The Outbreak of War
After the arrival of the news of the assassination of my friend, the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, I gave up going to Kiel for the regatta week
and went back home, since I intended to go to Vienna for his funeral.
But I was asked from there to give up this plan. Later I heard that one
of the reasons for this was consideration for my personal safety; to
this I naturally would have paid no attention.
Greatly worried on account of the turn which matters might now take, I
decided to give up my intended journey to Norway and remain at home.
The Imperial Chancellor and the Foreign Office held a view contrary to
mine and wished me to undertake the journey, as they considered that it
would have a quieting effect on all Europe. For a long time I argued
against going away from my country at a time when the future was so
unsettled, but Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann told me, in short and
concise terms, that if I were now to give up my travel plans, which
were already widely known, this would make the situation appear more
serious than it had been up to that moment and possibly lead to the
outbreak of war, for which I might be held responsible; that the whole
world was merely waiting to be put out of suspense by the news that I,
in spite of the situation, had quietly gone on my trip.
Thereupon I consulted the Chief of the General Staff, and, when he
also proved to be calm and unworried regarding the state of affairs
and himself asked for a summer leave of absence to go to Carlsbad, I
decided, though with a heavy heart, upon my departure.
The much-discussed so-called Potsdam Crown Council of July 5th in
reality never took place. It is an invention of malevolent persons.
Naturally, before my departure, I received, as was my custom, some
of the Ministers individually, in order to hear from them reports
concerning their departments. Neither was there any council of
Ministers and there was no talk about war preparations at a single one
of the conferences.
My fleet was cruising in the Norwegian fjords, as usual, while I was
on my summer vacation trip. During my stay at Balholm I received only
meager news from the Foreign Office and was obliged to rely principally
on the Norwegian newspapers, from which I got the impression that the
situation was growing worse. I telegraphed repeatedly to the Chancellor
and the Foreign Office that I considered it advisable to return home,
but was asked each time not to interrupt my journey.
When I learned that the English fleet had not dispersed after the
review at Spithead, but had remained concentrated, I telegraphed again
to Berlin that I considered my return necessary. My opinion was not
shared there.
But when, after that, I learned from the Norwegian newspapers--not
from Berlin--about the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and, immediately
thereafter, about the Serbian note to Austria, I started without
further ado upon my return journey and commanded the fleet to repair
to Wilhelmshaven. Upon my departure I learned from a Norwegian source
that it was said that a part of the English fleet had left secretly
for Norway in order to capture me (though peace still reigned!). It
is significant that Sir Edward Goschen, the English ambassador, was
informed on July 26th at the Foreign Office that my return journey,
undertaken on my own initiative, was to be regretted, since agitating
rumors might be caused by it.
SAYS WAR WAS NOT FORESEEN
Upon my arrival at Potsdam I found the Chancellor and the Foreign
Office in conflict with the Chief of the General Staff, since General
von Moltke was of the opinion that war was sure to break out, whereas
the other two stuck firmly to their view that things would not get to
such a bad pass, that there would be some way of avoiding war, provided
I did not order mobilization. This dispute kept up steadily. Not until
General von Moltke announced that the Russians had set fire to their
frontier posts, torn up the frontier railway tracks, and posted red
mobilization notices did a light break upon the diplomats in the
Wilhelmstrasse and bring about both their own collapse and that of
their powers of resistance. They had not _wished_ to _believe_ in the
war.
This shows plainly how little we had expected--much less prepared
for--war in July, 1914. When, in the spring of 1914, Tsar Nicholas II
was questioned by his Court Marshal as to his spring and summer plans,
he replied: "Je resterai chez moi cette année parceque nous aurons
la guerre" ("I shall stay at home this year because we shall have
war"). (This fact, it is said, was reported to Imperial Chancellor von
Bethmann; I heard nothing about it then and learned about it for the
first time in November, 1918.) This was the same Tsar who gave me, on
two separate occasions--at Björkö and Baltisch-Port--entirely without
being pressed by me and in a way that surprised me, his word of honor
as a sovereign, to which he added weight by a clasp of the hand and
an embrace, that he would never draw his sword against the German
Emperor--least of all as an ally of England--in case a war should break
out in Europe, owing to his gratitude to the German Emperor for his
attitude in the Russo-Japanese War, in which England alone had involved
Russia, adding that he hated England, since she had done him and Russia
a great wrong by inciting Japan against them.
At the very time that the Tsar was announcing his summer war program I
was busy at Corfu excavating antiquities; then I went to Wiesbaden,
and, finally, to Norway. A monarch who wishes war and prepares it
in such a way that he can suddenly fall upon his neighbors--a task
requiring long secret mobilization preparations and concentration of
troops--does not spend months outside his own country and does not
allow his Chief of the General Staff to go to Carlsbad on leave of
absence. My enemies, in the meantime, planned their preparations for an
attack.
Our entire diplomatic machine failed. The menace of war was not seen
because the Foreign Office was so hypnotized with its idea of "surtout
pas d'histoires" ("above all, no stories"), its belief in peace at any
cost, that it had completely eliminated war as a possible instrument of
Entente statesmanship from its calculations, and, therefore, did not
rightly estimate the importance of the signs of war.
Herein also is proof of Germany's peaceful inclinations. The
above-mentioned standpoint of the Foreign Office brought it to a
certain extent into conflict with the General Staff and the Admiralty
Staff, who uttered warnings, as was their duty, and wished to make
preparations for defense. This conflict in views showed its effect
for a long time; the army could not forget that, by the fault of the
Foreign Office, it had been taken by surprise, and the diplomats were
piqued because, in spite of their stratagems, war had ensued, after all.
Innumerable are the pieces of evidence that as early as the spring
and summer of 1914, when nobody in Germany believed as yet in the
Entente's attack, war had been prepared for in Russia, France,
Belgium, and England.
I included the most important proofs of this, in so far as they are
known to me, in the _Comparative Historical Tables_ compiled by me.
On account of their great number, I shall cite only a few here. If in
so doing I do not mention all names, this is done for reasons easily
understood. Let me remark furthermore that this whole mass of material
became known to me only little by little, partly during the war, mostly
after the war.
1. As far back as April, 1914, the accumulation of gold reserves
in the English banks began. On the other hand, Germany, as late as
July, was still exporting gold and grain; to the Entente countries,
among others.
2. In April, 1914, the German Naval Attaché in Tokyo, Captain von
Knorr, reported that he was greatly struck by the certainty with
which everyone there foresaw a war of the Triple Alliance against
Germany in the near future ... that there was a something in the
air as if, so to speak, people were expressing their condolences
over a death sentence not yet pronounced.
3. At the end of March, 1914, General Sherbatsheff, director of
the St. Petersburg War Academy, made an address to his officers,
wherein, among other things, he said: That war with the powers
forming the Triple Alliance had become unavoidable on account
of Austria's anti-Russian Balkan policy; that there existed the
strongest sort of probability that it would break out as early as
that same summer; that, for Russia, it was a point of honor to
assume the offensive immediately.
4. In the report of the Belgian ambassador at Berlin regarding a
Japanese military mission which had arrived from St. Petersburg in
April, 1914, it was stated, among other things: At the regimental
messes the Japanese officers had heard quite open talk of an
imminent war against Austria-Hungary and Germany; it was stated,
however, that the army was ready to take the field, and that the
moment was as auspicious for the Russians as for their allies, the
French.
5. According to the memoirs of the then French ambassador at St.
Petersburg, M. Paléologue, published in 1921, in the _Revue des
Deux Mondes_, the Grand Duchesses Anastasia and Militza told him
on July 22, 1914, at Tsarskoe Selo, that their father, the King of
Montenegro, had informed them, in a cipher telegram, that "we shall
have war before the end of the month [that is, before the 13th of
August, Russian style]; ... nothing will be left of Austria....
You will take back Alsace-Lorraine.... Our armies will meet in
Berlin.... Germany will be annihilated."
6. The former Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, Bogitshevich,
tells in his book, _Causes of the War_, published in 1919, of the
following statement which Cambon, the then French ambassador at
Berlin, made to him on the 26th or 27th of July, 1914: "If Germany
wishes matters to come to a war, she will have England also against
her. The English fleet will take Hamburg. We shall thoroughly beat
the Germans." Bogitshevich states that this talk made him sure
that the war had been decided upon at the time of the meeting of
Poincaré with the Russian Tsar at St. Petersburg, if not sooner.
RUSSIAN CROWN COUNCIL
7. Another Russian of high rank, a member of the Duma and a good
friend of Sazonoff, told me later about the secret Crown Council
held, with the Tsar presiding, in February, 1914; moreover, I
obtained corroboration, from other Russian sources mentioned in
my _Historical Tables_, of the following: At this Crown Council
Sazonoff made an address wherein he suggested to the Tsar to
seize Constantinople, which, since the Triple Alliance would not
acquiesce in it, would cause a war against Germany and Austria. He
added that Italy would break away from these two, in the natural
course of events; that France was to be trusted absolutely and
England probably.
The Tsar had agreed, it was said, and given orders to take the
necessary preliminary steps. The Russian Finance Minister, Count
Kokovzeff, wrote to the Tsar advising against this course--I
was informed of this by Count Mirbach after the peace of
Brest-Litovsk--recommending a firm union with Germany and warning
against war, which, he said, would be unfavorable to Russia and
lead to revolution and the fall of the dynasty. The Tsar did not
follow this advice, but pushed on toward war.
The same gentleman told me this: _Two_ days after the outbreak
of war he had been invited by Sazonoff to breakfast. The latter
came up to him, beaming with joy, and, rubbing his hands together,
asked: "Come now, my dear Baron, you must admit that I have chosen
the moment for war excellently, haven't I?" When the Baron, rather
worried, asked him what stand England would take, the Minister
smote his pocket, and, with a sly wink, whispered: "I have
something in my pocket which, within the next few weeks, will bring
joy to all Russia and astound the entire world; I have received the
English promise that England will go with Russia against Germany!"
8. Russian prisoners belonging to the _Siberian_ Corps, who were
taken in East Prussia, said that they had been transported by rail
in the summer of 1913, to the vicinity of Moscow, since maneuvers
were to be held there by the Tsar. The maneuvers did not take
place, but the troops were not taken back. They were stationed for
the winter in the vicinity of Moscow. In the summer of 1914 they
were brought forward to the vicinity of Vilna, since big maneuvers
were to be held there by the Tsar; at and near Vilna they were
deployed and then, suddenly, the sharp cartridges (war ammunition)
were distributed and they were informed that there was a war
against Germany; they were unable to say why and wherefore.
9. In a report, made public in the press, during the winter of
1914-15; by an American, concerning his trip through the Caucasus
in the spring of 1914, the following was stated: When he arrived
in the Caucasus, at the beginning of _May_, 1914, he met, while
on his way to Tiflis, long columns of troops of all arms, in war
equipment. He had feared that a revolt had broken out in the
Caucasus. When he made inquiries of the authorities at Tiflis,
while having his passport inspected, he received the quieting
news that the Caucasus was quite peaceful, that he might travel
wheresoever he wished, that what he had seen had to do only with
practice marching and maneuvers.
At the close of his trip at the end of May, 1914, he wished to
embark at a Caucasian port, but all the vessels there were so
filled with troops that only after much trouble could he manage to
get a cabin for himself and his wife. The Russian officers told him
that they were to land at Odessa and march from there to take part
in some great maneuvers.
THE COSSACK'S TESTIMONY
10. Prince Tundutoff, Hetman of the Calmuck Cossacks living
between Tsaritsin and Astrakhan, who was, before and during the
war, personal aid of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch, came
to General Headquarters at Bosmont in 1918, seeking to establish
connection with Germany, since the Cossacks were not Slavs at all
and thoroughly hostile to the Bolsheviki.
He stated that he had been sent by Nicholas Nicholaievitch, before
the outbreak of war, to the General Staff, in order to keep the
Grand Duke posted on happenings there and that he had been a
witness of the notorious telephone talks between the Tsar and the
Chief of the General Staff, General Januskevitch; that the Tsar,
deeply impressed by the earnest telegram of the German Emperor,
had resolved to forbid mobilization and had ordered Januskevitch
by telephone not to carry out mobilization, _i. e._, to break
it off; that the latter had not obeyed the unmistakable order,
but had inquired by telephone of Sazonoff, Minister of Foreign
Affairs--with whom, for weeks, he had kept in touch, intrigued and
incited to war--what he was to do now; that Sazonoff had answered
that the Tsar's order was nonsense, that all the General need do
was to carry out mobilization, that he [Sazonoff] would bring the
Tsar around again next day and talk him out of heeding the stupid
telegram from the German Emperor; that, thereupon, Januskevitch had
informed the Tsar that mobilization was already under way and could
no longer be broken off.
Prince Tundutoff added: "This was a lie, for I myself saw the
mobilization order lying beside Januskevitch on his writing table,
which shows that it had not as yet been given out at all."
The psychologically interesting point about the above is that Tsar
Nicholas, who helped prepare the World War and had already ordered
mobilization, wished to recede at the last moment. My earnest,
warning telegram, it seems, made him realize clearly for the first
time the colossal responsibility which he was bringing upon himself
by his warlike preparations. Therefore, he wished to stop the war
machine, the murderer of entire peoples, which he had just set in
motion. This would have been possible and peace might have been
preserved if Sazonoff had not frustrated his wish.
When I asked whether the Grand Duke, who was known as a
German-hater, had incited much to war, the Cossack chief replied
that the Grand Duke had certainly worked zealously for war, but
that incitement on his part would have been superfluous, since
there was already a strong sentiment against Germany all through
the Russian officer corps; that this spirit was transmitted,
principally, from the French army to the Russian officers; that
there had been a desire, in fact, to go to war in 1908-09 (Bosnian
Question), but France was not then ready; that, in 1914, Russia,
likewise, was not quite ready; that Januskevitch and Sukhomlinoff
had really planned the war for 1917, but Sazonoff and Isvolsky, as
well as the French, could not be restrained any longer; that the
former two were afraid of revolution in Russia and of the influence
of the German Emperor on the Tsar, which might dissuade the Tsar
from the idea of waging war; and that the French, who were sure,
for the time being, of England's help, were afraid that England
might come to an understanding later on with Germany at the expense
of France.
When I asked whether the Tsar had been aware of the warlike spirit
in Russia and had tolerated it, the Cossack Prince answered that it
was worthy of note that the Tsar had forbidden once for all, as a
matter of precaution, the inviting of German diplomats or military
attachés to luncheons or evening meals given by Russian officers at
which he himself was to be present.
STORES OF ENGLISH COATS
11. When our troops advanced in 1914 they found, in northern France
and along the Belgian frontier, great stores of English soldiers'
greatcoats. According to statements by the inhabitants, these were
placed there during the _last years of peace_. Most of the English
infantrymen who were made prisoners by us in the summer of 1914
had no greatcoats; when asked why, they answered, quite naïvely:
"We are to find our greatcoats in the stores at Maubeuge, Le
Quesnoy, etc., in the north of France and in Belgium."
It was the same regarding maps. In Maubeuge great quantities of
English military maps of northern France and Belgium were found
by our men; copies of these have been shown to me. The names of
places were printed in French and English, and all sorts of words
were translated in the margin for the convenience of soldiers;
for instance: moulin=mill, pont=bridge, maison=house, ville=town,
bois=wood, etc. These maps date from 1911 and were engraved at
Southampton.
The stores were established by England, with the permission of the
French and Belgian Governments, _before_ the war, in the midst of
peace. What a tempest of horror would have broken out in Belgium,
the "neutral country," and what a rumpus England and France would
have kicked up, if we had wished to establish stores of German
soldiers' greatcoats and maps in Spa, Liège, and Namur!
Among the statesmen who, besides Poincaré, particularly helped
unleash the World War, the Sazonoff-Isvolsky group probably should
take first rank. Isvolsky, it is said, when at Paris, proudly
placed his hand upon his breast and declared: "I made the war. Je
suis le père de cette guerre" ("I am the father of this war").
Delcassé also has a large share in the guilt for the World War, and
Grey an even larger share, since he was the spiritual leader of
the "encirclement policy," which he faithfully pushed forward and
brought to completion, as the "legacy" of his dead sovereign.
I have been informed that an important rôle was played in the
preparation of the World War directed against the monarchical Central
Powers by the policy of the international "Great Orient Lodge";
a policy extending over many years and always envisaging the goal
at which it aimed. But the German Great Lodges, I was furthermore
told--with two exceptions wherein non-German financial interests
are paramount and which maintain secret connection with the "Great
Orient" in Paris--had no relationship to the "Great Orient." They
were entirely loyal and faithful, according to the assurance given me
by the distinguished German Freemason who explained to me this whole
interrelationship, which had, until then, been unknown to me. He said
that in 1917 an international meeting of the lodges of the "Great
Orient" was held, after which there was a subsequent conference in
Switzerland; at this the following program was adopted: Dismemberment
of Austria-Hungary, democratization of Germany, elimination of the
House of Hapsburg, abdication of the German Emperor, restitution of
Alsace-Lorraine to France, union of Galicia with Poland, elimination of
the Pope and the Catholic Church, elimination of every state Church in
Europe.
I am not now in a position to investigate the very damaging information
which has been transmitted to me, in the best of faith, concerning the
organization and activities of the Great Orient Lodges. Secret and
public political organizations have played important parts in the life
of peoples and states, ever since history has existed. Some of them
have been beneficial: most of them have been destructive, if they had
to have secret passwords which shunned the light of day. The most
dangerous of these organizations hide under the cloak of some ideal
object or other--such as active love of their neighbors, readiness
to help the weak, and poor, and so forth--in order that, with such
pretexts as a blind, they may work for their real secret ends. It
is certainly advisable to study the activities of the Great Orient
Lodges, since one cannot adopt a final attitude toward this worldwide
organization until it has been thoroughly investigated.
I shall not take up the war operations in this work. I shall leave this
task all the more readily to my officers and to the historians, since
I, writing as I am without a single document, would be able to describe
events only in very broad outline.
When I look back upon the four arduous war years, with their hopes and
fears, their brilliant victories and losses in precious blood, what is
uppermost in my mind is the feeling of ardent gratitude and undying
admiration for the unequaled achievements of the German Nation in arms.
PROUD OF GERMAN ARMY
Just as no sacrifice in endurance and privation was too great for those
staying at home, so also the army, in defending itself during the
war criminally forced upon us, did not merely overcome the crushing
superiority of twenty-eight hostile nations, but likewise, on land and
water and in the air, won victories whose glory may have paled a bit
in the mists of the present day, but, for that very reason, will shine
forth all the more brightly in the light of history. Nor is that all.
Wherever there was distress among our allies, German intervention,
often with weak forces, always restored the situation and often won
noteworthy successes. Germans fought on all the battlefields of the
far-flung World War.
Surely the heroic bravery of the German nation deserved a better fate
than to fall a victim to the dagger that treacherously stabbed it from
behind; it seems to be the German destiny that Germans shall always be
defeated by Germans. Recently I read the unfortunately not entirely
unjustified words: "In Germany every Siegfried has his Hödur behind
him."
Finally, let me say a word concerning the German "atrocities" and give
two instances thereof!
After our advance into northern France I immediately ordered that art
treasures be protected. Art historians and professors were assigned to
each army, who traveled about inspecting, photographing, and describing
churches, châteaux, and castles. Among them Professor Clemen, Curator
of the Rhine Province, especially distinguished himself and reported to
me, when I was at the front, on the protection of art treasures.
All the collections in towns, museums, and castles were catalogued and
numbered; whenever they seemed to be imperiled by the fighting they
were taken away and assembled, at Valenciennes and Maubeuge, in two
splendid museums. There they were carefully preserved and the name of
the owner marked on each article.
The old windows of the cathedral of St. Quentin were removed by German
soldiers, at the risk of their lives, under English shell-fire. The
story of the destruction of the church by the English was told by a
German Catholic priest, who published it with photographs, and it was
sent, by my orders, to the Pope.
At the château of Pinon, which belongs to the Princess of Poix, who had
been a guest of mine and the Empress, the headquarters of the general
commanding the Third Army Corps was located. I visited the château and
lived there. Previously the English had been quartered there and had
ravaged the place terribly. The commanding general, von Lochow, and his
staff had a great deal of trouble getting it into some sort of shape
again after the devastation wrought by the English.
Accompanied by the general, I visited the private apartments of the
Princess, which, up to then, our soldiers had been forbidden to enter.
I found that her entire wardrobe had been thrown out of the clothes
presses by the English soldiers and, together with her hats, was lying
about on the floor. I had every garment carefully cleaned, hung in the
presses, and locked up. The writing desk had also been broken into and
the Princess's correspondence was scattered about. At my command, all
the letters were gathered together, sealed in a package, placed in the
writing desk, and locked up.
Afterward, all the silverware was found buried in the garden.
According to the villagers this had been ordered as early as the
_beginning of July_, so the Princess had known about the war long
before its outbreak! I at once ordered that the silver be inventoried,
deposited in the bank at Aix-la-Chapelle, and returned to the Princess
after the war. Through neutral channels I caused news to be transmitted
to the Princess in Switzerland, by my Court Marshal, Freiherr von
Reischach, concerning Pinon, her silverware, and my care for her
property. No answer was received. Instead, the Princess had published
in the French press a letter to the effect that General von Kluck had
stolen all her silver.
On account of my care and the self-sacrificing work of German art
experts and soldiers--partly at the risk of their lives--art treasures
worth billions were preserved for their French owners and for French
towns. This was done by the Huns, the boches!