This is true not only of his logical faculties, but of his l

_AMERICAN LECTURES ON THE

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS_

SECOND SERIES—1896-1897

RELIGIONS OF PRIMITIVE

PEOPLES

BY

DANIEL G. BRINTON, A.M., M.D., LL.D., SC.D.

Professor of American Archæology and Linguistics in the

University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

_FOURTH IMPRESSION_

G. P. PUTNAM’S SONS

NEW YORK AND LONDON

The Knickerbocker Press

COPYRIGHT, 1897

BY

G. P. PUTNAM’S SONS

Entered at Stationers’ Hall, London

The Knickerbocker Press, New York

ANNOUNCEMENT.

On the 24th of December, 1891, fifteen persons interested in promoting

the historical study of religions united in issuing a circular-letter,

inviting a conference in the Council Chambers of the Historical Society

of Philadelphia, on the 30th of the same month, for the purpose of

instituting “popular courses in the History of Religions, somewhat after

the style of the Hibbert lectures in England, to be delivered annually

by the best scholars of Europe and this country, in various cities, such

as Baltimore, Boston, Brooklyn, Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, and

others.” There participated in this conference personally or by letter

from Philadelphia, Rev. Prof. E. T. Bartlett, D.D., Rev. George Dana

Boardman, D.D., Prof. D. G. Brinton, M.D., Sc.D., Horace Howard Furness,

LL.D., Prof. E. J. James, Ph.D., Prof. Morris Jastrow, Jr., Ph.D.,

Provost Wm. Pepper, M.D., LL.D., of the University of Pennsylvania,

Hon. Mayer Sulzberger, Mrs. Cornelius Stevenson, and Talcott Williams,

LL.D.; from Baltimore, Prest. D. C. Gilman, LL.D., of the Johns Hopkins

University, and Prof. Paul Haupt, Ph.D.; from Boston and Cambridge, Rev.

E. E. Hale, D.D., Prof. C. R. Lanman, Ph.D., Prof. D. G. Lyon, Ph.D., and

Prof. C. H. Toy, LL.D.; from Brooklyn, Rev. Edward S. Braislin, D.D.,

and Prof. Franklin W. Hooper of the Brooklyn Institute; from Chicago,

Prest. W. R. Harper, Ph.D., of the University of Chicago, and Rev. Prof.

Emil G. Hirsch, Ph.D.; from New York, Rev. Prof. C. A. Briggs, D.D.,

LL.D., Rev. Prof. Francis Brown, D.D., Rev. G. Gottheil, D.D., Prof. R.

J. H. Gottheil, Ph.D., Rev. John P. Peters, Ph.D., and Rev. W. Hayes

Ward, D.D., LL.D.; from Ithaca, N. Y., Prest. J. G. Schurman of Cornell

University, and Hon. Andrew D. White, LL.D.

At this conference Prof. Jastrow submitted a plan for establishing

popular lecture courses on the historical study of religions by securing

the co-operation of existing institutions and lecture associations, such

as the Lowell, Brooklyn, and Peabody Institutes, the University Lecture

Association of Philadelphia, and some of our colleges and universities.

Each course, according to this plan, was to consist of from six to eight

lectures, and the engagement of lecturers, choice of subjects, and so

forth were to be in the hands of a committee chosen from the different

cities, and representing the various institutions and associations

participating. This general scheme met with the cordial approval of the

conference, which voted the project both a timely and useful one, and

which appointed Dean Bartlett, Prof. Jastrow, and Dr. Peters a committee

to elaborate a plan of organisation and report at an adjourned meeting.

That meeting was held at the Union Theological Seminary in New York City,

February 6, 1892, and, as a result, an association was organised for the

purpose of encouraging the study of religions. The _terms_ of association

then adopted, with slight modifications introduced later, are as follows:

1.—The object of this Association shall be to provide courses

of lectures on the history of religions, to be delivered in

various cities.

2.—The Association shall be composed of delegates from

institutions agreeing to co-operate, or from local boards,

organised where such co-operation is not possible.

3.—These Delegates—one from each Institution or Local

Board—shall constitute themselves a council under the name

of the “American Committee for Lectures on the History of

Religions.”

4.—The Council shall elect out of its number a President, a

Secretary, and a Treasurer.

5.—All matters of local detail shall be left to the

Institutions or Local Boards, under whose auspices the lectures

are to be delivered.

6.—A course of lectures on some religion, or phase of religion,

from an historical point of view, or on a subject germane to

the study of religions, shall be delivered annually, or at such

intervals as may be found practicable, in the different cities

represented by this Association.

7.—The Council (_a_) shall be charged with the selection of the

lecturers, (_b_) shall have charge of the funds, (_c_) shall

assign the time for the lectures in each city, and perform such

other functions as may be necessary.

8.—Polemical subjects, as well as polemics in the treatment of

subjects, shall be positively excluded.

9.—The lecturer shall be chosen by the Council at least ten

months before the date fixed for the course of lectures.

10.—The lectures shall be delivered in the various cities

between the months of October and June.

11.—The copyright of the lectures shall be the property of the

Association.

12.—One half of the lecturer’s compensation shall be paid at

the completion of this entire course, and the second half upon

the publication of the lectures.

13.—The compensation offered to the lecturer shall be fixed in

each case by the Council.

14.—The lecturer is not to deliver elsewhere any of the

lectures for which he is engaged by the Committee, except with

the sanction of the Committee.

The Committee appointed to carry out this plan as now constituted, is as

follows:

Prof. C. H. Toy, of Harvard University, Chairman.

Prof. Morris Jastrow, Jr., of the University of Pennsylvania,

Secretary.

Rev. John P. Peters, D. D., of New York, Treasurer.

Prof. Richard J. H. Gottheil, of Columbia University.

Prof. Paul Haupt, of the Johns Hopkins University.

Prof. F. W. Hooper, of the Brooklyn Institute.

Prof. J. F. Jameson, of Brown University.

Prof. F. K. Sanders, of Yale University.

President J. G. Schurman, of Cornell University.

For its first course the Committee selected as lecturer Prof. T. W.

Rhys Davids, Ph.D. LL.D., of London, England, who delivered a course

of lectures in the winter of 1894-95 on The History and Literature

of Buddhism, at the following places, with the co-operation of the

institutions named:

Baltimore, before the Johns Hopkins University.

Boston, at the Lowell Institute.

Brooklyn, at the Brooklyn Institute.

Ithaca, before the Cornell University.

New York, before the Columbia University.

Philadelphia, before the University of Pennsylvania Lecture

Association.

Providence, before the Brown University Lecture Association.

Professor Davids’ lectures were published in 1896 by arrangement with

Messrs. G. P. Putnam’s Sons, the publishers to the Committee, as the

First Series of The American Lectures on the History of Religions.

As the second lecturer, the Committee chose Prof. Daniel G. Brinton,

A.M., M.D., LL.D., Sc.D., of Philadelphia; and as the subject, “The

Religions of Primitive Peoples.” Dr. Brinton, who holds the chair of

American Archæology and Linguistics in the University of Pennsylvania,

is a leading authority on the languages and customs of the American

Indians, and on Anthropology in general. His studies have led him also

into the domain of Prehistoric Archæology and Comparative Mythology. As

the product of his investigations in the latter field, he published as

early as 1868, _The Myths of The New World_, which at once attracted the

attention of scholars, and has passed through several editions since.

In 1876 he issued an important contribution to the Science of Religion,

under the title, _The Religious Sentiment_. In addition to this he has

published a large number of works on American Languages on Anthropology,

and Archæology, the most notable of which is the series Library of

Aboriginal American Literature. His papers, scattered in various

scientific periodicals of this country and Europe, number several hundred.

The lectures delivered by him under the auspices of the Committee

represent the ripe fruit of many years of study, and will, we feel

assured, be welcomed as an important contribution to a subject now

attracting much attention.

The lectures were delivered during the winter of 1896-97, at the

following places:

Boston, (Lowell Institute).

Brooklyn, (Brooklyn Institute).

Ithaca, (Cornell University).

New Haven, (Yale University).

New York, (New York University).

Philadelphia, (University of Pennsylvania).

Providence, (Brown University Lecture Association).

The object of this Association is to provide the best opportunities for

bringing to the knowledge of the public at large the methods and results

of those distinguished specialists who have devoted their lives to the

study of the religions of other countries and other ages. It is safe to

say that there is no other subject of modern research which concerns

all classes so nearly as the study of religions. It is the hope of the

Committee to provide courses at intervals of two years, or oftener, if

the encouragement which the undertaking receives warrants it, and the

practical difficulties involved in securing competent lecturers do not

make it impossible.

Arrangements have been made for a course of lectures during the winter of

1897-98, by the Rev. T. K. Cheyne, M.A., D.D., Professor of Old Testament

Interpretation at Oriel College, Oxford, and Canon of Rochester;

whose subject will be Religious Thought and Life among the Hebrews in

Post-Exilic Days, to be followed in 1898-99 by a complementary course

on Religious Life and Thought among the Hebrews in Pre-Exilic Days, by

Professor Karl Budde, of the University of Strasburg, Germany.

JOHN P. PETERS,

C. H. TOY,

MORRIS JASTROW, JR.

_Committee on Publication._

_May 10, 1897._

CONTENTS.

PAGE

LECTURE I. THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF PRIMITIVE RELIGIONS—METHODS

AND DEFINITIONS.

Ethnology Defined—The Scientific Study of Religions—It is not

Theology—Its Methods: 1. The Historic Method; 2. The Comparative

Method; 3. The Psychologic Method—Strange Coincidences in

Human Thought—Conspicuous in Primitive Religions—“Primitive”

Peoples Defined—The Savage Mind—Examples—Means of Study: 1.

Archæology; 2. Language: 3. Folk-Lore; 4. Descriptions of

Travellers—Examples: The Early Aryans, Etruscans, Semites,

Egyptians, American Tribes, Australians, Polynesians,

etc.—“Religions” Defined—Compared with “Superstitions”—No One

Belief Essential to Religion—Atheistic Religions—Fundamental

Identity of Religions—No Tribe Known Devoid of a Religion—How the

Opposite Opinion Arose—Earliest Men probably had No Religion—No

Signs of Religion in Lower Animals—Power of Religion in Primitive

Society—True Source of Religion 1

LECTURE II. THE ORIGIN AND CONTENTS OF PRIMITIVE RELIGIONS.

Former Theories of the Origin of Religions—Inadequacy of

these—Universal Postulate of Religions that Conscious

Volition is the Source of Force—How Mind was Assigned

to Nature—Communion between the Human and the Divine

Mind—Universality of “Inspiration”—Inspiration the Product of

the Sub-Conscious Mind—Known to Science as “Suggestion”—This

Explained—Examples—Illustrations from Language—No Primitive

Monotheism—The Special Stimuli of the Religious Emotions:

1. Dreaming and Allied Conditions—Life as a Dream—2. The

Apprehension of Life and Death and the Notion of the Soul—3. The

Perception of Light and Darkness; Day and Night—The Sky God as

the High God—4. The Observation of Extraordinary Exhibitions of

Force—The Thunder God—5. The Impression of Vastness—Dignity of

the Sub-Conscious Intelligence 41

LECTURE III. PRIMITIVE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION: IN THE WORD.

An Echo Myth—The Power of Words—Their Magical Potency—The

Curse—Power Independent of Meaning—The Name as an Attribute—The

Sacred Names—The Ineffable Name—“Myrionomous” Gods—“Theophorous”

Names—Suggestion and Repetition as Stimulants—I. The Word

_to_ the gods: Prayer—Its Forms, Contents, and Aims—II. The

Word _from_ the gods: The Law and the Prophecy—The Ceremonial

Law, or _tabu_—Examples—Divination and Prediction—III. The

Word _concerning_ the gods: The Myths—Their Sources chiefly

Psychic—Some from Language—Examples—Transference—Similarities—The

Universal Mythical Cycles: 1. The Cosmical Concepts; 2. The

Sacred Numbers; 3. The Drama of the Universe; Creation and Deluge

Myths; 4. The Earthly Paradise; 5. The Conflict of Nature; 6. The

Returning Saviour; 7. The Journey of the Soul—Conclusion as to

these Identities 86

LECTURE IV. PRIMITIVE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION: IN THE OBJECT.

Visual Ideas—Fetishism—Not Object-Worship only—Identical with

Idolatry—Modern Fetishism—Animism—Not a Stadium of Religion—The

Chief Groups of Religious Objects: 1. The Celestial Bodies—Sun

and Moon Worship—Astrolatry; 2. The Four Elements—Fire, Air (the

Winds), Water, and the Earth—Symbolism of Colours; 3. Stones

and Rocks—Thunderbolts—Memorial Stones—Divining Stones; 4. Trees

and Plants—The Tree of Life—The Sacred Pole and the Cross—The

Plant-Soul—The Tree of Knowledge; 5. Places and Sites—High Places

and Caves; 6. The Lower Animals—The Bird, the Serpent, etc.; 7.

Man—Anthropism in Religion—The Worship of Beauty; 8. Life and its

Transmission—Examples—Genesiac Cults—The Fatherhood of God—Love

as Religion’s Crown 130

LECTURE V. PRIMITIVE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION: IN THE RITE.

The Ritual a Mimicry of the Gods—Magical Rites—Division of Rites

into I. Communal, and II. Personal. I. Communal Rites: 1. The

Assemblage—The Liturgy—2. The Festal Function—Joyous Character of

Primitive Rites—Commensality—The “Ceremonial Circuit”—Masks and

Dramas—3. The Sacrifice—Early and Later Forms—4. The Communion

with God—Pagan Eucharists. II. Personal Rites: 1. Relating

to Birth—Vows and Baptism—2. Relating to Naming—The Personal

Name—3. Relating to Puberty—Initiation of Boys and Girls—4.

Relating to Marriage—Marriage “by Capture” and “by Purchase”—5.

Relating to Death—Early Cannibalism—Sepulchral Monuments—Funerary

Ceremonies—Modes of Burial—Customs of Mourning 172

LECTURE VI. THE LINES OF DEVELOPMENT OF PRIMITIVE RELIGIONS.

Pagan Religions not wholly Bad—Their Lines of Development as

Connected with: 1. The Primitive Social Bond—The Totem, the

Priesthood, and the Law; 2. The Family and the Position of Woman;

3. The Growth of Jurisprudence—The Ordeal, Trial by Battle,

Oaths, and the Right of Sanctuary—Religion is Anarchic; 4. The

Development of Ethics—Dualism of Primitive Ethics—Opposition of

Religion to Ethics; 5. The Advance in Positive Knowledge—Religion

_versus_ Science; 6. The Fostering of the Arts—The Aim for

Beauty and Perfection—Colour-Symbolism, Sculpture, Metre,

Music, Oratory, Graphic Methods—Useful Arts, Architecture;

7. The Independent Life of the Individual—His Freedom and

Happiness—Inner Stadia of Progress: 1. From the Object to the

Symbol; 2. From the Ceremonial Law to the Personal Ideal; 3. From

the Tribal to the National Conception of Religion—Conclusion 214

RELIGIONS OF PRIMITIVE PEOPLES

LECTURE I.

The Scientific Study of Primitive Religions—Methods and Definitions.

CONTENTS:—Ethnology Defined—The Scientific Study of

Religions—It is not Theology—Its Methods: 1. The Historic

Method; 2. The Comparative Method; 3. The Psychologic

Method—Strange Coincidences in Human Thought—Conspicuous in

Primitive Religions—“Primitive” Peoples Defined—The Savage

Mind—Examples—Means of Study: 1. Archæology; 2. Language;

3. Folk-Lore; 4. Descriptions of Travellers—Examples: The

Early Aryans, Etruscans, Semites, Egyptians, American

Tribes, Australians, Polynesians, etc.—“Religions”

Defined—Compared with “Superstitions”—No One Belief Essential

to Religion—Atheistic Religions—Fundamental Identity of

Religions—No Tribe Known Devoid of a Religion—How the Opposite

Opinion Arose—Earliest Men probably had No Religion—No Signs

of Religion in Lower Animals—Power of Religion in Primitive

Society—True Source of Religion.

The youngest in the sisterhood of the sciences is that which deals with

Man. In its widest scope it is called Anthropology, and as such includes

both the physical and mental life of the species, from the beginning

until now. That branch of it which especially concerns itself with the

development of man as indicated by his advance in civilisation, is known

as Ethnology.

When we analyse the directive forces which have brought about this

advance, and whose study therefore makes up Ethnology, they can be

reduced to four, to wit, Language, Laws, Arts, and Religion. Do not

imagine, however, that these are separable, independent forces. On the

contrary, they are inseparable, constituent elements of an organic unity,

each working through the others, and on the symmetrical adjustment of all

of them to the needs of a community depend its prosperity and growth. No

one of them can be omitted or exaggerated without stunting or distorting

the national expansion. This lesson, taught by all ages and confirmed by

every example, warns us to be cautious in giving precedence to one over

the others in any general scheme; but we can profitably separate one from

the others, and study its origins and influence.

On this occasion I invite your attention to Religion, and especially as

displayed in its earliest and simplest forms, in the faiths and rites of

primitive peoples. I shall present these to you in accordance with the

principles and methods of Ethnology.

There is what has been called the “science of religion.” The expression

seems to me a little presumptuous—or, at least, premature. We do not yet

speak of a “science of jurisprudence,” although we have better materials

for it than for a science of religion. I shall content myself, therefore,

in calling what I have to offer a study of early religions according to

scientific methods.

I need not remind you that such a method is absolutely without bias or

partisanship; that it looks upon all religions alike as more or less

enlightened expressions of mental traits common to all mankind in every

known age.[1] It concedes the exclusive possession of truth to none, and

still less does it aim to set up any other standard than past experience

by which to measure the claims of any. It brings no new canons of faith

or doctrine, and lays no other foundation than that which has been laid

even from the beginning until now.

But just there its immediate utility and practical bearings are

manifested. It seeks to lay bare those eternal foundations on which the

sacred edifices of religion have ever been and must ever be erected. It

aims to accomplish this by clearing away the incidental and adventitious

in religions so as to discover what in them is permanent and universal.

Those sacred ideas and institutions which we find repeated among all the

early peoples of the earth, often developing in after ages along parallel

lines, will form the special objects of our investigation. The departures

from these universal forms, we shall see, can be traced to local or

temporary causes, they turn on questions of environment, and serve merely

to define the limits of variability of the ubiquitous principles of

religion as a psychic phenomenon, wherever we find it.

This is not “theology.” That branch of learning aims to measure the

objective reality, the concrete truth, of some one or another opinion

concerning God and divine things; while the scientific study of religions

confines itself exclusively to examining such opinions as phases of human

mental activity, and ascertaining what influence they have exerted on the

development of the species or of some branch of it. Therefore it is never

“polemic.” It neither attacks nor defends the beliefs which it studies.

It confines itself to examining their character and influence by the

lights of reason and history.

The methods which we employ in this process of reduction are three in

number: 1. The Historic Method; 2. The Comparative Method; 3. The

Psychologic Method. A few words will explain the scope of each of these.

The Historic Method studies the history of beliefs and the development of

worship. It seeks to discover what influences have been exerted on them

by environment, transmission, heredity, and conquest, and to bring into

full relief what is peculiar to the tribe or group under consideration,

and what is exotic. For in one sense it is true that every nation and

tribe, even every man, has his own religion.

Such ethnic traits merit the closest scrutiny. They are so marked

and constant as to modify profoundly the history of even the ripest

religions. It is quite true, as has been observed by an historian of

Christianity, that “there is in every people an hereditary disposition to

some particular heresy,”[2] that is, to altering any religion which they

accept in accordance with the special constitution of their own minds.

The Comparative Method notes the similarities and differences between the

religions of different tribes or groups, and, gradually extending its

field to embrace the whole species, endeavors, by excluding what is local

or temporal, to define those forms of religious thought and expression

which are common to humanity at large.

The Psychologic Method takes the results of both the previous methods

and aims to explain them by referring the local manifestations to the

special mental traits of the tribe or group, and the universal features

to equally universal characteristics of the human mind.

The last, the Psychologic Method, is the crown and completion of the

quest; for every advanced student of religion will subscribe to the

declaration of Professor Granger, that “all mythology and all history

of beliefs must finally turn to psychology for their satisfactory

elucidation.”[3] In other words, the laws of human thought can alone

explain its own products.

And here I must mention a startling discovery, the most startling, it

seems to me, of recent times. It is that these laws of human thought are

frightfully rigid, are indeed automatic and inflexible. The human mind

seems to be a machine; give it the same materials, and it will infallibly

grind out the same product. So deeply impressed by this is an eminent

modern writer that he lays it down as “a fundamental maxim of ethnology”

that, “we do not think; thinking merely goes on within us.”[4]

These strange coincidences find their explanation in experimental

psychology. This science, in its modern developments, establishes the

fact that the origin of ideas is due to impressions on the nerves of

sense. The five senses give rise to five classes of ideas, the most

numerous of which are those from the sense of sight, visual ideas, and

those from the sense of hearing, auditory ideas. The former yield the

conceptions of space, motion, and lustre (colour, brightness, etc.),

the latter that of time. From the sense of touch arise the “tactual”

impressions, which yield the ideas of power and might, through the

sensations of resistance and pressure, pleasure and pain. From these

primary ideas (or perceptions), drawn directly from impressions,

are derived secondary, abstract, and general ideas (apperceptions)

by comparison and association (the laws of Identity, Diversity, and

Similarity).

Under ordinary conditions of human life there are many more impressions

on the senses which are everywhere the same or similar, than the

reverse. Hence, the ideas, both primary and secondary (perceptions and

apperceptions), drawn from them are much more likely to resemble than to

differ.

The consequence of this is that the same laws of growth which develop the

physical man everywhere into the traits of the species, act also on his

psychical powers, and not less absolutely, to bring their products into

conformity.

This is true not only of his logical faculties, but of his lightest

fancies and wildest vagaries. “Man’s imagination,” observes Mr. Hartland,

“like every other known power, works by fixed laws, the existence and

operation of which it is possible to trace; and it works upon the same

material,—the external universe, the mental and moral constitution of

man, and his social relations.”[5]

In reference to my particular subject, Professor Buchmann expressed some

years ago what I believe to be the correct result of modern research

in these words: “It is easy to prove that the striking similarity

in primitive religious ideas comes not from tradition nor from the

relationship or historic connections of early peoples, but from the

identity in the mental construction of the individual man, wherever he is

found.”[6]

We can scarcely escape a painful shock to discover that we are bound by

such adamantine chains. As the primitive man could not conceive that

inflexible mechanical laws control the processes of nature, so are we

slow to acknowledge that others, not less rigid, rule our thoughts and

fancies.

Nowhere, however, is the truth of it more clearly demonstrated than in

primitive religions. Without a full appreciation of this fact, it is

impossible to comprehend them; and for the lack of it, much that has

been written upon them is worthless. The astonishing similarity, the

absolute identities, which constantly present themselves in myths and

cults separated by oceans and continents, have been construed as evidence

of common descent or of distant transmission; whereas they are the

proofs of a fundamental unity of the human mind and of its processes,

“before which,” as a German writer says, “the differences in individual,

national, or even racial divisions sink into insignificance.”[7] Wherever

we turn, in time or in space, to the earliest and simplest religions of

the world, we find them dealing with nearly the same objective facts in

nearly the same subjective fashion, the differences being due to local

and temporal causes.

This cardinal and basic truth of the unity of action of man’s

intelligence, which is established just as much for the arts, the laws,

and the institutions of men as for their religions, enables me to

present to you broadly the faiths of primitive peoples as one coherent

whole, the product of a common humanity, a mirror reflecting the deepest

thoughts of the whole species on the mighty questions of religious life

and hope, not the isolated or borrowed opinions of one or another tribe

or people.

Of course, the recognition of this principle does not diminish the

attention to be paid to the ethnic or local developments of culture and

to the borrowing or transference of myths and rites. Wherever this can be

shown to have occurred, it is an adequate explanation of identities; but

in tribes geographically remote, the presumption is that such identities

are due to the common element of humanity in the species.

Such similarities are by no means confined to the primitive forms of

religion; but in them they are more obvious, and their causes are

more apparent; so for that reason, a study of such primitive forms is

peculiarly remunerative to one who would acquaint himself with the

elements of religion in general. No one, in fact, can pretend to a

thorough knowledge of the great historic religions of the world who has

not traced their outlines back to the humble faiths of early tribes from

which they emerged.

He must have recourse to them for like reasons that the biologist, who

would learn the morphology of a mammal, betakes himself to the study of

the cells and fibres of the simplest living organisms; for in their

uncomplicated forms he can discover the basic activities which animate

the highest structures.

I must define, however, more closely what ethnologists mean by “primitive

peoples”; because the word is not used in the sense of “first” or

“earliest,” as its derivation would indicate. We know little, if

anything, about the earliest men, and their religion would make a short

chapter. “Primitive” to the ethnologist means the earliest of a given

race or tribe of whom he has trusty information. It has reference to a

stage of culture, rather than to time. Peoples who are in a savage or

barbarous condition, with slight knowledge of the arts, lax governments,

and feeble institutions, are spoken of as “primitive,” although they may

be our contemporaries. They are very far from being the earliest men or

resembling them. Hundreds of generations have toiled to produce even

their low stage of culture up through others, far inferior, of which we

can form some idea by the aid of language and prehistoric archæology.

They are therefore not degenerates, ruins fallen from some former high

estate, some condition of pristine nobility. That is an ancient error,

now, I hope, exploded and dismissed from sane teaching. Even the rudest

of savages is a creation of steady, long-continued advancement from the

primeval man. We have the evidence of what he was, in his implements

and weapons preserved in pre-glacial strata and in the mud-floors of the

caves he inhabited.

These announce to us a law of progressive advancement for all races, over

all the earth, on the same lines of progress, toward the same goals of

culture, extremely slow at the outset, and unequal especially in later

ages, but vindicating the unity of the species and the identity of its

hopes and aims everywhere.

You will understand, therefore, that by “primitive peoples,” I mean

savage or barbarous tribes, wherever they are or have been, and that I

claim for them brotherhood with ourselves in all the traits that go to

make up oneness of species. A few hundred years ago the ancestors of the

English-speaking nations were as savage as the savagest, without temples

to their gods, in perpetual and bloody war, untamed cannibals; add a few

thousand years to the perspective, and man over the whole globe was in

the same condition.

The savage state was the childhood of the race, and by some the mind of

the savage has been likened to that of the child. But the resemblance

is merely superficial. It rather resembles that of the uncultivated and

ignorant adult among ourselves. The same inaccurate observation and

illogical modes of thought characterise both. These depend on certain

mental traits, which it is well to define, because they explain most of

the absurdities of primitive religions.

The first is, that the idea is accepted as true, without the process of

logical reasoning or inductive observation. In other words, what appears

true to the individual is accepted by him as true, without further

question. His dreams seem real to him; therefore they are real. What the

tribe believes, he believes, no matter what his senses tell him.

When an Australian Black is on a journey and fears being overtaken by the

night, he will place a lump of clay in the forks of a tree, believing

that thus he can arrest the motion of the sun and prolong the day. It is

not a religious act, but a piece of natural science current in the tribe,

which no experience will refute in their minds.[8]

Just such a notion recurs among the Mandan Indians. Captain Clark

observed near their villages upright poles fifteen or twenty feet

long with bundles of female clothing tied to them. He asked what they

signified, and one of the old men explained thus: “If you watch the sun

closely, you will see that he stops for a short time just as he rises,

and again at midday, and as he sets. The reason is that he rests a few

moments to smoke in the lodges of three immortal women, and we offer them

this clothing that they may be induced to say a kind word to him in our

behalf. We were told by our ancestors not to forget this.”[9] The fact

that the orb does not stop was of no consequence in the face of this

tradition.

The second trait is the extreme nervous susceptibility of savages. It

is much higher than ours, although the contrary is often taught. Their

emotions or feelings control their reasoning powers, and direct their

actions. Neurotic diseases, especially of a contagious character, are

very frequent among them, and they are far more prone than ourselves to

yield to impressions upon their sensory organs. The traveller Castren

relates that a sudden blow on the outside of a tent of the Samoyeds will

sometimes throw the occupants into spasms; and the missionary Livingstone

draws a touching picture of young slaves dying of “a broken heart,” when

they heard the song and music of the villagers and could not join in the

revelry.[10]

These two traits, therefore, the acceptance of the idea as subjectively

true, and the subordination of reason to the feelings, are the main

features of the undeveloped mind. They are common in civilised

conditions, but are universal in savagery.

The question has often been considered whether the mental powers of the

savage are distinctly inferior. This has been answered by taking the

children of savages when quite young and bringing them up in civilised

surroundings. The verdict is unanimous that they display as much aptitude

for the acquisition of knowledge, and as much respect for the precepts

of morality, as the average English or German boy or girl; but with less

originality or “initiative.”

I have been in close relations to several full-blood American Indians,

who had been removed from an aboriginal environment and instructed in

this manner; and I could not perceive that they were either in intellect

or sympathies inferior to the usual type of the American gentleman.

One of them notably had a refined sense of humour, as well as uncommon

acuteness of observation.

The assertion, however, is frequently advanced that in their savage state

they are of the earth earthy, that their whole time is taken up with the

gratification of sensuous desires, and that they neither think nor care

for speculations of a super-sensuous or spiritual character.

The investigation of this point is desirable in a study of their

religions, for upon it depends the decision whether we can assign to

their myths and rites a meaning deeper than that of deception, or

passion, or frivolity.

To reach a decision, I take the most unfavourable example which can

be suggested,—the Australian Blacks. Considering their number and the

extent of their territory, they were, when discovered, the most degraded

people on the globe. They had nothing which could be called a government,

and some dialects have no word for chief. None of them could count the

fingers on one hand, for none of the dialects had any words for numerals

beyond _three_ or _four_. Mr. Hale, the eminent ethnographer, who was

among them in 1843, says that they evinced “an almost brutal stupidity,”

“downright childishness and imbecility.”[11]

Their natural feelings and moral perceptions seem incredibly blunted. I

can best illustrate this by narrating an incident which happened at a

frontier station, one of many of the same character.

The white family employed a native girl named Mattie about fifteen years

old. She had a baby, which one day disappeared. On inquiry she stated

that her mother had said that she was too young to take care of a baby,

and had therefore cooked and eaten it with some of her cronies. Mattie

cried in telling this. Because her baby had been killed? Oh no! but

because her mother had given her none of the tidbits, but only the bones

to pick![12]

Yet even these seemingly hopeless brutes have an intricate system of

kinship and marriage laws, the most rigid of any known. Marriage with

sisters or first cousins is not only forbidden, “It is not conceived as

possible.” The prohibitions about food are so absolute that the natives

would perish of hunger rather than break them. Some of their religious

ceremonies entail voluntary mutilations of the most dreadful description.

Their mythology is extensive, and I shall have frequent occasion to quote

it. And so far are they from an obtuse indifference to the future and the

past, an accurate observer who lived among them says: “They wonder among

themselves and talk at night about these things, and the past existence

of their race, and how they came here.”[13]

Savage tribes are distinctly unlettered. They belong in a stage of

culture where the art of writing, as we understand it, is unknown. They

have no bibles, no sacred books, by which to teach their religions. What

means have we, therefore, to learn their opinions about holy things?

The question is one which demands an answer, the more because I shall

often refer to the religions of tribes long since extinct, and whose very

names are forgotten. How do we dare to speak with confidence of what they

thought about the gods?

We can do so, and it is one of the marvels of modern scientific research,

quite as admirable as its more familiar and practical results.

Our sources of information regarding primitive peoples may be classed

under four titles, Archæology, Language, Folk-lore, and Ethnographic

descriptions.

By the first of these, archæology, we become acquainted with the

objective remains of beliefs long since extinguished. The temples, idols,

and altars of dead gods reveal to us the attributes assigned to them by

their votaries and the influences they were believed to exert. We can

interpret their symbols, and from rude carvings re-construct the story of

their divine struggles. Especially, from ancient sepulchres and the modes

of disposal of the dead which they reveal, can we discern what hopes

vanished nations held of a life to come.

In this direction, we are powerfully aided by that close similarity of

mental products in like stages of culture, to which I have referred,

and shall often refer. By comparing a living tribe with one which ten

thousand years ago was in a similar condition as shown by its relics, we

can with the highest probability interpret the use and motives of the

latter’s remains.

We are further assisted in such research by the critical analysis of

the early forms of language, which is one of the achievements of modern

linguistics. By establishing the identities of names, we can trace the

diffusion of myths, and by tracing such names to their proper dialect and

original meaning, we can locate geographically and psychologically the

origin of given forms of religions. In fact, the value of linguistics

to the study of religions cannot be overestimated. No one is competent

to describe the sacred beliefs of a nation, its myths and adjurations,

unless he has a sufficient knowledge of its tongue to ascertain the true

sense of the terms employed in its liturgies.

But these so obvious applications are the least that language can

furnish. Its impress on religions goes much deeper. It was well remarked

by the Chevalier Bunsen that in primitive conditions the two poles of

human life, around which all else centres, are language and religion,

and that each conditions the other, that is, imparts to it special forms

and limits.

For instance, those languages which have grammatic gender almost

necessarily divide their deities according to sex[14]; those in which the

passive voice is absent or feebly developed, will be led to associate

with their deities higher conceptions of activity than where the passive

is a favourite form: those which have no substantive verb cannot express

God as pure being, but must associate with Him either position, action,

or suffering.

In the speech of the Algonquin Indians, there is no grammatic distinction

of sex; but there is broad discrimination between objects which are

animate and those which are inanimate. When the Catholic missionaries

brought to them the rosary, the natives at first spoke of it as

inanimate; but as their reverence for it grew, it was transferred to the

animate gender, and was thus on its way to a personification.[15]

The third source of information is that which is called folk-lore. Its

field of research is to collect the relics and survivals of primitive

modes of thought and expression, beliefs, customs, and notions, in the

present conditions of culture. It is, therefore, especially useful in

a study like the present, the more so on account of the extraordinary

permanence and conservative character of religious sentiments and

ceremonies. Among the peasantry of Europe, the paganism of the days of

Julius Cæsar flourishes with scarcely abated vigour, though it may be

under new names. “The primitive Aryan,” writes Professor Frazer,[16] “is

not extinct; he is with us to-day.” And another English writer does not

go too far when he says: “There is not a rite or ceremony yet practised

and revered among us that is not the lineal descendant of barbaric

thought and usage.”[17] It is this which gives to folk-lore its extremely

instructive character for the student of early religion.

The fourth source of information is the description of native religions

by travellers. You might expect this to be the most accurate and

therefore valuable of all the sources; but it is just the reverse.

Omitting the ordinary tourist and globe-trotter, who is not expected

to know anything thoroughly, and never deceives the expectation, even

painstaking observers, who have lived long with savage tribes, sometimes

mastering their languages, are, for reasons I shall presently state,

constantly at fault about the native religions. We must always take their

narratives with hesitation, and weigh them against others by persons of

a different nationality and education. Indeed, of all elements of native

life, this of religion is the most liable to be misunderstood by the

foreign visitor.

Bearing in mind these various sources of information, what tribes,

about which we have sufficient knowledge, could fairly be considered as

examples of primitive conditions?

Beginning with those remotest in time, I believe we know enough about

the early Aryans to claim it for them. The acute researches of recent

scholars, so admirably summed up in the work of Professor Schrader,

have thrown a flood of light on the domestic, cultural, and religious

condition of the pristine epoch of Aryan society from the side of

language; while the tireless prosecution of prehistoric archæology in

Europe has put us into possession of thousands of objects illustrating

the religious arts and usages then in vogue. Classical mythology and

ritual, as well as modern folk-lore, lend further efficient aid toward

reconstructing the modes and expressions of their sacred thought.

A very ancient people, possibly of Aryan blood, but more likely, I

believe, to have come from North Africa and to be of Libyan affinities,

were the Etruscans. They were extremely religious, and their theological

opinions deeply coloured the worship of the Romans. We know the general

outlines of their doctrine of the gods, and its simplicity and grandeur

bespeak our admiration. I shall draw from this venerable “Etruscan

discipline” from time to time for illustrations.

Quite as much may be said of the diligence of the explorers and scholars

in the field of Semitic antiquity. We can without room for doubt trace

the stream of Semitic religious thought through the Hebrew Bible and

the Assyrian and Babylonian cuneiform tablets to a possibly non-Semitic

source among the Accadian or Sumerian population, which ten thousand

years ago had already begun to develop an artistic and agricultural life

on the Babylonian plain. Numerous students have restored the outlines and

motives of this ancient faith, whose forms and doctrines bind and shape

our lives in America to-day.

Of the possibly still older culture of Egypt, so much cannot be said. The

original creeds of its religion have been less successfully divined. Like

its early inscriptions, they were erased and overlaid so often by the

caprice or prejudice of successive dynasties, and so profoundly modified

by foreign influences, that with our present knowledge they are no

longer legible.[18]

Turning to the religions which have preserved their primitive forms to

modern times, the first place should be conceded to those of America. Up

to four hundred years ago, all of them, throughout the continent, had

developed from an unknown antiquity untouched by the teachings of Asian

or European instructors; for no really sane scholar nowadays believes

either that St. Thomas preached Christianity in the New World in the

first century, or that Buddhist monks in the seventh or any other century

carried their tenets into Mexico and Guatemala.

Many of the American tribes, moreover, lived in the rudest stages of

social life, ignorant of agriculture, without fixed abodes, naked

or nearly so, in constant bloody strife, destitute even of tribal

government. Here, if anywhere, we should find the religious sentiment, if

it exists at all, in its simplest elements.

On the other hand, the first European explorers found in Peru, Yucatan,

and Mexico numerous tribes in almost a civilised condition, builders

of huge edifices of carved stones, cultivating the soil, and acquainted

with a partly phonetic system of writing. Their mythology was ample and

their ritual elaborate, so that it could scarcely be called primitive in

appearance; but in all these instances, myth and ritual were so obviously

identical in character with those of the vagrant tribes elsewhere, that

we shall make no mistake in classifying them together.

Equally isolated and surely as rude as the rudest were the native

Australians, the wavy-haired, bearded, black people who sparsely

inhabited that huge island, two thousand miles wide by two thousand five

hundred miles long. Isolated by arid stretches of desert, the struggle

for life was incessant, and there is little wonder that we find them

in an incredibly debased condition associated with unending war and

cannibalism. For these very reasons, their religious notions deserve our

closest scrutiny.

The vast island-world of Polynesia was peopled by related tribes, usually

of limited cultivation, but with a rich mythology, of which we have

many strange and beautiful fragments. They are primitive in form and

expression, with singular differences as well as analogies to the beliefs

of continental tribes.

Africa, with its countless dusky hordes, offers a less promising field

to the student of the earliest phases of religion than we might expect.

The conditions of the arts, and the ruins of foreign-built cities unite

with the classic historians to show that in remote ages the influence

of distant nations, from Egypt, Arabia, and India, on the typical black

population was profound and far-reaching. The white Hamites of the north

crossed the Sahara and extended their arms far into the Soudan; while

on the east coast, the black Hamites and Arabic Ethiopians drove the

aborigines far to the South. Later, Arabic influences penetrated into the

interior, dissolving the older faiths or discolouring them. Thus, little

of the independent development of religious thought remains in Africa.

Its most primitive features are probably best preserved in the extreme

South, among the Hottentots, Bushmen, and Zulus.

On the Asian continent, some of the Sibiric tribes in the north and some

of those of Dravidian descent in the mountains of Hindoostan preserved

to a late day their primitive traits; while the fading remnants of the

Veddahs in Ceylon and the black islanders of Melanesia still continue in

the simple faiths of their ancestors.

These hints will indicate the chief sources from which I shall draw the

material to illustrate the rudimentary stages of religious thought and

act, the embryonic period, as it were, of those emotions and beliefs

which to us, in riper forms, are so dear and so holy.

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