AN APOLOGY FOR THE WAR.
I think it may be received as a fact that the Northern States, taken
together, sent a full tenth of their able-bodied men into the ranks
of the army in the course of the summer and autumn of 1861. The
South, no doubt, sent a much larger proportion; but the effect of
such a drain upon the South would not be the same, because the slaves
were left at home to perform the agricultural work of the country. I
very much doubt whether any other nation ever made such an effort
in so short a time. To a people who can do this it may well be
granted that they are in earnest; and I do not think it should be
lightly decided by any foreigner that they are wrong. The strong and
unanimous impulse of a great people is seldom wrong. And let it be
borne in mind that in this case both people may be right,--the people
both of North and South. Each may have been guided by a just and
noble feeling; though each was brought to its present condition by
bad government and dishonest statesmen.
There can be no doubt that, since the commencement of the war, the
American feeling against England has been very bitter. All Americans
to whom I spoke on the subject admitted that it was so. I, as an
Englishman, felt strongly the injustice of this feeling, and lost
no opportunity of showing or endeavouring to show that the line of
conduct pursued by England towards the States was the only line which
was compatible with her own policy and just interests, and also with
the dignity of the States' Government. I heard much of the tender
sympathy of Russia. Russia sent a flourishing general message, saying
that she wished the North might win, and ending with some good
general advice, proposing peace. It was such a message as strong
nations send to those which are weaker. Had England ventured on such
counsel the diplomatic paper would probably have been returned to
her. It is, I think, manifest that an absolute and disinterested
neutrality has been the only course which could preserve England from
deserved rebuke,--a neutrality on which her commercial necessity for
importing cotton or exporting her own manufactures should have no
effect. That our Government would preserve such a neutrality I have
always insisted, and I believe it has been done with a pure and
strict disregard to any selfish views on the part of Great Britain.
So far I think England may feel that she has done well in this
matter. But I must confess that I have not been so proud of the tone
of all our people at home as I have been of the decisions of our
statesmen. It seems to me that some of us never tire in abusing the
Americans, and calling them names for having allowed themselves to
be driven into this civil war. We tell them that they are fools and
idiots; we speak of their doings as though there had been some plain
course by which the war might have been avoided; and we throw it in
their teeth that they have no capability for war. We tell them of
the debt which they are creating, and point out to them that they
can never pay it. We laugh at their attempt to sustain loyalty, and
speak of them as a steady father of a family is wont to speak of some
unthrifty prodigal who is throwing away his estate and hurrying from
one ruinous debauchery to another. And, alas! we too frequently allow
to escape from us some expression of that satisfaction which one
rival tradesman has in the downfall of another. "Here you are with
all your boasting," is what we say. "You were going to whip all
creation the other day; and it has come to this! Brag is a good
dog, but Holdfast is a better. Pray remember that, if ever you find
yourselves on your legs again." That little advice about the two
dogs is very well, and was not altogether inapplicable. But this
is not the time in which it should be given. Putting aside slight
asperities, we will all own that the people of the States have
been and are our friends, and that as friends we cannot spare them.
For one Englishman who brings home to his own heart a feeling of
cordiality for France--a belief in the affection of our French
alliance--there are ten who do so with reference to the States. Now,
in these days of their trouble, I think that we might have borne with
them more tenderly.
And how was it possible that they should have avoided this war? I
will not now go into the cause of it, or discuss the course which it
has taken, but will simply take up the fact of the rebellion. The
South rebelled against the North, and such being the case, was it
possible that the North should yield without a war? It may very
likely be well that Hungary should be severed from Austria, or Poland
from Russia, or Venice from Austria. Taking Englishmen in a lump,
they think that such separation would be well. The subject people do
not speak the language of those that govern them, or enjoy kindred
interests. But yet when military efforts are made by those who govern
Hungary, Poland, and Venice to prevent such separation, we do not
say that Russia and Austria are fools. We are not surprised that
they should take up arms against the rebels, but would be very much
surprised indeed if they did not do so. We know that nothing but
weakness would prevent their doing so. But if Austria and Russia
insist on tying to themselves a people who do not speak their
language or live in accordance with their habits, and are not
considered unreasonable in so insisting, how much more thoroughly
would they carry with them the sympathy of their neighbours
in preventing any secession by integral parts of their own
nationalities? Would England let Ireland walk off by herself if
she wished it? In 1843 she did wish it. Three-fourths of the Irish
population would have voted for such a separation; but England would
have prevented such secession _vi et armis_ had Ireland driven her to
the necessity of such prevention.
I will put it to any reader of history whether, since government
commenced, it has not been regarded as the first duty of government
to prevent a separation of the territories governed, and whether also
it has not been regarded as a point of honour with all nationalities
to preserve uninjured each its own greatness and its own power? I
trust that I may not be thought to argue that all governments or even
all nationalities should succeed in such endeavours. Few kings have
fallen in my day in whose fate I have not rejoiced; none, I take it,
except that poor citizen King of the French. And I can rejoice that
England lost her American colonies, and shall rejoice when Spain has
been deprived of Cuba. But I hold that citizen King of the French in
small esteem, seeing that he made no fight, and I know that England
was bound to struggle when the Boston people threw her tea into the
water. Spain keeps a tighter hand on Cuba than we thought she would
some ten years since, and therefore she stands higher in the world's
respect.
It may be well that the South should be divided from the North. I am
inclined to think that it would be well--at any rate for the North;
but the South must have been aware that such division could only
be effected in two ways: either by agreement,--in which case the
proposition must have been brought forward by the South and discussed
by the North,--or by violence. They chose the latter way, as being
the readier and the surer, as most seceding nations have done.
O'Connell, when struggling for the secession of Ireland, chose the
other, and nothing came of it. The South chose violence, and prepared
for it secretly and with great adroitness. If that be not rebellion
there never has been rebellion since history began; and if civil
war was ever justified in one portion of a nation by turbulence in
another, it has now been justified in the northern States of America.
What was the North to do; this foolish North, which has been so
liberally told by us that she has taken up arms for nothing, that she
is fighting for nothing, and will ruin herself for nothing? When was
she to take the first step towards peace? Surely every Englishman
will remember that when the earliest tidings of the coming quarrel
reached us on the election of Mr. Lincoln, we all declared that any
division was impossible;--it was a mere madness to speak of it. The
States, which were so great in their unity, would never consent to
break up all their prestige and all their power by a separation!
Would it have been well for the North then to say, "If the South wish
it we will certainly separate?" After that, when Mr. Lincoln assumed
the power to which he had been elected, and declared with sufficient
manliness, and sufficient dignity also, that he would make no war
upon the South, but would collect the customs and carry on the
government, did we turn round and advise him that he was wrong? No.
The idea in England then was that his message was, if anything, too
mild. "If he means to be President of the whole Union," England said,
"he must come out with something stronger than that." Then came Mr.
Seward's speech, which was, in truth, weak enough. Mr. Seward had ran
Mr. Lincoln very hard for the President's chair on the republican
interest, and was--most unfortunately, as I think--made Secretary
of State by Mr. Lincoln, or by his party. The Secretary of State
holds the highest office in the United States Government under the
President. He cannot be compared to our Prime Minister, seeing
that the President himself exercises political power, and is
responsible for its exercise. Mr. Seward's speech simply amounted to
a declaration that separation was a thing of which the Union would
neither hear, speak, nor, if possible, think. Things looked very like
it; but no; they could never come to that! The world was too good,
and especially the American world. Mr. Seward had no specific against
secession; but let every free man strike his breast, look up to
heaven, determine to be good, and all would go right. A great deal
had been expected from Mr. Seward, and when this speech came out, we
in England were a little disappointed, and nobody presumed even then
that the North would let the South go.
It will be argued by those who have gone into the details of American
politics that an acceptance of the Crittenden compromise at this
point would have saved the war. What is or was the Crittenden
compromise I will endeavour to explain hereafter; but the terms and
meaning of that compromise can have no bearing on the subject. The
republican party who were in power disapproved of that compromise,
and could not model their course upon it. The republican party may
have been right or may have been wrong; but surely it will not be
argued that any political party elected to power by a majority should
follow the policy of a minority, lest that minority should rebel.
I can conceive of no government more lowly placed than one which
deserts the policy of the majority which supports it, fearing either
the tongues or arms of a minority.
As the next scene in the play, the State of South Carolina bombarded
Fort Sumter. Was that to be the moment for a peaceable separation?
Let us suppose that O'Connell had marched down to the Pigeon House at
Dublin, and had taken it--in 1843, let us say--would that have been
an argument to us for allowing Ireland to set up for herself? Is
that the way of men's minds, or of the minds of nations? The powers
of the President were defined by law, as agreed upon among all the
States of the Union, and against that power and against that law,
South Carolina raised her hand, and the other States joined her in
rebellion. When circumstances had come to that, it was no longer
possible that the North should shun the war. To my thinking the
rights of rebellion are holy. Where would the world have been,
or where would the world hope to be, without rebellion? But let
rebellion look the truth in the face, and not blanch from its own
consequences. She has to judge her own opportunities and to decide on
her own fitness. Success is the test of her judgment. But rebellion
can never be successful except by overcoming the power against which
she raises herself. She has no right to expect bloodless triumphs;
and if she be not the stronger in the encounter which she creates,
she must bear the penalty of her rashness. Rebellion is justified
by being better served than constituted authority, but cannot be
justified otherwise. Now and again it may happen that rebellion's
cause is so good that constituted authority will fall to the ground
at the first glance of her sword. This was so the other day in
Naples, when Garibaldi blew away the king's armies with a breath. But
this is not so often. Rebellion knows that it must fight, and the
legalized power against which rebels rise must of necessity fight
also.
I cannot see at what point the North first sinned; nor do I think
that had the North yielded, England would have honoured her for her
meekness. Had she yielded without striking a blow she would have
been told that she had suffered the Union to drop asunder by her
supineness. She would have been twitted with cowardice, and told
that she was no match for Southern energy. It would then have seemed
to those who sat in judgment on her that she might have righted
everything by that one blow from which she had abstained. But having
struck that one blow, and having found that it did not suffice, could
she then withdraw, give way, and own herself beaten? Has it been so
usually with Anglo-Saxon pluck? In such case as that would there have
been no mention of those two dogs, Brag and Holdfast? The man of the
northern States knows that he has bragged,--bragged as loudly as his
English forefathers. In that matter of bragging the British lion and
the Star-spangled banner may abstain from throwing mud at each other.
And now the northern man wishes to show that he can hold fast also.
Looking at all this I cannot see that peace has been possible to the
North.
As to the question of secession and rebellion being one and the
same thing, the point to me does not seem to bear an argument. The
confederation of States had a common army, a common policy, a common
capital, a common government, and a common debt. If one might secede,
any or all might secede, and where then would be their property,
their debt, and their servants? A confederation with such a license
attached to it would have been simply playing at national power.
If New York had seceded--a State which stretches from the Atlantic
to British North America--it would have cut New England off from
the rest of the Union. Was it legally within the power of New York
to place the six States of New England in such a position? And
why should it be assumed that so suicidal a power of destroying a
nationality should be inherent in every portion of the nation? The
States are bound together by a written compact, but that compact
gives each State no such power. Surely such a power would have been
specified had it been intended that it should be given. But there are
axioms in politics as in mathematics, which recommend themselves to
the mind at once, and require no argument for their proof. Men who
are not argumentative perceive at once that they are true. A part
cannot be greater than the whole.
I think it is plain that the remnant of the Union was bound to take
up arms against those States which had illegally torn themselves off
from her; and if so, she could only do so with such weapons as were
at her hand. The United States' army had never been numerous or well
appointed; and of such officers and equipments as it possessed, the
more valuable part was in the hands of the Southerners. It was clear
enough that she was ill-provided, and that in going to war she was
undertaking a work as to which she had still to learn many of the
rudiments. But Englishmen should be the last to twit her with such
ignorance. It is not yet ten years since we were all boasting that
swords and guns were useless things, and that military expenditure
might be cut down to any minimum figure that an economizing
Chancellor of the Exchequer could name. Since that we have
extemporized two, if not three armies. There are our volunteers at
home; and the army which holds India can hardly be considered as one
with that which is to maintain our prestige in Europe and the West.
We made some natural blunders in the Crimea, but in making those
blunders we taught ourselves the trade. It is the misfortune of the
northern States that they must learn these lessons in fighting their
own countrymen. In the course of our history we have suffered the
same calamity more than once. The Roundheads, who beat the Cavaliers
and created English liberty, made themselves soldiers on the bodies
of their countrymen. But England was not ruined by that civil war;
nor was she ruined by those which preceded it. From out of these she
came forth stronger than she entered them,--stronger, better, and
more fit for a great destiny in the history of nations. The northern
States had nearly five hundred thousand men under arms when the
winter of 1861 commenced, and for that enormous multitude all
commissariat requirements were well supplied. Camps and barracks
sprang up through the country as though by magic. Clothing was
obtained with a rapidity that has, I think, never been equalled. The
country had not been prepared for the fabrication of arms, and yet
arms were put into the men's hands almost as quickly as the regiments
could be mustered. The eighteen millions of the northern States lent
themselves to the effort as one man. Each State gave the best it had
to give. Newspapers were as rabid against each other as ever, but
no newspaper could live which did not support the war. "The South
has rebelled against the law, and the law shall be supported." This
has been the cry and the heartfelt feeling of all men; and it is a
feeling which cannot but inspire respect.
We have heard much of the tyranny of the present Government of the
United States, and of the tyranny also of the people. They have both
been very tyrannical. The "habeas corpus" has been suspended by the
word of one man. Arrests have been made on men who have been hardly
suspected of more than secession principles. Arrests have, I believe,
been made in cases which have been destitute even of any fair ground
for such suspicion. Newspapers have been stopped for advocating views
opposed to the feelings of the North, as freely as newspapers were
ever stopped in France for opposing the Emperor. A man has not been
safe in the streets who was known to be a Secessionist. It must be at
once admitted that opinion in the northern States was not free when I
was there. But has opinion ever been free anywhere on all subjects?
In the best-built strongholds of freedom have there not always been
questions on which opinion has not been free; and must it not always
be so? When the decision of a people on any matter has become, so
to say, unanimous,--when it has shown itself to be so general as
to be clearly the expression of the nation's voice as a single
chorus,--that decision becomes holy, and may not be touched. Could
any newspaper be produced in England which advocated the overthrow
of the Queen? And why may not the passion for the Union be as strong
with the northern States, as the passion for the Crown is strong with
us? The Crown with us is in no danger, and therefore the matter is at
rest. But I think we must admit that in any nation, let it be ever
so free, there may be points on which opinion must be held under
restraint. And as to those summary arrests, and the suspension of the
"habeas corpus," is there not something to be said for the States'
Government on that head also? Military arrests are very dreadful,
and the soul of a nation's liberty is that personal freedom from
arbitrary interference which is signified to the world by those two
unintelligible Latin words. A man's body shall not be kept in duress
at any man's will; but shall be brought up into open court, with
uttermost speed, in order that the law may say whether or no it
should be kept in duress. That I take it is the meaning of "habeas
corpus," and it is easy to see that the suspension of that privilege
destroys all freedom, and places the liberty of every individual at
the mercy of him who has the power to suspend it. Nothing can be
worse than this; and such suspension, if extended over any long
period of years, will certainly make a nation weak, mean-spirited,
and poor. But in a period of civil war, or even of a widely-extended
civil commotion, things cannot work in their accustomed grooves. A
lady does not willingly get out of her bedroom-window with nothing on
but her nightgown; but when her house is on fire she is very thankful
for an opportunity of doing so. It is not long since the "habeas
corpus" was suspended in parts of Ireland, and absurd arrests were
made almost daily when that suspension first took effect. It was
grievous that there should be necessity for such a step, and it is
very grievous now that such necessity should be felt in the northern
States. But I do not think that it becomes Englishmen to bear
hardly upon Americans generally for what has been done in that
matter. Mr. Seward, in an official letter to the British Minister at
Washington--which letter, through official dishonesty, found its way
to the press--claimed for the President the right of suspending the
"habeas corpus" in the States whenever it might seem good to him
to do so. If this be in accordance with the law of the land, which
I think must be doubted, the law of the land is not favourable to
freedom. For myself, I conceive that Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward have
been wrong in their law, and that no such right is given to the
President by the Constitution of the United States. This I will
attempt to prove in some subsequent chapter. But I think it must be
felt by all who have given any thought to the constitution of the
States, that let what may be the letter of the law, the Presidents of
the United States have had no such power. It is because the States
have been no longer united that Mr. Lincoln has had the power,
whether it be given to him by the law or no.
And then as to the debt; it seems to me very singular that we in
England should suppose that a great commercial people would be ruined
by a national debt. As regards ourselves, I have always looked on our
national debt as the ballast in our ship. We have a great deal of
ballast, but then the ship is very big. The States also are taking in
ballast at a rather rapid rate;--and we too took it in quickly when
we were about it. But I cannot understand why their ship should not
carry, without shipwreck, that which our ship has carried without
damage, and, as I believe, with positive advantage to its sailing.
The ballast, if carried honestly, will not, I think, bring the vessel
to grief. The fear is lest the ballast should be thrown overboard.
So much I have said, wishing to plead the cause of the northern
States before the bar of English opinion, and thinking that there is
ground for a plea in their favour. But yet I cannot say that their
bitterness against Englishmen has been justified, or that their tone
towards England has been dignified. Their complaint is that they
have received no sympathy from England; but it seems to me that a
great nation should not require an expression of sympathy during its
struggle. Sympathy is for the weak rather than for the strong. When
I hear two powerful men contending together in argument, I do not
sympathize with him who has the best of it; but I watch the precision
of his logic, and acknowledge the effects of his rhetoric. There has
been a whining weakness in the complaints made by Americans against
England, which has done more to lower them as a people in my judgment
than any other part of their conduct during the present crisis. When
we were at war with Russia, the feeling of the States was strongly
against us. All their wishes were with our enemies. When the Indian
mutiny was at its worst, the feeling of France was equally adverse to
us. The joy expressed by the French newspapers was almost ecstatic.
But I do not think that on either occasion we bemoaned ourselves
sadly on the want of sympathy shown by our friends. On each occasion
we took the opinion expressed for what it was worth, and managed to
live it down. We listened to what was said, and let it pass by. When
in each case we had been successful, there was an end of our friends'
croakings.
But in the northern States of America the bitterness against England
has amounted almost to a passion. The players, those chroniclers of
the time, have had no hits so sure as those which have been aimed
at Englishmen as cowards, fools, and liars. No paper has dared to
say that England has been true in her American policy. The name
of an Englishman has been made a byword for reproach. In private
intercourse private amenities have remained. I, at any rate, may
boast that such has been the case as regards myself. But even in
private life I have been unable to keep down the feeling that I have
always been walking over smothered ashes.
It may be that, when the civil war in America is over, all this will
pass by, and there will be nothing left of international bitterness
but its memory. It is sincerely to be hoped that this may be
so;--that even the memory of the existing feeling may fade away and
become unreal. I for one cannot think that two nations, situated as
are the States and England, should permanently quarrel and avoid each
other. But words have been spoken which will, I fear, long sound in
men's ears, and thoughts have sprung up which will not easily allow
themselves to be extinguished.