Hohenlohe
Again I was confronted with the difficult task of choosing a
Chancellor. His position and activities were to be under somewhat about
the same auspices and subject to the same conditions as in the case
of his predecessor. But now there was more of a desire that he should
be a statesman, an older man, of course, qualified to inspire Prince
Bismarck with more confidence than a mere general could do.
It was assumed that a statesman would know better how to walk in the
footsteps of the Prince, politically speaking; and provide Bismarck
with less opportunity for criticism and attacks. These latter had
tended to create gradually among all Government officials, who dated
mostly from the period of Bismarck, an unmistakable nervousness and
dissatisfaction, by which the work of the entire governmental system
was impaired to an extent by no means inconsiderable. Moreover, it
lent to the opposition in the Reichstag a constantly renewed strength
drawn from elements previously faithful to the Government, and made
itself felt in a detrimental manner. Especially in the Foreign Office,
the spirit of Holstein, the supposed representative of the "old,
tried Bismarckian traditions," began to assert itself, so that the
unwillingness to collaborate with the Emperor became particularly
strong and the belief grew up that it was necessary to carry on,
independently, the policy of Bismarck.
After mature deliberation, I decided to intrust the post of Chancellor
to Prince Hohenlohe, who was then Governor of Alsace-Lorraine. At the
outbreak of the War of 1870 he had succeeded, as Bavarian Minister, in
getting Bavaria to enter the war on the side of Prussia. Ever since he
had been highly esteemed by Prince Bismarck on account of his fidelity
to the Empire. It was natural to expect that Bismarck's opposition
would cool off when confronted with such a successor. Thus, the choice
of Hohenlohe as Chancellor was strongly influenced by consideration for
Prince Bismarck and for the public opinion inspired by him.
Prince Hohenlohe was the typical old-style grand seigneur. He was
thoroughly urbane by nature and in his dealings with others: a man of
refined mind, with a slight touch of playful irony sometimes glinting
through, keen on account of his years, a level-headed observer and
judge of men. Despite the great difference in age between him and me he
got along very well with me, which was shown on the surface by the fact
that he was treated both by the Empress and by myself as our uncle, and
addressed as such, which brought about a certain atmosphere of intimate
confidence in our intercourse. In his talks with me, especially in
giving his opinion as to appointments of officials, he offered very
characteristic descriptions of the gentlemen being discussed, often
combined with philosophical observations which proved that he had
reflected deeply on life and humanity, and which were evidence of a
maturity and wisdom grounded on experience.
Something happened during the first period of Hohenlohe's régime as
Chancellor which throws an interesting light upon the relations between
France and Russia. Having, at the time of the fraternization between
Russia and France, received reliable information from the General
Staff as well as from our Embassy at Paris to the effect that France
contemplated withdrawing a portion of her troops from Algeria, in
order to shift them to southern France either against Italy or against
Alsace, I apprised Tsar Nicholas II of this news, adding the remark
that I should be obliged to adopt counter-measures unless the Tsar
could dissuade his ally from so provocative a step.
SOME DIPLOMATIC FENCING
At that time the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was Prince
Lobanoff, formerly ambassador at Vienna, well known for his pro-French
proclivities. During the summer of 1895 he had visited France and been
very cordially entertained. During the autumn, just as I was staying
for the hunting at Hubertusstock on the Schorfheide near Eberswalde,
Prince Lobanoff, on his return journey from Paris, requested to be
received in audience, at the behest of the Tsar. Upon being received
by me he described the calm and sensible frame of mind which he
had found in Paris and sought to quiet me, too, with regard to the
above-mentioned troop movements, which, according to him, were mere
empty rumor and chatter without any real basis. He added that he was
bringing to me the most quieting assurances, that there was no reason
for my feeling the slightest alarm. I thanked him heartily for his
report, remarking that the word "alarm" was not to be found in the
dictionary of a German officer; and I added that, if France and Russia
wished to make war, I could not prevent it.
Whereupon the Prince, piously casting up his eyes toward heaven, made
the sign of the cross and said: "Oh, la guerre! quelle idée; qui y
pense?--cela ne doit pas être" ("Oh, war! what an idea; who thinks
of such a thing? it must not be"). To that I replied that I, in any
event, was not thinking about it, but that an observer--and he need not
be very keen eyed--must assuredly consider the constant celebrations
and speeches, as well as the official and unofficial visits exchanged
between Paris and St. Petersburg, as significant symptoms which
could not be ignored, and which were calculated to arouse great
dissatisfaction in Germany; that, should it come to war, against my own
will and that of my people, I felt that, trusting in God and in my army
and people, it would be possible for Germany to get the better of both
opponents.
To this I added still another statement, reported to me from Paris,
which had been made by a Russian officer who was in France as a member
of an officers' deputation. Having been asked by a French comrade
whether the Russians believed that they could beat the Germans, the
gallant Slav replied: "Non, mon ami, nous serons battus à plate
couture, mais qu'est-ce que ça fait? Nous aurons la République" ("No,
my friend, we shall be thoroughly beaten, but what does that matter? We
shall get a republic").
At first the Prince eyed me, speechless, then, shrugging his shoulders,
he remarked: "Oh, la guerre, il ne faut pas même y penser" ("Oh,
war, one must not even think about it"). The officer had merely
expressed the general opinion of the Russian intelligentsia and social
circles. As far back as my first visit to St. Petersburg, in the early
'eighties, a grand duchess said to me at dinner, quite calmly: "Here we
sit all the time on a volcano. We expect the revolution any day! The
Slavs are not faithful, they are not at all monarchical, all of them
are republicans at heart; they disguise their sentiments, and they lie,
every one of them, all the time."
Three important events, related to foreign politics, came within the
period of Prince Hohenlohe's incumbency of the Chancellorship: the
opening, in 1895, of the Emperor William Canal (North Sea-Baltic
Canal), begun under Emperor William the Great, to which squadrons
or individual ships representing countries all over the world were
invited; the annexation, in 1897, of Tsing-tao; and, third, the
much-discussed Kruger dispatch.
THE SEIZURE OF TSING-TAO
Prince Hohenlohe played an especially important rôle in the annexation
of Tsing-tao. He, too, was of the opinion that Germany needed some
coaling stations for her ships, and that the demands of commercial
elements that the opportunity for opening up China to international
trade be not allowed to pass were justified. It was resolved that,
under unimpaired Chinese sovereignty and after payment of the likin
(octroi, or internal revenue tax), a trading port, with a marine
coaling station as protection, was to be founded, wherein it was
contemplated to allow China to co-operate to the utmost possible extent.
The station was to serve the ends of commerce, before all else, the
military measures being limited solely to the protection of the trading
center as it developed; they did not constitute an end in themselves or
a basis for further military enterprises.
Already several places had been considered, but these had proved,
upon more careful investigation, to be unfitted, mostly because they
had either bad connections or none at all with the interior regions,
were not promising from a commercial-political standpoint, or were
encumbered by privileges already granted to other foreign countries.
Finally it was agreed--because of the reports of Admiral Tirpitz,
who was, at that time, chief of the East Asiatic cruiser squadron,
and because of the opinion of the geographical expert, Freiherr von
Richthofen, who, having been questioned on the subject, had drawn
a most promising picture of the possibilities of development in
Shantung--to found a settlement on the bay of Kiao-Chau.
The Chancellor proceeded to collect data on the political questions
which arose as a result of this and which must be taken into
consideration. It was particularly necessary not to interfere with
Russia's designs, nor to disturb her. Further information was obtained,
some of it from our East Asiatic division; from this source favorable
reports came in as to anchorages and the ice-free nature of the bay
of Kiao-Chau, and as to the prospects, if a port were to be founded
there. From conversations among the officers of the Russian China
division, which had come to our ears in our intercourse with them, it
was learned that the Russian Admiral, in accordance with orders from
his Government, had anchored one winter in the bay, but had found it
so desolate and so atrociously lonesome--there were no tea houses
with Japanese geisha girls, which the Russians deemed absolutely
indispensable to winter quarters--that the Russian squadron would never
go back there any more.
It was also reported that the Russian Admiral had advised his
Government most earnestly against prosecuting any further its intention
of founding a settlement on this bay, since there was absolutely no
advantage to be derived from it. Hence, the Russians had no intention
of gaining a foothold there.
This last piece of news arrived at about the same time as the answer
from the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Muravieff, sent through the
German ambassador, relative to the sounding of Russian opinion, which
had been made pursuant to instructions from the Chancellor. Muravieff
set forth that Russia, to be sure, had no direct claims, based on
treaty with China, to the bay, but that she, nevertheless, laid claim
to it on the basis of the "droit du premier mouillage" ("right of first
anchorage"), since the Russian ships had anchored there before those
of any other fleet. This answer, it will be seen, ran counter to the
report of our East Asiatic division relative to the statements made by
the Russian Admiral.
When I, with Hollmann, met the Chancellor, in order to discuss the
Russian claim to Kiao-Chau, the Prince listened to the reading of
it with his little ironical smile, and remarked that he had been
unable to find any jurist at the Foreign Office who could tell him
anything about this wonderful claim. Was the navy in a position to
do so? Admiral Hollmann declared that he, in all his experience on
foreign service, had never heard of it; that it was nonsense and an
invention of Muravieff, whose only motive was unwillingness to have
some other nation settle on the shores of the bay. I advised that
Privy Councilor of the Admiralty Perels, one of the most famous living
experts on international maritime law and an acknowledged authority in
this domain, be asked to deliver an opinion, in order to clarify the
question. This was done. The opinion tore Muravieff's contention to
pieces, corroborated that of Hollmann, and completely did away with the
legend about the "right of first anchorage."
Months elapsed; my August, 1897, visit to Peterhof was imminent. In
agreement with the Prince, my uncle, I decided to discuss the entire
matter in person and frankly with the Tsar, and, if possible, put an
end to Muravieff's notes and evasions. The talk took place at Peterhof.
The Tsar stated that he had no interest in the territory south of the
Tientsin-Peking line, which meant that there was no reason why he
should place obstacles in our path in Shantung: that his interest was
concentrated upon the territory on the Yalu, around Port Arthur, etc.,
now that the English had made difficulties for him at Mokpo; that he
would, in fact, be pleased if Germany should locate herself in future
on the other side of the Gulf of Chih-li as Russia's welcome neighbor.
Afterward I had a talk with Muravieff. He employed all his arts,
wriggled back and forth in his statements, and finally brought up his
famous "right of first anchorage." That was all I wanted. I now passed
to the offensive myself, striking out at him squarely with the opinion
delivered by Perels. When I had told him, finally, as the Tsar desired,
the result of the conversations between us two sovereigns, the diplomat
was even more embarrassed, lost his assumed calm, and capitulated.
Thus was the soil prepared, politically speaking. In the autumn
came the news from Bishop Anzer of the murder of the two German
Catholic missionaries in Shantung. The entire German Catholic world,
particularly the "colonials" in the Centerist party, demanded energetic
measures. The Chancellor proposed to me immediate intervention. While I
was engaged in the winter hunting at Lotalingen, I consulted with him,
in one of the little towers of the castle there, as to what steps were
to be taken. The Prince proposed to intrust Prince Henry of Prussia,
who was present, with the command of the squadron that was to be sent
out to reinforce the East Asiatic Division. I informed my brother
of this in the presence of the Chancellor, whereat the Prince and
the other gentlemen present were highly pleased. The Chancellor sent
the news to the Foreign Office and to the new Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, Herr von Bülow, who was away on a journey.
Kiao-Chau was occupied in November, 1897. In December of that year
Prince Henry sailed, on board the _Deutschland_, with his squadron to
Eastern Asia, where he later took over the command of the entire East
Asiatic Division. On the 6th of March, 1898, the agreement with China
concerning Kiao-Chau was signed. At the same time, Mr. Chamberlain
in London brought up before the Japanese ambassador, Baron Kato, the
idea of the conclusion of an Anglo-Japanese alliance, in order to bar
Russia's advance in the East.
QUEST FOR COALING STATIONS
One will naturally inquire why, in the discussion of our audacious
move, there is no mention of England, since she was certainly deeply
interested therein. Preliminaries, however, had already been gone
into with England. In order to meet the necessity for German coaling
stations, I had intended to found, lease, or buy some in agreement
with England, so far as might be possible. In view of the fact that
my uncle, the Chancellor, was, as a member of the Hohenlohe family,
related to Queen Victoria, known to her personally for years and
highly esteemed by her, I hoped that this might tend to facilitate the
negotiations which were entered into with the English Government for
the above-noted purpose. My hope was disappointed. The negotiations
dragged along without any prospect of successful termination.
I took occasion, therefore, at the behest of the Chancellor, to discuss
the matter with the English ambassador at Berlin. I complained of
the treatment received from the English Government, which everywhere
opposed German wishes, even such as were justified. The ambassador
agreed frankly with this, and expressed his astonishment at England's
failure to meet Germany halfway, and at English shortsightedness,
since, when a young, rising nation like Germany, whose development,
after all, was not to be prevented, turned directly to England in
order to acquire territory with her consent, instead of going straight
ahead or allying itself with other nations, it was certainly more than
England could reasonably ask.
Moreover, he added that, since England already owned almost all the
world, she could certainly find a place where she might permit Germany
to establish a station; that he was unable to understand the gentlemen
in Downing Street; that in case Germany should not succeed in obtaining
England's approval, she would probably occupy, on her own account, such
places as were suited to her ends, since, after all, there was no law
against it.
I laid stress upon the fact that this agreed entirely with my own
view and, in conclusion, I summed up my standpoint once more for
the ambassador: I told him that Germany was the only country in the
world which, despite its colonial possessions and its rapidly growing
commerce, possessed no coaling stations; that we were quite willing to
acquire these with England's consent; that, should she refuse to show a
realization of our situation and fail to meet us halfway, we should be
compelled to turn to some other great power, in order, with its help,
to found settlements.
This talk, likewise, was fruitless. Finally, the negotiations with
England were broken off, without result, in a rather impolite manner.
Thereupon the Chancellor and I decided to appeal to Russia.
The occupation of Kiao-Chau aroused surprise and anger in the English
Government. Having refused us her support, England had definitely
reckoned on the belief that nobody would help Germany in attaining her
goal. Now things had turned out differently, and there was no lack of
recriminations from London. When the English ambassador took up this
tone he was referred to the conversation with me, and it was made clear
to him that it was solely the fault of his Government that it had come
to no understanding with Germany.
England's attitude of aloofness surprised us at that time. An
occurrence which, then, was unknown to me, may serve to throw light on
the matter.
FINDS SEED OF WORLD WAR[3]
In a book (_The Problem of Japan_) which appeared anonymously at The
Hague in 1918 and was said to have been written by an "Ex-Diplomat from
the Far East," an excerpt was published from a work of the American,
Professor Usher of Washington University at St. Louis. Usher, like his
former colleague, Prof. John Bassett Moore of Columbia University,
New York, has often been called into consultation as an adviser on
foreign relations by the State Department at Washington, since he had a
knowledge possessed by few other Americans on international questions
affecting the United States. Professor Usher, in his book published in
1913, made known, for the first time, the existence and contents of
an "agreement" or "secret treaty" between _England_, _America_, and
_France_, dating from the spring of 1897. In this it was agreed that,
in case Germany or Austria, or both of them, should begin a war for the
sake of "Pan-Germanism," the United States should at once declare in
favor of England and France and go to the support of these powers with
all its resources. Professor Usher cites at length all the reasons,
including those of a colonial character, which inevitably imposed upon
the United States the necessity of taking part, on the side of England
and France, in a war against Germany, which Professor Usher, in 1913,
prophesied as _imminent_!!
The unknown author of _The Problem of Japan_ went to the trouble of
publishing in tabulated form the agreements between England, France,
and America in 1897, in order thereby to show, in a way easily
understood, the extent of the reciprocal obligations. This chapter
is extraordinarily worth reading; it gives a good glimpse into the
preliminary history and _preparation of the World War_ on the part of
the _Entente_, which even at that time was uniting _against Germany_,
although not yet appearing under the name of Entente Cordiale. The
ex-diplomat remarks in this connection:
Here is a treaty that Professor Usher alleges to have been entered
into as long ago as 1897, in which every phase of activity and
participation in future events by England, France, and the United
States is provided for, including the conquest of the Spanish
dependencies, control over Mexico and Central America, the opening
of China, and the annexation of coaling stations. And all these
measures Professor Usher wishes us to believe were taken to defend
the world against Pan-Germanism.
It is unnecessary to remind Professor Usher, or anybody else, for
that matter, that Pan-Germanism, if we go so far as to assume that
such a thing actually exists, had certainly never been heard of
in 1897, at which time Germany had not yet adopted her program
for naval construction on a large scale, the same having been
bruited for the first time in 1898. If, therefore, it is true that
England, France, and the United States harbored the mutual designs
imputed to them by Professor Usher, and entered into an alliance to
accomplish them, it will scarcely do to attribute the conception
of the idea and the stimulus to its consummation to so feeble a
pretext as the rise of a Pan-Germanism.[4]
Thus the ex-diplomat.
This is truly amazing. A definite treaty of partition directed against
Spain, Germany, etc., arranged even to minute details, was planned
between Gauls and Anglo-Saxons, in a time of the profoundest peace,
and concluded without the slightest twinge of conscience, in order to
annihilate Germany and Austria and eliminate their competition from
the world market! _Seventeen years_ before the beginning of the World
War _this_ treaty was made by the united Anglo-Saxons and its goal was
systematically envisaged throughout this entire period! Now one can
understand the ease with which King Edward VII could pursue his policy
of encirclement; for years the principal actors had been united and
in readiness. When he christened the compact "Entente Cordiale," its
appearance was for the world, especially for Germany, an unpleasant
novelty, but in the countries on the other side it was merely the
official acknowledgment of facts long known there.
In view of this agreement, one can understand also the opposition
of England in 1897 to an agreement with Germany regarding coaling
stations, and the anger aroused because Germany managed, in agreement
with Russia, to gain a firm foothold in China, concerning the
exploitation of which land _without_ German participation a tripartite
treaty had already been made.
Usher talked out of school and conclusively proved _at whose door
lies the guilt for the World War_. The treaty directed against
Germany--sometimes called the "gentleman's agreement"--of the spring
of 1897, is the basis, the point of departure, for this war, which was
systematically developed by the Entente countries for seventeen years.
When they had succeeded in winning over Russia and Japan likewise for
their purposes, they struck the blow, after Serbia had staged the
Sarajevo murder and had thus touched the match to the carefully filled
powder barrel.
Professor Usher's statements are likewise a complete refutation of
all those who were impelled, during the war, to find the reason for
the entry of the United States in certain military acts on the part
of Germany, as, for instance, the _Lusitania_ case, the expansion of
U-boat warfare, etc. None of that is right. The recently published,
excellent book of John Kenneth Turner, _Shall It Be Again?_ points out,
on the basis of convincing proofs, that Wilson's alleged reasons for
going to war and war aims were not the real ones. America--or rather
President Wilson--was resolved probably from the start, certainly
from 1915, to range herself against Germany and to fight. She did the
latter, alleging the U-boat warfare as a pretext, in reality under the
influence of powerful financial groups, and yielding to the pressure
and prayers of her partner, France, whose resources in man power were
becoming more and more exhausted. America did not wish to leave a
weakened France along with England, whose annexation designs on Calais,
Dunkirk, etc., were well known to her.
It was a fateful thing for Germany--let this be stated here, in a
general way--that our Foreign Office was unable to meet the broad
policy of encirclement of England and the cunning of Russia and France
with an equal degree of diplomatic skill. This was partly because it
had not really been trained under Prince Bismarck; and therefore
when, after the retirement of the Prince and Count Herbert, the
all-dominating will and spirit were lacking, it was not up to the task
of conducting foreign affairs on its own independent initiative.
Moreover, it is difficult in Germany to train up good diplomats, since
our people lack the taste and endowment for diplomacy which have shone
forth brilliantly only from a few German minds, like Frederick the
Great and Bismarck. Unfavorable also to the Foreign Office were the
very frequent changes of Secretaries of State. Imperial Chancellors,
following the example of Bismarck, maintained their influence upon the
Foreign Office and suggested the Secretaries of State who should direct
its affairs. I acquiesced in the proposals of the Imperial Chancellors
as to these posts, since I admitted their right to choose themselves
their leading collaborators in the domain of foreign affairs. That
these frequent changes were not calculated to work toward the
continuity of political policy was a disadvantage that had to be taken
into account.
The Foreign Office was largely influenced by the axiom: "No
disagreeable quarrels with other powers"--"surtout pas d'histoires"
("above all, no yarns"), as the French general said to a company of
soldiers which, he had heard, wished to mutiny. One of the Secretaries
of State told me once when, in placing some matter before me, I had
called his attention to the apparently serious situation in connection
with some foreign question, that this simply must be righted, that the
Foreign Office based its acts primarily upon the maxim: "Let us have
quiet."
Given this attitude, one can also understand the answer which the
German representative gave to a German merchant in a South American
republic who had asked him for help and intercession with the
authorities, since his shop had been plundered and his property
stolen: "Oh, don't bother me with these things! We have established
such pleasant relations with this republic; any action undertaken in
your behalf would only serve to upset them." I need scarcely add that
whenever such a conception of duty came to my attention I removed the
official concerned from his post.
The Foreign Office enjoyed general unpopularity both among the people
and in the army. I worked continuously, during the tenure of office
of various Chancellors, for thorough reform, but in vain. Every new
Chancellor, especially if he himself did not come from the ranks of the
foreign service, needed the Foreign Office in order to work himself
into foreign affairs, and this took time. But once he had worked
himself in he was under obligation to the officials, and was reluctant
to make extensive changes, burdened as he was by other matters and
lacking detailed knowledge regarding the Foreign Office personnel,
particularly as he still believed that he needed the advice of those
who were "orientated."
DEVELOPMENT OF TSING-TAO
But let us return to Tsing-tao. Here everything was done to promote
commerce and industry, and done jointly with the Chinese; the flag
of the Chinese Empire, moreover, was hoisted over the Custom House at
Tsing-tao. The development there was such that the port, during the
years immediately preceding the war, ranked sixth among all Chinese
trading centers in the commercial register of the great Chinese
merchants and of the merchants' guild coming just after Tientsin.
Tsing-tao was a prospering German commercial colony, where many Chinese
worked side by side with Germans; it was, so to speak, a great sample
warehouse of German abilities and German achievements, to which the
Chinese, who formerly had not known Germany, her capabilities of
achievement, or her products, could repair for selection and emulation;
it was a contrast to the naval stations of Russia and England, which
were purely military, directed solely toward domination and conquest.
The rapid rise of Tsing-tao as a trading center aroused the envy of the
Japanese and English, but this did not prevent swarms of the latter
from journeying, with their families, to the splendid beach, enjoying
its cool air and the beautiful Strand Hotel, and devoting themselves
to playing polo and lawn tennis after they had escaped from the heat
of Hongkong, Canton, and Shanghai. Envy prompted England in 1914 to
demand that Japan should take Tsing-tao, although it was _de facto_
Chinese. Japan did this joyfully, promising to return it to China, but
it was not returned until the beginning of 1922, after much pressure,
although Japan had agreed with America that she was not to be allowed
to make any territorial changes in China without previous consultation
with Washington.
Thus a great German cultural work in foreign lands, which stood as a
model of the method and manner which a cultured nation should employ
in extending the advantages of its culture to another nation, was
annihilated by English commercial envy. Some day, when Hongkong has
gone the same way, England will repent of her act and bitterly reproach
herself for having abandoned her old maxim, in accordance with which
she has acted for so many years: "White men together against colored
men." When once Japan has made a reality out of her watchword, "Asia
for the Asiatics," and brought China and India under her sway, England
will cast her eyes about in search of Germany and the German fleet.
As to the "yellow peril," I had the following interview with the Tsar
later, after the Russo-Japanese War, at a meeting between us.
The Tsar was, at that time, visibly impressed by the growing power
of Japan and its constant menace to Russia and Europe, and requested
my opinion concerning this. I answered that if the Russians counted
themselves among the cultured nations of Europe they must be ready
to rally to the defense of these nations against the "yellow peril"
and to fight for and by the side of Europe for their own and Europe's
existence and culture; but that if the Russians, on the other hand,
considered themselves Asiatics they would unite with the "yellow
peril," and, joining forces with it, would assail Europe. The Tsar,
said I, must bear this in mind in providing for the defense of his land
and organizing his army.
When the Tsar asked me what course I thought the Russians would take, I
replied: "The second."
The Tsar was outraged and wished to know at once on what I based
this opinion. I answered that my opinion was based on Russia's
construction of railways and on the arraying of the Russian army along
the Prussian-Austrian frontier. Thereupon the Tsar protested that he
and his house were Europeans, that his country and his Russians would
certainly cleave to Europe, that he would look upon it as a matter of
honor to protect Europe from the "yellow men." To this I replied that
if this was the Tsar's attitude he must make his military preparations
conform to it without delay. The Tsar said nothing.
At all events, I sought to utilize Tsar Nicholas II's worry at the
growing power of Japan to the advantage of Germany and general European
culture. Russia, despite siding with Japan, was the first nation to
collapse among all those participating in the war.
REPROACHES FOR JAPAN
The able statesmen of Japan, of whom there are quite a number, must be
in some doubt as to whether they ranged their country on the right side
in the war. Yes, they will perhaps ask themselves whether it would not
have been more advantageous for Japan to have prevented the World War.
This would have been within her powers, had she ranged herself firmly
and unequivocally on the side of the Central Powers, from which in
former times she had learned so willingly and so much.
Had Japan adopted soon enough such an orientation in her foreign
policy, and, like Germany, fought by peaceful means for her share in
world trade and activity, I should have put the "yellow peril" away in
a corner and joyfully welcomed into the circle of peacefully inclined
nations the progressive Japanese nation, the "Prussians of the East."
Nobody regrets more than I that the "yellow peril" had not already lost
its meaning when the crisis of 1914 arose. The experience derived from
the World War may yet bring this about.
Germany's joint action with France and Russia at Shimonoseki was based
upon Germany's situation in Europe. Wedged in between on-marching
Russia, threatening Prussia's frontier, and France, fortifying her
borders anew with forts and groups of fortresses, confronted with a
friendship between these two nations resembling an alliance, Berlin
looked with anxiety into the future. The warlike preparations of the
two powers were far ahead of ours, their navies far more modern and
powerful than the German navy, which consisted of a few old ships
almost without fighting value. Therefore it seemed to us wise to
acquiesce in the suggestion of this strong group, in order that it
might not--should we decline--turn immediately to England and cause
the entry of the latter into the combination. This would have meant
the formation, at that time, of the combination of 1914, which would
have been a serious matter for Germany. Japan, on the other hand,
was about to go over anyhow to England, in her sympathies. Moreover,
Germany's making common cause with the Franco-Russian group offered
the possibility of achieving gradually a more trusting and less
strained relationship in Europe and of living side by side with our two
neighbors there in more friendliness, as a result of the common policy,
adopted in the Far East. The policy adopted by us at this juncture was
also consistently based on the maintenance of world peace.
In the entire Kiao-Chau question, Prince Hohenlohe, despite his age,
evinced a capacity for sticking steadily to his purpose and a degree of
resolution which must be reckoned as greatly to his credit.
Unfortunately in the matter of the Kruger dispatch his prudence and
his vision, so clear on other occasions, abandoned him: only by so
assuming is his obstinate insistence on the sending of this dispatch
to be understood. The influence of such an energetic and eloquent
personage as Herr von Marschall, former State Attorney, may have been
so powerful, the siren song of Herr von Holstein so convincing, that
the Prince yielded to them. In any event, he did his country an ill
turn in this matter, and damaged me seriously both in England and at
home.
THE KRUGER TELEGRAM[5]
Since the so-called Kruger dispatch made a big stir and had serious
political consequences, I shall tell the story of it in detail.
The Jameson raid caused great and increasing excitement in Germany.
The German nation was outraged at this attempt to overpower a little
nation, which was Dutch--and, hence, Lower Saxon-German in origin--and
to which we were sympathetic because of racial relationship. I was much
worried at this violent excitement, which also seized upon the higher
classes of society, foreseeing possible complications with England. I
believed that there was no way to prevent England from conquering the
Boer countries, should she so desire, although I also was convinced
that such a conquest would be unjust. But I was unable to overcome the
reigning excitement, and was even harshly judged by my intimates on
account of the attitude I adopted.
One day when I had gone to my uncle, the Imperial Chancellor, for a
conference, at which the Secretary of State for the Navy, Admiral
Hollmann, was present, Freiherr Marschall, one of the Secretaries of
State, suddenly appeared in high excitement, with a sheet of paper in
his hand. He declared that the excitement among the people--in the
Reichstag, even--had grown to such proportions that it was absolutely
necessary to give it outward expression, and that this could best be
done by a telegram to Kruger, a rough draft of which he had in his hand.
I objected to this, being supported by Admiral Hollmann. At first the
Imperial Chancellor remained passive in the debate. In view of the fact
that I knew how ignorant Freiherr Marschall and the Foreign Office were
of English national psychology, I sought to make clear to Freiherr
Marschall the consequences which such a step would have among the
English; in this, likewise, Admiral Hollmann seconded me. But Marschall
was not to be dissuaded.
Then, finally, the Imperial Chancellor took a hand. He remarked that
I, as a constitutional ruler, must not stand out against the national
consciousness and against my constitutional advisers; otherwise, there
was danger that the excited attitude of the German people, deeply
outraged in its sense of justice and also in its sympathy for the
Dutch, might cause it to break down the barriers and turn against me
personally. Already, he said, statements were flying about among the
people; it was being said that the Emperor was, after all, half an
Englishman, with secret English sympathies; that he was entirely under
the influence of his grandmother, Queen Victoria; that the dictation
emanating from England must cease once for all; that the Emperor must
be freed from English tutelage, etc.
SAYS HE SIGNED AGAINST HIS WILL
In view of all this, he continued, it was his duty as Imperial
Chancellor, notwithstanding he admitted the justification of my
objections, to insist that I sign the telegram in the general political
interest, and, above all else, in the interest of my relationship to my
people. He and also Herr von Marschall, he went on, in their capacity
of my constitutional advisers, would assume full responsibility for the
telegram and its consequences.
Sir Valentine Chirol, at that time correspondent of the _Times_,
wrote, in the _Times_ of September 11th, that Herr von Marschall,
directly after the sending of the dispatch, had stated to him that the
dispatch did not give the personal opinion of the Emperor, but was a
governmental act, for which the Chancellor and he himself assumed full
responsibility.
Admiral Hollmann, when the Imperial Chancellor appealed to him for
corroboration of this point of view and was asked by him to uphold it
to me, declined to do so with the remark that the Anglo-Saxon world
would unquestionably attribute the telegram to the Kaiser, since
nobody would believe that such a provocative thing could come from His
Majesty's elderly advisers, and all would consider it an "impulsive"
act of the "youthful" Emperor.
Then I again tried to dissuade the gentlemen from their project. But
the Imperial Chancellor and Marschall insisted that I sign, reiterating
that they would be responsible for consequences. It seemed to me that I
ought not to refuse after their presentation of the case. I signed.
Not long before his death Admiral Hollmann recalled the occurrence to
me in full detail, as it is described here.
After the Kruger dispatch was made public the storm broke in England,
as I had prophesied. I received from all circles of English society,
especially from aristocratic ladies unknown to me, a veritable flood of
letters containing every possible kind of reproach, some of the writers
not hesitating even at slandering me personally and insulting me.
Attacks and calumnies began to appear in the press, so that soon the
legend of the origin of the dispatch was as firmly established as the
amen at church. If Marschall had also announced in the Reichstag what
he stated to Chirol, I personally would not have been drawn into the
matter to such an extent.
In February, 1900, while the Boer War was in progress and while I was
with the fleet at Heligoland attending the maneuvers of ships of the
line, after having been present at the swearing in of recruits at
Wilhelmshafen I received news by telegraph from the Wilhelmstrasse,
_via_ Heligoland, that Russia and France had proposed to Germany to
make a joint attack on England, now that she was involved elsewhere,
and cripple her sea traffic. I objected and ordered that the proposal
be declined.
Since I assumed that Paris and St. Petersburg would present the matter
at London in such a way as to make it appear that Berlin had made
the above proposal to both of them, I immediately telegraphed from
Heligoland to Queen Victoria and to the Prince of Wales (Edward) the
fact of the Russo-French proposal, and its refusal by me. The Queen
answered expressing her hearty thanks, the Prince of Wales with an
expression of astonishment.
Later, Her Majesty let me know secretly that, shortly before the
receipt of my telegram from Heligoland concerning the proposal from
Paris and St. Petersburg, the false version of the matter foreseen
by me had indeed been told, and that she was glad to have been able,
thanks to my dispatch, to expose the intrigue to her Government and
quiet it as to the loyal attitude of Germany; she added that she would
not forget the service I had done England in troublous times.
DEAL WITH CECIL RHODES
When Cecil Rhodes came to me, in order to bring about the construction
of the Cape-to-Cairo Railway and Telegraph line through the interior
regions of German East Africa, his wishes were approved by me, in
agreement with the Foreign Office and the Imperial Chancellor; with
the proviso that a branch railway should be built _via_ Tabora, and
that German material should be used in the construction work on German
territory. Both conditions were acquiesced in by Rhodes most willingly.
He was grateful at the fulfillment of his pet ambition by Germany, only
a short time after King Leopold of Belgium had refused his request.
Rhodes was full of admiration for Berlin and the tremendous German
industrial plants, which he visited daily. He said that he regretted
not having been in Berlin before, in order to have learned about the
power and efficiency of Germany, and to have got into touch with the
German Government and prominent Germans in commercial circles. He said
he had wished, even before the Jameson raid, to visit Berlin, but had
been prevented in London at that time from so doing; that, had he been
able to inform us before of his plan to get permission to build the
Cape-to-Cairo line through the Boer countries, as well as through our
colonies, the German Government would probably have been able to help
him by bringing persuasion to bear upon Kruger, who was unwilling to
grant this permission; that "the stupid Jameson Raid" would never have
been made, in that case, and the Kruger dispatch never written--as to
that dispatch, he had never borne me a grudge on account of it.
He added that as we, in Germany, could not be correctly informed as
to aim and actual purposes, the said raid must have looked to us like
"an act of piracy," which naturally and quite rightly had excited the
Germans; that all he had wanted was to have such stretches of land as
were needed for his rail lines--such, in fact, as Germany had just
granted to him in the interior of her colonies--a demand which was not
unjust and would certainly have met with German support. I was not to
worry, he added, about the dispatch and not bother myself any more
about the uproar in the English press. Rhodes did not know about the
origin of the Kruger dispatch and wanted to console me, imagining that
I was its originator.
Rhodes went on to advise me to build the Bagdad Railway and open up
Mesopotamia, after having had irrigation simultaneously introduced
there. He said that this was Germany's task, just as his was the
Cape-to-Cairo line. In view of the fact that the building of this line
through our territory was also made dependent upon the cession to us of
the Samoan Islands, Rhodes worked actively in London toward having them
turned over to us.
In home politics, Prince Hohenlohe, as Chancellor, showed a mildness
which was not generally favorable. Owing to his long acquaintanceship
with Herr von Hertling, he was able to establish friendly relations
with the Vatican. His mildness and indulgence were also exercised
toward Alsace-Lorraine, in which, as an expert of long standing,
he showed particular interest. But he got little thanks for this,
since the French element, indirectly benefited thereby, behaved with
ever-increasing arrogance.
PEN SKETCH OF HOHENLOHE
Prince Hohenlohe loved to employ mediation, compromise, and
conciliation--toward the Socialists likewise--and he employed them on
some occasions when energetic measures would have been more fitting. He
hailed with much joy my Far East trip to Constantinople and Jerusalem.
He was pleased at the strengthening of our relations with Turkey and
considered the plan for the Bagdad Railway arising from them as a great
cultural work worthy of Germany.
He also gave his most enthusiastic approval to my visit to England in
1899, made by me with my wife and two sons at the desire of my royal
grandmother, who, growing steadily weaker on account of her years,
wished to see her oldest grandson once more. He hoped that this journey
might serve to efface somewhat the consequences of the Kruger dispatch
sent by him, and also to clarify some important questions by means of
conferences between me and English statesmen.
In order to avoid any unpleasantness from the English press, which,
angered by the Boer War and the partly unjustified attacks of certain
German newspapers, had been answering in like tone, the Queen had
commissioned the author of _The Life of the Prince Consort_, Sir
Theodore Martin, to inform the English press of Her Majesty's desire
that a friendly reception be accorded to her Imperial grandson. And
that is what indeed came to pass. The visit ran its course harmoniously
and caused satisfaction on all sides. I held important conferences with
various leading men.
Not once in the entire visit was the Kruger dispatch mentioned.
On the other hand, my royal grandmother did not conceal from her
grandson how unwelcome the whole Boer War was to her; she made no
secret of her disapproval and aversion for Mr. Chamberlain and all
that he represented, and thanked me again for my prompt and sharp
refusal of the Russo-French proposal to interfere and for my immediate
announcement of this proposal. One could easily see how much the Queen
loved her splendid army and how deeply she had been grieved by the
heavy reverses suffered by it at the outset of the war, which had
caused by no means negligible losses. Referring to these, the aged
Field Marshal Duke of Cambridge coined the fine phrase: "The British
nobleman and officer have shown that they can die bravely as gentlemen."
On my departure, the Queen bade me farewell with cordial and grateful
greetings to her "much-cherished cousin," the Imperial Chancellor,
whose ability and experience, she hoped, would continue to maintain
good relations between our two countries.
My report entirely satisfied Prince Hohenlohe as to the success of
my journey; at the same time, however, I was the object of the most
violent attacks from a certain section of the press and from many
excited "friends of the Boers." The German lacks the very thing with
which the English people has been inoculated, and to which it has
been trained by long political self-discipline: when a fight is on,
even though it be merely upon the field of diplomacy, the Englishman
unquestioningly follows the flag, in accordance with the proverb: "You
can't change the jockey while running."
In the autumn of 1900 Prince Hohenlohe retired from the Chancellorship,
since the work had become too arduous for a man of his advanced age.
Moreover, the constant quarrels and disputes of the political parties
with one another were disagreeable to him, and it went against the
grain with him to make speeches before them in the Reichstag. Equally
disagreeable to him was the press, part of which had taken the bit
between its teeth and imagined that it could conserve the Bismarckian
tradition by quoting sayings by Bismarck, and had greatly jeopardized
relations with England, especially during the Boer War.
CHANCELLOR'S RETIREMENT
The hope, aroused by the choice of Prince Hohenlohe as Chancellor and
his assumption of the office, that Prince Bismarck would place less
obstacles in his path, had been only partly fulfilled. The atmosphere
had been much relieved and Prince Bismarck brought to a much milder
frame of mind by my reconciliation with him, which had received
outward expression in his solemn entry into Berlin and his staying
at the old Hohenzollern palace, but his adherents and those rallying
around him for the sake of opposition were not to be dissuaded from
their activities. Moreover, the political representatives of the
people succeeded, while I was on my way to Friedrichsruh to celebrate
Bismarck's eightieth birthday, in refusing to pay homage to the old
Imperial Chancellor, a thing which naturally deeply hurt the sensitive
Prince Hohenlohe and filled him with indignation.
He, like myself, was deeply moved by the death of his great
predecessor, and we, together with the German people, sincerely mourned
Prince Bismarck as one of the greatest of the sons of Prussia and
Germany, in spite of the fact that he had not always made our task
easy. I insisted upon hurrying back from my trip to Norway in order
to pay honor to him who, as a faithful servant of his old master, had
helped the German nation to unity, and under whom I, when I was Prince,
had had the proud privilege of working.
It is said that one of the reasons why Prince Hohenlohe retired from
his post was the advice of his son Alexander, who was much at his
father's house; he was known in society as "the Crown Prince," and was
essentially different from his lovable father.
Prince Hohenlohe could look back upon a series of successes during
his term as Chancellor: the overcoming of the disputes concerning
the "Citizens' Book of Laws," the reform of the military punishment
procedure, the Naval law, the appointment of Waldersee to the command
in China at the time of the Boxer War, Tsing-tao, and the Yangtse
Treaty.
He bade me farewell on the 15th of October, 1900. Both of us were
greatly moved, for not only was the Chancellor and faithful co-worker
parting from his Emperor, but also the uncle from his nephew,
who looked up with grateful esteem to the old man. At the age of
seventy-five years--an age when others have long since retired to rest
and contemplation--he had not hesitated to obey the summons of the
Emperor to subject himself to even more exacting labors and devote his
time and strength to the German fatherland. When about to leave my
room, he grasped my hand once again with the request that I might grant
him, during the years of life still remaining to him (which he meant
to spend in Berlin), the same plain, faithful friendship which he had
so long noted and admired between me and Admiral von Hollmann. I shall
always preserve him faithfully in my memory.
[3] "Once the magnitude of Pan-Germanism dawned on the English and
French diplomats, once they became aware of the lengths to
which Germany was willing to go, they realized the necessity of
strengthening their position, and therefore made overtures to the
United States, which resulted, probably before the summer of the
year 1897, in an understanding between the three countries. There
seems to be no doubt whatever that no papers of any sort were
signed, that no pledges were given which circumstances would not
justify any one of the contracting parties in denying or possibly
repudiating. Nevertheless, an understanding was reached that in
case of a war begun by Germany or Austria for the purpose of
executing Pan-Germanism, the United States would promptly declare
in favor of England and France and would do her utmost to assist
them."--ROLAND G. USHER, _Pan-Germanism_, chap. x, p. 139.
[4] _The Problem of Japan_, by an Ex-Counselor of Legation in the Far
East, chap. viii, p. 136, note. Published by C. L. Langenhuysen,
Amsterdam and Rotterdam. 1918.
[5] Tremendous excitement was caused in England when the incident of
the Kruger message became known. On January 3, 1896, the German
Emperor telegraphed as follows to the President of the South
African Republic:
"I congratulate you most sincerely on having succeeded, with
your people, without calling on the help of foreign powers,
by opposing your own force to an armed band which broke into
your country to disturb the peace, in restoring quiet and in
maintaining the independence of your country against external
attack."
On January 6th, in conversation with Sir Frank Lascelles,
Baron von Marschall protested against the view of the English
press that it was an act of hostility against England and
an encroachment on English rights for the German Emperor to
congratulate the head of a friendly state on his victory over an
armed band that had invaded his land in defiance of international
law, and had been declared to be outside the pale of the law by
the English Government itself. But it was not recorded that he
disavowed the Kaiser's responsibility for it.