following units:
[6] Three Brigades of three battalions each, and one pioneer battalion.
173RD BRIGADE--2/2nd London Regiment (Royal Fusiliers).
3rd " " " "
2/4th " " " "
174TH BRIGADE--2/6th London Regiment (Rifles).
7th " "
8th " " (Post Office).
175TH BRIGADE--9th London Regiment (Queen Victoria's Rifles).
10th " " (Hackney).
12th " " (Rangers).
Before the Division left the Amiens area the imminence of a German
offensive was a matter of common knowledge to all ranks, and so
impressed with the seriousness of the situation was the High Command,
that on the 5th February a most inspiring message from General Gough
was conveyed in a lecture by the Brigadier, to all officers, warrant
officers and sergeants of the Brigade.
The state of affairs was indeed critical and a grave crisis in the
War was approaching. Some slight account of the general conditions
which had brought this about has already been attempted, and there is
no occasion now to recapitulate the main factors of the situation in
which the Allies found themselves. We must, however, point to one or
two conditions especially attaching to the British front which had a
pre-eminent influence on what followed.
The gradual and ever-increasing numerical preponderance of the Germans
on the British front has been referred to; translated into numbers the
position may be better appreciated. During the period from the 1st
November 1917 to the 21st March 1918, the number of German divisions
on the Western front rose steadily from 146 to 192, an increase of
46, against which the total number of British divisions in France
was but 58, and these sadly depleted in numbers. The question of the
falling off in the numbers of reinforcements sent to France at this
period has become the subject of an embittered controversy to which we
do not propose to offer any contribution. We are, however, concerned
in pointing to the result, whatever the cause, of this growing
numerical disparity, which was to confront G.H.Q. with a most anxious
problem. The British front was now some 125 miles long, and a glance
at any war map will show that the general trend of the front was in a
north-westerly direction, _i.e._ near its northern extremity the line
ran comparatively close to the sea. In other words, the space available
for manœuvre in the event of a considerable break-through by enemy
forces was dangerously small in the vital neighbourhood of the Channel
Ports; and a successful German offensive in this region might have the
effect of rolling up our forces against the sea. In the south the space
between the lines and the sea was greater, but a large enemy success in
the southern area also had serious possibilities as it might entail the
complete isolation of the British Armies from the French.
These were very briefly the two alternative possibilities which G.H.Q.
had to face, and the problem awaiting solution was how to provide with
the inadequate force at its disposal for the efficient defence of its
lines no matter where the blow might fall. The matter was further
complicated. The French were equally nervous of a sudden blow against
their weak spots in Champagne and at Rheims, which might lay open the
German road to Paris, and this fear rendered it impossible for them
to place at the disposal of British G.H.Q. sufficient forces to make
up the very grave inequality of strength which existed on the British
front. The grouping of forces was, moreover, rendered more difficult
by the fact that, so great were the available German reserves, it
might well prove that the first enemy blow, although serious and
energetic, might in reality not be the main effort. This doubt would
inevitably, whatever the Allies' dispositions might be, have the effect
of sterilising the British and French reserves for some days until it
was quite certain that the first blow was not a feint, to be succeeded
later by a still greater effort elsewhere.
Such was the problem, and surely never has a military commander been
faced by a more difficult situation; for on the wisdom of G.H.Q.'s
dispositions would probably rest the fortunes of the whole British
Empire.
Before stating the solution adopted by G.H.Q. in especial relation
to the doings of the 2/4th Battalion, we may perhaps be pardoned for
glancing at one or two aspects of Ludendorff's problem which, as is now
known from his own book, was by no means free from difficulty.
The vital necessity of a stern British defence of the Channel Ports
was appreciated by Ludendorff as fully as by the British G.H.Q.,
and he was therefore alive to the possibility--knowing the British
inferiority in numbers--that the overwhelming importance of the north
might lead to a concentration of British divisions in the north at the
expense of the southern area. But could he be certain that this course
would be adopted? He might, after staking his all in the south, find
that British G.H.Q. had outwitted him and anticipated his intention
to attack at St Quentin. It was clearly essential that, to achieve
the sweeping victory which alone could save Germany, Ludendorff must
endeavour to encompass the temporary sterilisation of the Allied
reserves which has been alluded to. To ensure this his plans must
be shrouded in secrecy till the last moment; and the organisation
of so vast an attack as was ultimately launched without disclosing
its location to a vigilant enemy must have caused Ludendorff acute
anxiety. That it was in fact accomplished can only beget admiration
on our side for a most skilful opponent. And failure to Ludendorff,
moreover, was fraught with consequences quite as awful from his point
of view as his success would be to the British. Austria had gained a
temporary respite in its victory over the Italians, but its army was
becoming disintegrated and lacking in supplies; and no one realised
more keenly than Ludendorff that the Dual Monarchy itself could not
outlive a collapse of its army. In Germany the revolutionary ideas
from Russia were beginning to have a weakening effect on the loyalty
and steadfastness of an increasing section of the population; hunger
was becoming intensified, for the comparative failure of the U-boat
campaign resulted in an ever-tightening Allied blockade. And ever in
front of Ludendorff loomed the spectre of gigantic American forces on
their way to France, which the U-boats were powerless to stop. How many
Americans had landed? How soon could they be thrown into the battle
line to turn the scale against the Central Powers? These were questions
to which Ludendorff must earnestly have sought an answer, and which
must have brought home to him the realisation that this gigantic bid
for victory he was preparing would for good or evil be the last effort
which Germany could make.
The decision of G.H.Q. on these questions was that the Channel Ports
must be adequately defended at all costs, and that if any sector of
the line must be left weakly defended, that sector must be in the
southern area, which the Fifth Army had now taken over. The depth of
the space available for retirement in rear of the lines in this area
no doubt had its influence in this decision; and in addition, the fact
that, in the event of a considerable withdrawal of our forces under the
pressure of the German attack, a natural line of defence in rear of
the forward positions seemed to be offered in the line of the Somme,
which at Péronne makes a wide sweep southwards, thus forming a natural
barrier more or less parallel with the British front in the St Quentin
district. Possibly a further factor was the apparent natural strength
of the extreme south of the front between Moy and La Fère, where the
Oise Canal and marshes formed a wide and difficult obstacle between the
Germans and our own troops. In the southern area, moreover, it would in
case of need be more easy to make use quickly of such reserves as the
French might be able to place at G.H.Q.'s disposal.
II. _The Retreat from La Fère_
The Fifth Army was allotted a front of 42 miles, which was held by
17 divisions in line and 3 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions in
reserve. The sector was held by four Corps, from left to right the VII
(Congreve), the XIX (Watts), the XVIII (Maxse), and the III (Butler).
The III Corps, with which alone we are concerned, comprised at the
date of battle the 14th, 18th and 58th Divisions on a front of 30,000
yards, a gigantic sector for 27 battalions, not one of which was at war
strength. In reserve were the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions. The sector
allotted to the 58th Division, in which it relieved the 30th between
the 7th and 9th February 1918, was the extreme right of the British
Armies and extended from north of Travécy, where it touched the 18th
Division on the left, to south of Barisis, where it linked up with the
French on its right. This enormous front of nearly 9½ miles was held
by two brigades, the two subsectors finding their natural division in
the Oise marshes and the Canal de St Quentin, which at La Fère take a
sudden turn westward, thus running at right angles into the British
positions. North of the Canal the country is comparatively open and
gently undulating, while south of it the lines plunge through the hilly
and densely wooded district of the Forêt de St Gobain.
The marsh area at La Fère is about a mile and a half wide, so that
the frontage which needed active defence by each Brigade was roughly
four miles. On so vast a frontage a defence by continuous trench lines
was clearly out of the question, and the British defence was designed
to be in great depth. It was divided into three zones of defence.
The Forward Zone, about 1000 yards in depth, relied for its defence
on small company redoubts with the space between taken up by hidden
machine-guns. This zone was intended to act as a "shock-absorber" in
which the first intensity of the enemy's onslaught might be met and
checked. The main defence was to be offered in the Battle Zone, about
1500 yards in rear of the Forward Zone. The Battle Zone occupied a
depth of about 2000 yards and was to consist of isolated and wired
forts, again strengthened by inter-supporting machine-guns. It was
hoped that a final check might be administered to the enemy's attempts
in this zone, but in rear of it a further defensive system, in this
case a continuous line, was to be created as a Rear Zone. Beyond this
again the Somme line was to be put into a state of defence.
At the date of taking over this area from the French the defensive
organisation on the lines above indicated was practically non-existent.
Very little depth was provided for in the defence and in rear of the
Forward Zone practically all was yet to be done. The Battle Zone
redoubts were inadequate and insufficiently wired, while the Rear Zone
line was merely spit-locked.
For weeks, therefore, the whole energies of every available formation,
infantry holding the line, engineers, pioneers and labour corps units
from all parts of the world, were concentrated on the enormous task of
converting the G.H.Q. scheme into a reality. Valuable time which could
have been well spent in training the infantry in defensive measures
and counter-attack, and in assimilating the new personnel which had
been brought into battalions by the reorganisation of January, was
inevitably devoted to entrenching and wiring work, wearying in itself
and trying as only work done against time can become. All ranks,
however, were sufficiently impressed by the need, and all were working
with the zeal born of a grim determination to prove themselves equal to
the demands which would be made upon them.
The 173rd Brigade moved forward to take over the left or north
brigade sector on the 7th February. The 2/4th Battalion railed from
Villers-Bretonneux to Appilly, whence it marched to billets at Quierzy
on the south bank of the Oise. Here it was joined the following day by
the transport which had moved by road. On the evening of the 8th the
Battalion was attached temporarily to the 174th Brigade south of the
Canal, and on the 9th moved to the Forward Zone, where it relieved the
7th Londons. As was to be expected from the conditions under which the
line was held, the Battalion was now rather scattered, Headquarters
and C and D Companies being stationed at Amigny-Rouy, while A and B
Companies were at Sinceny and the stores and transport at Autreville.
Enemy activity in this area was almost non-existent and the whole
energies of the Battalion were devoted to entrenching work, which was
carried out under Royal Engineer supervision. Large working parties,
totalling on some occasions 12 officers and 400 other ranks, were
called for daily for a variety of tasks to which the only relief was a
periodical exchange of companies for bathing at Sinceny. On the 24th
February the Battalion completed the Divisional relief and moved to the
extremity of the British lines, where it relieved the 8th East Surreys,
Headquarters, C and D Companies occupying Bernagousse Quarries, while
A and B Companies were billeted in Pierremande. In this area the
Battalion spent a few quiet days, occupied in strengthening the battle
positions under the Royal Engineers. On the 27th it was relieved by the
7th Londons, and returned to the 173rd Brigade, going into Divisional
reserve in rear of the northern brigade subsector. In this area the
Battalion was again much split up, Headquarters, A and B Companies
being at Viry Noureuil, and C and D Companies at Tergnier. This day
the Battalion was joined by three more officers of the 2/1st Londons,
2/Lieuts. L. F. Wardle, C. B. Francis and C. W. Cumner.
The situation on the 173rd Brigade front during February had been
remarkably quiet. The policy adopted had been purely defensive, and
our artillery had shown but little activity. The distance separating
the British lines from the enemy's and the nature of the terrain had
rendered observation a matter of some difficulty; but the enemy's
energies appeared to be devoted to strengthening his own defences of
La Fère rather than to the preparation of an offensive operation. The
general impression gained from the Brigade Intelligence Summary for
this month is indeed that the idea of any attack being launched in
the La Fère area was rather ridiculous, and that everyone was quite
prepared to settle down at Fargniers for life. General Gough, however,
as is well known, did not share this comfortable optimism, for almost a
month earlier at a conference of his Corps Commanders at Catelet he had
made what later proved to be an accurate forecast of the location of
the German attack.
The Battalion's work during the three weeks immediately preceding
the battle calls for little comment. After two days in Divisional
reserve it moved forward to the Battle Zone, in which it relieved the
3rd Londons on the 2nd March, and this position it continued to hold
until the offensive was launched, providing daily working parties for
the improvement of the defences. The early days of March saw a slight
increase of artillery and trench mortar activity on both sides, but the
area was still comparatively quiet with but little outward indication
of the storm which was shortly to burst over it.
On the 7th March 2/Lieut. D. F. Crawford joined the Battalion.
The skill with which the Germans continued to conceal their intentions
was indeed marvellous. For some time past the withdrawal of divisions
from the line had taken place, but so widely disseminated had this
process been that it had attracted comparatively little notice. The
attack divisions had been assembled well in rear of the lines, beyond
the reach of our prying aeroplanes, and had there been put through a
very thorough course of training, which extended to the smallest detail
of what was expected of each division. Finally, about the middle of
March this gigantic force had begun to move towards the line, marching
by night and closely concealed by day, and by the evening of the
20th the enormous concentration was complete. Von Hutier, commanding
the Eighteenth German Army, had now between the Omignon and Vendeuil
11 divisions in line, 8 in close support and 2 in reserve; Von Gayl
opposite La Fère had 4 divisions and Von Boehn at St Gobain another 2;
making a total of 27 divisions. Opposed to this colossal strength were
Butler's 5 and Maxse's 4 weak divisions. Such were the odds on the 21st
March 1918.
Before proceeding to the battle itself there is one further point to
which we desire to refer, and that is the thick fog which lay over
the marshes of the Oise early on the morning of the 21st and the
succeeding days. The effect of this fog on what transpired had been
variously estimated. The general consensus of opinion of officers and
men who took part in the battle is that it was a great disadvantage
to the defence. In many ways this was undoubtedly the case. The
complete blotting out of all landmarks beyond a few yards' radius
rendered any sort of co-operation with adjoining units impossible; the
inter-supporting machine-guns between the redoubts were comparatively
useless for they could not see when and where to fire. The artillery
was also handicapped for it knew not where to lay its barrages to trap
the advancing enemy. Many times in the course of the battle, redoubts
which thought themselves not yet attacked suddenly realised that in
the fog they had been surrounded and cut off. The general result was
that the defence degenerated into a series of isolated battles in which
companies and platoons made individual stands, unsupported by their
comrades and in ignorance of what was occurring on their flanks.
But there is another side to the picture, and the German opinion is
equally strong, that but for the fog their success would have been
more far-reaching than it actually proved to be. The inevitable
loss of direction and touch between attacking columns, the feeling
of uncertainty born of drifting forwards without seeing one's
surroundings, the strange tricks which fog always plays in the matters
of distance and sound--all these could not but affect detrimentally
the speed and cohesion of the attack--and speed was of all things the
essential for complete German success. Swiftly though the attack came,
from the very first day the advances were made far behind schedule,
and to this extent the German attack failed. How far it failed through
the fog we will not venture to estimate; but that the fog was a
contributory factor there can be no doubt.
On the afternoon of the 20th March the order "Prepare for attack"
was received from III Corps, and by 3.30 p.m. all companies of the
Battalion were ready to man their battle positions.
The scheme of defence has already been alluded to in general terms,
and it has been indicated that both the Forward and Battle Zones were
divided into a series of defended localities each held by a company.
These localities comprised a main keep, supported by two or more
subsidiary redoubts, while the space intervening between adjoining
localities was covered by the guns of the Brigade Machine-Gun Company.
[Illustration: THE RETREAT FROM LA FÈRE, MARCH 1918]
Map No. 15 shows the relative positions of the various localities in
the scheme of defence, and in the Northern Brigade area, with which
alone we are henceforward concerned, the disposition of troops on the
night 20th/21st March was as follows:
FORWARD ZONE--2/2nd London Regiment.
Main Keep Locality: Headquarters and 1 company.
Jappy Locality: 1 company with a standing patrol at Beautor.
Brickstack Locality: 1 company.
Travécy Locality: 1 company.
BATTLE ZONE--2/4th London Regiment.
Headquarters on the Crozat Canal, Fargniers.
Fargniers South Locality: A Company (Lieut. H. J. M. Williams).
Fargniers North Locality: B Company less 2 platoons
(Capt. S. G. Askham).
Farm Rouge Locality: D Company (Capt. C. A. Clarke).
Triangle Locality: C Company (Lieut. G. E. Lester).
The two remaining platoons of B Company were detached as follows:
1 platoon (2/Lieut. D. F. Crawford) at the junction of the St
Quentin and Crozat Canals.
1 platoon (Lieut. W. F. Brown) at Condren, where there was also
a squadron of the Oxfordshire Hussars.
Quessy Locality: 1 company 1/4th Suffolks (Pioneers).
Brigade Headquarters were at Quessy Château near Crozat Canal, and
the 3rd Londons were in Divisional reserve at Viry Noureuil.
It will be seen that the bulk of the defensive force was
concentrated--if such a word may be applied to so attenuated a
defence--on the right flank, where the line of the Oise marshes, by
now practically no obstacle owing to the unusually dry spring, laid
open the road to Chauny and Noyon. It was quite evident that should the
Germans succeed in breaking through on the St Firmin-Vendeuil front
they would almost certainly endeavour to expand the breach behind
the British lines and make a south-westerly dash towards Noyon and
Compiègne in order to complete the isolation of the British armies from
the French. The Oise flank therefore was vitally important.
At 4.20 a.m. on the 21st March the enemy barrage opened with terrific
intensity. The messages to man battle positions were already written
in Brigade Headquarters, but delay was caused in conveying them to
the various units concerned, for during the first few minutes of the
bombardment Brigade Signal Headquarters were knocked out by a direct
hit, so that this and subsequent messages had to be sent by runner.
Lieut.-Col. Dann, in fact, did not receive any orders to move until
long after he had, on his own initiative, despatched his companies to
their posts.
It is rather difficult to understand why the companies were kept in
billets such as cellars under the ruins of Fargniers and Quessy until
the last moment, especially as warning of the attack had been received
the previous afternoon. Most platoons had several hundred yards, and
some as much as a mile and a half, to traverse to their trenches; and
under the intense and accurate barrage many casualties were sustained
during this forward move. By about 7.30 a.m., however, the companies
were all reported in position.
The actual time of the attack is not known, but it probably occurred
between 6.30 and 7 a.m., for at 7.10 a.m. a message was received from
Lieut.-Col. Richardson (2/2nd Londons) that the enemy was in Jappy
Keep, and about the same time the bombardment of the Battle Zone
positions became still more intense. It must be borne in mind that fog
hung over the whole area like a thick curtain, completely cutting off
the Forward Zone from the observation, which it had been reasonably
anticipated would be obtained over it. The Battle Zone troops and
Brigade Headquarters were thus in the dark as to what was going on in
the forward positions.
By 9 a.m. the enemy was reported in possession of Main Keep Locality,
which meant a serious incursion into the defences on the vital flank.
Steps were at once taken to employ the 3rd Londons (in reserve), one
company being directed on Fargniers, while artillery and machine-gun
barrages were laid on the Canal crossings at St Firmin and Beautor and
on the area west of the captured positions.
Lieut.-Col. Dann now ordered forward patrols from each of the companies
to endeavour to keep in touch with the situation, but it seems that
if these orders ever reached the companies--they certainly were not
received by the left company--the patrols themselves were destroyed by
the enemy shell fire, for no information of value was obtained.
All this time no word had been received from the Travécy Locality
though attempts were made to communicate from the 2/4th Londons and
from the 18th Division on the left, and it is probable that the fog
enabled the enemy to surround the garrison before its commander was
able to communicate with his Headquarters.
During the morning Lieut.-Col. Richardson asked for counter-attack
troops to be sent forward to him in the hope that the enemy in the St
Firmin area might be ejected, but this request was refused by Division
on the ground that the Battle Zone garrisons must be maintained intact.
In consequence, therefore, of the extreme pressure on his front,
Lieut.-Col. Richardson was compelled to order a withdrawal of the few
remaining details of his shattered battalion on to the Fargniers area
occupied by the 2/4th Londons, and by midday the fall of the Forward
Zone was complete.
Shortly after midday the fog lifted slightly, and the 2/4th Londons
in the Battle Zone became engaged with the enemy, who began to exert
pressure on the extreme right flank. At about 2 p.m. the platoon of A
Company holding Distillery Post next the Oise Canal was driven in and
Lieut.-Col. Dann ordered the company of the 3rd Londons in Fargniers to
launch a counter-attack. This effort was only partly successful, and
Distillery Post remained in German hands.
About the same time the enemy advanced in large numbers all along
the line, especially against the Farm Rouge and Triangle Localities.
The former of these had always been regarded as a weak spot in the
defences, and two reserve machine-guns were at once turned on to the
enemy advancing against it. By 3.45 p.m., after a stubborn resistance
against overwhelming numbers, Clarke's weak company was ejected from
the Farm Rouge itself, and its grip on the remainder of the Locality
much weakened. The assaulting columns continued to press on in the
direction of the Quessy Locality, thus isolating the Fargniers position
in the corner between the two Canals and completely cutting off Lester,
who was still hanging on to his position in the Triangle against
impossible odds.
A prompt endeavour to counter this very serious turn of events was
taken by Brigade, who sent forward two platoons of the Suffolks to
reinforce Clarke and fill the gap between him and Askham. The 3rd
Londons also were drawn on again, and a second company was sent forward
through Quessy to strengthen the Farm Rouge Locality. Of this company,
however, only two platoons ever reached their objective, the others
being destroyed by the enemy's fire at the crossing of the Crozat Canal.
At about 6.50 p.m. the Battle Zone, in spite of repeated and heavy
enemy attacks, was still intact with the exceptions of the penetrations
next the Canal on the extreme right and in the Farm Rouge Locality, and
it was decided to lay down a provisional S.O.S. line on the forward
edge of the Battle Zone. The enemy, however, was continuing his attacks
with great persistence, and the gradual infiltration of his storm
troops between our scattered positions was constantly altering the
situation. By 7.15 p.m. he had already overrun the new S.O.S. line
in the vicinity of the Distillery, and was beginning to close in on
Fargniers from the south.
In the 18th Division area on the left the struggle was also raging
in the Battle Zone, though one or two posts in the Forward Zone were
continuing their glorious yet hopeless struggle. Beyond the 18th
Division the 14th had received a severe blow and the Germans had
penetrated some miles into the British positions. It appeared by no
means improbable that if the enemy's progress in this region were
unchecked the left flank of the III Corps would be entirely rolled up.
A general withdrawal was therefore inevitable to prevent the line being
broken. To conform with these movements it was decided by Division to
effect a withdrawal to the line of the Crozat Canal from its junction
with the St Quentin Canal as far north as a line running due west
between the Farm Rouge and Triangle Localities, which latter was to be
held.
Instructions to this end were immediately issued, and Lieut.-Col.
Dann was ordered to conduct the withdrawal of the whole of the mixed
details now in the Fargniers corner, and all troops in the Battle Zone
were placed under his orders. This withdrawal was really a stubborn
rearguard action, for the enemy was unrelenting in his efforts to drive
in the Farm Rouge gap and reach the Canal. But a stern resistance
was offered in which gallant service was rendered by the Suffolks at
Quessy, and by midnight Lieut.-Col. Dann was enabled to report his
heterogeneous command in position on the west bank of the Canal, with
all iron rations, S.A.A., stores and Orderly Room records intact.
The defence of the Triangle Locality must now be referred to as it
comprises, owing to the wedge driven into the Farm Rouge Locality early
in the day, an isolated battle, and is a magnificent example of stern
courage against overwhelming numbers. The casualties suffered from
gas shell in this area had been numerous, but apart from the accurate
shooting of the Bosche gunners, C Company had been, like the rest of
the Battalion, not closely engaged until the Forward Zone was overrun.
The lifting of the fog about midday disclosed a large force of the
enemy, which is estimated at about a battalion, advancing against
Lester's thinly held positions. From this time onwards no orders or
messages of any kind reached Lester from Battalion Headquarters or
the adjoining companies, and he was left to fight his own battle. The
advancing enemy were hotly engaged by rifle and Lewis gun fire, and
large numbers were killed. Already D Company were losing their grip on
the Farm Rouge, but Lester decided that the only course open to him was
to await reinforcements. These never came, and probably, owing to the
utter severance of communications, it was never realised how urgent
his need was. The only support to this gallant company was one 18-pr.
gun firing over open sights from near Quessy. All the afternoon the
unequal fight was maintained, though the defenders were much harassed
by low-flying German 'planes. With the approach of dusk the mist came
down again, surrounding the company with an impenetrable curtain. Again
and again Lester sent out runners and patrols to seek connection with
the adjoining troops but these never returned. "I still hoped against
hope," he writes, "that we should be reinforced, as the Colonel had
kept rubbing it in at conferences before the battle that we had to
stand fast at all costs." At last it became clear that the flanks were
in the air and that the rear of the Company was being encircled, and it
was decided to fight back to the Crozat Canal. On the left the remains
of two platoons under Blair managed to get back, but of the others but
two men got away, and Lester, Wardle and the remainder of the company,
nearly all wounded, were captured.
This splendid fight, maintained till nearly 10 p.m. against hopeless
odds, was without doubt of enormous value in holding up the enemy and
inflicting severe loss on his picked troops. It also formed a strong
buttress to the flank of the 18th Division, without which they would
have found the right of their Battle Zone turned; and it gave time for
the withdrawal of the 2/4th Londons to the Canal line.
Lieut.-Col. Dann's mixed force on the Canal was of necessity in need
of organisation, and the 8th Londons, who had been in reserve at
Pierremande, were on their way to relieve the troops who had borne the
day's fighting. By 6 a.m. the relief was complete and the 8th Londons
were established on the Canal line, while Lieut.-Col. Dann's force,
consisting of the remains of the 2/2nd, 3rd and 2/4th Battalions, the
Suffolks, and elements of the 503rd Field Company R.E. and of the
182nd Tunnelling Company, who had also been thrown into the fight,
were assembled on a line west of Vouel, with Headquarters on the Butte
de Vouel. This position was an unfinished work, in parts not more
than a foot deep, and extended from the Butte almost due south to the
Chauny-Tergnier Road. Brigade Headquarters had withdrawn overnight to
Le Bas de Viry.
The Condren position, which had not been attacked on the 21st,
remained intact but was reinforced by a company of the Suffolks.
The results of the first day's fighting were tolerably serious. The
Forward and Battle Zones had been lost, and thus the greater part of
the defences which had been brought to a stage in any way approaching
completion were in the enemy's hands. The whole of the available
reserves were already inextricably in the fight, and should the attack
extend to the Southern Brigade area from Amigny-Rouy to Barisis there
would be no means of assisting the defence in that vicinity. Serious
losses of personnel had been sustained, and the swiftness and weight
of the blow had had their effect, though the morale of the troops were
still high. On the other hand the enemy had by no means gained the
success which he had anticipated. On the Brigade front of some 5000
yards, held by two weak battalions reinforced by parts of one other
battalion, he had employed nearly four divisions, and in spite of these
ridiculous odds had only advanced an average of about 5000 yards to
find that the defence had successfully withdrawn behind an obstacle
of much natural strength. The defence was shaken, but it was not in
the least broken, and a break through was the only means of ultimate
success to the Germans.
On arrival in the Vouel line in the early hours of the 22nd March, the
Battalion, which occupied the north end of the position near the Butte,
was reorganised in three companies, with A Company under 2/Lieut. F. G.
Williams on the right, B under Capt. Askham in the centre and D under
Capt. Clarke on the left. As on the 21st, a dense mist appeared with
the early hours, and until it rose, shortly after midday, no infantry
movement took place. Under cover of the mist the Battalion was able to
do a good deal of work on the Vouel line, and in this they were not
much interfered with, as most of the German shells were falling on the
road in front.
About 1.15 p.m. the enemy attack opened with great vigour and immense
weight on the Canal line and Tergnier. The crossing of the Canal was
rendered easier to the enemy by reason of the unfortunate fact that one
or two bridges had not been entirely demolished after our withdrawal.
All had long before been prepared for demolition, but for some reason
the charges did not explode in every case. A certain bewilderment was
caused to the defenders at first as the Germans appear to have gained
their first footing west of the Canal disguised in British uniforms
stolen from the fallen men of the 2/2nd Londons. But as soon as the
8th Londons appreciated what was happening they put up a very stubborn
resistance. After getting across the Canal the Bosche seems to have
tried to extend north and south along the western bank, and in this
he was successful in the northern area. In the south, however, the
magnificent fight made by the two companies in Tergnier checked his
progress, and time after time his attacks were stopped.
During the afternoon the German 'planes were seeking for the next
position held by us, and in spite of the hasty efforts of the Battalion
to camouflage its trench, the Vouel line was soon discovered, and
ranging on it by the German batteries rapidly ensued. No infantry
attack was delivered on the Vouel line, probably on account of the
enemy's lack of success at Tergnier.
Late in the afternoon the enemy's pressure on the 8th Londons grew
almost intolerable, and little by little he was working his way
into Tergnier. It was therefore decided to vacate the position, and
after dusk the 8th Londons fell back on to the Vouel line, which
they extended to the right from the Viry-Tergnier Road as far as
the railway. The two companies in Tergnier were ably extricated by
their commander and managed to get clear across the Oise, joining the
garrison at Condren, which had not been attacked.
The Vouel line was now the most advanced position, and at 6.30 p.m.
the Headquarters of the 3rd, 2/4th and 8th Londons were withdrawn from
it to Noureuil. The night passed without any further attempt on the
enemy's part to advance, and on our side a good deal of patrolling
activity took place. This led to several encounters with small parties
of enemy, and resulted in the collection of a quite useful bag of
German prisoners as well as a machine-gun and team. Under cover of
darkness also touch was regained with the Condren garrison.
Information was received on the evening of the 22nd that French troops
were rapidly advancing to our assistance, and that they would be ready
to counter-attack the next morning with the object of retaking the
Crozat Canal line.
On the 23rd March mist appeared yet once more, considerably hampering
our defence and giving the enemy an opportunity of massing for attack.
Shortly after 8 a.m. the French attack was launched by two battalions
of the 125th French Infantry which passed forward through the Vouel
line. The result of the attack is not definitely known as it was
impossible to see beyond a radius of about 15 yards. It is certain,
however, that it failed to reach Tergnier, and by 11 a.m. the French
advance was broken and the troops beginning to drift back into our
lines. It should be pointed out in fairness to our Allies that they had
been rushed up into the line, incomplete in equipment and transport,
and that they were called on to operate without previous reconnaissance
over ground which was shrouded in mist and unknown to them. On the
extreme left the withdrawal was conducted in some disorder, and it was
reported that the 18th Division on our left was also being forced back
through Frières Wood. The Vouel line, unfinished and shallow as it was,
was already occupied to its fullest capacity, and the French falling
back on it caused considerable congestion in the well-dug parts. About
the same time the German artillery, which had been plastering the Vouel
line fairly steadily all the morning, lifted, and was at once succeeded
by an accurate and intense machine-gun barrage. This further tended to
create difficulty in the position, for in view of the congestion of the
trench it became very hard to get orders along, while work on the gaps
between the well dug portions was almost impossible.
Shortly afterwards the mist cleared and the awkwardness of the
situation became more apparent. The 18th Division were being pressed
back towards Villequier-Aumont, and the left flank was entirely in
the air, while the constant pushing of small highly trained bodies of
the enemy was enabling them to progress along the Oise marshes on the
right. Vouel itself was strongly occupied, and troops were massing for
attack. By 12 noon the position was no longer tenable. The enemy was
advancing frontally and from both flanks, and Lieut.-Col. Dann ordered
a withdrawal on to the Green line. This was a partly dug position which
formed a portion of the Rear Zone and was held by troops of the 6th
Dismounted Cavalry Brigade and the 18th Entrenching Battalion, on a
line east of Noureuil and Viry-Noureuil from the St Quentin Canal to
the Vouel-Villequier Road. The withdrawal to the Green line from the
Vouel position averaged about 1500 yards, and so hard were the enemy
pressing that some platoons had to fight their way back. An attempt
was made by the French machine-gunners in the Vouel line to cover the
Battalion's withdrawal, but this was not effective and, together with
several of our own men, they were captured.
The situation was now critical. The falling back of the 18th Division
on the left revealed a gap between the Vouel-Villequier Road and
Frières Wood of which the enemy was not slow to take advantage, and
there appeared every likelihood that the 173rd Brigade would be cut off
from the 18th Division and rolled up against the St Quentin Canal. To
meet this threat the left flank of the Green line position, consisting
of troops of the Dismounted Brigade and details of the 8th Londons,
was thrown back and extended towards Villequier-Aumont in an attempt
to gain touch once more with the 18th Division. This line was thin,
and under the continued German pressure it suffered severely. During
the afternoon the enemy thrust south again and entered Noureuil, thus
driving a wedge behind the flank of the Green line troops. A glance
at the map will show that a further withdrawal was inevitable if the
whole Brigade was not to be rounded up. This began about 6 p.m. and the
troops, including all that was left of the fighting ranks of the 2/4th
Londons, about 120 all told under Capt. Askham, fell back to a position
west of Viry-Noureuil, which village was yielded to the enemy.
During the afternoon, while the fate of the bulk of the Brigade was
still in the balance, and it was obviously imperative to check the
enemy's advance into Chauny by all available means, the Brigadier
ordered Major Grover of the 2/4th Londons, who was at Chauny with
battle surplus, to organise all available details for the defence of
the town. With remarkable skill and despatch Major Grover collected a
heterogeneous force of clerks, cooks, officers' servants, transport
drivers--anyone who could hold a rifle--and by dusk reported himself in
position on the eastern outskirts of Chauny with a force of 10 officers
and 270 other ranks at his command. Of these, 2 officers and 54 other
ranks were of the 2/4th Londons. This very brilliant piece of work
no doubt did much to save the situation, and "Grover's Force" beyond
question deserves to rank high among the various similar "scarecrow
armies" which these critical days produced.
During the afternoon Lieut.-Col. Dann was attached for duty to Brigade
Headquarters, and the remains of the 2/4th and 8th Londons came under
command of Lieut.-Col. Derviche-Jones of the latter Battalion.
The withdrawal from the Green line to the River Helot position was
considerably impeded by the French troops who were streaming in a
westerly direction, and Brigade therefore endeavoured to ascertain what
the intentions of the French Commander were. These were found to be to
hold a line from Viry-Noureuil to Villequier-Aumont, and accordingly
it was decided that the whole of the 173rd Brigade Group should be
withdrawn and reorganised in positions to support the French. This
reorganisation was successfully carried out. In view of the rapid and
confusing moves which had followed each other in such quick succession,
it may be well to state in detail the Brigade positions at dawn on the
24th March:
BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS AT ABBÉCOURT
GROVER'S FORCE--Covering the eastern exits of Chauny from
the St Quentin Canal to north of the
Chauny--Viry-Noureuil Road.
18TH ENTRENCHING BATTALION--Astride the St Quentin Canal
on the right of Grover's Force.
6TH DISMOUNTED CAVALRY BRIGADE--On the left of Grover's
Force east of the Chauny--Villequier-Aumont Road.
DETAILS OF THE 2/4TH AND 8TH LONDONS--On the left
of Grover's Force west of the
Chauny--Villequier-Aumont Road.
The Condren garrison substantially maintained its original positions
and was in touch by means of patrols with the 18th Entrenching
Battalion, while on the extreme right the 174th Brigade, which had not
been attacked, continued to hold the Amigny-Rouy--Barisis front.
On the left of the conglomerate force which now formed the 173rd
Brigade Group the line was continued by the 18th and 14th Divisions,
with whom French troops were interspersed in the direction of Cugny.
The whole line was strained to breaking-point under the unceasing
enemy pressure. Every available man was in the firing line, and
the Battalion, which had been now fighting and marching without
intermission for three days, was getting worn. But in spite of the
enormous odds the Battalion clung on with determination, for it knew
that the saving of the situation rested with itself, and attack after
attack had failed to give the German masses the break-through which was
essential for them.
For the fourth day in succession the Germans were favoured with a thick
fog which enshrouded their movements, and under cover of which they
were able to prepare a further heavy blow. Early in the morning they
attacked and broke through the French outpost line on the River Helot,
and about 11 a.m. the lifting of the mist revealed them attacking
Grover's Force east of Chauny, and also endeavouring to work round the
south of the position next the Canal. This was serious, for a wedge
driven in between the Chauny line and the Condren bridgehead, which was
also under great pressure from the enemy, might possibly involve the
loss of the Oise line, the retention of which was vital for us.
Arrangements were at once made by Brigade for a further withdrawal, and
this was rendered the more imperative by the rapid advance made on the
left of the Corps front during the day. In this region the enemy were
already threatening Guiscard, eight miles north-west of Chauny, and the
security of Noyon itself was seriously in doubt.
For several hours Grover's details and the tiny Condren force
maintained their fight, but in the afternoon the withdrawal began in
accordance with the orders already issued. Under Grover's command the
mixed force was skilfully withdrawn, fighting a stubborn rearguard
action, to a prepared position about 1000 yards east of Abbécourt,
while the detached portion of the 2/4th Londons on Grover's left, now
about 60 strong, fell back to Ognes, and marched into Besme across the
Oise about midnight. Early in the afternoon Major Grover was wounded
and Capt. Askham took over his command. By 4.30 p.m. the Abbécourt
position, being no longer tenable, was vacated and the whole of the
173rd Group, including 2/4th and 8th Londons, 503rd Field Company,
R.E. and the 6th Dismounted Cavalry Brigade, had crossed the Oise at
Manicamp. About the same time the Condren garrison which had held
manfully to its positions since the opening of the battle got clear
across the river.
Before this withdrawal was completed the whole of the Oise bridges, and
also the R.E. Dump at Chauny, were demolished, and it may be remarked
that during the four days of fighting not a single gun had been lost
except those destroyed by enemy shell fire.
With the withdrawal across the Oise the hardest of the Battalion's
fighting in this great battle was finished, though it remained in
contact with the enemy with very little rest. The Division now held
a river front of over nine miles on the south bank of the Oise from
Quierzy to Servais, in addition to the original four miles held by
the 174th Brigade in the Forêt de St Gobain. With this enormous front
in contact with an enterprising enemy no rest was yet to be expected.
The early hours of the 25th March were devoted to sorting out the
hopeless tangle of units which the battle had caused, and at 11.30
a.m. Lieut.-Col. Dann became responsible (in conjunction with the 6th
Dismounted Cavalry Brigade) for the defence of the river crossings at
Quierzy, with a composite force comprising details of four battalions,
reorganised in companies as follows:
1 Coy. representing 2/2nd Londons guarding Quierzy bridge.
1 " " 3rd Londons on its right.
1 " " 8th Londons on its left.
1 " " 2/4th Londons in support.
This company of the 2/4th Londons was the party of 60 which had reached
Besme the previous evening, and was now under 2/Lieut. Griffiths.
The same night (25th/26th March) this composite force was relieved by
the 246th French Regiment and withdrew to Besme to refit, Lieut.-Col.
Dann taking charge of another composite force of troops of the 175th
Brigade. In the meantime the remainder of the 2/4th Londons, which had
formed part of Grover's Force and were now under Askham, took up a
defensive position under orders of Lieut.-Col. Chart, 18th Entrenching
Battalion, east of Manicamp, on the south side of the Canal and the
Ailette River. At night this party was also relieved by Lieut.-Col.
Dann's force and joined the remainder of the Battalion at Besme.
The 173rd Brigade was now entirely extricated from the line, and a day
of reorganisation and collection of scattered details from the various
composite forces, which the needs of the moment had created, was of
urgent necessity. This respite was obtained on the 26th March when the
three original units were reorganised as one battalion, known as the
Fusilier Battalion as follows:
No. 1 Coy.--117 other ranks 2/4th Londons under Capt. Askham.
No. 2 Coy.-- 88 other ranks 2/4th " " 2/Lieut. Blair.
No. 3 Coy.--179 " " 2/2nd " " Capt. Wright.
No. 4 Coy.--189 " " 3rd " " 2/Lieut. Curtis.
Lieut.-Col. Dann returned from the 175th Brigade to command this newly
constituted force. In addition to the Fusilier Battalion, the Brigade
included temporarily the 12th Londons under Lieut.-Col. Bayliffe,
C.M.G., and the 18th Entrenching Battalion under Lieut.-Col. Chart.
The whole of the III Corps had now been brought south of the Oise,
and Noyon fell into the enemy's hands on the 26th. The main weight
of the German offensive continued to sweep westward in the direction
of Amiens, but with the details of this part of the fight we are not
concerned. The 58th Division, however, was not yet out of the fight,
and the enemy made repeated efforts to force a breach in the long river
line which it held, but without success. The French troops were now
numerous in this area, and though General Butler continued to command
his own Corps, the supreme command of the area was taken by the French.
In this battle the Battalion had the extraordinary experience of being
driven entirely out of the battle area. It had lost severely and borne
several days of the most terrific ordeal that it had yet been called on
to face, but with the exception of a deep indentation in its positions
at Farm Rouge on the first day there had never been any semblance of
a break-through on its front. Frequently hard pressed, often almost
surrounded, it had been forced back day after day, stubbornly fighting
but never broken.
Constituted as described above the 173rd Brigade took over the Manicamp
sector from the 175th on the evening of the 27th March, the 12th
Londons occupying the right subsector, with the Fusilier Battalion on
the left adjoining Manicamp village. The two 2/4th London Companies
were stationed on the Ailette River and in the village. The Brigade
remained in these positions strengthening the defences until the night
of 2nd/3rd April, when it was relieved by the French, the Fusilier
Battalion reaching Blérancourt at midnight. The daylight hours of the
3rd April were occupied in resting and cleaning up, and after dark
the Battalion moved to Andignicourt, where it was accommodated in an
enormous cave probably large enough to hold a brigade at full strength.
The following afternoon the route was continued and the Battalion
reached Amblèny at 8 p.m. Here the Fusilier Battalion broke up, its
component companies being once more organised as three battalions under
their respective commanders. The 12th Londons returned to their own
brigade, being replaced in the 173rd Brigade by the 16th Entrenching
Battalion (Lieut.-Col. Nicholls).
The 2/4th Londons were joined on the 3rd April by Major F. G.
Tollworthy, 1st Londons, as second in command vice Major Grover wounded.
On the 5th April another evening march was made to Dommiers, and the
next day after a very trying march the Battalion reached Villers
Cotterets at 8 p.m. Here it entrained with the remainder of the
Division for an area further north to which the III Corps had been
transferred. The total casualties sustained by the 2/4th Battalion
in the second battle of the Somme between 21st March and 3rd April
amounted to:
Officers--Lieut. J. Cairns, missing, believed killed; 2/Lieut. F.
G. Williams, died of wounds; Major A. Grover, M.C.,
Capt. C. A. Clarke, M.C., Lieut, H. J. M. Williams,
2/Lieuts. R. W. Chamberlain, C. C. H. Clifford, A.
Woodington, E. M. Cuthbertson and C. B. Francis,
wounded; Lieut. W. F. Brown, gassed; Lieuts. G. E.
Lester, H. W. Durlacher, M.C., 2/Lieuts. D. F. Crawford
and L. F. Wardle, captured.
N.C.O.'s and men: 37 killed, 125 wounded and 217 missing.
The total losses of the Division for the same period were 2204, of whom
57 officers and 1606 other ranks were missing.
III. _The Action at Villers-Bretonneux_
In the first portion of this chapter we have endeavoured to give some
account of the manner in which the 2/4th Battalion, with the 58th
Division and the whole of Butler's III Corps, had been literally pushed
aside by the main force of the German onslaught and had been extricated
from the fight due southwards through French territory, while the
advancing enemy had swept on in a westerly direction towards Amiens.
By the evening of the 28th March, that is to say, a week after the
opening of the battle, the Fifth and Third Armies had been forced back
from the line of the Somme and over the old Somme battlefields, and had
reached the Amiens defence line south of the Somme, while on the north
bank the enemy had occupied Albert.
On the 28th March a further attack was delivered on a wide front from
north of Arras to Puisieux which resulted in a severe defeat for the
Germans; but as only the 1/4th Battalion is concerned in the fighting
on this day we propose to defer the account of it to another chapter,
and to pursue for the moment the fortunes of the 2/4th Battalion until
the final stabilisation of the line in front of Amiens.
The German offensive on the Somme front was now showing signs of
weakening, though owing to the enormous losses incurred by our
divisions in personnel and material the enemy was still able to make
progress. The defences of Amiens in particular were threatened,
and Gen. Gough had been entrusted by G.H.Q. with the task of
extending and strengthening them. The last days of March saw fierce
fighting in this area, and by the 31st of the month the Fifth
Army south of the Amiens-Péronne Road had fallen back to the line
Villers-Bretonneux-Hangard, both villages inclusive to the British,
while on the right the French were holding a small corner of the angle
between the Luce and Avre Rivers on the line Hangard-Moreuil Station.
The German attacks finally exhausted themselves by April 5th, after
which date there was a short period of trench warfare.
It was to this area, still on the extreme right of the British Armies,
that the 58th Division was now directed. From Villers Cotterets, which
it left on 6th April, the 2/4th Battalion was railed to Longueau,
a suburb of Amiens. The battle line was now quite close to the
Amiens-Paris line, a lateral railroad of vital importance to us, and as
the Battalion passed Boves the British field guns were in action within
a quarter of a mile of the train.
On detrainment the Battalion marched to a reserve position in the
Bois de Gentelles, where a long day was devoted to reorganisation.
The losses of the latter end of March had not yet been made good by
reinforcements, and it was therefore decided to make use of the 16th
Entrenching Battalion for this purpose. Accordingly on the 7th April
two companies of this unit were transferred to the 2/4th Battalion,
making an increase of strength of 4 officers (Capt. B. H. C. Hettler,
M.C., and 2/Lieuts. J. W. Bocking, E. V. Grimsdell and W. T. Millar)
and 344 other ranks. With this valuable reinforcement it was possible
once again to organise four companies as follows:
No. 1 Coy. under Capt. G. H. Hetley} 2/4th London men.
No. 2 " " Capt. S. G. Askham}
No. 3 " " Capt. B. H. C. Hettler } 16th Entrenching
No. 4 " " 2/Lieut. E. V. Grimsdell} Battalion men.
It should be remarked in passing that the Entrenching Battalions had
no connection with the Labour Corps. They were trained and combatant
troops whose existence as Entrenching Battalions only dated from
the Divisional reorganisations of the preceding January, and they
represented in effect the troops which had been "left over" after the
reorganisation was completed. The bulk of the reinforcement which thus
came to the 2/4th Battalion were enlisted in the 6th K.O.Y.L.I., and
were undoubtedly some of the finest reinforcements the Battalion ever
received: although young they were very keen, and included some most
reliable non-commissioned officers.
At 7.45 p.m. on the 7th April the Battalion relieved the 12th Londons
in the Reserve system between the village of Gentelles and the
Amiens-Roye Road, Nos. 3 and 4 Companies occupying the front line
with Nos. 1 and 2 in support to them and Headquarters in the Bois
de Gentelles. For ten days the Battalion continued to occupy these
positions, constantly employed in working parties on its own defences
and on elaborately wiring the lines in conjunction with the R.E.'s.
This wire was strengthened to form a considerable obstacle for the
Gentelles line, which was the final line of the Amiens defences and was
to be held at all costs. During this tour of duty the 2/4th Battalion
suffered somewhat from German shell fire, for the British batteries
were close behind the Gentelles line.
It was confidently anticipated that the enemy would endeavour once
more to break the Amiens defences in this area. The village of
Villers-Bretonneux stands on a somewhat prominent hill seven miles
east of Amiens, and its possession would have enabled the Germans to
play havoc by their artillery with the city itself and our important
road and railway communications which radiate from it. Its value to
the Germans rendered it a matter of the highest importance to us to
defend it stubbornly. In anticipation of an attack, therefore, the
battle surplus was sent out of the trenches on the 10th and the work of
strengthening the defences pressed on with vigour.
Further reinforcements were received from the Base, numbering in all
127 other ranks. These were mostly young lads under nineteen years
of age whose despatch overseas had been rendered necessary by the
impossibility of otherwise replacing the deficiencies in the ranks.
They were all extremely keen and had received a good groundwork of
training at home. But they reached the Battalion at a time when it had
just been shaken by one battle and was about to become involved in
another, and it can only be deplored that circumstances prevented any
opportunity for assimilating them into the Battalion and for giving
them some preliminary experience of warfare under quieter conditions.
The whole Battalion was indeed rather conglomerate, for of a total of
some 650 rifles about 450 were strange to the Battalion and called upon
to go into action under a command unknown to them: this important point
should be borne in mind in considering the battle which followed.
On the evening of the 18th April the 58th Division took over from
the 5th Australian Brigade the front line east of Cachy, the 173rd
Brigade occupying the whole sector. This sector extended from the
immediate left of Hangard, through the Bois de Hangard to the
Villers-Bretonneux-Demuin Road, the 3rd Londons on the right, the
2/2nd in the centre and the 2/4th on the left. The 2/4th Battalion's
subsector, in which it relieved the 19th Australian Battalion, about
1500 yards frontage, was held with three companies (Nos. 1, 2 and 4)
in the front line and one (No. 3) in support, Headquarters occupying a
quarry east of Cachy. The 175th Brigade took over the Blue line while
the 174th was in reserve in Cagny.
The Battalion was now straining every nerve to complete the defences.
Much work was still to be done. The front line had originally existed
as a line of isolated posts, and these were not yet completely
connected up nor were they adequately wired. A great deal was to be
done in providing efficient fire positions throughout the line in order
that if lateral movement should become necessary the defence of the
position might not be impaired.
Orders were received that the front line would be held till the last.
The support company would be employed for counter-attack purposes
in the event of the enemy gaining a footing in our positions; and
the success of the defence would clearly depend on the rapidity and
skill with which this local reserve was used. The right flank of the
Brigade front was further strengthened by the 10th Londons, who were
temporarily attached in Brigade reserve.
On the 21st the Battalion suffered a severe loss in the adjutant,
Capt. F. W. Walker, D.S.O., who was wounded, his duties being taken by
Lieut. S. A. Seys, the assistant adjutant. On the 23rd Capt. Hetley
was attached to the 131st French Divisional Headquarters as liaison
officer, and his company was handed over temporarily to Capt. W. C.
Morton.
The same day information was obtained from Alsatian deserters that the
enemy attack would take place at dawn the following morning.
We may restate the distribution of companies in the trenches as follows:
In Front-- No. 2 (Askham) on the right.
No. 1 (Morton) in the centre.
No. 4 (Grimsdell) on the left.
In Support--No. 3 (Hettler).
By an extraordinary chance the enemy was yet once more favoured by
the weather, for, when his barrage dropped on our lines at 4 a.m. on
the 24th April with bitter intensity and great accuracy, the day was
dawning on a dense mist which impeded observation beyond a radius of
about 50 yards. The bombardment was severe, and in the area of forward
battery positions included gas shell.
The attack appears to have developed at widely different hours in
different parts of the line: the S.O.S. was received from the 8th
Division on the left as early as 5.40 a.m., and from Hangard at 6 a.m.,
but it was not until 6.20 a.m. that reports indicated that the 173rd
Brigade front was generally engaged. On the 2/4th Battalion front all
was ready to receive the advancing waves of German infantry, but it
must be admitted that some of the stoutest hearts were filled with
something approaching dismay when out of the fog, at a distance of 40
to 50 yards, loomed the weird forms of German tanks. So far as can
be ascertained about six tanks were directed on the 2/4th Battalion's
sector, and it was the only Battalion of the Brigade against which
they advanced. The tanks seem to have been uncertain of their bearings
in the mist and not too skilfully handled. One at least devoted its
energies to describing small circles, firing wildly into the ground
where none of our troops were posted.
In spite of this unskilful manœuvring, however, there is no doubt that
the sudden appearance of these monsters shook our defence for a moment,
and the men fell back a short distance. They remained perfectly under
control, and were rapidly rallied by their officers a short distance in
rear of the front trench, after which the German infantry, advancing
in three waves close behind the tanks, were hotly engaged with rifle
and Lewis gun fire, which inflicted heavy loss on them. Askham was hit
about twenty minutes after the attack began, and after his departure to
the Aid Post charge of affairs in the firing line, so far as control
was possible over a wide front in the mist, was assumed by Morton
of No. 1 Company. The first news of what was occurring in front was
received at Battalion Headquarters from Morton in a message timed 6.30
a.m.: "Tanks have crossed front line trenches, front line has fallen
back, have rallied them at Coy. H.Q. line."
Steadily the tanks pressed our line back though our retirement was
carried out gradually and at ghastly loss to the German infantry; and
finally Morton was able to collect all available men of the 2/4th
Battalion in the Cachy Switch.
The support company put up a good fight--Hettler was hit early--and
eventually was nearly surrounded; but it cut its way out and managed
also to gain the Cachy Switch. The Divisional records time our
retirement to the Cachy Switch at 7.40 a.m., but there seems no doubt
that the Battalion's resistance was much more prolonged than this would
indicate. Certainly Morton was not able to report the organisation of
his new position till 10.15 a.m. By this time only about one hundred
men of the Battalion with three subalterns, Prince, Sheppard and
Ewing, were under Morton's hand, though others rejoined later. The
2/4th Battalion's retirement had involved the risk of leaving the left
flank of the 2/2nd Londons on its right in the air, but this Battalion
conformed to our movement, though a gap ensued between the two units.
This was promptly filled by Brigade, who sent forward a company of the
2/10th Londons. By midday our line was more or less stabilised on a
line from the Cachy Switch immediately in front of Cachy village along
the Hangard Road. This meant that Hangard Wood was lost, and from the
left flank the bad news was also received that Villers-Bretonneux had
fallen into the enemy's hands.
Beyond artillery activity no further action of importance occurred on
the Battalion's front during the afternoon, which was busily occupied
in forming a line of shell hole defences in the new position and in
feeling out to the flanks to gain touch with adjoining units.
This was the only occasion on which either Battalion of the regiment
was called on to face tanks. There can be no question as to the
tremendous moral effect of these machines, though their actual
destructiveness--handled as they were--was not great. Under the
conditions of mist which prevented any warning of their approach,
and the conglomerate composition of the Battalion, a little initial
unsteadiness on the part of the less trained elements of the Battalion
was almost to be expected in face of such an ordeal. The rapid recovery
and steady rearguard fight back to the Cachy line, however, showed that
after the first shock the innate discipline of the Londoner asserted
itself and the number of enemy dead counted on the field was evidence
of the heavy cost to the Germans of their success.
2/Lieut. Ewing should be mentioned. "His behaviour was splendid
throughout. During the preliminary bombardment he was constantly up
and down his sector encouraging his men, and when the enemy ultimately
appeared his fire orders were clear and effective." He was awarded the
M.C., as was also Capt. Morton, who displayed throughout the day marked
qualities of leadership and coolness. Pte. Petrie, a stretcher-bearer
who gained the M.M., exhibited an utter disregard of personal danger in
pursuing his work of bringing in and tending wounded.
The heavy casualties sustained this day in "missing" were due to the
fact that in retirement the Battalion was forced to leave many men, who
might otherwise have been saved, in the enemy's hands. But the R.A.M.C.
staff under Lieut. Dunaway worked magnificently under heavy shell fire
till the last moment, thereby retrieving many wounded men who must
otherwise have been captured.
We have already pointed to the great importance of Villers-Bretonneux
in the defence of Amiens, and it is not surprising therefore that its
loss was followed by an immediate order from Army Headquarters that it
must be recaptured at all costs.
The counter-attack was delivered at 10 p.m. on the 24th April by the
9th Londons, the 54th Brigade and the Australians. Villers-Bretonneux
again passed into our hands, while on the 58th Division's front the
line was advanced about half-way forward from the Cachy Switch to the
original front line.
During the 25th April the 2/4th Battalion was not engaged, though it
was all day long subjected to severe artillery fire, which inflicted a
good many casualties. On the evening of the 25th the 2/4th Battalion
was relieved by troops of the French Moroccan Division, and withdrew on
relief to bivouacs in open country east of Boves.
The casualties of the two days' action were:
2/Lieut. J. W. Booking, killed; Capts. S. G. Askham, M.C., B. H. C.
Hettler, M.C., 2/Lieuts. S. F. G. Mears, P. J. Payne and L. H.
Sheppard, wounded; 2/Lieuts. S. C. Geering and C. W. Cumner,
missing; and in N.C.O.'s and men 23 killed, 108 wounded and 203
missing.
During the 26th April the Moroccan Division continued the
counter-attack, and at the end of the day the line was substantially
restored to its position prior to the German attack.
This was the last serious German attempt to reach Amiens. The line had
bent perilously, but the offensive in this area had been fought to a
standstill. At this point, therefore, we may leave the 2/4th Battalion
and deal with the defence of Arras, in which the 1/4th Battalion bore a
part.