Bülow
On the day after Prince Hohenlohe's farewell, the man summoned by me
as his successor--Count Bülow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
arrived. His choice for the post was eminently fitting, because he was
thoroughly cognizant of our foreign policy and, especially, of our
relations with England--which policy was becoming constantly livelier
and more complicated--and because he had already proved himself a
skillful orator and ready debater in the Reichstag. The fact that
the second of these qualities was lacking in his predecessor had
often been painfully noticeable. When Prince Hohenlohe's intention to
retire became known in the Imperial Council, the Bavarian ambassador
at Berlin, Count Lerchenfeld, very pointedly remarked to me that for
Heaven's sake I was not to choose another South German, since South
Germans were not fitted for the leading post at Berlin; North Germans
were naturally better able to fill it and, therefore, it would be
better for the Empire to select a North German.
I had been acquainted personally with Bülow for a long time, ever
since the period of his ambassadorship at Rome and his work as
Secretary of State. Then I had often visited him at his home and had
held many a conference with him in his garden. He came into closer
relationship with me when he accompanied me on my journey to the Far
East, where, in co-operation with the ambassador, Freiherr Marschall,
he assisted me in getting into personal touch with the leading men of
the Turkish Government. Hence, the relations of the new Chancellor with
me were already begun and, to a certain extent, established, since we
had for years discussed all political problems and spheres. Moreover,
he stood much nearer to me in age than his predecessors, most of whom
could have been my grandfather. He was the first "young Chancellor" of
Germany. And this made our common task easier for both of us.
When I was in Berlin, scarcely a day went by without my taking a
long morning walk with the Chancellor in the garden of the Imperial
Chancellor's palace, during which outstanding business was cleared up
and problems of actuality discussed. I often had a meal with him and
always found at his table, where I was most hospitably received by the
Count, his amiable wife and a group of the most interesting men, in
choosing whom the Count was a master. He was likewise unsurpassed in
skillfully conducting conversation and in the witty handling of the
various topics that arose. To me it was always a pleasure to be in the
company of the Chancellor and enjoy his bubbling wit, to exchange
views at his table with many professors, savants, and artists, as
well as Government officials of all sorts, in informal, unofficial
intercourse and stimulating exchange of ideas.
The Count was an excellent narrator of anecdotes, drawn both from books
and his own personal experience, which he told in several languages. He
liked to tell stories of the days when he was a diplomat, especially
about his stay at St. Petersburg.
BÜLOW A DISCIPLE OF BISMARCK
The Count's father was an intimate friend of Prince Bismarck and
had been one of his closest co-workers. Young Bülow also had begun
his career under the great Chancellor; he had been brought up on
Bismarckian ideas and traditions and strongly influenced by them, but,
nevertheless, had not adhered to them to such an extent as to lose his
independence.
In the course of one of the first talks which I had with Bülow as
Imperial Chancellor he informed himself concerning my ideas of how best
to handle the English and have dealings with them. I told him that I
considered absolute frankness the most important thing in dealing with
England and Englishmen; that the Englishman, in presenting his point of
view and working for his interests, was inconsiderate to the point of
brutality, for which reason he thoroughly understood anybody who acted
similarly toward him; that there must be no playing the diplomatic
game, or "finessing," with an Englishman, because it made him distrust
those with whom he was dealing and suspect that they were not honest
and wished secretly to cheat him; that such devious methods could be
successful only in dealing with Latin and Slavic nations; that, once
the Englishman had become suspicious, there was nothing more to be done
with him, despite the most honeyed words and most obliging concessions;
that the only advice, therefore, which I could give the Chancellor was
that he confine himself entirely to straightforwardness in his English
policy. I said this with particular emphasis, since "finessing" was
especially dear to the diplomatic character of Count Bülow and had
become second nature to him.
I also took occasion, during this talk, to warn the Chancellor against
Holstein. In spite of my warning--which was merely a repetition of
that given me before by Bismarck--Bülow worked a great deal, or was
obliged to work, with Holstein. This remarkable man had been able
gradually, especially since the time that the Foreign Office had been,
so to speak, orphaned by Bismarck's retirement, to create for himself a
position that became steadily more influential and to maintain it under
three Chancellors with such skill that he was considered indispensable.
Holstein was unquestionably possessed of great shrewdness, seconded by
a phenomenal memory and a certain talent for political combinations,
which, to be sure, often became a hobby in his case. His position
was also based largely on the fact that he was looked upon in many
quarters, especially among the older officials, as the "bearer of
the Bismarckian traditions," the man who upheld these in the teeth
of "the young master." His importance rested, above all, on his wide
personal knowledge in the entire domain of the foreign service. Since
he wielded, on account of this, an authoritative influence on all
proposals relative to the appointment of officials and hence, also, on
the careers of the younger officials, it may be easily understood why
he, little by little, had obtained for himself a dominating position at
the Foreign Office. But he sought more and more to obtain, at the same
time, a decisive influence upon the conduct of foreign policy; he had,
in fact, become the guiding spirit both of the Foreign Office and of
German foreign policy.
HOLSTEIN'S SECRET POWER
The serious thing about this was that he exerted his far-reaching
influence entirely from under cover and avoided all official
responsibility as an adviser. He preferred to remain in the dark and
exert his influence from there. He refused every responsible post--many
stood open to him--every honorary title, every promotion. He lived
in complete seclusion. For a long time I tried in vain to become
personally acquainted with him, for which purpose I used to invite him
to meals, but Holstein declined every time. Only once, in the course
of many years, did he consent to dine with me at the Foreign Office,
and it was characteristic of him that, whereas on this occasion all
the other gentlemen present wore full evening dress, he appeared in a
frock coat and excused himself on the plea that he had no dress coat.
The secrecy with which he surrounded himself in his work, so as not
to be held responsible for it, became apparent also at times in the
character of the memorials drawn up by him; they were unquestionably
ingenious and attractive, but often as involved and ambiguous as the
oracle of Delphi; there were occasions when, after a decision had been
made based on the contents of one of these documents, Herr von Holstein
would prove to a nicety that he meant exactly the opposite of what had
been thought.
I considered it a serious matter that an irresponsible counselor should
bring to bear such powerful influence, especially as he did so from
under cover and, hence, in doing it, eluded the officials who were in
duty bound to exert influence, and who were the responsible parties.
Often, especially in the von Richthofen era, it happened that I would
advise a foreign ambassador to discuss some political question, which
he had taken up with me, with the Secretary of State, and he would
reply: "J'en parlerai avec mon ami Holstein" ("I shall speak about
it with my friend Holstein"). The fact alone that an official of the
Foreign Office dealt with foreign ambassadors, going over the head of
his superior, did not seem right to me; but that he should be dubbed
by these foreigners "friend" seemed to me to go beyond what I deemed
advisable.
Matters had, in fact, developed gradually to such a stage that Holstein
conducted a good part of our foreign affairs. To be sure, he still
listened to the Chancellor in connection with them, but what the
Emperor thought or said about foreign affairs was rather unimportant.
If things turned out successfully, the Foreign Office reaped the
reward; if things went wrong, then it was the fault of the "impulsive
young master."
In spite of all this, Bülow, too, apparently thought Herr von Holstein
indispensable at first; he worked together with him for a long time,
until at last he, too, found unbearable the pressure which this strange
man exerted on everybody. To Herr von Tschirschky, during his tenure
of office as Secretary of State, belongs the merit of finally bringing
the unendurable situation to a head. On being questioned by me, he
declared that he considered it impossible that Herr von Holstein remain
at his post any longer, since he was embroiling the whole Foreign
Office, seeking to eliminate him, the Secretary of State, entirely, and
creating all kinds of obstacles, likewise, for the Chancellor.
DISMISSAL--AND AN ENEMY
Thereupon I ordered Herr von Tschirschky to prepare the way for the
dismissal of Herr von Holstein, which afterward took place, with the
approval of the Chancellor, after the latter had recovered from the
serious break-down in health which he had suffered meanwhile. Herr von
Holstein himself showed what manner of man he was by going at once
after his dismissal to Herr Harden and placing himself at the latter's
disposal for the campaign against the Emperor.
The year 1901 gave Count Bülow plentiful opportunities to show and
assert himself in dealings with England. Count Bülow still believed
strongly in the Bismarckian theory of having "two irons in the
fire"--_i. e._, in making friendly agreements with another country
while always remaining on good terms with Russia--in which he received
support from the many pretended adherents of Bismarck.
From the midst of the Jubilee celebration of the two hundredth
coronation anniversary, I was called to the deathbed of my grandmother,
Queen Victoria, by a dispatch announcing to me the serious condition
of the Queen. I hurriedly made the journey with my uncle, the Duke
of Connaught, who was at Berlin as the Queen's representative at the
festivities--he was the favorite son of the Queen and my particular
friend, and a son-in-law of Prince Frederick Charles--and I was
cordially received in London by the then Prince of Wales and the royal
family. As my carriage drove out at a trot from the railway station
a plainly dressed man stepped forward from the closely packed crowd
standing there in absolute silence, to the side of the carriage, bared
his head, and said: "Thank you, Kaiser." The Prince of Wales, later
Edward VII, added: "That is what they all think, and they will never
forget this coming of yours."
Nevertheless, they did forget it, and quickly.
After the Queen had quietly breathed her last in my arms, the curtain
fell for me upon many memories of childhood. Her death signified the
close of an epoch in English history and in Germany's relations with
England. I now got into touch, as far as possible, with prominent
personages, and noted everywhere a thoroughly sympathetic, friendly
spirit, which made no secret of the wish for good relations with
Germany.
At the farewell banquet impromptu speeches were made by King Edward
VII and myself, which were cordial in tone and content, and did not
fail to make an impression on their hearers. After the meal the English
ambassador at Berlin clasped my hand and said that my speech had
touched all his fellow countrymen's hearts, because what I said was
sincere and simple, as was fitting for Englishmen; that the speech
must at once be made public, since it would have an effect throughout
the country, which was grateful for my coming; and that this would be
useful to the relations between the two countries. I answered that it
was a matter for the British Government and the King to decide, that
personally I had no objections to having the speech made public.
Nevertheless, it was not made public, and the British people never
learned of my words, which were the sincere expression of my sentiments
and thoughts. In another talk later on with me at Berlin the same
ambassador deeply regretted this, but was unable to say what the reason
was for this omission.
In concluding my remarks on my stay in England I cannot pass over the
fact that a portion of the German press was unfortunately lacking both
in tactful appreciation of the grief of the English royal family and
people, as well as of the obligations which my family relationship and
political considerations imposed upon me.
After my return home from England I was able to report to the
Chancellor on the good impressions I had received, and particularly
that opinion in England was apparently in favor of an understanding and
of closer relations.
Bülow expressed himself as satisfied with the results of the journey,
after we had talked at length about it at Homburg, and consulted as
to how the situation created by the journey should be put to use. I
suggested that we should unquestionably come to a good agreement, if an
alliance--which I preferred--could not be brought about. In any event,
a firm agreement would suffice, I said, and would suit the English; in
the long run an alliance might always develop from it.
The opportunity for such an alliance came with unexpected promptness.
While I was at Homburg von der Höhe in the spring of 1901, Count
Metternich, who was with me as representative of the Foreign Office,
brought me a notification from Berlin that _Mr. Chamberlain_ had
inquired there as to whether Germany was ready for an _alliance with
England_. I immediately asked: "Against whom?"--since, if England so
suddenly offered to make an alliance in the midst of peace, it was
plain that she needed the German army, which made it worth while to
find out against whom the army was needed and for what reason German
troops were to fight, at England's behest, by her side. Thereupon the
answer came from London that they were needed against Russia, since
Russia was a menace both to India and to Constantinople.
The first thing I did was to call London's attention to the old
traditional brotherhood-in-arms between the German and Russian armies,
and the close family ties between the reigning dynasties of the two
countries; in addition, I pointed out the dangers of a war on two
fronts, in case France came in on the side of Russia, and also the
fact that we had acted jointly with France and Russia in the Far East
(Shimonoseki, 1895) and that there was no reason to unloose a conflict
with Russia at this time, when we were in the midst of peace; that the
superiority in number of the Russian army on a peace footing was very
great and the eastern frontiers of Prussia seriously threatened by the
grouping of the Russian forces; that England would not be in a position
to protect our eastern province from a Russian attack, since her fleet
could accomplish little in the Baltic and would be unable to sail into
the Black Sea; that, in case of our making common cause against Russia,
Germany would be the only one who would be in great danger, quite
independently of the possibility of the entry of France into the fight.
Chamberlain then informed us that a firm alliance should be made, by
which England would naturally bind herself to come to our aid.
BRITISH ALLIANCE FAILS
I had also pointed out that the validity of an alliance could only
be assured when the English Parliament had placed its approval upon
it, since the Ministry might be driven from office by the will of the
nation as expressed in Parliament, whereby signature of the Ministry
might be rendered null and void and the alliance invalidated, and that
we could look upon the Chamberlain suggestion, for the time being,
merely as a purely personal project of his own.
To this Chamberlain replied that he would get backing from Parliament
in due time and would find the way of winning the Unionists over to
his idea; that all needed now was the signature of Berlin. Matters
did not progress as far as that, because Parliament was not to be won
over to Chamberlain's plan; therefore the "plan" came to nothing. Soon
afterward England concluded her alliance with Japan (Hayashi). The
Russo-Japanese War broke out, in which Japan--owing to the fact that
it fitted in with her schemes--played the rôle of pawn for England's
interests, which rôle had originally been reserved for Germany. By
this war Russia was thrown from the east back to the west, where she
might concern herself again with the Balkans, Constantinople, and
India--which was to Japan's advantage--leaving to Japan a free hand in
Korea and China.
In 1905 came my journey to Tangier, undertaken much against my will.
It came about as follows: Toward the end of March I intended, as in
the previous year, to take a Mediterranean trip for the sake of my
health, for which I proposed to avail myself of some ship running empty
from Cuxhaven to Naples. The _Hamburg_ was destined by Ballin for this
purpose. At his request that I take along some other guests, since the
steamer was quite empty, I invited a number of gentlemen, among them
Privy Councilor Althoc, Admiral Mensing, Count Pückler, Ambassador von
Varnbuhler, Professor Schiemann, Admiral Hollmann, etc.
Soon after the proposed trip became known Bülow informed me that
there was a strong desire at Lisbon to have me stop there and pay the
Portuguese court a visit. To this I agreed. As the date of departure
approached, Bülow expressed the additional wish that I also stop at
Tangier and, by visiting that Moroccan port, strengthen the position of
the Sultan of Morocco in relation to the French.
This I declined, since it seemed to me that the Morocco question was
too full of explosive matter and I feared that such a visit would
work out disadvantageously rather than beneficially. Bülow returned
to the attack, without, however, persuading me of the necessity or
advisability of the visit.
AGAIN KAISER "GIVES IN"
During the journey I had several talks with Freiherr von Schoen, who
accompanied me as representative of the Foreign Office, as to the
advisability of the visit. We agreed that it would be better to drop
it. I telegraphed this decision to the Chancellor from Lisbon. Bülow
replied emphatically that I must take into consideration the view of
the German people and of the Reichstag, which had become interested in
the project, and that it was necessary that I stop at Tangier.
I gave in, with a heavy heart, for I feared that this visit, in view
of the situation at Paris, might be construed as a provocation and
cause an inclination in London to support France in case of war. Since
I suspected that Delcassé wished to make Morocco a pretext for war, I
feared that he might make use of the Tangier visit for this purpose.
The visit took place, after much difficulty had been experienced in the
open roadstead of Tangier, and it met with a certain amount of friendly
participation by Italian and Southern French anarchists, rogues, and
adventurers. A lot of Spaniards stood upon a small square, amid waving
banners and loud cries; these, according to a police official who
accompanied us, were an assembly of Spanish anarchists.
The first I learned about the consequences of my Tangier visit was
when I got to Gibraltar and was formally and frigidly received by the
English, in marked contrast to my cordial reception the year before.
What I had foreseen was justified by the facts. Embitterment and anger
reigned in Paris, and Delcassé tried to rouse the nation to war; the
only reason that he did not succeed was that both the Minister of War
and the Minister of the Navy declared France not yet ready.
The fact that my fears were justified was also corroborated later by
the conversation between Delcassé and the editor of _Le Gaulois_,
in which the Minister informed an astonished world that, in case of
war, England would have sided with France. Thus, even as far back as
that, I ran the risk, through the Tangier visit forced upon me, of
getting blamed for the unchaining of a world war. To think and act
constitutionally is often a hard task for a ruler upon whom in every
case responsibility is finally saddled.
In October, 1905, the Paris _Matin_ reported that Delcassé had declared
in the Council of Ministers that England had offered, in case of war,
to land 100,000 men in Holstein and seize the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal.
This English offer was repeated once more later on, with the suggestion
that it be affirmed in writing. And the well-known Jaurès, who was
murdered in accordance with the political ideas of Isvolsky upon the
outbreak of war in 1914, knew beforehand about the statements by
Delcassé published in the _Matin_.
The downfall of Delcassé and the accession of Rouvier to his post are
to be ascribed partly to the influence of the Prince of Monaco. During
the regatta week at Kiel the Prince had assured himself, by talks with
me, the Imperial Chancellor, and Government officials, of the sincerity
of our desire to compromise with France for the purpose of enabling us
to live at peace with each other. He stood well with the ambassador,
Prince Radolin, and worked actively toward a rapprochement between the
two countries.
The Prince of Monaco himself was of the opinion that Delcassé was a
menace to the maintenance of peace and hoped that he would soon fall
and be replaced by Rouvier, who was a prudent politician thoroughly
inclined to coming to an understanding with Germany. The Prince said
that he was on good terms with Rouvier personally and would willingly
place himself at the disposal of the German ambassador as a go-between.
NEGOTIATIONS FRUITLESS
Then came Delcassé's fall, and Rouvier became Minister. At once I
caused the initiation of the measures wherein I could count upon the
support of the Prince of Monaco. The Chancellor was instructed to
prepare a rapprochement with France. And I particularly told Prince
Radolin, who personally received his instructions in Berlin, to make
good use of the Rouvier régime for the purpose of eliminating all
possibilities of conflict between the two countries. I added that the
reports of the Prince of Monaco, with whom he was well acquainted,
would be useful to him in relations with Rouvier. Prince Radolin
proceeded with zeal and pleasure to the accomplishment of this
worth-while task.
At first the negotiations went well, so much so that I began to hope
that the important goal would be attained and the evil impression
caused by the Tangier visit effaced by an understanding. In the
meantime, the negotiations concerning Morocco were continued; they were
concluded, after endless trouble, by the summoning of the Algeciras
Conference, based upon the circular note of Prince Bülow, which
pointed out that the Most-Favored-Nation Clause No. 17 of the Madrid
Convention should remain in force and that the reforms in Morocco,
for which France alone was working, should be carried out, in so far
as necessary, only in agreement with the signatory powers of the
Madrid Conference. These events, which riveted general attention upon
themselves, relegated the special negotiations with Rouvier to the
background.
With regard to domestic policy, I had agreed with the Chancellor that
his main task was to be the restoration of order in the relations
between the parties in the Reichstag, which had got into a bad way
under Hohenlohe, and, above all, to rally the Conservatives, who had
been won over to the opposition by the Post-Bismarckians, once more to
the support of the Government. The Chancellor accomplished this task
with great patience and tenacity. He finally formed the famous "bloc,"
which arose from the great electoral defeat of the Socialists.
The Conservative party had many members who had direct relations with
the court, and also with me personally, so that it was easier for this
party than for any other to become informed as to my plans in political
and other matters and to discuss my ideas with me before they took
shape in projects for laws. I have not the impression that this was
done to the extent that was possible; I might perhaps have come into
agreement with the gentlemen, through informal conversations, in the
question of the building of the Central Canal--opposed, as is well
known, by the Conservatives--as well as in the less important matters
of the construction of the Cathedral and the Berlin Opera House, in
which I was deeply interested for the sake of the Church and of art.
I am saying nothing new if I remark that it was by no means easy to
deal with the gentlemen of the Conservative party. Through their
traditional services to the state they had acquired great experience
and independence of judgment, and had thus formed firm political
convictions, to which they held faithfully and in a genuinely
conservative manner. From their ranks great statesmen, eminent
Ministers, a brilliant officer corps, a model body of officials, had
largely been produced. Therefore, the consciousness of their own merit
was not without justification; in addition, their loyalty to their King
was unshakable. The King and the country both owed them gratitude.
FINDS FAULT WITH CONSERVATIVES
Their weakness lay in the fact that they were at times too
conservative--that is, they recognized too late the demands of the
time and began by opposing progress, although it might be progress
advantageous to themselves. One may understand this in view of their
past, but the fact remains that it worked to the detriment of their
relations with me, especially during my reign, when the development
of the Empire, particularly of industry and commerce, pushed rapidly
forward; and I desired--and was obliged--to place no obstacles in the
way of that development, but to promote it. When I said that it was not
always easy, for the reasons adduced, to deal with the Conservatives,
I am well aware that the same thing is maintained about me. Perhaps
this is because I stood close to the Conservatives on account of my
traditions, but was not a Conservative for party reasons. I was and
am, indeed, in favor of progressive conservatism, which preserves what
is vital, rejects what is outworn, and accepts that portion of the new
which is useful.
Let me add that in discussions I was able to endure the truth, even
when it was uncomfortable and bitter, better than people are aware,
provided it was told to me tactfully.
So that, when it is maintained that I and the Conservatives did not
get along in dealings with each other, the same reason was at the root
of the difficulty on both sides. It would have been better to arrive
oftener at an understanding with me in private conversations, for which
I was always ready. And in the canal question, on which we could not
agree, who was better qualified than the Conservative to understand and
appreciate the fact that I have never subscribed to the pretty couplet,
"Unser König absolut, wenn er unseren Willen tut" ("Absolute our King
may be, if he does what we decree")? For, had I acted according to
that principle--a very comfortable one for me--the Conservatives,
in view of their belief in a strong King who really governs, would
logically have been forced to oppose me. Surely the Conservatives must
have respected me for having matched their honorable axiom of manly
pride before the thrones of Kings with mine of kingly pride before the
Conservative party's throne, just as I did with regard to all other
parties.
In any event, the occasional differences with the Conservative party
and with individual Conservatives cannot make me forget the services
rendered by men of this very party to the House of Hohenzollern, the
Prussian state, and the German Empire.
Bülow finally did the great trick of bringing Conservatives and
Liberals together in Germany, thus getting a big majority for the
parties siding with the Government. In doing so, the great abilities
of the Chancellor, his skill, statecraft, and shrewd knowledge of men,
shone forth most brilliantly. The great service rendered by him in
achieving this success won him thorough appreciation and gratitude from
his country and from myself; and, in addition, an increase of my trust
in him. The boundless delight of the people of Berlin in the defeat of
the Social Democrats at the polls led to the nocturnal demonstration,
which I shall never forget, in front of my palace, in the course of
which my automobile had to force a way for itself, little by little,
amid a cheering crowd of many thousands surrounding it. The Lustgarten
was packed with great multitudes of people, at whose tumultuous request
the Empress and I had to appear on the balcony in order to receive
their homage.
The Chancellor was present at the visit of King Edward VII to Kiel.
Among the many guests was the former Chief Court Marshal of the
Empress, Frederick, Count Seckendorff, long acquainted with Edward
VII through his many visits to England, who reposed great trust in
the Count. This gentleman, at the behest of Bülow, with whom he was
friendly, arranged an interview between the King and the Chancellor.
It took place on board the royal English yacht after a breakfast to
which I and the Chancellor were invited. Both gentlemen sat for a long
time alone over their cigars. Afterward Bülow reported to me what had
transpired at the interview. In discussing the possible conclusion of
an alliance between Germany and England, the King, he told me, had
stated that such a thing was not at all necessary in the case of our
two countries, since there was no real cause for enmity or strife
between them. This refusal to make an alliance was a plain sign of the
English "policy of encirclement," which soon made itself felt clearly
and disagreeably at the Algeciras Conference. The pro-French and
anti-German attitude of England, which there came out into the open,
was due to special orders from King Edward VII, who had sent Sir D.
Mackenzie Wallace to Algeciras as his "supervising representative,"
equipped with personal instructions.
From hints given by the latter to his friends it turned out that it
was the King's wish to oppose Germany strongly and support France
at every opportunity. When it was pointed out to him that it might
be possible, after all, to take up later with Germany this or that
question and perhaps come to an understanding, he replied that,
first of all came the Anglo-Russian agreement; that, once that was
assured, an "arrangement" might be made with Germany also. The English
"arrangement" consisted in the encirclement of Germany.
HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH BÜLOW
The relations between me and the Chancellor remained trustful and
friendly throughout this period. He was present repeatedly at the Kiel
regatta. Here, he found occasion, among other matters, to confer with
the Prince of Monaco and a number of influential Frenchmen, who were
guests aboard the Prince's yacht, among whom doubtless the most eminent
was M. Jules Roche, the leading expert on European budgets, and a great
admirer of Goethe. He always carried a copy of _Faust_ in his pocket.
In April, 1906, came the unfortunate collapse in the Reichstag of the
overworked Chancellor. As soon as I received the news, I hurried there
and was glad that Privy Councilor Renvers could give me encouraging
news about Bülow's condition. While the Prince was recuperating
during the summer at Norderney, I went from Heligoland, which I had
been inspecting, on a torpedo boat to the island and surprised the
Chancellor and his wife at their villa. I spent the day in chatting
with the Chancellor, who had already recovered his health to an
encouraging degree and was browned by the sea air and sunlight.
In the late autumn of 1907 the Empress and I paid a visit to Windsor,
at the invitation of King Edward VII. We were most cordially received
by the English royal family and the visit went off harmoniously. After
this visit I went for a rest to the castle of Highcliffe, belonging
to General Stewart Worthley, situated on the south coast of England,
opposite The Needles.
Before my departure for England, the Chancellor, who was much pleased
at the English invitation, had long talks with me as to the best way
for getting on a better footing with England, and had suggested to
me a number of his desires and projects, to serve me as guides in my
conversations with Englishmen. During my visit I had frequent occasion
to discuss the subjects agreed upon and conduct conversations as
desired by the Chancellor. Cipher telegrams containing my reports on
these conversations went regularly to Berlin and I repeatedly received
from the Chancellor approving telegrams. I used to show these after
the evening meal to my intimates who accompanied me on my visit; these
men, among them the Chief Court Marshal Count Eulenburg and Prince Max
Egon Fürstenberg, read them and rejoiced with me at the harmonious
understanding between me and the Chancellor.
After my return from England I made a general report to the Chancellor,
whereupon he expressed to me his thanks for my having personally
troubled myself so much and worked so hard toward improving the
relations between the two countries.
DEFENDS FAMOUS INTERVIEW[6]
A year later came the incident about the so-called "interview,"
published in the _Daily Telegraph_. Its object was the improvement of
German-English relations. I had sent the draft submitted to me to the
Chancellor for examination through the representative of the Foreign
Office, Herr von Jenisch. I had called attention, by means of notes, to
certain portions which, to my way of thinking, did not belong therein
and should be eliminated. Through a series of mistakes on the part of
the Foreign Office, when the matter was taken up at my request, this
was not done.
A storm broke loose in the press. The Chancellor spoke in the
Reichstag, but did not defend the Kaiser, who was the object of attack,
to the extent that I expected, declaring, on the other hand, that he
wished to prevent in future the tendency toward "personal politics"
which had become apparent in the last few years. The Conservative party
took upon itself to address an open letter to the King through the
newspapers, the contents of which are known.
During these proceedings, I was staying first at Eckartsau, with Franz
Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, and later with Kaiser Franz
Joseph at Vienna, both of whom disapproved of the Chancellor's conduct.
From Vienna I went to Donaueschingen to visit Prince Fürstenberg, to
whom the press saw fit to address the demand that he should, being
an honest, upright man, tell the Emperor the truth for once. When we
talked over the whole matter, the Prince advised me to get together,
at the Foreign Office, the dispatches from Highcliffe in 1907, and the
answers to them, and have these laid before the Reichstag.
During this whole affair I underwent great mental anguish, which was
heightened by the sudden death before my eyes of the intimate friend
of my youth, Count Hülsen-Haeseler, chief of the Military Cabinet.
The faithful, self-sacrificing friendship and care of the Prince and
his family were most welcome to me in these bitter days. And letters
and demonstrations from the Empire, part of which sided with me and
severely censured the Chancellor, were a consolation to me during that
period.
After my return, the Chancellor appeared, lectured me on my political
sins, and asked that I sign the document that is already known, which
was afterward communicated to the press. I signed it in silence and in
silence I endured the attacks of the press against myself and the Crown.
The Chancellor struck a serious blow, by his conduct, at the firm
confidence and sincere friendship which had bound me before to him.
Undoubtedly Prince Bülow thought that, handling the matter as he did
both in the Reichstag and with me personally, he could best serve me
and the cause, especially as public excitement was running very high
at that time. In this I could not agree with him, all the more so
since his actions toward me in the _Daily Telegraph_ affair stood out
in too sharp contrast to the complaisance and recognition which Bülow
had previously manifested toward me. I had become so accustomed to the
amiability of the Prince that I found the treatment now accorded me
incomprehensible.
A BREAK WITH BÜLOW
The relationship between Emperor and Chancellor, excellent and amicable
up to that time, was, at all events, disturbed. I gave up personal
relations with the Chancellor and confined myself to official dealings.
After consultation with the Minister of the Royal Household and the
chief of the Cabinet, I resolved to follow Prince Fürstenberg's advice
as to getting together the Highcliffe dispatches, and charged the
Foreign Office with this task. It failed of accomplishment because the
dispatches in question were not to be found.
Toward the end of the winter the Chancellor requested an audience
with me. I walked up and down with him in the picture gallery of the
palace, between the pictures of my ancestors, of the battles of the
Seven Years' War, of the proclamation of the Empire at Versailles,
and was amazed when the Chancellor harked back to the events of the
autumn of 1908 and undertook to explain his attitude. Thereupon I took
occasion to talk with him about the entire past. The frank talk and
the explanations of the Prince satisfied me. The result was that he
remained in office.
The Chancellor requested that I dine with him that evening, as I had so
often done before, in order to show the outer world that all was again
well. I did so. A pleasant evening, enlivened by the visibly delighted
Princess with charming amiability, and by the Prince with his usual
lively, witty talk, closed that memorable day. Alluding to the Prince's
audience with me, a wag wrote later in a newspaper, parodying a famous
line: "The tear flows, Germania has me again."
By this reconciliation I also wished to show that I was in the
habit of sacrificing my own sensitiveness to the good of the cause.
Despite Prince Bülow's attitude toward me in the Reichstag, which
was calculated to pain me, I naturally never forgot his eminent gifts
as a statesman and his distinguished services to the fatherland. He
succeeded, by his skill, in avoiding a world war at several moments of
crisis, during the period indeed, when I, together with Tirpitz, was
building our protecting fleet. That was a great achievement.
A serious epilogue to the above-mentioned audience was provided by the
Conservatives. The Civil Cabinet informed the party leaders of the
Chancellor's audience and what happened there, with the request that
the party might now take back its "Open Letter." This request--which
was made solely in the interest of the Crown, not of myself
personally--was declined by the party. Not until 1916, when the war
was under way, did we get into touch again, through a delegate of the
party, at Great General Headquarters.
Just as the Conservatives did not do enough out of respect for the
Crown to satisfy me, so also the Liberals of the Left, the Democrats
and the Socialists, distinguished themselves by an outburst of fury,
which became, in their partisan press, a veritable orgy, in which
loud demands were made for the limitation of autocratic, despotic
inclinations, etc. This agitation lasted the whole winter, without
hindrance or objection from high Government circles. Only after the
Chancellor's audience did it stop.
Later, a coolness gradually arose between the Chancellor and
the political parties. The Conservatives drew away from the
Liberals--rifts appeared in the bloc. Centrists and Socialists--but,
above all, the Chancellor himself--brought about its downfall, as Count
Hertling repeatedly explained to me later--for the last time at Spa. He
was proud to have worked energetically toward causing Bülow's downfall.
When matters had reached an impossible pass, the Chancellor drew
the proper conclusions and recommended to me the choice of Herr
von Bethmann as the fifth Chancellor of the Empire. After careful
consultations, I decided to acquiesce in the wish of Prince Bülow, to
accept his request for retirement, and to summon the man recommended by
him as his successor.
[6] One of the most startling incidents of the Kaiser's reign was
the interview with him printed in the London _Daily Telegraph_
of Oct. 28, 1908. In it he said that "Englishmen, in giving rein
to suspicions unworthy of a great nation," were "mad as March
hares"; and that "the prevailing sentiment among large sections
of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not friendly
to England. I am, therefore, so to speak, in a minority in my
own land, but it is a minority of the best elements, just as it
is in England with respect to Germany." German opinion was, he
admitted, "bitterly hostile" to England during the Boer War, and,
that the German people, if he had permitted Boer delegates in
Berlin, "would have crowned them with flowers." He asserted that
he had formulated a plan of campaign in South Africa which Lord
Roberts adopted in substance.
The Kaiser was quoted in this interview as declaring Germany
needed a large fleet chiefly on account of the Far Eastern
situation.
The interview was republished in official German organs, and
caused as great a stir in Germany as in England. There were many
debates on it in the Reichstag and one or two "investigations."