End of the War and My Abdication
A few days after August 8, 1918, I summoned a Crown Council, in order
to get a clear conception of the situation and to draw therefrom the
necessary conclusions upon which to base the policy to be followed
by Count Hertling. The Chief Military Command approved the idea
that the Imperial Chancellor should keep in sight the possibility
of getting into closer touch with the enemy, but laid stress on the
necessity of first occupying the Siegfried line and there thoroughly
beating off the foe, and on the fact that negotiations must not begin
before this occurred. Thereupon I directed that the Chancellor get
into communication with a neutral power--the Netherlands--in order
to ascertain whether it was ready to undertake such a step toward
mediation.
What rendered the contemplated action through Dutch channels very
difficult was that Austria could not be brought to a definite
agreement, but continually postponed the declaration which had been
requested of her. Even a verbal agreement given to me by the Emperor
Charles was afterward broken by him under Burian's influence.
The Dutch government had already been informed by me and had signified
its readiness to act. Meanwhile, Austria, without notifying us, made
her first separate peace offer, which set the ball rolling. The Emperor
Charles had indeed got into touch secretly with the Entente and had
long since resolved to abandon us. He acted according to the plan which
he had explained thus to his entourage: "When I go to the Germans, I
agree to everything they say, and when I return home, I do whatever I
please."
Thus it happened that my government and I were constantly deceived by
actions in Vienna, without being able to do anything against it, since
from there we constantly received the hint: "If you make things hard
for us, we shall leave you in the lurch; in other words, our army will
no longer fight by your side." In view of our situation, such action on
Austria's part had to be avoided in any way possible, both on military
and political grounds.
The defection of Hungary and Austria brought a crisis upon us. Had
Emperor Charles kept control of his nerves for three weeks longer, many
things would have turned out differently. But Andrassy--as he himself
admitted--had been negotiating for a long time in Switzerland, behind
our backs, with the Entente. Thus Emperor Charles believed that he
would assure himself of good treatment at the hands of the Entente.
After our failure of August 8th, General Ludendorff had declared
that he could no longer guarantee a military victory. Therefore,
the preparation of peace negotiations was necessary. Since diplomacy
had not succeeded in initiating any promising negotiations and the
military situation had become even worse in the meantime, on account of
revolutionary agitation, Ludendorff, on the 29th of September, demanded
that preparations be made for an armistice instead of for peace
negotiations.
MOVEMENT FOR ABDICATION
At this critical time a strong movement began at home in favor of
setting up a new government for the now necessary termination of the
war. I could not ignore this movement, since the old government, during
the seven weeks from August 8th to the end of September, had not
managed to initiate peace negotiations offering any hope of success.
Meanwhile, General von Gallwitz and General von Mudra, summoned from
the front, appeared before me. They gave a picture of the inner
situation of the army, laying due emphasis upon the great number of
shirkers behind the front, the frequency of insubordination, the
displaying of the red flag upon trains filled with soldiers returning
from furloughs at home and other similar phenomena.
The two generals considered that the principal cause of the bad
conditions was to be sought in the unfavorable influence exerted upon
the soldiers by the spirit predominating behind the front and in the
general desire for ending the fighting and getting peace, which was
spreading from the homeland along the lines of communication behind the
front and was already becoming noticeable even among some of the troops
at the front itself. The generals advanced the opinion that, owing
to these reasons, the army must immediately be withdrawn behind the
Antwerp-Meuse line.
On that same day I commanded Field Marshal von Hindenburg by telephone
to effect as soon as possible the retreat to the Antwerp-Meuse line.
The falling back of the tired, but nowhere decisively beaten, army to
this position merely signified occupying an essentially shorter line,
possessing far greater natural advantages. It was not yet completed,
to be sure, but the fact was to be borne in mind that we had engaged
in battle on the Somme while occupying positions composed largely of
shell craters. What we had to do was to regain operative freedom,
which, to my way of thinking, was by no means impossible; in the course
of the war, had we not often retreated in order to put ourselves in a
situation that was more advantageous from the military point of view?
The army, to be sure, was no longer the old army. The new 1918 troops
particularly were badly tainted with revolutionary propaganda and often
took advantage of the darkness at night to sneak away from the firing
and vanish to the rear.
But the majority of my divisions fought flawlessly to the very end
and preserved their discipline and military spirit. To the very end
they were always a match for the foe in morale; despite superiority in
numbers, cannon, munitions, tanks, and airplanes, the foe invariably
succumbed when he ran up against serious resistance. Therefore, the
associations of our ex-fighters at the front are right in bearing upon
their banners the motto: "Unbeaten on land and sea!"
SAYS ARMY WAS STILL STRONG
The achievements of the German fighters at the front and of the German
Nation in arms, during four and a half years of war, are beyond
all praise. One does not know what to admire most: the enthusiasm
with which the magnificent youth of 1914, without waiting for our
artillery fire to take effect, joyfully charged on the enemy, or the
self-sacrificing fidelity to duty and tenacity with which our men in
field gray, sparingly fed and seldom relieved, year in, year out,
digging by night, living in dugouts and earthholes by day, or crouching
in shell holes, defied the hail of steel from the enemy artillery,
flyers, and tanks. And this army, which one might have expected was to
be rated as utterly fought to a finish, was able, after nearly four
years of war, to carry out successful offensive operations such as our
foes could nowhere boast of, despite their colossal superiority.
In spite of all this, it was not right to believe the German army
capable of accomplishing the superhuman; it was necessary for us to
fall back, in order to get breath.
The Field Marshal balked at the order to retreat; the army, he thought,
should stay where it was, for political reasons (peace negotiations and
so on); he also pointed out, among other things, that it was necessary,
first, to arrange for the withdrawal to the rear of war materials, etc.
I now resolved to go to the front, acquiescing in the desire expressed
to me by the army that I might be with my hard-fighting troops and
convince myself personally of their spirit and condition.
I could carry out this resolve all the sooner in view of the fact that,
ever since the new Government had been set up, no further claims were
made upon my time either by it or by the Imperial Chancellor, which
made my staying at home seem useless.
The notes to Wilson were discussed and written by Solf, the War
Cabinet, and the Reichstag, after sessions lasting hours, without my
being informed thereof; until, finally, on the occasion of the last
note to Wilson, I caused Solf to be given to understand very plainly,
through my chief of Cabinet, that I demanded to know about the note
_before_ it was sent.
Solf appeared and showed the note; he was proud of his antithesis
between _laying down_ of arms ("Waffenstreckung"), which was demanded
by Wilson, and _armistice_ ("Waffenstillstand"), which was proposed.
When I spoke about the rumors of abdication and demanded that the
Foreign Office adopt an attitude, through the press, against what was
unworthy in the newspaper polemics, Solf replied that already everybody
on every street corner was talking about abdication and that, even in
the best circles, people were discussing it quite unreservedly.
When I expressed my indignation at this, Solf sought to console me by
observing that, should His Majesty go, he also would, since he could
serve no longer under such conditions. I went, or--to put it much
more correctly--I was overthrown by my own Government, and--Herr Solf
remained.
When the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max, heard of my resolve to
go to the front, he did all he could to prevent it. He asked why I
wished to go and received the answer that I considered it my duty, as
Supreme Commander, to return to the front, since I had been separated
for almost a month from the hard-fighting army. When the Chancellor
objected that I was indispensable at home, I retorted that we were at
war, that the Emperor belonged to his soldiers. Finally, I declared,
once for all, that I would go; that in case Wilson's armistice note
arrived, it would have to be discussed, anyhow, at the General
Headquarters of the army, for which purpose the Chancellor and other
members of the Government would be obliged to go to Spa for the
conferences.
"JOYFULLY RECEIVED" BY ARMY
I went to the army in Flanders, after having once more given the
General Staff at Spa definite orders to fall back as quickly as
possible to the Antwerp-Meuse line, in order that the troops might
finally be taken out of the fighting and given a rest. Despite
objections that this would demand time, that the position was not yet
ready, that the war material must first be taken back, and so forth, I
stood by the order. The retreat was begun.
In Flanders I saw delegations from the different divisions, spoke with
the soldiers, distributed decorations, and was everywhere joyfully
received by officers and men. Particularly ardent enthusiasm reigned
among the soldiers of a royal Saxon recruit depot, who greeted me
with wild cheers at the railway station when I was returning to my
train. While I was giving out decorations to members of the Reserve
Guard Division, an enemy bombing squadron, followed by heavy fire from
anti-aircraft guns and machine guns, flew directly over us and dropped
bombs near the special train.
The commanders of the army were unanimous in declaring that the spirit
of the troops at the front was good and reliable; that, further to the
rear, among the supply columns, it was not so good; that the worst of
all were the soldiers back from leave, who, it was plain to be seen,
had been worked upon and infected at home, whence they had brought
back a poor spirit. The young recruits at the depots, it was stated,
furthermore, were good.
At Spa, whither I now went, news came constantly from home about the
ever more violent agitation and hostile attitude against the Emperor
and the growing slackness and helplessness of the Government, which,
without initiative or strength, was letting itself be pushed around
at will. It was alluded to contemptuously in the newspapers as the
"debating society" and Prince Max was called by leading newspapers the
"Revolution Chancellor." As I learned afterward, he lay in bed for ten
days, suffering from grippe and incapable of really directing affairs.
His Excellency von Payer and Solf, with the so-called War Cabinet,
which was in permanent session, governed the German Empire.
At such a critical time, to my way of thinking, the imperiled ship
of state should not be steered by representatives of the Imperial
Chancellor, since they certainly cannot have the authority possessed by
the responsible head of the Government. What was particularly needed at
this juncture was authority; yet, so far as I know, no wide powers to
act had been conferred upon the Vice Chancellor.
The right solution--_i. e._, the one that those concerned were in duty
bound to adopt--would have been to remove Prince Max actually from
the post of Chancellor and summon in his place some man of strong
personality. Since we had the parliamentary form of government it
devolved upon the political parties to bring about the change in the
Chancellorship and present me with a successor to Prince Max. This did
not take place.
Now the efforts of the Government and the Imperial Chancellor to induce
me to abdicate began. Drews, the Minister of the Interior, came to me
at the behest of the Chancellor, in order to supply me with information
concerning the spirit in the country. He described the well-known
happenings in press, high finance, and public, and laid emphasis on the
fact that the Imperial Chancellor himself adopted no attitude toward
the question of my abdication, but, nevertheless, had sent him to me.
Drews, in short, was to suggest to me that I myself should decide to
abdicate, in order that it might not appear that the Government had
exerted pressure upon me.
I spoke to the Minister about the fateful consequences of my abdication
and asked how he, as a Prussian official, could reconcile such a
supposition with his oath as an official to his King. The Minister grew
embarrassed and excused himself by reference to the command of the
Imperial Chancellor, who had been unable to find any other man for the
task. I was informed later that Drews was one of the first officials
who spoke of the abdication of his master and King.
I refused to abdicate and declared that I would gather troops together
and return with them in order to help the Government to maintain order
in the land.
After that, Drews was received, in my presence, by Field Marshal
von Hindenburg and General Gröner, whom he informed of the mission
intrusted to him by the Imperial Chancellor and by both of whom he was
very sharply rebuked in the name of the army. Gröner's characterization
of Prince Max, in particular, was expressed in such plain terms that I
had to appease and comfort the Minister.
The Field Marshal also called Drews's attention to the fact that, in
the event of my abdication, the army would not go on fighting, but
would disperse, and that the majority of the officers, in particular,
would probably resign and thus leave the army without leaders.
Soon after that I learned from one of my sons that the Imperial
Chancellor had tried to ascertain whether he was prepared to undertake
the mission which subsequently was undertaken by Drews. My son
indignantly declined to suggest abdication to his father.
In the meantime I had sent the chief of Cabinet, von Delbrück, to
Berlin, in order to lay before the Chancellor a general address, also
intended for publication, which should take the place of my address
to the Ministry (not published by the Chancellor), deal more broadly
with the matters taken up therein, and make clear my attitude toward
the Government and toward the new direction taken by public opinion.
At first the Chancellor failed to publish this. Not until several days
later did he find himself forced to permit publication, owing to a
letter written to him, as I learned afterward, by the Empress.
Thereupon Herr von Delbrück informed me that the address had made a
good impression in Berlin and in the press, relieved the situation,
and tended to quiet the people, so that the idea of abdication had
begun to disappear and even the Socialists of the Right had decided to
postpone action concerning it.
SOCIALIST ACTIVITY
During the next few days there were constant reports that the
Socialists in Berlin were planning trouble and that the Chancellor
was growing steadily more nervous. The report given by Drews to the
Government, after his return from Spa, had not failed to cause an
impression; the gentlemen wished to get rid of me, to be sure, but for
the time being they were afraid of the consequences.
Their point of view was as obscure as their conduct. They acted as
if they did not want a republic, yet failed completely to realize
that their course was bound to lead straight to a republic. Many, in
fact, explained the actions of the Government by maintaining that the
creation of a republic was the very end that its members had in view;
plenty of people drew the conclusion, from the puzzling conduct of the
Chancellor toward me, that he was working to eliminate me in order to
become himself President of the German Republic, after being, in the
interim, the administrator of the Empire.
To believe this is undoubtedly to do the Prince an injustice; such a
train of thought is impossible in a man belonging to an old German
princely family.
General Gröner, who had gone to Berlin to study the situation, reported
on his return that he had received very bad impressions regarding the
Government and the sentiment prevailing in the country; that things
were approaching revolution; that the Government was merely tearing
down without setting up anything positive; that the people wanted peace
at last, at any cost, no matter what kind of peace; that the authority
of the Government was equal to zero, the agitation against the Emperor
in full swing, my abdication hardly to be avoided longer.
He added that the troops at home were unreliable and disagreeable
surprises might come in case of a revolt; that the courier chests of
the Russian Bolshevist ambassador, seized by the criminal police,
had disclosed some very damaging evidence that the Russian Embassy,
in conjunction with the Spartacus group, had long since thoroughly
prepared, without being disturbed, a Bolshevist revolution on the
Russian model. (This had gone on with the knowledge of the Foreign
Office--which had received constant warning, but had either laughed at
them all or dismissed them with the remark that the Bolsheviki must
not be angered--likewise under the very eyes of the police, which was
continually at loggerheads with the Foreign Office.) The men back from
leave, he went on, infected by propaganda, had already carried the
poison to the army, which was already partly affected and would, as
soon as it had been made free by an armistice, refuse to fight against
the rebels upon its return home.
Therefore, he declared, it was necessary to accept, immediately
and unconditionally, any sort of armistice, no matter how hard
its conditions might be; the army was no longer to be trusted and
revolution was imminent behind the front.
PRINCE MAX INSISTENT
On the morning of the 9th of November,[9] the Imperial Chancellor,
Prince Max of Baden, caused me to be informed again--as he had already
done on the 7th--that the Social Democrats, and also the Social
Democratic Secretaries of State, demanded my abdication; that the rest
of the members of the Government, who had stood out so far against it,
were now in favor of it, and that the same was true of the majority
parties in the Reichstag. For these reasons, he continued, he requested
me to abdicate immediately, since, otherwise, extensive street fighting
attended by bloodshed would take place in Berlin; it had already
started on a small scale.
I immediately summoned Field Marshal von Hindenburg and the
Quartermaster General, General Gröner. General Gröner again announced
that the army could fight no longer and wished rest above all else,
and that, therefore, any sort of armistice must be unconditionally
accepted; that the armistice must be concluded as soon as possible,
since the army had supplies for only six to eight days more and was
cut off from all further supplies by the rebels, who had occupied all
the supply storehouses and Rhine bridges; that, for some unexplained
reason, the armistice commission sent to France--consisting
of Erzberger, Ambassador Count Oberndorff, and General von
Winterfeldt--which had crossed the French lines two evenings before,
had sent no report as to the nature of the conditions.
The Crown Prince also appeared, with his Chief of Staff, Count
Schulenburg, and took part in the conference. During our conversation
several telephone inquiries came from the Imperial Chancellor, which,
pointing out that the Social Democrats had left the Government and
that delay was dangerous, became most insistent. The Minister of War
reported uncertainty among part of the troops in Berlin--4th Jägers,
Second Company of Alexander Regiment, Second Battery, Jüterbog, gone
over to the rebels--no street fighting.
I wished to spare my people civil war. If my abdication was indeed the
only way to prevent bloodshed, I was willing to _renounce the Imperial
throne, but not to abdicate as King of Prussia_; I would remain, as
such, with my troops, since the military leaders had declared that the
officers would leave in crowds if I abdicated entirely, and the army
would then pour back, without leaders, into the fatherland, damage it,
and place it in peril.
A reply had been sent to the Imperial Chancellor to the effect that my
decision must first be carefully weighed and formulated, after which
it would be transmitted to the Chancellor. When, a little later, this
was done, there came the surprising answer that my decision had arrived
late! The Imperial Chancellor, on his own initiative, had summarily
announced my abdication--which had not occurred yet at all!--as well as
renunciation of the throne by the Crown Prince, who had not even been
questioned. He had turned over the Government to the Social Democrats
and summoned Herr Ebert as Imperial Chancellor. All this had been
spread simultaneously by wireless, so the entire army could read it.
DENIES HE FORSOOK FOLLOWERS
Thus the decision as to my going or staying, as to my renunciation of
the Imperial Crown and retention of the Royal Crown of Prussia, was
summarily snatched from me. The army was shaken to the core by the
erroneous belief that its King had abandoned it at the most critical
moment of all.
If the conduct of the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, is
considered as a whole, it appears as follows: first, solemn declaration
that he will place himself, together with the new Government, before
the Emperor's throne, to protect it; then, suppression of the address,
which might have impressed public opinion favorably, elimination of
the Emperor from all co-operation in the Government, sacrifice of the
respect due the Emperor by suppression of the censorship, failure to
come to the support of the monarchy in the matter of abdication; then,
attempts to persuade the Emperor to abdicate voluntarily; and, finally,
announcement of my abdication by wireless, in which the Chancellor went
over my head.
This sequence of events shows the course--a perilous one to the
nation--adopted by Scheidemann, who held the Chancellor in the hollow
of his hand. Scheidemann left the Ministers, his colleagues, in the
dark as to his real purposes, drove the Prince from one step to
another, and finally summoned Ebert, declaring that the leaders no
longer had the masses under control. Thus he caused the Prince to
sacrifice the Emperor, the princes, and the Empire, and made him the
destroyer of the Empire. After that, Scheidemann overthrew the weak
princely "statesman."
Following the arrival of the wireless message, the situation was
difficult. To be sure, troops were being transported to Spa for
the purpose of going on undisturbed with the work at Great General
Headquarters, but the Field Marshal now thought it no longer possible
to reckon absolutely on their reliability in case rebellious forces
should advance from Aix-la-Chapelle and Cologne and confront our troops
with the dilemma of whether or not to fight against their own comrades.
In view of this, he advised me to leave the army and go to some neutral
country, for the purpose of avoiding such a "civil war."
I went through a fearful internal struggle. On the one hand, I, as a
soldier, was outraged at the idea of abandoning my still faithful,
brave troops. On the other hand, there was the declaration of our foes
that they were unwilling to conclude with me any peace endurable to
Germany, as well as the statement of my own Government that only by my
departure for foreign parts was civil war to be prevented.
In this struggle I set aside all that was personal. I consciously
sacrificed myself and my throne in the belief that, by so doing, I was
best serving the interests of my beloved fatherland. The sacrifice was
in vain. My departure brought us neither better armistice conditions
nor better peace terms; nor did it prevent civil war--on the contrary,
it hastened and intensified, in the most pernicious manner, the
disintegration in the army and the nation.
PROUD OF THE ARMY
For thirty years the army was my pride. For it I lived, upon it I
labored. And now, after four and a half brilliant years of war with
unprecedented victories, it was forced to collapse by the stab in the
back from the dagger of the revolutionists, at the very moment when
peace was within reach!
And the fact that it was in my proud navy, my creation, that there was
first open rebellion, cut me most deeply to the heart.
There has been much talk about my having abandoned the army and gone to
neutral foreign parts.
Some say the Emperor should have gone to some regiment at the front,
hurled himself with it upon the enemy, and sought death in one last
attack. That, however, would not only have rendered impossible the
armistice, ardently desired by the nation, concerning which the
commission sent from Berlin to General Foch was already negotiating,
but would also have meant the useless sacrifice of the lives of many
soldiers--of some of the very best and most faithful, in fact.
Others say the Emperor should have returned home at the head of the
army. But a peaceful return was no longer possible; the rebels had
already seized the Rhine bridges and other important points in the
rear of the army. I could, to be sure, have forced my way back at the
head of loyal troops taken from the fighting front; but, by so doing,
I should have put the finishing touch to Germany's collapse, since,
in addition to the struggle with the enemy, who would certainly have
pressed forward in pursuit, civil war would also have ensued.
Still others say the Emperor should have killed himself. That was made
impossible by my firm Christian beliefs. And would not people have
exclaimed:
"How cowardly! Now he shirks all responsibility by committing suicide!"
This alternative was also eliminated because I had to consider how to
be of help and use to my people and my country in the evil time that
was to be foreseen.
I knew also that I was particularly called upon to champion the cause
of my people in the clearing up of the question of war guilt--which
was disclosing itself more and more as the pivotal point in our
future destiny--since I better than anyone else could bear witness to
Germany's desire for peace and to our clean conscience.
After unspeakably arduous soul struggles, and following the most urgent
advice of my counselors of the highest rank who were present at the
moment, I decided to leave the country, since, in view of the reports
made to me, I must needs believe that, by so doing, I should most
faithfully serve Germany, make possible better armistice and peace
terms for her, and spare her further loss of human lives, distress, and
misery.
[9] Concerning the course of events up to the fateful 9th of November
and this day itself there are authentic statements by an
eyewitness in the book (well worth reading) of Major Niemann, who
was sent by the Chief Army Command to me, entitled _War and
Revolution (Krieg und Revolution)_, Berlin, 1922.