must institute some persons under the appellation of magistrates, whose
peculiar office it is to point out the decrees of equity, to punish
transgressors, to correct fraud and violence, and to oblige men, however
reluctant, to consult their own real and permanent interests. In a word,
obedience is a new duty which must be invented to support that of
justice, and the ties of equity must be corroborated by those of
allegiance.
But still, viewing matters in an abstract light, it may be thought that
nothing is gained by this alliance, and that the factitious duty of
obedience, from its very nature, lays as feeble a hold of the human
mind, as the primitive and natural duty of justice. Peculiar interests
and present temptations may overcome the one as well as the other. They
are equally exposed to the same inconvenience; and the man who is
inclined to be a bad neighbour, must be led by the same motives, well
or ill understood, to be a bad citizen or subject. Not to mention, that
the magistrate himself may often be negligent, or partial, or unjust in
his administration.
Experience, however, proves that there is a great difference between the
cases. Order in society, we find, is much better maintained by means of
government; and our duty to the magistrate is more strictly guarded by
the principles of human nature, than our duty to our fellow-citizens.
The love of dominion, is so strong in the breast of man, that many not
only submit to, but court all the dangers, and fatigues, and cares of
government; and men, once raised to that station, though often led
astray by private passions, find, in ordinary cases, a visible interest
in the impartial administration of justice. The persons who first attain
this distinction, by the consent, tacit or express, of the people, must
be endowed with superior personal qualities of valour, force, integrity,
or prudence, which command respect and confidence; and, after government
is established, a regard to birth, rank, and station, has a mighty
influence over men, and enforces the decrees of the magistrate. The
prince or leader exclaims against every disorder which disturbs his
society. He summons all his partisans and all men of probity to aid him
in correcting and redressing it, and he is readily followed by all
indifferent persons in the execution of his office. He soon acquires the
power of rewarding these services; and in the progress of society, he
establishes subordinate ministers, and often a military force, who find
an immediate and a visible interest in supporting his authority. Habit
soon consolidates what other principles of human nature had imperfectly
founded; and men, once accustomed to obedience, never think of departing
from that path, in which they and their ancestors have constantly trod,
and to which they are confined by so many urgent and visible motives.
But though this progress of human affairs may appear certain and
inevitable, and though the support which allegiance brings to justice be
founded on obvious principles of human nature, it cannot be expected
that men should beforehand be able to discover them, or foresee their
operation. Government commences more casually and more imperfectly. It
is probable, that the first ascendent of one man over multitudes began
during a state of war; where the superiority of courage and of genius
discovers itself most visibly, where unanimity and concert are most
requisite, and where the pernicious effects of disorder are most
sensibly felt. The long continuance of that state, an incident common
among savage tribes, inured the people to submission; and if the
chieftain possessed as much equity as prudence and valour, he became,
even during peace, the arbiter of all differences, and could gradually,
by a mixture of force and consent, establish his authority. The benefit
sensibly felt from his influence, made it be cherished by the people, at
least by the peaceable and well disposed among them; and if his son
enjoyed the same good qualities, government advanced the sooner to
maturity and perfection; but was still in a feeble state, till the
further progress of improvement procured the magistrate a revenue, and
enabled him to bestow rewards on the several instruments of his
administration, and to inflict punishments on the refractory and
disobedient. Before that period, each exertion of his influence must
have been particular, and founded on the peculiar circumstances of the
case. After it, submission was no longer a matter of choice in the bulk
of the community, but was rigorously exacted by the authority of the
supreme magistrate.
In all governments, there is a perpetual intestine struggle, open or
secret, between Authority and Liberty, and neither of them can ever
absolutely prevail in the contest. A great sacrifice of liberty must
necessarily be made in every government; yet even the authority, which
confines liberty, can never, and perhaps ought never, in any
constitution, to become quite entire and uncontrollable. The sultan is
master of the life and fortune of any individual; but will not be
permitted to impose new taxes on his subjects: a French monarch can
impose taxes at pleasure; but would find it dangerous to attempt the
lives and fortunes of individuals. Religion also, in most countries, is
commonly found to be a very intractable principle; and other principles
or prejudices frequently resist all the authority of the civil
magistrate; whose power, being founded on opinion, can never subvert
other opinions equally rooted with that of his title to dominion. The
government, which, in common appellation, receives the appellation of
free, is that which admits of a partition of power among several
members, whose united authority is no less, or is commonly greater, than
that of any monarch; but who, in the usual course of administration,
must act by general and equal laws, that are previously known to all the
members, and to all their subjects. In this sense, it must be owned,
that liberty is the perfection of civil society; but still authority
must be acknowledged essential to its very existence: and in those
contests which so often take place between the one and the other, the
latter may, on that account, challenge the preference. Unless perhaps
one may say (and it may be said with some reason) that a circumstance,
which is essential to the existence of civil society, must always
support itself, and needs be guarded with less jealousy, than one that
contributes only to its perfection, which the indolence of men is so apt
to neglect, or their ignorance to overlook.
OF THE INDEPENDENCY OF PARLIAMENT[1]
Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving
any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controls of
the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a _knave_, and to have
no other end, in all his actions, than private interest. By this
interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him,
notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition, cooperate to public
good. Without this, say they, we shall in vain boast of the advantages
of any constitution, and shall find, in the end, that we have no
security for our liberties or possessions, except the good-will of our
rulers; that is, we shall have no security at all.
It is, therefore, a just _political_ maxim, _that every man must be
supposed a knave_; though, at the same time, it appears somewhat
strange, that a maxim should be true in _politics_ which is false in
_fact_. But to satisfy us on this head, we may consider, that men are
generally more honest in their private than in their public capacity,
and will go greater lengths to serve a party, than when their own
private interest is alone concerned. Honour is a great check upon
mankind: but where a considerable body of men act together, this check
is in a great measure removed, since a man is sure to be approved of by
his own party, for what promotes the common interest; and he soon learns
to despise the clamours of adversaries. To which we may add, that every
court or senate is determined by the greater number of voices; so that,
if self-interest influences only the majority (as it will always do),
the whole senate follows the allurements of this separate interest, and
acts as if it contained not one member who had any regard to public
interest and liberty.
When there offers, therefore, to our censure and examination, any plan
of government, real or imaginary, where the power is distributed among
several courts, and several orders of men, we should always consider the
separate interest of each court, and each order; and if we find that, by
the skilful division of power, this interest must necessarily, in its
operation, concur with the public, we may pronounce that government to
be wise and happy. If, on the contrary, separate interest be not
checked, and be not directed to the public, we ought to look for nothing
but faction, disorder, and tyranny from such a government. In this
opinion I am justified by experience, as well as by the authority of
all philosophers and politicians, both ancient and modern.
How much, therefore, would it have surprised such a genius as Cicero or
Tacitus, to have been told, that in a future age there should arise a
very regular system of _mixed_ government, where the authority was so
distributed, that one rank, whenever it pleased, might swallow up all
the rest, and engross the whole power of the constitution! Such a
government, they would say, will not be a mixed government. For so great
is the natural ambition of men, that they are never satisfied with
power; and if one order of men, by pursuing its own interest, can usurp
upon every other order, it will certainly do so, and render itself, as
far as possible, absolute and uncontrollable.
But, in this opinion, experience shows they would have been mistaken.
For this is actually the case with the British constitution. The share
of power allotted by our constitution to the House of Commons, is so
great, that it absolutely commands all the other parts of the
government. The king's legislative power is plainly no proper check to
it. For though the king has a negative in framing laws, yet this, in
fact, is esteemed of so little moment, that whatever is voted by the two
Houses, is always sure to pass into a law, and the royal assent is
little better than a form. The principal weight of the crown lies in the
executive; power. But, besides that the executive power in every
government is altogether subordinate to the legislative; besides this, I
say, the exercise of this power requires an immense expense, and the
Commons have assumed to themselves the sole right of granting money. How
easy, therefore, would it be for that house to wrest from the crown all
these powers, one after another, by making every grant conditional, and
choosing their time so well, that their refusal of supply should only
distress the government, without giving foreign powers any advantage
over us! Did the House of Commons depend in the same manner upon the
king, and had none of the members any property but from his gift, would
not he command all their resolutions, and be from that moment absolute?
As to the House of Lords, they are a very powerful support to the crown,
so long as they are, in their turn, supported by it; but both experience
and reason show, that they have no force or authority sufficient to
maintain themselves alone, without such support.
How, therefore, shall we solve this paradox? And by what means is this
member of our constitution confined within the proper limits, since,
from our very constitution, it must necessarily have as much power as it
demands, and can only be confined by itself? How is this consistent with
our experience of human nature? I answer, that the interest of the body
is here restrained by that of the individuals, and that the House of
Commons stretches not its power, because such an usurpation would be
contrary to the interest of the majority of its members. The crown has
so many offices at its disposal, that, when assisted by the honest and
disinterested part of the House, it will always command the resolutions
of the whole, so far, at least, as to preserve the ancient constitution
from danger. We may, therefore, give to this influence what name we
please; we may call it by the invidious appellations of _corruption_ and
_dependence_; but some degree and some kind of it are inseparable from
the very nature of the constitution, and necessary to the preservation
of our mixed government.
Instead, then, of asserting absolutely, that the dependence of
parliament, in every degree, is an infringement of British liberty, the
country party should have made some concessions to their adversaries,
and have only examined what was the proper degree of this dependence,
beyond which it became dangerous to liberty. But such a moderation is
not to be expected in party men of any kind. After a concession of this
nature, all declamation must be abandoned; and a calm inquiry into the
proper degree of court influence and parliamentary dependence would have
been expected by the readers. And though the advantage, in such a
controversy, might possibly remain to the _country party_, yet the
victory would not be so complete as they wish for, nor would a true
patriot have given an entire loose to his zeal, for fear of running
matters into a contrary extreme, by diminishing too[2] far the
influence of the crown. It was, therefore, thought best to deny that
this extreme could ever be dangerous to the constitution, or that the
crown could ever have too little influence over members of parliament.
All questions concerning the proper medium between extremes are
difficult to be decided; both because it is not easy to find _words_
proper to fix this medium, and because the good and ill, in such cases,
run so gradually into each other, as even to render our _sentiments_
doubtful and uncertain. But there is a peculiar difficulty in the
present case, which would embarrass the most knowing and most impartial
examiner. The power of the crown is always lodged in a single person,
either king or minister; and as this person may have either a greater or
less degree of ambition, capacity, courage, popularity, or fortune, the
power, which is too great in one hand, may become too little in another.
In pure republics, where the authority is distributed among several
assemblies or senates, the checks and controls are more regular in their
operation; because the members of such numerous assemblies may be
presumed to be always nearly equal in capacity and virtue; and it is
only their number, riches, or authority, which enter into consideration.
But a limited monarchy admits not of any such stability; nor is it
possible to assign to the crown such a determinate degree of power, as
will, in every hand, form a proper counterbalance to the other parts of
the constitution. This is an unavoidable disadvantage, among the many
advantages attending that species of government.
[1] I have frequently observed, in comparing the conduct of the _court_
and _country_ party, that the former are commonly less assuming and
dogmatical in conversation, more apt to make concessions, and though
not, perhaps, more susceptible of conviction, yet more able to bear
contradiction than the latter, who are apt to fly out upon any
opposition, and to regard one as a mercenary, designing fellow, if he
argues with any coolness and impartiality, or makes any concessions to
their adversaries. This is a fact, which, I believe, every one may have
observed who has been much in companies where political questions have
been discussed; though, were one to ask the reason of this difference,
every party would be apt to assign a different reason. Gentlemen in the
_opposition_ will ascribe it to the very nature of their party, which,
being founded on public spirit, and a zeal for the constitution, cannot
easily endure such doctrines as are of pernicious consequence to
liberty. The courtiers, on the other hand, will be apt to put us in mind
of the clown mentioned by Lord Shaftesbury. 'A clown,' says that
excellent author, 'once took a fancy to hear the _Latin_ disputes of
doctors at an university. He was asked what pleasure he could take in
viewing such combatants, when he could never know so much as which of
the parties had the better.'--_'For that matter,'_ replied the clown,
_'I a'n't such a fool neither, but I can see who's the first that puts
t'other into a passion.'_ Nature herself dictated this lesson to the
clown, that he who had the better of the argument would be easy and well
humoured: but he who was unable to support his cause by reason would
naturally lose his temper, and grow violent.
To which of these reasons will we adhere? To neither of them, in my
opinion, unless we have a mind to enlist ourselves and become zealots in
either party. I believe I can assign the reason of this different
conduct of the two parties, without offending either. The country party
are plainly most popular at present, and perhaps have been so in most
administrations so that, being accustomed to prevail in company, they
cannot endure to hear their opinions controverted, but are so confident
on the public favour, as if they were supported in all their sentiments
by the most infallible demonstration. The courtiers, on the other hand,
are Commonly run down by your popular talkers, that if you speak to them
with any moderation, or make them the smallest concessions, they think
themselves extremely obliged to you, and are apt to return the favour by
a like moderation and facility on their part. To be furious and
passionate, they know, would only gain them the character of shameless
mercenaries, not that of zealous patriots, which is the character that
such a warm behaviour is apt to acquire to the other party.
In all controversies, we find, without regarding the truth or falsehood
on either side, that those who defend the established and popular
opinions are always most dogmatical and imperious in their style: while
their adversaries affect almost extraordinary gentleness and moderation,
in order to soften, as much as possible, any prejudices that may be
Against them. Consider the behaviour of our _Freethinkers_ of all
denominations, whether they be such as decry all revelation, or only
oppose the exorbitant power of the clergy, Collins, Tindal, Foster,
Hoadley. Compare their moderation and good manners with the furious zeal
and scurrility of their adversaries, and you will be convinced of the
truth of my observation. A like difference may be observed in the
conduct of those French writers, who maintained the controversy with
regard to ancient and modern learning. Boileau, Monsieur and Madame
Dacier, l'Abbé de Bos, who defended the party of the ancients, mixed
their reasonings with satire and invective, while Fontenelle, la Motte,
Charpentier, and even Perrault, never transgressed the bounds of
moderation and good breeding, though provoked by the most injurious
treatment of their adversaries.
I must however observe, that this remark with regard to the seeming
moderation of the _court_ party, is entirely confined to conversation,
and to gentlemen who have been engaged by interest or inclination in
that party. For as to the court writers, being commonly hired
scribblers, they are altogether as scurrilous as the mercenaries of the
other party: nor has the _Gazetteer_ any advantage, in this respect,
above common sense. A man of education will, in any party, discover
himself to be such by his goodbreeding and decency, as a scoundrel will
always betray the opposite qualities. _The false accusers accused_, &c.
is very scurrilous, though that side of the question, being least
popular, should be defended with most moderation. When L--d B--e, L--d
M--t, Mr. L--n, take the pen in hand, though they write with warmth,
they presume not upon their popularity so far as to transgress the
bounds of decency.
I am led into this train of reflection by considering some papers wrote
upon that grand topic of _court influence and parliamentary dependence_,
where, in my humble opinion, the country party show too rigid an
inflexibility, and too great a jealousy of making concessions to their
adversaries. Their reasonings lose their force by being carried too far
and the popularity of their opinions has seduced them to neglect in some
measure their justness and solidity. The following reasoning will, I
hope, serve to justify me in this opinion.
[2] By that _influence of the crown_, which I would justify, I mean only
that which arises from the offices and honours that are at the disposal
of the crown. As to private _bribery_, it may be considered in the same
light as the practice of employing spies, which is scarcely justifiable
in a good minister, and is infamous in a bad one; but to be a spy, or to
be corrupted, is always infamous under all ministers, and is to be
regarded as a shameless prostitution. Polybius justly esteems the
pecuniary influence of the senate and censors to be one of the regular
and constitutional weights which preserved the balance of the Roman
government.--Lib. vi. cap. 15.
WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INCLINES MORE TO ABSOLUTE MONARCHY OR TO
A REPUBLIC
It affords a violent prejudice against almost every science, that no
prudent man, however sure of his principles, dares prophesy concerning
any event, or foretell the remote consequences of things. A physician
will not venture to pronounce concerning the condition of his patient a
fortnight or a month after: and still less dares a politician foretell
the situation of public affairs a few years hence. Harrington thought
himself so sure of his general principle, _that the balance of power
depends on that of property_, that he ventured to pronounce it
impossible ever to reestablish monarchy in England: but his book was
scarcely published when the king was restored; and we see that monarchy
has ever since subsisted upon the same footing as before.
Notwithstanding this unlucky example, I will venture to examine an
important question, to wit, _Whether the British Government inclines
more to absolute monarchy or to a republic; and in which of these two
species of government it will most probably terminate?_ As there seems
not to be any great danger of a sudden revolution either way, I shall
at least escape the shame attending my temerity, if I should be found to
have been mistaken.
Those who assert that the balance of our government inclines towards
absolute monarchy, may support their opinion by the following reasons:
That property has a great influence on power cannot possibly be denied;
but yet the general maxim, _that the balance of the one depends on the
balance of the other_, must be received with several limitations. It is
evident, that much less property in a single hand will be able to
counterbalance a greater property in several; not only because it is
difficult to make many persons combine in the same views and measures,
but because property, when united, causes much greater dependence than
the same property when dispersed. A hundred persons of £1,000 a year
apiece, can consume all their income, and nobody shall ever be the
better for them, except their servants and tradesmen, who justly regard
their profits as the product of their own labour. But a man possessed of
£100,000 a year, if he has either any generosity or any cunning, may
create a great dependence by obligations, and still a greater by
expectations. Hence we may observe, that, in all free governments, any
subject exorbitantly rich has always created jealousy, even though his
riches bore no proportion to those of the state. Crassus's fortune, if I
remember well, amounted only to about two millions and a half of our
money; yet we find, that though his genius was nothing extraordinary,
he was able, by means of his riches alone, to counterbalance, during his
lifetime, the power of Pompey, as well as that of Cæsar, who afterwards
became master of the world. The wealth of the Medici made them masters
of Florence, though it is probable it was not considerable, compared to
the united property of that opulent republic.