COL. SMITH WITH HIS OWN REGIMENT AND FIVE COMPANIES
OF THE THIRTY-NINTH OHIO PROCEEDS WEST TO PLATTE
RIVER BRIDGE, AND COMMENCES REPAIRING IT--COL.
SCOTT IS ORDERED TO CO-OPERATE WITH HIM AGAINST THE
REBELS IN THAT VICINITY--WE PROCEED TO CAMERON BY
RAILROAD, IMPRESS TRANSPORTATION AND MARCH TOWARD
LIBERTY--THE FIRST NIGHT--SECOND DAY'S MARCH--SECOND
NIGHT AT CENTERVILLE--CANNONADING IN THE DISTANCE--OUR
FEELINGS--LIEUT. CALL RECONNOITERS AS FAR AS
LIBERTY--WE MOVE AT 3 A. M.--AT SUNRISE DRIVE BACK THE
ENEMY'S PICKETS AND CAMP AT LIBERTY--NO TIDINGS FROM
SMITH--CANNONADING IN THE DIRECTION OF INDEPENDENCE,
AND PROBABILITIES OF AN ENGAGEMENT ACROSS THE
RIVER--COL. SCOTT RESOLVES TO ATTACK.
BATTLE OF BLUE MILLS LANDING.
We expected that the troops now under these two generals would be
directed in pursuit of Green. In this we were disappointed. There
were now far more important movements on foot, but of which we could
conjecture nothing. Both the Sixteenth Illinois and the detachment
of the Thirty-ninth Ohio were sent west under Smith. This seemed
a little strange; but in reality it was not at all so; for we had
already learned that the enemy had captured St. Joseph, and we had
just received intelligence of the Platte river bridge tragedy with
which the country is familiar. The Twenty-seventh Ohio and the
additional five companies of the Thirty-ninth Ohio arrived by way
of the North Missouri Railroad, and, under Sturgis, proceeded west
as far as Utica, when leaving the railroad, they moved south toward
Lexington. I have been unable to ascertain the orders under which
these columns moved. There is a chaos about the loss of Lexington,
out of which it is scarcely possible to bring any thing tangible or
intelligible. It seems, however, that General Pope had control of
the movements designed to reinforce that garrison from the north,
and that General Sturgis was under his command. Be this as it may,
the dispositions were faulty in the extreme. It seems that the Union
Guards designed reinforcing Mulligan from the line of the Hannibal
and St. Joseph Railroad, and, at the same time, driving out the
rebels from the vicinity of St. Joseph. Col. Smith, whom we supposed
sent to effect the latter purpose, proceeded as far west as Platte
river bridge, nine miles from St. Joseph, and commenced repairing
it. Why he did not proceed against the enemy is inexplicable. If his
force was insufficient, why was our regiment still lying at Macon?
Above all, why were these movements delayed a day when Lexington was
in such peril? Such questions will ever recur to us when we remember
what an annoyance the operations of the western army received in
the surrender of that garrison. The rebels began to retreat from
the vicinity of St. Joseph, and what then? Why, it was now time to
organize pursuit!
For this purpose, the Third Iowa was to go west and co-operate with
Smith. On the morning of September 15th, Colonel Scott received
orders to this effect, and, in less than two hours those of the
regiment who were able to endure a forced march were aboard a
train of cars and proceeding rapidly toward the west. The Colonel
compelled many partially ill or convalescent, who wished to join in
the movement, to remain behind; because he expected to perform rapid
marches, and did not wish to be embarrassed by straggling.
At 1 P. M. we arrived at Cameron, a station about forty miles east
of St. Joseph, and got our effects off the train. Here we heard the
first rumors of Price's movements, and began to have glimpses of what
was before us. Colonel Scott's orders from General Sturgis were to
leave the railroad at Cameron, march upon Liberty, act against the
rebels and co-operate with Smith. The plan seems to have been that
Smith and Scott should unite at Liberty, defeat the St. Joseph rebels
and capture their immense train before they could cross the Missouri;
and then, following them down the north bank of that stream, unite
with Sturgis, who would then be able to appear before Lexington in
such force as to raise the siege. It is easy to see wherein this plan
was defective. It involved, first, a division of our forces in the
presence of an enemy who was numerically our superior; and, secondly,
the accomplishing of two objects almost simultaneously when the whole
force should have been concentrated for the accomplishment of the
main one, the relief of Mulligan. As will be shown in the following
pages, the faults in executing were not less than those in planning,
and the whole thing was a total and disgraceful failure, relieved
only by two bright tints of glory, the heroism of Mulligan at
Lexington and of Scott at Blue Mills. In justice to Colonel Smith,
however, it is proper to state here, that, as will be seen by the
_St. Louis Republican's_ account, given in the next chapter, orders
to proceed to Lexington, after cutting off Boyd and Patton, did not
reach him at all.
We were not long getting our baggage and effects off the cars. But
how were we to move without transportation? Colonel Smith had taken
our wagons from us on a previous occasion, and still had them.
Colonel Scott, with his characteristic energy, set himself to work
to solve this problem. Before the men had got their dinners, he had
put into requisition several teams belonging to citizens, on which we
loaded our subsistence and the few cooking utensils we took along. We
were joined by a detachment of Captain Schwartz's Missouri Battery,
fourteen men and a six pounder, under command of a sergeant.
At three o'clock, we began to move. It had been raining slowly since
noon; but, though the roads were slippery, the mud was not deep, and
the wagons and artillery proceeded without difficulty. After a steady
march of seven miles, we bivouacked on an open meadow. It continued
to drizzle slowly till sunset, and finally the wind rose in the
northwest, damp and raw, which rendered the night very comfortless.
The common ration of food being found insufficient to satisfy our
hunger, Colonel Scott humanely and wisely ordered extra issues to be
made.
The march was resumed at an early hour. The scenery through which we
passed this day was sufficiently pleasing to repay even the toils
of the tiresome march. The day was clear and warm, and by noon the
roads were quite dry. We halted for dinner and rest at the small town
of Hainesville. As will be seen by Colonel Scott's official report,
it was from this point that he sent his first messenger to Smith.
[What became of these messengers? Were they captured by the enemy? Or
were they too timid to go far? To suppose that they were unable to
find Colonel Smith would be preposterous.]
After a short rest, we resumed the march, and arrived at Centerville
at sunset. We had scarcely stacked arms, when we heard toward the
west the firing of cannon. Every pulse beat quicker. There was not
a man who did not listen with interest. Every jar seemed an earnest
of something to come. Each seemed to tell of human passions broke
loose, of men turned demons, of carnage and of death. There was to
us a strange romance in those sounds. We rejoiced; for we knew that
in that direction were both friends and foes. That the latter were
there, gave us a double joy. We would meet them, and wipe out the
unjust reproach of Shelbina. We would show the country, that under
a brave leader, we were no cowards. We would make good our promises
to our friends and loved ones at home. We would earn the right to be
called comrades of the gallant men who fought at Springfield. The
fact that friends were there, gave us the assurance that we should
not meet the enemy alone and without hope of success.
We found Centerville almost entirely deserted. The inhabitants were
rebels. They had heard of our approach and fled. Nothing belonging
to them, however, was disturbed except their henroosts. It requires
no more than the teachings of ordinary experience to show that pilot
bread and fat bacon will not support great fatigue. The country
through which we passed supplied us in a measure with what our
commissariat lacked. No one went beyond the bounds of reason, and
the people were surprised that we took so little. Thus every man
had plenty of good food; his blood flowed vigorously; and what,
under other circumstances, would have cost him great fatigue, he now
endured with comparative ease.
Colonel Scott sent another messenger to Smith, and Lieut. Call
reconnoitered as far as Liberty. He reported the enemy marching
through that place. This was sufficient to determine Scott. The sound
of Madison's guns convinced him that the enemy was closely pursued.
He was determined, that, if decisive results were not attained, it
should not be through any fault of his.
Accordingly the drums beat reveille at two o'clock. We breakfasted
hastily, and at three the column was in motion. There was an
inspiration in this hurried march which the memory loves to recall.
Colonel Scott since said in a private letter, "My impression at this
moment of the proudest conduct of the old Third runs me back to
the morning of Sept. 17th, '61, driving in the rebel pickets, and,
with the eye of an eagle and the tread of a wild stag, closing up
that heavy march and advancing upon Liberty, in the expectation of
meeting thousands of rebels at any moment." At sunrise we came in
sight of Liberty. There were indeed enemies at hand, but no friends.
Lieut. Call drove the whole rebel pickets through the town, and we
bivouacked on the hill overlooking it from the north. But where was
Smith? Colonel Scott could not suppose that his last messenger had
not reached him. He accordingly waited with great impatience for his
arrival. Nine o'clock--ten--twelve; but no tidings from him.
On the other hand, we heard the firing of cannon in the direction
of Independence. This led us to believe that troops from the other
side of the Missouri were engaging the enemy while he was attempting
to cross. Colonel Scott seems to have been convinced on this point;
for it had been his understanding before leaving the railroad, that
troops from Kansas City were to co-operate. There was no mistaking
the sounds. Six discharges were heard, loud and distinct. Besides,
citizens actually reported that a fight was taking place on the other
side of the river. This left it impossible for Colonel Scott to doubt
that such was the case. He was, then, governed by two considerations:
_First_, our friends were engaging the enemy and needed assistance.
To hesitate or delay could not receive too much reproach. _Second_,
if the enemy was not entirely across, he was divided by the river.
Thus it was not only an absolute duty to attack at all hazards;
but, in doing so, it was probable that he would be able to strike
a decisive blow. Nevertheless, it was plain to see, that the
undertaking involved great hazard. The lowest reports of the citizens
placed the enemy's force at 3,000 men, with three pieces of cannon.
Universally hostile to us, and chagrined that their friends had fled
before so small a force, it is reasonable to suppose that they
represented his numbers less than they really were. But Colonel Scott
accepted the hazard and determined to attack without delay. It was a
resolution worthy of our old commander, and every soldier rejoiced to
join in executing it.
This was between the hours of one and two. Colonel Scott started a
messenger to Smith, and ordered the men to fall in. In a few minutes
the regiment was marching through the town, keeping a buoyant tread
to martial notes that had never sounded so sweetly before. The
people, mostly ladies--for there were few men to be seen--gathered
upon the street corners and watched us as we passed. We were marching
to attack their sons and brothers, and yet in our enthusiasm,
we thought we could see a gleam of admiration in their eyes. We
subsequently learned that we were not deceived. We almost fancied we
heard them murmur; "Those are five thousand; these, five hundred. Ah,
how great the odds! Brave men! with what a tread they march forward
to slaughter and defeat! But they are enemies, and it must be so."
I can imagine, too, the feelings of Colonel Scott, as he rode at the
head of these devoted men. I believe he recognized in the coming
hour not only duty but glory. There are moments in men's lives
when a vigorous blow seems to revolutionize their destiny. The man
who watches for these moments, who hails them in the distance, who
recognizes them when they arrive, and who then strikes, may almost be
said to be master of his fortune. It is given to few men to command
a force, acting independently against an enemy, when there is an
opportunity to strike a decisive blow. Colonel Scott, then, doubtless
recognized this as his hour of destiny. And such it was; for though
success might not attend the blow, a failure to strike quickly would
bring upon him the imputation of cowardice, and consign his name to
irreparable disgrace. His force was small; but to each man the hazard
was no less, than if they were a hundred thousand. Besides, it was at
a period of the war when we had not begun to fight great battles; but
when small successes made generals, and gave opportunity for greater
ones. It must have been an anxious hour to Scott. But he was equal to
it, and rode on, cool and firm as a Roman.
Lieut. Call with his mounted Missourians had the advance. They
encountered the enemy's pickets about two miles from Liberty, drove
them in and closely followed them. Anticipating this, his rearguard,
a battalion of cavalry under Colonel Childs, ambushed themselves in
a ravine behind a dense thicket, having previously picketed their
horses in the rear, and awaited their approach. The Lieutenant and
his party rode almost on to the muzzles of their guns, when the
rebels discovered themselves by a simultaneous volley, which emptied
five saddles, killing four men instantly and wounding a fifth. What
was to be done? The enemy was dismounted and posted. The Home Guards
had no sabers, only muskets, and could not charge. It was a trying
moment; but they fully vindicated their courage. Not a man drew rein
to retreat. They returned the fire, and only retired at the command
of Lieut. Call. In this encounter, Capt. Cupp of the Home Guards was
killed. Capt. Hawk was also wounded in such a manner that it seemed
half a miracle that it did not kill him. A ball struck him full on
the corner of the forehead, but by some means glanced, and spared the
gallant Captain's life. This affair won for Lieut. Call's Home Guards
our highest respect; for it taught us that they were brave men.
The four ghastly bodies, as we passed them, were visible presages of
what was to come. Near the scene of this occurrence, Colonel Scott
halted the battalion, and brought it to a front. He ordered us to
inspect our ammunition, and untie the bunches in the lower partition
of our boxes. He then gave the command to load, and rode along the
line cautioning the men to be steady and fire low. He caused the
artillery to take position in the center of the column, and a company
of infantry to be deployed forward as skirmishers. He ordered the
mounted men to bring up the rear as a reserve.
These dispositions being made, the column continued to advance. It
will be remembered that, at this point, we were perhaps half way
between Liberty and Blue Mills Landing; two miles from either place.
We were in a wooded bottom which continued to the river, interrupted
by one or two small corn-fields. The timber was very dense, and the
fallen trees and tangled vines rendered it almost impenetrable. It
would be impossible for a battalion deployed in line to advance
through it with any degree of rapidity or order. This induced Colonel
Scott to keep the battalion marching by the flank in the road, and to
trust to the skirmishers to discover the enemy in time to allow him
to make dispositions to attack him. Thus, making frequent halts to
relieve the skirmishers with fresh companies, we felt our slow way
forward.
That the character of the ground in a manner compelled us to advance
thus, proved to be the chief misfortune of the day. We however
reached a point before finding the enemy, that presented a favorable
opportunity for preventing this. The road on which we advanced led
north and south. We came to a square corn field lying to the left
of the road and bordering upon it. On the south side of this field
came a heavily traveled road from the east, entering the one on
which we were marching at right angles. On the right of the north
and south road and about three rods from it, ran parallel to it a
slough several rods in width, unobstructed save by occasional logs,
and, at this time, dry. We were now not more than a mile from the
river, General Atchison's report to the contrary, notwithstanding.
The enemy was between us and the river, if he had not crossed; and
being so near, it was time to begin to proceed with greater caution.
I have always believed that the Colonel's greatest mistake was in
not forming line here, where the ground presented so favorable an
opportunity, and advancing cautiously thus, the cannon in the road,
and the skirmishers well in advance. But this is only the opinion of
a soldier, given after the battle is over. Probably no one knew what
to do _then_ better than Colonel Scott; and when it was over, no one
knew what should have been done better than he.
As it was, the column halted and the skirmishers now in advance were
relieved by Company B, Captain Long, which was deployed forward
on the left of the road, and by twelve men of Company F, under
First Sergeant Abernethy, who were deployed forward on the right of
the road in the dry slough. Company I was now in the lead of the
battalion, next the artillery, and then Company F, followed by the
other companies. In this order the column again advanced, with no
signs of the enemy until Captain Long is said to have reported from
the line of skirmishers that he could hear the enemy advancing, their
officers giving commands, and the ground shaking with their tread.
For some reason, the Colonel paid no heed to this report, but rode
very coolly on, cautioning the skirmishers not to get too far ahead.
The enemy was indeed advancing, and the skirmishers were not more
than twelve rods beyond the head of the column.
All at once, we heard a few sharp reports, and then a deafening crash
of musketry. It was on the right in front of Sergeant Abernethy's
skirmishers. They had unmasked the enemy and opened fire upon him,
and with what fury he was returning it! Brave comrades! we knew that
they were suffering, but we had scarcely time to think of them before
the firing became general, and the enemy's balls flew thick and fast
along the entire length of the column. The situation was disastrous
in the extreme. It did not require a second thought to comprehend it.
While marching to attack the enemy, he had ambushed us and attacked
us in column. All that we could now do was to make the best of a
desperate situation. The men moved quickly to the right and left
without regard to their positions in ranks, concealed themselves as
best they could, and began to return the enemy's fire.
Colonel Scott immediately ordered the cannon forward. It was brought
forward a short distance, got into position and fired two discharges
of canister, which are said to have done great execution. This is
doubtless the case; for the rebels were almost under its muzzle. But
they opened upon the artillerists with rifles and shot guns--for they
were within buckshot range--and in a few moments disabled several of
their horses and killed and wounded half the squad. Soon after this,
the Colonel is said to have given the order to "fall back a little."
If such an order was given, it was intended only for those who had
got too far in advance, and was heard by few and heeded by none.
The enemy began to push a column past our right; but this proved a
disastrous attempt; for, being exposed to the fire of our entire
column across the slough, it was soon scattered and beaten back.
Company I was particularly prominent in this. Colonel Scott put forth
every effort to bring the companies into line parallel with that of
the enemy; but the men could not be brought out of the confusion,
and in the noise, the commands could not be heard. But he himself
resolutely kept the extreme advance, and his example was almost worth
a battalion of reinforcements.
Every moment matters grew worse. Out of sixteen commissioned officers
ten had fallen. The cannon was totally disabled. The enemy, though
he had been checked in his charges on our front, and in his attempt
to flank our right, had fallen back to his cover, and his bullets
rained as thickly as at first. We began to give back slowly, keeping
up an unabated fire, and carrying off our wounded. Only three
wounded men were left on the field. We, the men, evidently thought
that it was "advisable to fall back." But we had no orders to this
effect,--at least, none that many of us heard, though a dozen might
have been given. We were simply repulsed; driven out of the woods
perforce; compelled to get out of the enemy's ambuscade or stand
where we were and be shot down to no purpose. If orders to retreat
were not given, they should have been. The enemy's long line, masked
in a dry ravine, extended around us in the shape of a crescent, and
we were exposed to a concentrated fire from its center and both
flanks. Under the circumstances, we did the bravest thing possible;
we retired slowly, disputing the enemy's advance. Our caisson had
got clogged between two trees, and, as most of its horses were shot
down, and the enemy pressing upon it, we were compelled to abandon
it. But the cannon must be saved. Captain Trumbull waved his sword,
and called on the men around him to help drag it off. As many seized
hold of it as could, including Lieut. Crosley, Sergeant Abernethy,
and the sergeant who commanded the artillery squad. It was with great
difficulty that it was got away, and three men were shot while hold
of it.
Colonel Scott who had been in the advance during the fight, was still
nearest the enemy in the retreat. Two or three times he endeavored,
but without success, to re-form the regiment before getting out of
the timber. These efforts sadly demonstrated the advantages accruing
in battle from good discipline among troops. We had been too little
accustomed to implicit obedience of orders, and the tyrannical
conduct of Colonel Williams had exerted a bad influence on us in this
respect. Under the Colonel's direction, however, a number of men,
mostly members of Companies E and F, rallied; these to the flag,
their Company's colors, presented to them by the ladies of Fayette
county, Iowa, and now borne by the gallant Lakin, one of their
number; those to their former captain, Scott, who lingered near the
enemy, so loth was he to give up the field. They formed a platoon
across the road and drove back the enemy's cavalry which attempted to
charge our rear in pursuit.
As soon as we reached the open ground, the battalion was again
formed. It was now nearly night. The enemy would not attack us on
open ground, and we would not venture to attack him again in his
ambuscade. Accordingly we began to retire toward Liberty. We soon met
Colonel Smith's advance of mounted men. A brief consultation ensued,
and then the march was resumed, and we soon reached our camp on the
hill, where we had bivouacked in the morning.