"The Maratha cavalry at times make very long and rapid marches, in
which they do not suffer themselves to be interrupted by the monsoon or
any violence of weather. In very pressing exigencies it is incredible
the fatigue a Maratha horseman will endure; frequently many days pass
without his enjoying one regular meal, but he depends entirely for
subsistence on the different corn-fields through which the army passes:
a few heads of juari, which he chafes in his hands while on horseback,
will serve him for the day; his horse subsists on the same fare, and
with the addition of opium, which the Marathas frequently administer
to their cattle, is enabled to perform incredible marches."
The above analysis of the Maratha troops indicates that their real
character was that of freebooting cavalry, largely of the same type
as, though no doubt greatly superior in tone and discipline to the
Pindaris. Like them they lived by plundering the country. "The
Marathas," Elphinstone remarked, "are excellent foragers. Every
morning at daybreak long lines of men on small horses and ponies
are seen issuing from their camps in all directions, who return
before night loaded with fodder for the cattle, with firewood torn
down from houses, and grain dug up from the pits where it had been
concealed by the villagers; while other detachments go to a distance
for some days and collect proportionately larger supplies of the same
kind." [223] They could thus dispense with a commissariat, and being
nearly all mounted were able to make extraordinarily long marches,
and consequently to carry out effectively surprise attacks and when
repulsed to escape injury in the retreat. Even at Panipat where their
largest regular force took the field under Sadasheo Rao Bhao, he had
70,000 regular and irregular cavalry and only 15,000 infantry, of whom
9000 were hired sepoys under a Muhammadan leader. The Marathas were at
their best in attacking the slow-moving and effeminate Mughal armies,
while during their period of national ascendancy under the Peshwa
there was no strong military power in India which could oppose their
forays. When they were by the skill of their opponents at length
brought to a set battle, their fighting qualities usually proved
to be distinctly poor. At Panipat they lost the day by a sudden
panic and flight after Ibrahim Khan Gardi had obtained for them a
decided advantage; while at Argaon and Assaye their performances
were contemptible. After the recovery from Panipat and the rise of
the independent Maratha states, the assistance of European officers
was invoked to discipline and train the soldiery. [224]