ARRIVAL OF SMITH--HIS MARCH FROM THE RAILROAD--WHY HE
ARRIVED TOO LATE--OUR FEELINGS ON HIS ARRIVAL--THE
SITUATION THE MORNING AFTER THE BATTLE--WHAT SHOULD
HAVE BEEN DONE--SMITH STARTS FOR ST. JOSEPH--BURYING
THE DEAD AND CARING FOR THE WOUNDED--SCOTT'S OFFICIAL
REPORT--COMMENTS ON THE SAME--GALLANTRY OF SCOTT AND
LAKIN--OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE ENEMY--ESTIMATE OF HIS
FORCE--ACCOUNT IN THE MISSOURI REPUBLICAN--ACCOUNT IN
POLLARD'S FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR--THE NECESSITY AND
MERITS OF THE BATTLE.
Col. Smith's command arrived a little after sunset. He had left
Platte City at eight in the morning, and had taken a route so
circuitous that his men estimated the distance of the day's march
at twenty-six miles; whereas, it could have been accomplished in
fifteen. He had left Platte river bridge Sunday at nine in the
morning. It was seven miles further from that point to Liberty than
from Cameron. He had six hours the start of Colonel Scott in pursuit
of the rebels. He had plenty of transportation; we had to impress
ours. The roads were no more muddy with him than with us. In fact,
they were not muddy to any degree; only a little slippery, and by
noon of the next day were completely dry. He had twelve companies of
infantry, four pieces of cannon and one company of dragoons of the
regular army. He had left three companies of the Thirty-ninth Ohio to
guard the bridge. With this force he could not hesitate to follow
the enemy closely; but at no time did he get within a day's march of
his main force. He took a circuitous route, and bore so far to the
west that it has even been averred that he retreated from two o'clock
of one day till eight o'clock of the next, expecting that the enemy
was following him. It seems, however, that his system of scouts was
so poor (if indeed he had any at all), that he knew nothing of the
movements of the enemy's main body, and that the rebels' rear guard,
Childs' battalion of three hundred cavalry, led him around over the
country, while their infantry, artillery, and long wagon train of
plunder were making their escape. In this movement, Smith displayed
neither skill nor decision. No sufficient reason can be given why he
did not reach Liberty as soon as we, or, at least, soon enough to
co-operate with us.
It is impossible to tell with what feelings we thought of our being
compelled to fight the battle alone, and to suffer a defeat, which
might entail disgrace, because this officer had been so tardy in
his support. In this state of feeling, we clamored loudly and with
curses, to be led back against the enemy. But Colonel Smith decided
to defer a renewal of the attack till morning, and his exhausted
troops in the meantime took quarters in the court house and other
buildings.
Early in the morning, Lieut. Call and his men went forward to
reconnoiter. The field was abandoned. The enemy had crossed the
river and was out of our reach. But would we pursue to Lexington? We
understood that Price had besieged the garrison there with all his
forces. Smith was now without orders; but reason and duty pointed
to but one course; to march down the river and support Sturgis, who
was endeavoring to succor Mulligan. Had Smith known or acted upon
the simplest principle of defensive warfare, that forces concentrate
when threatened, he would not have hesitated at least in placing
himself in communication with that officer. But he took precisely the
opposite course. After spending most of the following day at Liberty,
his men in the meantime plundering and outraging the citizens, he
took up the march in the evening for St. Joseph, giving Scott an
additional piece of artillery of Schwartz's battery, under command of
a lieutenant, and leaving him under orders to return to Liberty as
soon as he had made dispositions for his wounded, at the same time
refusing him transportation to enable him to do so; thus, as we were
willing to believe, placing us between him and the enemy, while he
was making his shameful flight. Thus, while the enemy was making an
inroad into our territory and threatening all our detachments west of
St. Louis, he divided his small force and commenced the occupation of
the country from which a portion of the rebels had just retreated.
The privates in the ranks saw the stupidity of these movements at the
time; and it is a striking illustration of their patriotism that,
under such leadership, they were not thoroughly demoralized.
Our regiment spent the day after the battle in taking care of our
wounded and burying our dead. Most of the bodies of the dead were
brought from the field and buried in the public cemetery with
military honors. The building of the William Jewell College was
converted into a hospital for the use of our wounded. Dr. Cool, our
assistant surgeon, and Dr. ----, assistant surgeon of the Sixteenth,
were untiring in their efforts in behalf of the sufferers. The three
wounded men left in the hands of the enemy were taken across the
river by them, but procured next day by flag of truce. They reported
the rebel loss very severe, and the captain of the ferry boat
confirmed their statements. Other corroborative statements have since
been made, and all the evidence that can be gathered, including the
studied silence of the rebel official report on this point, tends to
convince us that such was the case.
The following is Colonel Scott's official report:
HEAD QUARTERS, 3d Reg. Iowa Volunteers, }
LIBERTY, Mo., Sept. 18th, 1861. }
S. D. STURGIS, BRIG. GEN. U. S. A.--_Sir_: In relation
to an affair of yesterday which occurred near Blue
Mills Landing, I have the honor to report:
Agreeably to your orders, I left Cameron at 3 o'clock,
P. M. of the 15th instant, and through a heavy rain and
bad roads, made but seven miles that afternoon. By a
very active march on the 16th I reached Centerville,
ten miles north of Liberty, by sunset, when the firing
of cannon was distinctly heard in the direction of
Platte City, which was surmised to be from Colonel
Smith's (Illinois 16th) command. Had sent a messenger
to Col. Smith, from Hainesville, and one from
Centerville, but got no response. On the 17th instant
at 2 A. M. I started from Centerville for Liberty, and
at daylight the advance guard fell in with the enemy's
pickets which they drove in and closely followed. At 7
A. M. my command bivouacked on the hill north of, and
overlooking the town. I dispatched several scouts to
examine the position of the enemy, but could gain no
definite information. They had passed through Liberty
during the afternoon of the 16th to the number of
about four thousand; had taken the road to Blue Mills
Landing, and were reported as having four pieces of
artillery. At 11 A. M., heard firing in the direction
of the Landing, which was reported as a conflict
between the rebels and forces disputing their passage
over the river. At 12 M. moved the command, consisting
of five hundred of the 3d Iowa, a squad of German
artillerists and about twenty Home Guards, in the
direction of Blue Mills Landing. On the route, learned
that a body of our scouts had fallen in with the
enemy's pickets and lost four killed and one wounded.
Before starting, dispatched a courier to Colonel Smith
to hasten his command.
About two miles from Liberty the advance guard drove
in the enemy's pickets, skirmishers closely examined
the dense growth through which our route lay, and at
3 P. M., discovered the enemy in force, concealed on
both sides of the wood, and occupying the dry bed of a
slough, left resting on the river, and right extending
beyond our observation. He opened a heavy fire which
drove back our skirmishers, and made simultaneous
attacks on our front and right. These were well
sustained, and he retired with loss to his position.
In the attack on our front the artillery suffered so
severely that our only piece, a brass six pounder,
was left without sufficient force to man it, and
I was only able to have it discharged twice during
the action. Some of the gunners abandoned the piece,
carrying off the matches and primer, and could not be
found.
The enemy kept up a heavy fire from his position--and
our artillery useless, and many of the officers and men
already disabled--it was deemed advisable to fall back,
which was done slowly, returning the enemy's fire and
completely checking pursuit.
The six pounder was brought off by hand, through the
gallantry of various officers of the Third Iowa, after
it had been completely abandoned by the artillerists.
The ammunition wagon becoming fastened between a
tree and a log in such a manner that it could not be
released without serious loss, was abandoned. The
engagement lasted one hour, and was sustained by my
command with an intrepidity that merits my warmest
approbation.
I have to regret the loss of many brave officers and
men, who fell gallantly fighting at their posts. I
refer to the enclosed list of killed and wounded as a
part of this report.
The heaviest loss was sustained by Company I, Third
Iowa Volunteers, which lost four killed and twenty
wounded, being one-fourth of our total loss. This
company deserves especial mention. Captain Trumbull,
assisted by Lieut. Crosley of Company E, brought off
the gun by hand under a heavy fire. Major Stone,
Captains Warren, Willet and O'Niel were severely
wounded, and also Lieutenants Hobbs, Anderson and
Knight. The latter refused to retire from the field
after being three times wounded, and remained with his
men till the close of the engagement. Among the great
number who deserve my thanks for their gallantry, I
mention Sergeant James H. Lakin of Company F, Third
Iowa, who bore the colors, and carried them through
the fight with all the coolness of a veteran. The loss
of the enemy can not be certainly ascertained; but
from accounts deemed reliable, it is not less than one
hundred and sixty, many of whom were killed. His total
force was about four thousand four hundred.
Your most obedient servant,
(Signed) JOHN SCOTT
Lt. Col. 3d Iowa Volunteers, Comdg.
This report was written the day after the battle, under very
harassing circumstances, and before any written reports of
subordinates could be received. Leaving out some slight inaccuracies
on points which could not be thoroughly investigated then, it
reflects very closely the impression of the affair most of us had at
the time.
I think it was nearly two o'clock when we moved from Liberty to
the attack, and that the action did not commence before four. The
manner in which he mentions the officers is both truthful and just.
Captain Trumbull and Lieutenants Knight and Crosley attracted the
attention of all by their gallantry. Major Stone returned to the
field as soon as his wound was dressed, and kept with us during
the remainder of the action. I think the report should also have
mentioned Sergeant Abernethy, who commanded the twelve skirmishers
that commenced the battle, four of whom were wounded, and who was
one of the first to follow Captain Trumbull in dragging off the
cannon. I am personally knowing to the fact, that the German sergeant
who commanded the gun assisted in dragging it off. I do not believe
that any of the published accounts of this action do justice to those
German artillerists. They were almost recruits, they and their horses
untrained. They were ordered to take the position so far in advance
that they were within buckshot range of the enemy. The road was so
narrow, that with their untamed and fractious horses, it was almost
impossible to get their gun in position at all. It was stated by men
who say they saw it, that the man who had the primer was shot, and
staggering fell dead several yards in advance of the piece. Their
post was in the road where they could not seek shelter. Here they
stood till many of their horses and half their number were shot down.
Who could expect more, or be surprised if, under these circumstances,
some of them were appalled. I only blame some of them, including
their sergeant, for drinking whisky several times out of a pint
bottle on their way from Liberty.
Colonel Scott refrained from mentioning more fully the gallantry of
the enlisted men, from a sense of delicacy in saying too much on a
subject in which he might be supposed to be personally interested.
When the battle was well over, and we began to distribute, comrade to
comrade, his proper meed of praise or blame, two names were mentioned
by every tongue, and with an enthusiasm which amounted almost to
idolatry; Scott, who led his men into the fight and followed them
out, and upon whom, riding nearest the enemy, all eyes were turned
so often with the expectation of seeing him fall; and Lakin, who
bore the colors so bravely; totally heedless of his own safety,
but thinking only of duty; keeping the flag all the while near the
Colonel, and calling upon his comrades to stand by it. Scott's horse
was hit several times, and several balls went through his clothes.
Eight balls went through the flag in the hands of Lakin, and a ninth
one struck the staff. It seemed half a miracle that, while so many
fell in places less exposed, these two, all the while in sight of the
enemy, escaped unhurt.
The following is the official report of the enemy:--
LEXINGTON, Sept. 21st, 1861.
GENERAL PRICE,--_Sir_: In pursuance of your orders
I left this place on the 15th inst., and proceeded
forthwith to Liberty, Clay county, Missouri, where I
met the State Guard on the march from the northwest,
one regiment of infantry under command of Colonel
Saunders, and one regiment of cavalry under command
of Colonel Wilfley of the Fifth District, and one
regiment of infantry under command of Colonel Jeff
Patton, and one battalion of cavalry under command of
Colonel Childs of the Fourth District. I delivered
your orders to the above commands to hasten to this
point (Lexington) with as much dispatch as possible.
They marched forthwith and reached the Missouri river
about four o'clock in the evening, when Colonel Boyd's
artillery and battalion and baggage were crossed to
the south side, where he took position, Captain Kelly
planting his artillery so as completely to command
the river. The crossing continued all night without
interruption, every officer and man using his best
exertions. We received news during the night that the
enemy would be in the town of Liberty, about six miles
from Blue Mills Ferry, at an early hour the ensuing
morning. We were crossing in three small flats, and
much time was necessary to move the large train of a
hundred wagons. Colonel Childs with his command had
taken post for the night about two miles from Liberty
on the road to the ferry. Here he engaged the enemy's
advance or pickets, killing four and wounding one, with
no loss on our side. The enemy then fled, and we heard
no more of them until three or four o'clock, when their
approach was announced in large force, supposed to be
nine hundred men with one piece of artillery, a six
pounder. The men of our command immediately formed,
Colonel Jeff Patton leading the advance, to meet the
enemy. After proceeding about three miles from the
river, they met the advance guard of the enemy and
the fight commenced. But the Federal troops almost
immediately fled, our men pursuing rapidly, shooting
them down until they annihilated the rear of their
army, taking one caisson, killing about sixty men, and
wounding, it is said, about seventy. The Federal troops
attempted two or three times to make a stand, but ran
after delivering one fire. Our men followed them like
hounds in a wolf chase, strewing the road with dead and
wounded, until compelled to give over the chase from
exhaustion, the evening being very warm.
Colonel Saunders, Colonel Patton, Colonel Childs,
Colonel Caudiff, Colonel Wilfley, Major Grease,
Adjutant Shackleford, and all other officers and men
so far as I know or could learn, behaved gallantly.
R. D. ATCHISON.
This report is doubtless a second-hand affair. Prisoners since
captured informed us that General Atchison was not in the battle at
all--but on the south side of the river; that the battle was fought
by Colonel Saunders against his orders, for which this officer was
court martialed, but acquitted. If we accept certain assertions known
to be false, and make due allowance for the bombastic style of this
report, and the border ruffian proclivities of its author, it speaks
louder for us than anything else can. It confesses the rebel force to
have been three regiments, two of infantry under Saunders and Patton,
and one of cavalry under Wilfley; and two battalions, one of cavalry
under Childs, and one (the arm not given) under Boyd, and one battery
under Kelly; which being just recruited and with full ranks, could
not have fallen far short of four thousand men.
The following account of Blue Mills is from the _St. Louis
Republican_:
"The rebel forces under Patton, numbering some four thousand five
hundred, evacuated St. Joseph on the 12th September, and retreated in
the direction of Lexington. On the succeeding Monday, an expedition
under Lieut. Col. Scott, left Cameron on the Hannibal & St. Joseph
Railroad with orders to co-operate with Col. Smith in the pursuit of
the secession soldiers.
"The column of Lieut. Col. Scott was composed of five hundred men
of the Iowa Third Regiment, a small detachment of Home Guards, and
artillerists to work one gun, making five hundred and seventy in the
aggregate. Simultaneously with the movements of these troops from
Cameron, Colonel Smith of the Illinois Sixteenth, with two companies
of Colonel Groesbeck's Thirty-ninth Ohio and four pieces, left St.
Joseph. Both columns were ordered to Liberty, there to effect a
junction and combine their forces. Lieut. Col. Scott, it appears,
reached Liberty on the 17th inst., at 7 o'clock in the morning, and
waited for the arrival of Colonel Smith until one o'clock in the
afternoon. The latter not having got up, Colonel Scott sent back a
messenger, stating that he would push forward after the enemy, whose
camp was about five miles distant, which was accordingly done. Boyd
and Patton with, as we stated, about four thousand five hundred men,
were occupying a position in a thicket near Blue Mills Landing. The
following statement is furnished of what transpired:
"Our skirmishers received a galling fire and slowly retired to the
main body, when the action became general. Our six pounder was
brought to bear on the enemy, and two shots fired which proved
destructive. At this time a heavy fire was opened upon our single
gun, killing one gunner and wounding two others. On this, several
of the remaining gunners (Germans), abandoned their gun, carrying
off the primer and fuses, rendering the piece useless. The action
continued for an hour, when the column was slowly withdrawn, bringing
off the wounded and dragging away the gun by hand--all the horses
having been killed or badly wounded. In addition to the loss of the
Third Iowa, there were six Home Guards and one artillery man killed.
Four of these Home Guards were killed in a skirmish about two hours
before the battle. Three of the missing are supposed to be in the
hands of the enemy and the balance killed.
"It seems that Colonel Smith, owing to the heavy rains and consequent
bad roads, had been greatly delayed on the route, and his failure
to join Lieut. Col. Scott is attributable to these causes. On the
receipt, however, of Col. Scott's message, he immediately ordered
his cavalry and mounted men to the front, and took them forward
at a rapid pace. On his arrival at Liberty after dark, he found
Scott there after having been repulsed by overwhelming numbers of
the enemy. The men were exhausted, and as the enemy were reported
strongly intrenched, it was resolved to postpone an attack until
morning. Lieut. Col. Wilson reached Liberty with the infantry two
hours after Colonel Smith.
"Early on the following morning, the 18th, the combined forces
moved forward; but, on reaching Blue Mills Landing, found that the
rebels had crossed the river and eluded them, the last detachment
having gone over at two o'clock in the morning. They had been two
days taking their baggage and stores across, and with a ferry boat
and three flats found it comparatively easy to take their men over,
especially as the Missouri is quite narrow at that point. Thus
Boyd, Patton, and their army escaped. The loss of the rebels in the
engagement of the 17th is not known. But from the desperation with
which the Iowa boys fought, it must have been considerable. It seems
that these soldiers had been somewhat chagrined at what was termed
their flight at Shelbina, although that retreat was reluctant and
under orders. They determined on the first opportunity to show that
they were not cowards, and this feeling it was, doubtless, that
actuated Lieut. Col. Scott to push forward without waiting for Col.
Smith's column. It was not of course intended that either command was
to attack the vastly superior force of the enemy unsupported; and
in this respect the conduct of Lieut. Col. Scott was unauthorized,
though we do not hear of any disposition to attach any blame to him.
His object, seeing that the enemy was making preparations to cross
the river, was probably to draw him out and retreat before him in
expectation of meeting a timely reinforcement from Col. Smith. It
appears that Col. Smith left St. Joseph previous to the receipt of
the full orders which were for him, after the contemplated cutting
off of Boyd and Patton from Lexington, to move on himself to the
latter place. These directions reaching St. Joseph subsequent to
Col. Smith's departure, were sent after him by a mounted officer,
who returned without having overtaken Col. Smith, and consequently
without having delivered his orders. The reader, therefore, who
has supposed that Col. Smith had moved to join Col. Mulligan, at
Lexington, will be disappointed to learn that in his report to
General Pope, he speaks of being about to return to St. Joseph."
As this book is intended to be an amusement to my comrades, I give
the version of our first battle which I find in a book entitled _The
First Year of the War_, written by one of the most distinguished
men of the South, Edward A. Pollard, of Richmond, author of _Black
Diamonds_, and editor of the _Richmond Examiner_. I give it out of
curiosity, and to illustrate what complete falsehood and nonsense may
sometimes be dignified by the name of history:
"Gen. Price was informed that four thousand men under Lane and
Montgomery were advancing from the direction of St. Joseph on the
north side of the Missouri river, and Gen. Sturgis, with fifteen
hundred cavalry was also advancing from the Hannibal and St. Joseph
Railroad for the purpose of relieving the forces under Mulligan.
About twenty-five hundred Missourians under the immediate command of
Colonel Saunders, were, at the same time hurrying to the aid of Gen.
Price from the same direction with the Lane and Montgomery jayhawks;
and having reached Blue Mills, thirty miles above Lexington, on
the 17th of September, crossed over their force, except some five
hundred men, in a ferry-boat. While the remainder were waiting to
cross over, the jayhawkers attacked the five hundred Missourians on
the north bank of the river. The battle raged fiercely for one hour
on the river bottom, which was heavily timbered and in many places
covered with water. The Missourians were armed with only shotguns and
rifles, and taken by surprise: no time was given them to call back
any portion of their force on the south side of the river; but they
were from the counties contiguous to Kansas, accustomed in the border
wars since 1854 to almost monthly fights with the Kansas jayhawkers
under Lane, and were fired with the most intense hatred of him and
of them. Gen. D. R. Atchison, former President of the United States
Senate, and well known as one of the boldest leaders of the State
Rights party in Missouri, had been sent from Lexington to hasten them
on to his camp. He was with the five hundred, on the north side of
the river when they were attacked, and by his presence and example
cheered them on in the conflict. Charging the jayhawkers with shouts
of almost savage ferocity, and fighting with reckless valor, the
Missourians drove the enemy back ten miles, the conflict becoming a
hand to hand fight between detached parties on both sides. At length,
being unable to support the fearful fire of the Missourians at the
short distance of forty yards, the enemy broke into open flight. The
loss of the jayhawkers was very considerable. Their official report
admitted one hundred and fifty killed and some two hundred wounded.
The entire loss of the Missourians was five killed and twenty
wounded. The intelligence of this brilliant victory of the 'five
hundred' was received with shouts of acclamation by Price's army at
Lexington."
And now, should we approve Blue Mills? I answer unhesitatingly,
yes. Some have pronounced it a piece of unpardonable rashness. But
one more glance at the situation; the enemy crossing the river;
every reason for believing there was a diversion on the other side;
the absolute duty of co-operating with it; the certainty that in
this event his forces would be divided by the river; the almost
certain nearness of support; the consciousness that to attack,
though defeated by overwhelming numbers, would be honorable, and
that to fail to do so on any pretext would be a disgrace; these
were the motives which decided Scott. Who but a coward would have
done differently? But what is more, Scott well knew, as most of his
officers and men afterwards confessed, that, after Kirksville and
Shelbina, to allow this opportunity of a battle to pass, would have
thrown the regiment into a state of demoralization. But I will not
seek further to justify an act of which scarcely a man complained.
All felt that the battle was a necessity, and that the only one to
blame was the hesitating, halting commander who had left us to fight
it without support.
I am not disposed to attempt criticism on the tactical mistakes
committed on our side. It is easy to criticise the best dispositions
when the battle is over. The mistake which drew us into the enemy's
ambuscade in column was owing as much to his skill in removing early
his rear guard and pickets, and posting his men completely out of
observation, as to the fault of Col. Scott in not sooner deploying
the column and keeping his skirmishers farther in advance. When once
there, the situation called forth the highest powers of a commander.
All that Scott could do by word or example, he did. Nothing less
than the conduct he displayed could have induced his men to bear
the disaster so bravely. It is no exaggeration to say that his
resolution, in making the attack, and his conduct during the action,
won for him the devoted admiration of the regiment.
Such was our first battle; undertaken through a lofty sense of
honor and a loftier sense of duty, against eight times our number;
beginning in mistake, sustained with desperation, ending in retreat;
a martyrdom to public opinion, and vindication of character, a
victory under the name of defeat.